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The thesis considers aspects of British perceptions,
images and attitudes towards war and defence, and certain key
persons who presented them to the public, approximately from
1866 to 1906.	 It is concerned primarily with leading civi-
lian artists and writers on war and defence, and with the
message and images presented by the press, books and pictures,
on land warfare more than naval warfare. 	 It considers first
the visual images of war in the press and painting, and the
press special war artists and the studio battle-painters. It
then considers war correspondents and the work and message of
two leading correspondents, Archibald Forbes and George
Warrington Steevens. 	 It then considers aspects of the war-
portrayal and message of the fiction of future war. 	 Con-
clusions drawn include the essential unity of the presented
image of war and defence, such that the varied media and com-
municators mutually reinforced their message. The image was
shaped by predetermined selectivity by an ideological cluster
of patriotism, imperialism, social darwinism, bellicism and
martial values.	 These so dominated perceptions that the
presentations of those with and without battle experience
hardly differed. The presentations were purposive and
inspirational, warning and urging material and moral pre-
paration.	 War was presented positively, as heroism and
adventure, its horrors minimised and contained. 	 Military
and civilians interacted in this presentation, and the com-
municators were also influenced by factors including conti-
nental influences, party politics, journalistic imperatives,
artistic and literary convention, and individual careerism.
Though pacifists and others dissented from it, the influence
of this dominant image of war and defence was pervasive,
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Since the Great War the pre-1914 mentality and the
influences that formed it have continued to fascinate and
have been the subject of polemic and research. 	 In recent
years following a less traumatic change, the ending of the
Empire, the imperialist mentality and the influences that
formed it have also been of increased concern to historians.
At the same time there has been a renaissance of military
and related history.	 Since the late 1950s when Brian Bond
pioneered the study of the Victorian army, major work has
been published on the 19th and early 20th century army,
navy, defence policy, wars, war and society and civil-
military relations, and on related areas of international
relations, the Empire and imperialism, literature and the
media.	 This thesis is indebted to the work of scholars
in these areas.	 John Keegan, John Ellis, Richard Holmes
and others have studied the actualities of war and battle.
This thesis does not study such reality, yet it is the
implicit standard against which its subject, the images
and perceptions of war presented to the public, is
evaluated.	 Not having experienced battle, I largely
depend on these historians for that standard.
This thesis attempts to contribute towards answering
two related questions.	 First, what input of information
and images of war and defence did the reading public -
approximately the 'political nation' of the upper, middle
and artisan classes - receive from the various written and
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visual media, from the press, books and pictures?	 Second,
who were the communicators, the image-makers, who con-
structed this input, and what were their backgrounds,
social position, influences on them, and their attitudes?
A full answer would be immense, beyond any single thesis.
This thesis deals with some of the issues, assumptions and
images of war and defence presented to the British public,
with influences which formed their notions and images of
war and defence; and with those who presented them to the
public, the image-makers, in the period approximately from
1866 to 1906.	 It comprises studies of related aspects of
its theme and is necessarily selective, omitting or con-
sidering only briefly some important topics. 	 Some of
these have already been studied, for example navalism by
A.J. Marder and by W.M. Hamilton, or invasion scares by
Howard Moon.	 It considers aspects of its theme which have
hitherto not been so researched.	 It is concerned primarily
with civilian writers on war and defence, publicists who
reached a wide audience and had credibility in their day.
It is largely concerned with land warfare and to a lesser
extent with the navy, navalism and sea warfare. 	 It
relates to war and society, militarism, imperialism, civil-
military relations, war and the media, and the 'unspoken
assumptions' and climate of opinion preceding and during
the Great War.
The public received its input on war and defence
from a variety of sources, constructed by a variety of
communicators: journalists, politicians, publicists,
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artists and fiction-writers. 	 The thesis' approach to its
subject is partly thematic, and largely through certain key
individual communicators.	 These were, in a sense, self-
selecting through contemporaneous opinions of them, and the
scale and circulation of their work.	 The thesis considers
first the visual images of war in the press and painting -
the iconography which complemented contemporary writing on
war - and the leading artists, both artist-reporters
('special war artists') and studio painters, who presented
them.	 It relates the battle-painters to the 'world of art'
and to issues of war and defence.
	 It then considers war
correspondents and the work and message of the leading war
correspondents of the mid and late Victorian periods res-
pectively, Archibald Forbes and George Warrington Steevens.
Next it considers some aspects of the war-portrayal and
message of the fiction of future war.
	
It includes each
selected communicator's career, message in his military and
related writings, and contemporaries' estimation of him,
and attempts to place his work in in its context, relate it
to contemporary military thinking, evaluate it historically
and assess its influence. 	 A continuing theme is the
relationship of the military to the civilian communicators,
and the former's contribution to the latter's input on war
and defence.	 Finally the thesis offers conclusions, some
of them tentative, on its broad and varied subject.
This thesis is original in that nobody has previously
so considered the subject. 	 Inherent in research is that
one may discover nothing new of importance, and in the
earlier stages of my research I spent much time rediscover-
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ing from primary sources what had already been discovered
and published.	 While it includes data from the Duke,
Wilkinson, Arnold-Forster, Roberts and other papers, the
thesis by its nature draws much from published sources:
Kitson Clark has written of, "the mistake of believing
that what is unpublished is necessarily of greater signi-
ficance than what is published.	 There is no reason why
this should be so".
	
The quotations included are necessary
evidence because of the significance not only of what was
stated but how it was stated, the language used: the medium
was part of the message.	 The thesis considers some sub-
jects, notably the press, written about by sociologists. I
have taken a 'commonsense' view that much-read publications
had influence though it cannot now be quantified, and that
they were influenced by their readers though this also can-
not be quantified.	 I have not attempted to impose socio-
logical models on historical data.	 This thesis is partly
on colonial war, not its reality but its presentation to
the British public: the thesis is necessarily Anglocentric.
The perceptions of indigenous peoples are important but
not the subject of this thesis.
This thesis is reduced from a much larger, more
extensive study which so exceeded the specified maximum
size that, with the agreement of my supervisor, I have
omitted a major section and much reduced those remaining.
That omitted is on the work and message of two leading
civilian defence publicists, Charles Dilke and Spenser
Wilkinson.	 I have, however, used some of this research
in the other sections and final conclusions, and hope to
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publish from it.	 I have published two articles on subjects
closely related to and complementary to this thesis. 	 The
first, originally intended for this thesis, is 'Wells and
War: H.G. Wells's writings on military subjects, before the
Great War', The Welisian VI NS (Summer 1983). 	 The second
is 'War and the Media in the 19th Century: Victorian Mili-
tary Artists and the Image of War, 1807-1914,' RUSI: Journal




I am indebted to my tutors at Merton College, the
Oxford University O.T.C. and the T.A., my experience of
Uganda and Rhodesia, the late Dr. Kitson Clark's seminar at
Cambridge, the Military History Seminar and other I.H.R.
seminars, and especially to my supervisor Professor Brian
Bond.	 I am indebted to those who helped my inquiries
including Professor Ranft, the Librarian of Balliol College,
the Head Master and the Head Porter of the City of London
School, and to the staff of the Cambridge University
Library, the National Army Museum, the Army Museums Ogilby
Trust, and other libraries where I worked, and to Miss
Maria Wong for typing. 	 I am also Indebted to my parents,
to the late Kenneth Hulbert, and to my wife.
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CHAPTER I.
	 THE WAR ARTISTS
"all read of war
The best amusement for our morning meal!"
Coleridge, 'Fears in Solitude', 1798.
"When the history of our age comes to be written
the pictorial press will form an inexhaustible
storehouse for the historian."
Mason Jackson, 18851.
In 1885 Mason Jackson, the Illustrated London News
art editor and pioneer historian of the pictorial press,
wrote of, "the inherent love of pictorial representation
in all races of men and in every age.. .the pictures speak
a universal language which requires no teaching to
comprehend". 2
 Persons' weltanschauung, including
perceptions of and attitudes to war, was much shaped by
pictures. 3
 They complemented written text and were
usually more memorable, more extensively received and,
from childhood on, continually influencing.
	 Visual
images, and from them more general conceptions, of the
armed forces and of war were conveyed through a variety
of interconnected media ranging from advertisements,
consumer-product packaging such as biscuit tins, cigarette
cards, commemorative pottery, magic-lantern slides, inn
signs and fairground ornamentation, through calendars,
postcards, toys and children's books to the canvases
exhibited at the Royal Academy and purchased by
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4Queen Victoria and by provincial plutocrats. 	 Most wide-
spread and probably most influential were the artists'
pictures published in the illustrated press. 	 They had
initially the impact of topicality but their influence,
direct and indirect, continued for longer.
Since earliest history men have portrayed war in the
varied media of their cultures, often glorifying it - or, as
with Jacques Callot or with Goya - portraying its horrors.5
The portrayal of war as pictorial journalism was a British
innovation of the 1840s made possible by printing technology
and a sufficiently large public to make it profitable: "the
pictorial press of London originated with the Illustrated
London News in 1842,, 6	 It first regularly published
illustrations to the news and, "no sooner became an assured
success than it was imitated", as had been Punch, in Britain
and overseas. 7	Imitators included the Illustrated Midlands
News, the steel-engraved Illustrated News of the World, and
Henry Vizetelly's Pictorial Times, "a cheap competitor...a
clever and popular journal for some years". 8	Illustrated
papers were also started in the colonies, on the continent
and in the United States. 9	In Britain and the Empire - for
the I.L.N. followed the flag to the clubs and messes, to the
frontiers and beyond - the I.L.N. remained dominant until
the Graphic was founded in 1869 on the eve of the Franco-
Prussian War, "a most favourable time for establishing a
new paper" and became its leading rival: "the two papers
eclipsed all other illustrated papers in the world".'0
The illustrated press employed artists to sketch events on
location, functioning similarly to news photographers later.
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They had special skills: "the artist who supplies the sketch
has acquired by long practice a rapid method of working, and
can, by a few strokes of his pencil, indicates a passing
scene by a kind of pictorial shorthand which is afterwards
translated and extended in the finished drawing")'
According to Henry Vizetelly, Herbert Ingram first
intended the Illustrated London News to be a crime paper but
Vizetelly argued for wider news coverage and "made a great
point of the Afghan and Chinese wars in which we were then
engaged, and of the many 'telling' subjects these would
furnish the engraver". 12 War was "the food on which
picture newspapers thrive best"J 3 The I.L.N. and other
papers were imperialist and defence-minded, and gave
extensive coverage to wars, especially British colonial
wars 14 .	 They employed special war artists or artist-
correspondents as well as sometimes using local artists or
serving of f leers. 15 The sketches sent from the war were
usually adapted by London staff artists for publication.
Sometimes they were much altered, though sometimes famous
special artists' sketches were printed in facsimile complete
with the artists' notes. 16	Some drawings were prominently
featured as full, double or triple page illustrations; for
Tel-el-Kebir the I.L.N. printed a four-page fold-out.17
Photography antedated pictorial journalism, but was long no
threat to the special artist. 18 Until the late 19th
century cameras were so cumbersome they could be used only
for static scenes, and even with the late 19th and early
20th century handheld cameras effective battle pictures
were not usually possible. 	 The camera was limited to
9
events in its presence: the artist could portray events he
had not witnessed.	 The photographs from South Africa which
the I.L.N. printed in 1900 were blurred and less informative
than artists' sketches.' 9	As late as the Great War combat
was still portrayed by artists, possibly partly because they
could fulfil the public's expectations of thrilling heroic
war. 2° This resulted in what John Terraine has called the
"two images t', from photographer and artist, "two different
wars, puzzling for those at home". 21 News film was shown
from the l890s but even in the Great War its limitations
were such that it complemented rather than was a rival to
the special artist.22
The special artists came from varied backgrounds and
had varied careers. 23 Though there were exceptions,
notably officers, the majority were professional artists
trained at colleges and studios in Britain and on the
continent. 24	Staff artists on the illustrated papers were
often chosen through personal contacts, or because they
impressed by drawings of witnessed events they sent to the
paper.	 Having proved themselves drawing events in
Britain - royal and parliamentary ceremonial, demonstrations,
fires and accidents - they might then be invited to the
lite employment, with the best pay and prospects, of
special war artist.	 Sometimes wanting any competent draw-
ings from a war, illustrated papers printed those sent by
freelance artists, British or local, and this provided an
alternative entry to the career of war artist. 	 Or a free-
lance on the spot might make an agreement with a paper or
agency and so establish himself.	 Sometimes, as with non-
10
artist war correspondents, specials had military connexions
and had considered a military career. 	 Some made war
illustration a life career: for others it was a brief
episode in an artistic career mostly in Britain. 	 Success
as a special depended largely on character and luck, rather
than background.	 The successful shared certain
characteristics, essentially those of successful corres-
pondents.	 They were technically competent, brave,
confident and physically and mentally tough; energetic and
keen, sociable and able to make friends with officers.
Campaigning could be exhausting, and was best endured by
those young and those who retained into middle age the
qualities of their young manhood. 	 Prior's editor wrote of
him, "he never grew old". 25 The lives of some of the lead-
ing war artists illustrate their characteristics and varied
careers.
The pioneer special war artist was William Simpson
(1823-99), known as 'Crimean Simpson', who portrayed the
Crimean War and, for the I.L.N., the Abyssinian campaign,
Franco-Prussian War and Commune and the Afghan War, and
became regarded as the leading special artist. 26 However,
he was then eclipsed by Melton Prior (1845-1910), probably
the most famous special artist, whose career spanned the
"golden age" of war illustration. 27
 The son of a landscape
painter, he was educated at St. Clement Danes Grammer School
and at art college in Boulogne.	 In 1868 he joined the
I.L.N. and first portrayed miscellaneous events in Britain.
He showed the qualities of a successful special artist: he
drew exceptionally fast and his work was "eminently graphic,
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and he had a keen eye for a dramatic situation". 28 His
opportunity came in 1873 when he was sent to Ashanti as the
I.L.N. special war artist. 	 He went with "pride and elation
at being sent out to represent the most important illustrated
paper in the world". 29 He met war correspondents, including
Henty and Stanley, and from them learned campaigning.	 He
made military contacts, notably Wolseley who was especially
helpful to correspondents: they were, Prior wrote, "placed
on the same footing as Staff officers". 3° Like other
correspondents Prior was armed and fought in battle, with
his double-barrelled shotgun loaded with swanshot.	 He
survived battle and fever and sent dramatic sketches to the
I.L.N.	 The war was much publicised and unexpectedly
popular, and made Wolseley a popular hero.	 It also, with
the I.L.N.'s promotion, made Prior famous. 	 Having proved a
successful war artist and become so known that his name was
an asset, he was repeatedly employed by the I.L.N. as a war
special.	 Proud of himself and his profession, for thirty
years he "followed the drum", covered campaigns from the
Carlist War to the Russo-Japanese War and drew, he claimed,
over one hundred battles.	 By 1900 he was recognised as
"the doyen of war specials".31
Another leading special war artist was Prior's rival
Frederick Villiers (1852-1922), "the Forbes of special war
artists". 32 Born in London, he was educated in France and
at the Royal Academy Schools, and while a student did free-
lance pictorial journalism.	 As a boy he had been keen on
soldiering and a Volunteer cadet; later he was an officer
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in the 24th Middlesex Volunteers. 	 In 1876 at the time of
the Turco-Serbian War he suffered a "fit of dyspeptic
melancholia", decided to "lose my own feelings for a time in
the noise and excitement of battle", offered his services to
the Graphic and went as special artist to the war. 33 He
was successful and thereafter devoted almost his entire
career to war illustration, covering colonial campaigns, the
Sino-Japanese War and the Great War. 	 F.L. Bullard wrote,
"He has seen more battles than any soldier living and endured
more privation". 34 He was the admiring friend of
Archibald Forbes.	 He was a competent artist who exhibited
at the Royal Academy 5 though some of his Graphic drawings
were crudely and inaccurately redrawn, and on his later
campaigns he also used still and cine cameras. 36 He
became famous as a special and as such, romantically,
identified himself.	 The title of his final memoirs
encapsulated his attitude - Villiers: His Five Decades of
Adventure.	 The Times obituary dismissed him as, "only an
artist of moderate ability". 37 Another prominent war
artist was Frank Vizetelly (1830-83), son of a London
publisher of Italian descent and brother of Henry Vizetelly8
He worked for the Pictorial Times and Le Monde Illustre',
then for the I.L.N.	 He portrayed the 1859 Austro-Italian
War, Garibaldi's 1860 campaign and the American Civil War,
and was killed with Hicks Pasha in 1883. 	 Others were
special war artists for only part of more varied careers,
sometimes for only a single campaign. 	 J.A. Crowe
(1825-96), for example, was an I.L.N. special artist in
the Crimea, taught art in India, was a Times reporter and
finally entered the Foreign Office.39
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Like other war correspondents, the special artists
suffered the hardships and risked the dangers of war: disease,
shot and shell, execution as spies, drowning. 40 Some died
on service.	 Those who survived and wrote memoirs emphasised
what they had been through: it was essential to their image.
Prior and Villiers emphasised their repeated escapes from
death. 41	In their reports, lectures, interviews and long
self-laudatory memoirs, the special artists presented them-
selves as heroic adventurers.	 Prior repeatedly sent draw-
ings of himself to the I.L.N. In illustrations to articles
and to their memoirs, and sometimes at their lectures, they
appeared in campaigning kit: paramilitary jacket, jauntily-
angled wide-brimmed hat, belt, straps, pouches and holster.
An alternative style was evening dress, with medals and
decorations.	 Villiers lectured with knobkerries, spears
and other native weapons around him, and "always carried
into the lecture room that air of the swashbuckler which
was at one time comportment for the soldiers of the pen".42
The image of the special artist as adventurer was further
promoted by their editors, by books on the press, and by
Kipling's The Light That Failed (1891). 	 In 1882
Joseph Hatton wrote that, "the pencil is as adventurous
as the pen.. .the newspaper artist's life is as full of
venture as that of the journalistic correspondent with,
in warfare, the additional spice of danger attaching to
the possession of sketching materials". 43	In 1885
Mason Jackson wrote that the special artist, "undergoes
fatigues, overcomes formidable difficulties and often
incurs personal danger in fulfilling his mission".44
Although soldiers, particularly rankers, sometimes
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groused at the privileges and luxuries of correspondents and
artists, the dominant press continued to emphasise their
heroic suffering and endurance. 	 Editors boosted public
interest in them by articles and exhibitions of sketches.45
The I.L.N. printed Prior's sketch of himself drawing
Dr. Jameson, and later printed "the sketcher sketched", a
full-page drawing by another artist of Prior sketching under
fire in the Boer War. 46 The specials and their promoters
repeatedly quoted compliments from the famous. 	 When Prior
lectured on Tel-el-Kebir it was reported - with his drawing
of himself lecturing and the Prince of Wales prominent in
the front row - in the I.L.N. and the Prince's praise was
quoted. 47 Villiers recorded in his memoirs that at
Victoria's request the Graphic forwarded his campaign
sketches to her and, "sometimes on returning my portfolio
the Queen would send me a charming little note".48
Success as a special artist could bring high rewards:
financial, social and in prestige and fame. 49 Campaigning
gave the opportunity of acquaintance with officers including
royals, aristocrats, and generals who were popular heroes.
Villiers became acquainted with the Dukes of Connaught and
Teck, and with Beresford, Burnaby and Roberts. 5° Simpson
stated that artists, because considered uncritical, were
more welcome on campaign than correspondents. 51 Generals -
with the notable exceptions of Chelmsford and Kitchener -
wanting favourable publicity were usually friendly towards
correspondents and special artists. 	 Wolseley, despite his
oft-quoted condemnation of correspondents as "drones",
conciliated and used them. 52 He repeatedly helped Prior,
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and after Tel-el-Kebir lent him his own battle plan to copy3
In 1886 Roberts approached Villiers and invited him to
accompany his staff in the next war, which he said would be
against Russia. 54	Such favours later made their contrast-
ing treatment by the British authorities in the Great War
the more galling for veteran specials. 	 Villiers wrote, "I
resented being so scurvily treated. . .when through forty
years of British warfare I had been persona grata with
generals like Wolseley, Roberts, Methuen, Browne and Buller"5
Leading specials were well paid, with generous expenses, and
might have the opportunity of loot. 	 Prior, who later
righteously machine-gunned a looter in Alexandria, looted
gold objects from Kumasi and smuggled them past Wolseley's
sentries. 56	They might gain British medals or at least
campaign ribbons, and foreign medals and orders. 57 Villiers
stated in Who's Who he was "the recipient of twelve English
and foreign war medals, clasps and decorations", and like
Archibald Forbes, he lectured wearing his medals and orders.
On return to England they had the opportunity of further
income from lectures, articles, books, and the sale of
drawings and paintings.	 Success as a special artist could
be the means of social climbing, and their social
aspirations were sometimes criticised. 	 In 1883 the
Magazine of Art mocked "the gentleman who having gone with
an expedition, say to Madagascar, and there met a duke...
has returned to England with an increased sense of his own
importance and a curious delusion that he has somehow
become related to the aristocracy". 58	Special artists
might, like successful explorers, "the latest empire
builder, the newest millionaire, or the most recently
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discovered society beauty" 9 be invited into "Society" and
even temporarily lionised.	 Villiers became acquainted with
the Prince of Wales and, "my staying with the Prince...
brought me a sheaf of social engagements and for a year I
enjoyed the hospitality of a number of delightful people".6°
The special war artists largely shared the values and
attitudes of the officers with whom they campaigned. 	 They
were proud of British military prowess: Villiers told Russian
officers the "thin red line" had never been defeated. 61 Like
war correspondents, some had been or were officers in the
regular army, Volunteers or Yeomanry.
	 They were sociable,
convivial and hospitable. 	 They enjoyed alcohol and travelled
well-provided with it.	 Prior's memoirs repeatedly emphasised
this: in the Ashanti war his porters included a woman "carry-
ing between fifty and sixty pounds' weight of whisky and
claret on her head". 62 The specials identified with the
forces they accompanied and were critical of politicians
especially Mr. Gladstone, whom Villiers blamed for the
failure of the Gordon relief expedition and refused to meet.
They shared the officers' imperial and racial beliefs.
They claimed that British imperial wars were justified,
emphasised the barbarities of the states the British
attacked - Ashanti human sacrifice and Burmese torture -
and asserted the beneficence of British rule. 63 Officers
conventionally categorised and judged ethnic groups.
Wolseley, for example, wrote from Sierra Leone in 1873,
"The negroes are like so many monkeys; they are a lazy,
good-for-nothing race, no matter what Exeter Hall may say
to the contrary". 64	The artists shared such beliefs.
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Prior wrote of the necessity of firm treatment and flogging
of native servants, and described Fantee men as, "rank
cowards and utterly worthless as soldiers". 65 He wrote,
"no Egyptian was ever reknowned for pluck". 66 He wrote of
South Africa, "A Missionary Kaffir becomes a liar and a thief,
and the women, as soon as they put on stockings, lose all
sense of morality, whereas a raw Kaffir is one of the most
honest men to be found in the world and the women are most
virtuous". 67 He praised the Rhodesian settlers: "the finest
specimens I had even seen, manly and plucky".68
The special artists enjoyed their work and were eager
for combat, despite what they saw in battle and helping the
wounded afterwards.	 Frank Vizetelly was, "always in a
fever of excitement whenever there was a warlike outbreak
in any quarter of the world". 69	F.L. Bullard wrote that,
"Villiers is fond of his exhilarating profession, and
delights in the perils and even the hardships that must be
endured on the warpath". 7° Prior wrote of the Egyptian
campaign, "we were in for some good fighting, and the
correspondents were cheerful enough in consequence", and
that, "the opening of a battle is always most exciting".71
They expressed their attitudes both in their drawings and
their writings.	 They shared their officer contemporaries'
conventional view of war, based on a warrior ethos and
particular attitudes to heroes and to death.	 Despite and
because of death and suffering, war was a challenge and
adventure often, though not always, thrilling and heroic,
and usually with splendid conduct by all British troops.
Prior wrote of the bombardment of the Alexandria forts,
18
"the sight was magnificent and inspiriting", and typically,
that in Egypt the 60th charged, "in the grand old style",
and described the British bayonet charge at Tel-el-Kebir as
"a grand sight". 72 He wrote that the cavalry charge at
Elandslaagte was, "done in certainly magnificent style", and
that, "Tommy had behaved magnificently throughout this long
fight.. .We had a glorious day.. .The dauntless bravery of
English officers we seem to take for granted as a national
heritage, but one's heart goes out in positive admiration to
Tommy Atkins - sweating, swearing, grimy, dirty, fearless
and generous Tommy". 73	Similarly Villiers wrote of the
Black Watch before Tel-le-Kebir, "Veritable dogs of war they
looked, as they stood steady, waiting for the word, like
hounds eager to be slipped upon their quarry". 74 He
described a British cavalry officer in the Sudan: "The hand-
some face of their gallant leader, radiant with the spirit
of war upon it, glowed in the morning light". 75 Their
experience of war was real, and they perceived and expressed
it in the cliches of their ideology and age. 	 Their
perception of war was epitomised by the end in the Great
War of Villiers' long career. 	 He initially reported the
Western Front but apparently failed to comprehend it.	 He
tried to report it as he had colonial campaigns and, he
wrote, "I exhaust the Western Front of dramatic incidents -
I seek fresh fields and pastures new". 76	So he went again
to a familiar war, on the North West Frontier, where the
British were commanded by that very 19th century officer,
Kipling's erstwhile hero Dunsterville.77
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In their pictures - in what they selected, how they
portrayed it and what they omitted - the special artists
expressed their perception of war as dramatic and heroic.
They selected and emphasised "dramatic incidents". 78 Prior
typically, "had an eye for the dramatic situation" and,
"knew how to pick out subjects that made for striking
illustration". 79 They favourably portrayed comanding
officers: Prior chose not to draw Wolseley falling of f his
camel. 8° Usually they portrayed victory or heroic last
stands and ignored discreditable incidents. 	 Prior, for
example, ignored the panic of some British troops in
Zululand, though he later wrote, "A more disgraceful scene
,,81	 .I have never witnessed .	 However if it were sufficiently
important they portrayed British defeat: Prior drew the
British fleeing down Majuba Hill, "that terrible calamity
to British arms". 82 They knew the reality of war: Prior
wrote that, "The sight of these mangled soldiers, groaning
in their agony, is too awful even for the hardened corres-
pondent to witness unmoved". 83 They portrayed death and
wounds, but in a style that ommitted the horror, mutilation,
disfigurement, suffering and agony, and showed relatively
few British dead. For example, Prior portrayed the site
of Isandhlwana without horror: except for some skulls and
bones he showed only the living, and broken wagons and
boxes 4	Similarly his sketch of the highianders attack-
ing at Tel-el-Kebir showed mostly unharmed soldiers,
dramatically charging, with only two prone presumably dead,
neither their faces nor their wounds visible. 85	A typical
example, from the Boer War, was Ernest Prater's drawing of
stretcher-bearers carrying wounded from Spion Kop: the men
20
on the stretchers were not mutilated, disfigured or bloody,
and their faces showed no suffering: they hardly seemed
wounded. 86 Fenton and other war photographers similarly
selected and omitted. 	 The specials in their writings
expressed the same attitude to combat death as in their
pictures.	 Villiers wrote that after Tel-el-Kebir the
dead highianders were, "all resting in easy attitudes on
the desert as if in deep slumber, shot through their
brains". 87 This convention of omission of horror from
pictures of battle apparently expressed attitudes to
British war, rather than to the portrayal of horror and
suffering, for a different convention applied with natural
calamities such as earthquakes and with foreign atrocities.
Simpson and others drew, and the I.L.N. published, horrific
pictures of the reprisals against Communards, and Villiers
drew, and the Graphic published, a horrific picture of
Serbs burned to death by Turks. 88 Some contemporaries
recognised the subjective element in special artists'
portrayal.	 Barnett wrote, "there is an idea of some sort
in every incident...which...gives the picture human
interest, and makes it more than a dry record of incident.
If mere facts were all that were required, the special
might throw away his pencil and take to instantaneous
photography". 89 Ostensibly objective reportage, the
specials' portrayal expressed a particular view of war,
resulting from their perception of war and their ident-
fication with the British forces and the British imperial
cause.	 Though the specials portrayed war, and especially
British war, so selectively and favourably, nevertheless
their sketches were usually not published as drawn.
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Until the l880s they had to be redrawn for engraving, and
even later were often redrawn by artists at the journals'
offices, according to the conventions of war illustration,
making them more dramatic and heroic. 9° Maurice from his
experience of the Egyptian campaign criticised press mis-
representation, including the London redrawing of specials'
sketches into unrealistic fictional pictures and the draw-
ing, without specials' sketches, of imaginary pictures.
Both, he alleged, "tended directly to falsify the popular
conception of war". 9' Moreover some drawings were not
published, for example Prior's of the auctioning of dead
soldiers' kit after Majuba.92
Specials sometimes portrayed battle events they had
not themselves witnessed, although they were at or near the
battle: for example Rend Bull's drawings of the 21st Lancers
charge at Omdurman and of a lyddite shell bursting among
Boers at Spion Kop. 	 Moreover if the specials' sketches
failed to arrive, London office artists drew instead, from
available evidence and imagination. 	 When the I.L.N. did
not receive Prior's sketches of the battle of Abu Klea,
Caton Woodville in London portrayed it. 	 Such recon-
structions were considered legitimate, but faking - drawing
by specials purportedly witnesses but in fact far away -
was repeatedly denounced, especially by leading specials.
In 1883 Harry Barnett condemned the artist who, "puts up
at the best hotel in a big city at least a hundred miles
from the seat of war, and there concocts sketches under
the influence of champagne and one-and-nine-penny cigars3
but he stated this was "uncommon" and that usually specials
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were conscientious.	 Leading specials emphasised the
authenticity of their own work, and the turpitude of some
of their rivals.	 Villiers condemned the "cowardly
charlatans t' who, unlike himself, did not go to the front
but far away in safety, faked drawings, written reports and
films. 94	The illustrated papers also asserted the
authenticity of their drawings, in the Russo-Japanese War
the Sphere claimed it would, "publish no Imaginary
Drawings"
The leading specials and their work were much
praised.	 For example, in 1874 the Magazine of Art praised
Prior's Ashanti War sketches as, "truly admirable for their
high artistic qualities", and in 1883 Barnett praised
Prior's "excellent work" and praised C.E. Fripp's drawing
as, "so suggestive, picturesque and expressive". 96 Despite
occasional cynicism - Mason Jackson wrote of a "popular
belief that some of the sketches in the illustrated news-
papers were evolved from the inner consciousness of the
artists" 97 - the special artists' published drawings were
generally accepted as accurate, though pacifists alleged
they misrepresented war. 98 The illustrated press portrayal
of war was a major influence on the public image of war.
The illustrated papers at sixpence weekly could be easily
afforded by the middle classes and by better-paid artisans,
and they had large circulations - the I.L.N.'s exceeded any
daily newspaper's before the Daily Mail - and they were
recirculated and retained more than newspapers.99
Contemporaries believed them influential: Mason Jackson
wrote that the I.L.N., "helped to change the character of
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public taste". 1 The illustrated press artists' pictures
were - excepting a few inadequate photographs at the end of
the period - the only visual images of recent battle being
fought.	 They had initially the impact of topicality, of
recent news, but their influence, direct and indirect, lasted
far longer.	 Some were displayed in special exhibitions,
reprinted in special editions of their papers, and used in
popular multivolume war histories.'01 They were cut out
and pasted in scrapbooks and on screens, and used to decorate
the nurseries of the rich and the cottages of the poor J02
War correspondents and specials used them, as lantern slides,
to illustrate lectures) 03	The I.L.N. was kept, in bound
volumes, in private, club and public libraries: Sir Arthur
Bryant later recalled as a boy lying on the floor of his
father's library looking at volumes of the I.L.N)°4
The illustrated press war pictures were sources of
cartoons, by Tenniel and others in Punch and elsewhere,
advertisements, illustrations in textbooks, encyclopedias
and fiction of imperial war, for example G.A. Henty's.105
Moreover the specials and other artists used them as
sources for battle paintings.	 In 1874 the Art Journal
reported the exhibition together of Desanges' painting
'Fighting in the Ashantee Forest', of Wolseley and "the
gallant Black Watch" in the Ashanti War, and of Prior's
I.L.N. sketches on which the painting was based: "guided
by faithful and graphic suggestions from these excellent
sketches, and this guidance confirmed and illustrated by
the personal observation and experience of Mr. Prior him-
self, H. Desanges formed his conception of the view he has
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placed upon his canvas". 106 Villiers wrote proudly that,
"the great French military artist, Alphonse de Neuville,
painted his famous picture of Tel-el-Kebir from my original
sketches")°7 Woodville as part of his work for the I.L.N.
had to use Prior's and other specials' sketches, and they
influenced his own battle paintings. 	 Also even battle
painters, especially those without battle experience, with
less immediate contact with specials' drawings, were
necessarily influenced by them)08
25
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CHAPTER II.	 THE BATTLE PAINTERS
1. CONTEXT: THE VICTORIAN "WORLD OF ART"
Contemporary with and in part influenced by the
special war artists, were the studio-based artists in Britain
who painted battle scenes, some of whom also worked for the
illustrated press. 1 These battle-painters were not a
category totally separate from other artists. 	 They trained
as did other artists and only later chose to specialise in
battle painting, and they continued within the Victorian
"world of Art" - that complex of artists, dealers, critics,
patrons and publishers, of institutions, hierarchies and
publications, of moral, political and artistic values -
which, while closely interconnected with the ruling, and
art-buying, upper and middle classes, nevertheless formed a
distinct subculture.	 The Victorian battle painters can be
understood only in their context of this "world of Art", to
which they belonged.	 The values of the battle painters
and the message of their paintings must be seen in relation
not only to other contemporary statements of attitudes
towards war, but also in relation to the wider values and
messages of other contemporary painters and paintings, and
the responses to them.
In the period from 1870 to 1914 art apparently con-
tinued to flourish in Britain. 2 There were more artists,
art students, paintings, exhibitions, galleries, artists'
societies, art publications, and mass reproductions of
paintings.	 The 1871 census stated that there were in the
United Kingdom 6,074 artists and painters, of whom 5,005
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were male and 1,069 female. 3 Thereafter, with more art-
training facilities and the 'surplus' middle-class spinsters,
the numbers and competition continued to increase. 4 The
number of lady artists especially increased. 	 They remained
excluded from membership of the Royal Academy but their work
was hung there and a few, in Britain as in France, were
highly regarded. 5 There were lady art critics and writers
in the art press; for example 	 Alice Meynell, Helen Zimmern
and Mrs Andrew Lang.	 The Magazine of Art stated in 1897
that, "the Victorian era will henceforth be synonymous with
the brilliant advance of Women in Art as in other fields".6
There was much public awareness of artists, with articles in
the press and cartoons in Punch and other comic papers.
They were the subjects of popular fiction - for example,
Rita's 'Told in the Studios' - and it became a cliche of
the art press that, "Artists are at present taking the place
formerly occupied by the curate in the fashionable young
lady's novel". 7	The leading artists became celebrities.
Featured, for example, in the Strand Magazine's 'Illustrated
Interviews' and 'Portraits of Celebrities', together with
bishops, politicians, H.M. Stanley, Jules Verne, and members
of the royal family.
British painting was dominated by the Royal Academy,
the artistic establishment.	 Its power, fame and social
prestige reached its zenith under the presidency from 1878
to 1897 of Frederick Leighton, later Lord Leighton, and Its
exhibitions and banquets were part of the London season.8
It was the arbiter of orthodox artistic taste. 	 Its annual
exhibition was the climax of the artist's year; an out-
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standingly successful picture, "the popular success of this
year's academy" 9 could bring immediate fame and launch a
successful career.	 Associateship and especially membership
conferred a status which brought commissions and higher prices°
Even those who believed it should be reformed recognised its
pre-eminence and representativeness. 	 The Art Journal
claimed in 1875 that, "it is by what the Royal Academy of
England has to show that we must be content to stand or
fall"."	 In 1901 H.M. Spielmann claimed the Academy exhi-
bition, "reflects with accuracy the tendency of that art
which appeals to the greatest number". 12 Successful
artists usually had the same basic career pattern: a middle-
class background, though soclo-economically varied; art-
training in Britain and often on the continent; then exhi-
bition at the Academy or Royal Scottish Academy, and the
rewards of Victorian artistic success. 	 Success resulted
from attracting buyers. 	 The art market was largely con-
trolled by the rich, buying for themselves or sometimes for
civic art galleries.	 They were influenced by dealers such
as Gambart and by the private galleries. 13 Art publishers
such as Dickenson & Company, later the Fine Art Society.
Hildesheimer, C.W. Faulkner or Raphael Tuck, bought paint-
ings, or only their copyright, for reproduction as engrav-
ings for the lucrative mass market. 14 Publishers of
periodicals such as the Illustrated London News and the
Graphic also bought them to reproduce, and publishers some-
times commissioned works) 5 Chromolithographs were very
popular: Millais' 'Cherry Ripe' in the Graphic in 1880 sold
600,000 copiesJ 6	G.W. Joy wrote of the Cassells' Yule
Tide prints of his works, "I have seen them in little
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country inns, or by the flickering firelight through the
windows of roadside cottages". 17 Royalty continued to buy
paintings; Victoria sometimes bought the year's Academy
success: for example in 1855 Leighton's 'Cimabue's Madonna'
and in 1874 Elizabeth Thompson's 'The Roll Call',' 8	She
commissioned works from favoured artists and her patronage
advanced their careers. 	 Aristocrats such as the Duke of
Westminster continued to buy paintings. 	 So too did self-
made manufacturers such as Thomas Holloway, Lord Armstrong
and Joseph Chamberlain.' 9 Leighton sold largely to
financiers, Alma-Tadema largely to nouveaux riches.
Possibly their art-buying was 'bricabracomania', possibly
an attempt to buy history, culture and legitimacy.
Businessmen also controlled civic art patronage through
the new art galleries.	 These expressed orthodox middle-
class taste, including for scenes of recent imperial history
and battle.	 Frederick Goodall's 'Jessie's Dream' was in
the Mappin Gallery, Sheffield; works by Elizabeth Butler
and E.M. Hale were at Leeds, and by Woodville at Liverpool
and Bristol.
The 1870s and early '80s were for artists a boom
period of high prices and "marvellous prosperity" 20 when
the wealthy bought much and, as the Art Journal stated,
"paid quite absurd prices for pictures by artists of
eminence". 21	Such pictures included Edwin Long's 'Baby-
lonian Marriage Market' for 7,100 guineas and Millais'
'Princes in the Tower' for £3,900. 	 From the 1880s demand
and prices for paintings fall.	 Some blamed the economic
depression: M.H. Spielmann wrote that, "Art is a flower that
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blossoms only in the sunshine of prosperity". 22	Some attri-
buted the decline to collectors having no more room to hang
paintings, or preferring to buy old masters as investments.23
The decline meant lean years for some artists, but did not
affect artists uniformly. 	 It probably increased the diver-
gence between the rewards of leading artists and of those
less successful: for the former painting continued lucrative.
Success could bring fame and high rewards, financial and
socially.	 Leading artists, for example Millais or Leighton,
became acquaintances of royalty and merged smoothly into
'Society'.	 They were much honoured: by the Academy and its
foreign equivalents, by the state in Britain and overseas,
and by the universities. 	 Millais was awarded Oxford and
Durham doctorates and in 1885 creaLed a baronet.	 Leighton
was created knight, baronet and in 1896 baron, the first
artist created a peer.	 The increasing number of "Knights
and baronets of art" was recorded approvingly in the art
press. 24 Though such honours to artists and scientists
were partly to conceal the use of an inflated honours list
for political funding, 25 they also proclaimed the establish-
ment status of the successful artist.	 Symbolic of leading
artists' material success and status were the houses they
built.	 Idiosyncratic and expensive, these were repeatedly
featured in the popular illustrated press and the art press6
Leighton's house in Kensington,,"all alight with colour and
gold" contained the domed arabian court with old Syrian
tiles and a black marble fountain. 27 Alma-Tadema's "wonder-
ful house" in St. John's Wood resembled his paintings, with
a Pompeian-style doorway, stairs of burnished brass which a
German journalist once described as gold, marble walls,
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cedar doors, onyx windows and an aluminium dome. 28 Most
British artists were not 'F3ohemians' in the French meaning,
not alienated or rebels, but accepted the status quo:
typically after selling his 'Dante in Exile' Leighton invested
the money in railway debentures. 29 They were middle-class
professionals serving the desires of the rich.
France dominated 19th century art and Paris was widely
regarded as the artistic capital of the world: the Art
Journal declared in 1879, "France, whom, all in all, we
regard as the greatest expounder of modern Art, the heiress
of all its traditions". 30 Many British artists trained on
the continent, the British art press reported continental
art news, especially the Salons, and featured continental,
especially French, artists, and the French Gallery in Pall
Mall exhibited French paintings. 31	British patrons -
including the Hertfords, Sir Richard Wallace and John Bowes -
continued to purchase French paintings. 	 In religion,
philanthropy and such causes as anti-slavery and temperance,
British overseas connections were primarily with the Empire
and the United States. 32 However in fine art, as in
fashion and cookery, the British were primarily influenced
by the continentals, especially the French. 	 British
painters were influenced, in varying degrees, by
continental painters.
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2. CONTEXT: CONTENT AND VALUES IN VICTORIAN PAINTING
"Art is always the best history of any agett.
Professor J.A. Cramb)
British painting in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries was varied and eclectic, a melange of genres and
styles. 2 The dominant group were the classicists led by
Leighton, Watts, Poynter and Alma-Tadema, with their repeated
sunlit scenes of young nudity, marble and mythology. 3 They
portrayed Victorians in costume and omitted Roman cruelty
and horror.	 Anecdotal 'subject' and 'genre' pictures,
historical - for example Millais' 'Boyhood of Raleigh' - and
contemporary, continued popular; despite Whistler's
criticism, 4 as did religious subjects; landscapes and sea-
scapes.	 There were sometimes scenes of urban poverty,
"the philanthropy of art". 5	'Monkeyana' continued, and
among well-known animal painters was Edmund Caldwell who
enjoyed Lady Burdett-Coutts' patronage, painting Cocky the
cockatoo and her other pets. 6 Among the thousands of
pictures exhibited annually there were very few of the
Empire.	 The Mutiny inspired such emotive paeans to
British heroism as Frederick Goodall's 'Jessie's Dream',
Valentine Prinsep portrayed India, and some of the battle
painters portrayed scenes of colonial war, though fewer
than of the Napoleonic wars.	 G.F. Watts painted not the
Empire but imperial heroes: Lawrence, Roberts and Rhodes.7
The Empire was prominent and popular in the press, includ-
ing the religious press, music halls, advertising, fiction
for adults and children, verse, and such popular entertain-
ments, rivalling Buffalo Bill's Wild West Show, as
A)
'Savage South Africa' at Earls Court. 8	Yet, despite its
artistic opportunities, the Empire failed to inspire British
professional artists as did North Africa the French 'Orien-
talists'. 9	In part this was because of artistic values,
notably classicism: in part because professional artists
believed they needed to be near galleries and potential
buyers - though colonial galleries bought works by British
artists including Leighton, Lady Butler and Vereker Hamilton,
and Woodville and Hamilton found princely purchasers in
India10 - and partly, with the less successful, because of
travel costs.	 In not painting the Empire, professional
artists diverged from widespread popular attitudes, while
in painting it, battle-painters were exceptional among
professional artists.
Indicative of the divergence between popular atti-
tudes and what most professional artists chose to paint,
were the responses to General Gordon.	 Gordon was the
Victorian popular imperial "hero of heroes".	 A wave	 of
Gordon cultus passed over England in 1884,,,12 and continued
over twenty years.	 He was eulogised by the press, by
soldiers including Wolseley and Butler, by the Poet Laureate,
by schoolbooks and popular hagiographies such as General
Gordon: Hero and Saint.' 3 He was revered by Queen, cotta-
ger and colonial, commemorated in statues and statuettes,
in Doulton jugs, parian busts and Staffordshire figures)4
His Khartoum Journals published in 1885 were, Baring
claimed, "probably read by almost every educated man in
England". 15 John Morley claimed that, "Gordon seized the
imagination of England") 6 His fate aroused popular emo-
tion as did that of no other man and made such an impact
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that there was a "Gordon reflex" in the 1892 Uganda contro-
versy, which apparently contributed to the retention
decision. 17	G.W. Steevens wrote in 1898, "Gordon has
become a legend with his countrymen, and they all but deify
him". 18	Yet despite all this, despite the dramatic inci-
dents of his life suitable for portrayal - James Morris has
commented that Gordon, like other Victorian heroes, had a
vivid sense of theatre19 - and despite the 19th century
tradition of commemorative painting, the leading artists,
the Academicians, chose not to paint Gordon. 	 After his
death there were only two notable paintings of him, both by
artists never elected to the Academy, George W. Joy and
Caton Woodville.
George W. Joy's attitude to his painting of Gordon
was indicative.	 Joy was a successful, fashionable painter
of portraits and historical 'genre'; middle-class, patriotic,
imperialist, Unionist and a keen Volunteer.'° Some of his
paintings had idealogical purpose. He painted 'The Fair
Flagmaker' and 'Sister Kingmaker' in response to the Home
Rule crisis, and 'Britannia' in response to the Boer War.
Another deliberately propagandist work was 'The Death of
General Gordon'.	 He wrote, "On no historical or political
event have I felt so strongly...a betrayal of one of the
greatest men we ever possessed". 21 He believed Gordon a
hero, comparing him to Christ, and approached, "with all
due reverence, this great subject". 22 He researched,
gaining information from Wingate and others who knew Gordon
and the Sudan.	 He painted with the purpose of, "doing
something, however insignificant, to help on that awakening
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of the conscience of the nation". 23 Though his painting
arguably fell short of his aspiration, it became, much repro-
duced, the accepted image of Gordon's death, and Joy continued
proud of it.	 Yet in painting Gordon and so expressing popu-
lar and fervent British beliefs, Joy was exceptional among
professional artists.
Artists' and critics' attitudes towards art and popu-
lar artistic taste formed part of the context of attitudes
towards battle paintings.	 Victorian taste was not mono-
lithic, but a mixture of widely-accepted values and of con-
tinued controversy, changing through time. 	 Academy
acceptance of a picture was on basis of values within the
artistic establishment, yet always some Academy pictures
were condemned by the critics. 	 No single person dictated
taste though some particularly influenced it.
	
The dominant
critic was Ruskin, "the Master", whom Wilfrid Meynell in
1881 called, "the greatest of living art-critics". 24	The
art critics of the daily press also influenced attitudes,
and that of The Times probably most of all. 	 Its art critic
in the 'seventies was Tom Taylor, who established an autho-
ritative reputation: Meynell wrote that he, "played a more
important part in the history of English art and artists
than did many contemporary painters of distinction".25
The art press, notably the two leading periodicals the Art
Journal and the Magazine of Art and their related publi-
cations The Year's Art, the Art Annual and Royal Academy
Pictures, and also the Connoisseur; the illustrated papers
such as the Illustrated London News and the Graphic which
reported artists and exhibitions and reproduced paintings;
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the quarterly and monthly reviews; art books and encylopedias,
all contributed to shaping attitudes to art. 	 However their
influence, and the typicality of any writer, remains largely
conjectural.
Victorian attitudes to art and its purpose varied much.
Classicists like Leighton and Poynter believed its purpose
was the pursuit of beauty, of noble aesthetic sensation.
Whistler and the aesthetes asserted 'Art for Art's Sake'.
For Alma-Tadema and his patrons art was for profit, escape
and enjoyment.	 For others it was to tell a story and
illustrate a moral.	 Examples of "pictorial moralizing"
were Rossetti's 'Found' and Holman Hunt's 'The Awakened
Conscience'.	 Another was Alfred Elmore's 'On the Brink'
in which a young woman hesitates outside a gilt and crimson
room of gamblers and derni-mondaines, while behind her lurks
a figure resembling Dilke. 26 Religious subjects, such as
Hunt's 'The Light of the World' were valued for their
religious message, much reproduced and very popular. 	 Some
artists asserted art's didactic moral purpose: notably
G.F. Watts, whom contemporaries much admired. 	 While
aesthetic quality was highly valued, for many the message
remained paramount.	 Some paintings were condemned, regard-
less of aesthetic quality, because their message was
believed immoral.	 In 1881 the Magazine of Art protested
at W.S. Coleman's 'The Swing' as "belonging to a vicious
class of subject". 27	British critics repeatedly condemned
as immoral French Salon paintings. 28	In 1879 the Art
Journal castigated, "those studio enormities wherein
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positive obscenity was the character, and a corrupting
influence the result". 29	In 1883 it condemned, "the class
of Art which renders the Salon at Paris so repellent to
wholsome-minded people". 3° British critics also condemned
Salon paintings for sensational and horrific subjects: tomb-
violation, blood-drinking; death by cholera and by
starvation, and suicide by poison or railway. 31	In 1873
the Art Journal asserted that, "Art was not intended to
sicken people with the sight of such butchery"; and in 1897
the Magazine of Art condemned , " scenes of violence, of gory
horror, and of lust". 32	In British painting, sentimen-
tality was acceptable: horror or too realistic portrayal
of suffering or sordidness, were unacceptable. 	 It was in
this context of British attitudes to art, its purpose and
morality, that the British battle painters worked, and the
critics and public responded to their pictures.
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3. VICTORIAN BATTLE PAINTERS
1. INTRODUCT ION
Within the Victorian world of art were the battle
painters.	 Though European states varied in their mili-
tarism, their military paintings and attitudes towards them,
battle painting was a Europe-wide genre which in the 19th
century expressed both nationalist mythology and a common
fascination with the Napoleonic wars. 	 In France battle
painting had for centuries been officially patronised and
encouraged: by Louis XIV, Napoleon and the successive 19th
centry rgimes.	 France, "where art is so much encouraged
by the government" 1 in the 19th century had a minister for
the arts, official war artists - in Algeria, the Crimea and
Italy - and gave repeated official commissions for battle
paintings. 2	In 1886, for example, as the Art Journal
reported, "The French Minister of War has commissioned, for
the Salles d'Honneur of the Ministry, ten pictures repre-
senting the feats of arms of ten several regiments".3
The leading military painters were in the artistic
establishment and much honoured by the state.Vernet, for
example, was a Grand Officer de la Lgion d'honneur, and
Meissonier was awarded the Grand Croix de la Lgion.
Leading military painters received high prices for their
work from French and from British and American patrons.
In 1878 Meissonier received £10,000 for his 'Cuirassiers'
and A.T. Stewart, an American department-store owner, paid
$76,000 for his 'Friedland'. 4 British battle painters,
often trained on the continent, admired and envied their
continental contemporaries.
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In Britain there had been intermittent land battle
paintings through the 18th and early 19th century - for
example, West's 'Death of Wolfe' and Copley's 'Death of Major
Peirson' - but no British "school of battle painters".5
There was, however, a thriving tradition of naval war paint-
ing and, at Greenwich, "a Waihalla of naval heroes of this
country". 6	In Britain there were no official war artists
and no government patronage of battle painters. 	 British
battle painters remained on the fringe of the artistic
establishment, much less honoured and paid than leading
artists of other genres. 	 Battle paintings were exhibited
at the Academy but almost no battle painters were elected
to it. 7	Pictures of land battles, unlike naval battles,
were not purchased under the terms of the Chantrey Bequest,
and battle painters were not among the artists awarded
knighthoods, baronetcies and honorary degrees. 	 Woodville,
despite royal favour unmedalled by the British authorities,
-	 8
was awarded the Palmes academiques for his Napoleonic scenes.
Possibly indicative of national values though, as we shall
consider, probably more indicative of values within the
subculture of the artistic establishment, the leading
British painters chose not to paint battles. 	 Battle paint-
ing was an accepted but minor genre. 	 Battle paintings were
popular and impressed contemporaries, and the memory of them
long lingered, part of the folk-image of the era. 	 Yet
their influence was disproportionate to their number.
There were relatively few British battle painters and
battle paintings.	 In 1888 the Art Journal stated, "there
are not many battle painters of note in this country".9
Among the thousands of British painters of the later 19th
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and early 20th centuries, there were only about a dozen
battle painters considered noteworthy as such by their con-
temporaries: T.J. Barker, J. Beadle, Elizabeth Butler,
J. Charlton, Ernest Crofts, C.E. Fripp, R. Gibb, G.D. Giles,
E.M. Hale, Vereker Hamilton, W.B. Wollen, Caton Woodville
and Frederick Villiers. 	 Some of these worked largely in
other genres even if, like Gibb, they were best known as
battle painters.	 There were other artists who sometimes
painted military scenes, for example, A.C. Gow whom Sir James
Caw described as "less a battle-painter than a painter of
genre subjects in military costume", 1° or Lucy Kemp-Welch,
primarily an animal painter. There were also artists who
painted other military subjects: illustration of uniforms,
for example Richard Simkin, and portraitists who sometimes
painted military portraits, for example Charles Furse who
painted Roberts. Though the distinction must be somewhat
arbitrary, only Barker, Lady Butler, Wollen, Woodville and
Villiers, and possibly Fripp and Giles, might be considered
primarily battle painters.	 The best known and most
influential were Lady Butler and Caton Woodville.
Paul Delaroche's response to photography, "From today,
painting is dead!" 21has been much quoted, and some art-
historians have interpreted later 19th century art largely
in terms of response to photography. 	 Yet apparently it
had little effect on battle painting before 1914. Possibly
it contributed to battle-painters' and the public's concern
for material accuracy.	 Some painters, including Alma-
Tadema used photographs.	 The battle painters made little
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use of them, usually preferring their own or special artists'
sketches.	 Caton Woodville sometimes supplemented his
sketches by taking photographs, and occasionally drew his
Illustrated London News pictures from others' photographs.12
Lady Butler wrote, "I have never used a Kodak myself, find-
ing snapshots of little value, but quick sketches done
unbeknown to the sketchee and a good memory serve much
better". 13 Photographs could not then challenge battle
painting, as photographs were monochrome and static and
could not portray a battle as did artists with colour,
movement, excitment and the combattants close and vivid.
Photographs, unlike artists, could not show individuals
and their emotions.	 War photographers could and did
select and omit, but they could not create that particular
image of war - imagined, romantic, heroic and idealised -
which characterised, and was expected in, the work of the
Victorian battle painters.14
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3. VICTORIAN BATTLE PAINTERS: INTRODUCTION
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ii. T.J. BARKER
In the 1860s and early '70s, as later, there were few
British battle painters.	 Pre-eminent among them was Thomas
Jones Barker (l815_82))	 The son of an artist, "Barker of
Bath", a popular and wealthy painter of landscape and rural
life, he trained with his father then went to Paris in 1835
and became a pupil of Horace Vernet, the popular and off icial-
ly honoured battle-painter and Orientalist. 2 Barker exhi-
bited at the Salon, winning three gold medals.
	
About 1845
he returned to England, and exhibited at the Academy, the
British Institution and the Royal Society of British Artists.
He painted historical and sporting scenes, portraits, and in
1861'Queen Victoria Presenting a Bible' (now in the National
Portrait Gallery). 	 Many of his paintings were of battle,
and after 1872 he exhibited only "war canvases". 	 He painted
scenes from the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimea, the Mutiny and
the Franco-Prussian War. 	 He had painted Crimean scenes
during the war, and returned to them in the 1870s, with
'Balaclava: one of the Six Hundred' exhibited at the 1874
Academy - and eclipsed by Miss Thompson's 'Roll Call' - and
'The Return through the Valley of Death' in 1876.	 In 1878
in a eulogistic article in the Art Journal, James Dafforne
claimed Barker was "the Horace Vernet of England, our
principal battle-painter. . .certainly he remains the master
of the battle-field among our artists". 3 He researched
for his paintings, acquiring military material and inter-
viewing and portraying surviving participants. 	 His
'Return Through the Valley of Death' was painted with the
help of Lord George Paget and other survivors, and every
55
soldier shown was "a portrait". He portrayed and, as had
his French master, glorified patriotic scenes: for example,
'Nelson receiving the Sword of the Spanish Admiral' and 'The
Relief of Lucknow'.	 His battle scenes were dramatic, with
close-packed charging horsemen, waving swords and clouds of
smoke, dead bodies but no agony.	 They were more stylised,
more in the manner of Vernet, less realistic, and inferior
to those of Elizabeth Butler.	 Nevertheless in ignoring him
Lady Butler and those who wrote about her exaggerated the
originality of her subject and her role as pioneer of
Victorian battle painting.4
After his death in 1882 his reputation soon evaporated.
Probably this was partly because his style, like his mentor's,
became despised as artificial and dmod: Vernet's reputation
in Britain much declined. Alice Meynell, for example, wrote
in 1887 in the Art Journal that, "The triumph and caracolling
S
and the glory of Horace Vernet were indeed past and gone",
and in 1902 Claude Philips scorned the "uninspired, and pre-
eminently bourgeois Horace Vernet. . .these flat, stale, and
unprofitable performances, by which no pulse is any longer
stirred". 6 Vernet was remembered but despised: his British
pupil was ignored and almost forgotten. 	 Villiers, reminis-
cing in 1907, mentioned he had bought one of Wellington's
hats formerly owned by "the famous battle-painter Mr. Jones
Barker". 7 Yet as early as 1887, only five years after
Barker's death, Walter Armstrong did not mention him in his
Jubilee article; nor did Spielmann in his Britannica
article. 8 For them Victorian battle painting began with
Elizabeth Butler.
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The most famous British battle painter was Miss
Elizabeth Thompson, later Lady Butler (1846-1933) whose
career was contemporary with the golden age of the special
war artists.' Like Prior she achieved fame in the 1870s and
portrayed late 19th century colonial campaigns, and like
Villiers her last major work portrayed the Great War.	 How-
ever, unlike them she never saw a battle. 	 When she first
exhibited in the 1870s the 'genre militaire' was, she later
claimed in her autobiography, choosing to Ignore Barker, "a
line of painting almost non-exploited by English artists"2
and, as her brother-in-law the critic Wilfrid Meynell
claimed, "a branch of art in which England had hitherto won
no victories".3
Like most war specials, she was from a middle-class
family - wealthy rentiers - had a childhood interest in war
and was art-school trained.	 After training at South
Kensington and in Italy, she exhibited religious and military
paintings but they were almost unnoticed. 	 The Franco-
Prussian War revived her interest in war and she attended
manoeuvres.	 A Manchester manufacturer who had bought one
of her sketches commissioned an oil painting. 4	She
painted a Crimean scene, 'The Roll Call' and in 1874 exhi-
bited it at the Royal Academy. 	 Her father had discouraged
her, arguing the Crimea was "forgotten". 	 In fact it was
sufficiently distant for interest in it to revive, while
the Franco-Prussian War increased British concern with war
and she had little competition as a military painter.5
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'The Roll Call' was an outstanding success, "the picture of
the Burlington House exhibition this season" and "the picture
of the year". 6	It "astonished the world", bringing celebrity
and establishing her as a leading artist. 	 Its purchaser who
had paid £126 was offered £1,000. 	 The Queen and the Prince
of Wales both wanted to buy it, and Victoria ultimately did,
and also commissioned another painting. 	 Miss Thompson sold
the copyright for £1,200: so profitable was the mass repro-
duction of engravings that popular artists could sell the
copyright for more than the actual painting. 	 She followed
'The Roll Call' by further successful historical battle
paintings - 'Quatre Bras', 'Balaclava', 'Inkerman'. 'The
Remnants of an Army' and 'Scotland for Ever!' - and scenes
from recent colonial wars including the Zulu War, the first
Boer War and the Egyptian campaign. 	 Though she never
repeated her outstanding successes of the '70s and early
'80s, she continued a successful military artist portraying
historical and contemporary wars, as well as illustrating
books and the Graphic.	 In 1877 she married William Butler,
the rising Wolseleyite, and until widowed in 1910 enjoyed
the privileged life of a senior officer's wife, marred only
by the period in the Boer War when Butler was vilified for
his role in South Africa.	 Following his attitude to the
Boer War, she painted almost no pictures of it.7
Her career exemplified the rewards of a successful
artist.	 She gained fame: following the 'Roll Call' the
press praised, and a quarter of a million photographs of
her were sold. 8	She was lionised and met leading artists,
royalty, aristocracy and senior army officers. 	 Her work
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was praised by artists and critics including Millais,
Meissonier, Tom Taylor of The Times, and the arbiter of mid-
Victorian artistic taste, "the greatest of living art-
critics", John Ruskin.	 In 1879 she was almost elected to
the Academy, losing by only two votes, and it was widely
believed that she deserved election; the Magazine of Art
in 1881 wrote that her "claim to admission has been publicly
recognised since her 'Quatre Bras' ratified the sudden
triumph of the previous year's 'Roll Call". 9	She was
elected to the Royal Institute of Painters in Water Colours,
and Princess Louise copied her work) 0	She was widely
regarded as the leading British military painter. 	 In her
Autobiography - a work characterised by selective reticence,
but not by modesty - she noted that a French critic had
written of her, "L'Angleterre n'a guêre qu'un peintre
militaire, c'est une femme". 11	Florence Nightingale,
Crimean veterans and other experienced soldiers praised her
work.	 The Duke of Cambridge declared of the 'Roll Call':
"It is astonishing to me how any young lady should have been
able to grasp the speciality of soldiers under the circum-
stances delineated in the picture. . .1 was struck by the
military character which pervades the grouping and express-
ion of the piece". 12	Wolseley, who loved battle pictures,
admired her Tel-el-Kebir painting and wished someone would
buy it and present it to him. 13 Engravings of her work
were hung "in the mess-rooms of the British Army.. .in Clubs,
Homes and Institutes") 4	She profited financially. 	 At
a time when families of the poor existed on a pound a week
and "a single lady can get on very nicely upon an income
of about sixty pounds" per annum, she sold paintings for
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over a thousand pounds.' 5 An exceptionally high proportion
of her paintings were engraved, and the engravings sold in
large numbers in Britain and overseas)-6 She gained help
with her painting.	 The General Omnibus Company sent her
horses to draw; cavalry charged for her; engineers formed
square and fired for her; and Zulu and Egyptian War veterans
posed for her.	 She was the most famous British woman
painter and exceptional as a woman painter not only in the
extent of her success and fame, but in that she was a recog-
nised leader of her genre)- 7 Her popularity and fame were
such that she so eclipsed Barker and other battle painters
of the '60s and '7Os that late Victorian and Edwardian art
critics saw her as the pioneer of British battle painting.
In 1887, in his Jubilee retrospect 'Victorian Fine Art' in
the Art Journal, Walter Armstrong claimed that the British
school of battle painters, "had its origin in the appearance,
at the Academy of 1874, of Miss Elizabeth Thompson's 'Roll
Call", and that her works aroused interest in battle
paintings and prepared the way for other battle painters.18
Similarly M.H. Spielmann, writing on British painting since
1875 for the 11th editIon of Encyclopaedia Britannica, began
his section on military painting with Lady Butler.
She was hardworking and thorough. 	 She read memoirs
and histories and interviewed participants. 	 She gathered
military equipment, used soldiers as models, and repeatedly
sketched men and horses. 	 She was painstaking for accuracy
of detail in uniforms and accoutrements. 	 For 'Quatre Bras'
she bought some rye in a field and had it trampled by
children.	 Especially after marriage, she knew soldiers of
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all ranks, and as a soldier's wife she felt, "the sickening
sensation on waking some morning when news of a fight is
expected of saying to themselves, "I may be a widow."19
Nevertheless, despite her efforts, her own attitudes and
those of the soldiers with whom she talked, excluded her from
the reality of battle experience.	 She noted that, "Men who
go through the horrors of war say little about them".2°
Men's attitudes to their experience, and what they believed
proper to tell ladies, limited their informing her. A young
man like Kipling could enter experiences closed to her.
Possibly had she talked more to Florence Nightingale and
other army nurses she might have learned more.	 However,
as a soldier's wife possibly she had to close her mind to
the dangers and horrors of war.	 To paint battle one needed
a tough-minded, even callous or brutal, acceptance of suffer-
ing, as with Caton Woodville; a fatalism; or a crusading
determination to end war, as possibly with Verestchagin; or
a mental detachment, an innocence or "doublethink" as,
apparently, with Elizabeth Butler.	 She claimed that, "If
I had ever seen the corner of a battlefield, I could never
21have painted another war picture".	 The Times obituary
tribute stated that she had, "an unconquerable optimism
which gladdened the hearts of those about her.. .Absolutely
unworldly in her life, she never lost her belief in
humanity". 22 This mentality underlay her battle painting
and its selection and omission.
As her writings showed, she was concerned with the
army and war largely as her visual spectacle, rather than
soldiers' experience. 	 She was fascinated by light, colour,
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shape and movement, by "picturesqueness" and visual drama.
She was thrilled by reviews and manoeuvres, and wrote in her
diary after seeing a cavalry charge, "What a sight to please
me!	 I feel a physical sensation of refreshment on such
occasions". 23	She herself, and press comment, claimed that
she showed the reality and sadness of war. 24 Some contem-
poraries were deeply moved by her paintings, even weeping at
them.	 She preferred not to portray "a conflict", enemies
actually fighting.	 She claimed a battle painter "should be
careful to keep himself at a distance, lest the ignoble and
vile details under his eyes should blind him irretrievably
to the noble things that rise beyond" and that, "Oh, yes,
there is a seamy side to all things, but it isn't my way to
turn it up more than is necessary". 25 She wrote of her
'Quatre Bras', "I suppose it would not have done to be
realistic to the fullest extent". 26	She wrote in her diary,
"I hope my military pictures will have moral and artistic
qualities not generally thought necessary to the military
genre". 27	She wrote that she was "impregnated...with the
warrior spirit in art".28
She was influenced by contemporary French painters:
by animal painters notably Rosa Bonheur, and by military
painters including Meissonier, Detaille and de Neuville.29
Though Ruskin claimed 'Quatre Bras' was "the first fine
pre-Raphaelite picture of battle we have had", her work,
in its small size, detail and finish, was similar to the
school of Meissonier. 3° She was a careful observer and
and a technically-skilled and innovative painter: one of
the first to correctly portray the movement of horses' legs,
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she had a remarkable gift for depicting movement. 	 Her work
was admired for its imagination, subject, colour, drama and
depiction of individual character and emotion. 	 Her paint-
ings "appealed. . . to the world at large by their element of
pathos, unmistakable but not obtrusive". 31	Soldiers
admired her accuracy of horses and materiel and critics,
though sometimes criticising her colouring; praised her
technique.	 Wilfrid Meynell noted the importance of drama
in her painting: "That was the secret of Lady Butler's
success in 'The Roll Call', 'Quatre Bras' and 'Scotland for
Ever !'
	
The moments of waiting are dramatic, the fury of
attack is dramatic, the reaction of victory is dramatic".32
The newspaper, periodicals and art press repeatedly praised
her work. For example, in 1874 the Art Journal joined the
praise of the 'Roll Call', calling it "a genuine expression
of Art, as well as a popular picture. . .this beautiful
picture".	 It praised the portrayal of individual character
and claimed the picture showed, "a terrible quietude and
passionate severity of absolute fact. 	 The supreme merit
of the work, in an artistic sense, lies in this very quality
of perfect self-control that refuses to emphasize the misery
that is already great enough, and is content with the reserve
and silence proper to reality". 33 The Annual Register also
praised it, claiming, "It is impossible for a narrative to
be told more simply, truly or pathetically; the incidents
touch the heart, the drawing and the execution go direct to
nature". 34	In 1879 the Art Journal praised her 'Remnants
of an Army': "Elizabeth Butler's terribly striking canvas"5
In 1880 the Magazine of Art reviewing her 'Defence of Rorke's
Drift' praised her "vivid imagination" and "grasp of personal
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character", and her pictures "fire and energy" and
"scrupulous, quiet and close fidelity to the very smallest
accidents of individual character and peculiarity". 36 The
Journal praised 'Rorke's Drift', though criticising its
colouring and composition, as full of dramatic incident;
"The action and expression of some of the individuals are
very good, notably of the young soldier in the foreground
kneeling and reloading his rifle". 37	In 1881 M.P. Jackson
in the Magazine of Art praised "the infinitely talented
designer of horses in the pictures of 'Balaclava' and 'The
Remnants of an Army'". 38 The Magazine claimed her 'Scot-
land for Ever!' was "her chief work up to date", and praised
"her extraordinary mastery of movement", her portrayal of
horses, and the expressions of the soldiers: "In others
shines the indescribable 'light of battle' and every face
is that of a separate, individual and distinct man". 39 In
1882 the Journal praised her 'Floreat Etona!', though
criticising its colour, as "full of vigorous design".4°
It claimed that her early paintings "illustrated the
Crimean campaign in a manner in which none other of our
great wars have even been attempted. 	 It praised her
'Return from Inkerman' as better than her previous work
and expressing "that higher phase of Art, 'the pathetic'...
in every group, nay, in every figure, there is a mournful
story which requires but little effort to imagine". 	 Her
works "are not the mere occupants of one's thoughts for a
moment, but may be returned to again and again with the
certainty that fresh incidents will be discovered, and
new interest aroused".41
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Responses to her work, while mostly favourable, were
mixed.	 Some suggested her initial success was fortuitous
rather than earned: the result of her youth and sex, and the
Prince of Wales' praise at the Academy. 42 They criticised
such detail as horses' movement, 43 and suggested she would
be unable to repeat the quality of the 'Roll Call' and her
reputation would quickly collapse. 44 Her work was some-
times criticised, particularly from the l890s. 	 Early
reviews, even when largely laudatory, criticised her colour-
ing , and in 1882 the Art Journal claimed that in the 'Roll
Call' and 'Balaclava', "the theatrical element forced itself
to the front, and a prominence was imparted to ghastly
realities of warfare which had hitherto been unattempted,
but with which we are only now too familiar, thanks to the
production of the French school". 45	In 1897 the Magazine
of Art alleged she was a warning to women artists: "carried
away by foolish applause and exaggerated praise. . .stunted
in her artistic growth - her evolution as an artist fatally
cut short."	 It condemned her 'Steady the Drums and Fifes!'
as discreditable to the Academy, "a mere travesty of a
painting". 46	In 1908 Sir James Caw compared her unfavour-
ably to Robert Gibb and claimed that she, "despite her
gifts, is apt to show herself the talented amateur".47
Such criticism was from painterly criteria; not of her
choice of subject, degree of realism, or for not showing
the reality of war.	 Later the Connoisseur criticised her
work for sometimes erring towards theatrical sentiment,
especially 'After Balaclava' and 'Steady the Drums and
Fifes!'	 They were unrealistic because they exaggerated
British soldiers' failings.	 In the former she painted
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the dazed exceptions, not the majority who were willing to
charge again, and in the latter the soldiers appeared too
nervous: "one can confidently argue that they presented a
bolder front, for half their number fell on the field before
the French left them in possession". 48 One unusual critic
was her own husband.	 An idiosyncratic Gladstonian radical
"political general" sympathetic to Zulus, Egyptians and
Boers, he was critical of colonial war and from ideological
motive disliked her colonial war pictures. 	 He said of her
'Rorke's Drift', "One more picture like this and you will
drive me mad", and loathed her Tel-el-Kebir picture 'After
the Battle' telling her its subject, the slaughter of
fellahin, was unfit for art. 49 However such criticism was
exceptional.	 That a lady, who had never seen war or battle,
should paint battle was, if initially with some surprise,
accepted.	 Criticism was far outweighed by popularity and
praise.	 'Steady and Drums and Fifes!' was given a place of
honour by the hanging committee, admired by the Prince of
Wales and praised by Meynell as "one of the most important
of her works". 5° She continued a successful military
artist to the end of the Great War. 51 Like Villiers and
Woodville, she portrayed the Great War as she had 19th
century campaigns: she painted not gas on the Western Front
but cavalry charges in the Near East.52
Matthew Lalumia in his 1983 Victorian Studies
article, 'Realism and anti-aristocratic sentiment in
Victorian depictions of the Crimean War' has related
Elizabeth Butler's paintings to civilian criticism of army
officers and demand for army reform. 53 He claimed that
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at the time of the Crimean War the home-based artists, like
Punch cartoonists, in their paintings no longer glorified
generals but expressed criticism of aristocratic officers
and praise and sympathy for other ranks, and especially for
the wounded.	 He claimed that in the 1870s, at the time of
the Cardwell reform debates and renewed controversy on the
purchase of commissions, "a second generation of Crimean
War paintings" by Elizabeth Butler - notably the 'Roll Call'
and 'Balaclava' - further expressed sympathy and praise for
common soldiers, implied criticism of aristocratic officer
bunglers, and showed not military glory but the horror of
war.	 However, his interpretation, and especially his
suggestion that Lady Butler's paintings continued anti-
aristocratic, anti-officer attitudes, is mistaken. 	 Con-
temporaries, as the press comment showed, saw her paintings
as portraying the horror, destruction and squalor of war,
in contrast to "the conventional battle painters". 54 But
they did not perceive them as showing the futility or
ignobility of war. 	 They still perceived the horror of war
in the context of sacrifice, heroism and the, albeit
regrettable, sometimes necessity of war. 	 The greater the
horror and destruction - as in the charge of the Light
Brigade - the greater was the soldiers' nobility and
heroism.	 Lady Butler's Crimean paintings should be per-
ceived in the context of her other military paintings and
of her attitudes, and of such facts that both Queen Victoria
and Tom Taylor of The Times who admired her work, also
admired the work of Caton Woodville. 55 Her paintings were
not anti-officer.	 The most prominent figure in the 'Roll
Call' was General Higginson, the leading figure in
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'Scotland for Ever!' was an officer, and 'After the Battle'
portrayed Wolseley as the central figure, the acclaimed
heroic victor.	 Her 'Balaclava' was, in its lack of emphasis
on officers, exceptional.	 Moreover in later 19th century
battle pieces, such as Caton Woodville's, officers were
again prominent, and heroic.
Her paintings were largely accurate in equine and matriel
detail, though not always in battlefield condition of uni-
forms and equipment, which she portrayed as cleaner and
smarter than in reality. 	 For example, the Scots Greys at
Waterloo had been soaked by rain and the dye from their
jackets had run into their white belts, unlike in 'Scotland
for Ever!' 56 Her paintings were dramatic and heroic.
Though perceived by contemporaries as realistic and moving,
in fact they romanticised battle and omitted its horror,
the serious wounds and the agony of the wounded and dying.
'Scotland For Ever! ' for example showed no wounds or blood
and only two casualties, neither prominent, but merging
into the charging mass.	 Contemporaries valued her work for
its message of military qualities, nobility within war, and
individual heroism.	 She was "the painter of heroes".57
She portrayed war as many of her contemporaries perceived
it: a warrior ethos, shown with pathos but without brutality
or agony.	 Her influence is conjectural, but she both pro-
fited from and reinforced late 19th century popular mili-
tarism and the changed, if still ambivalent, attitudes to
the army.	 Meynell claimed that, "Lady Butler has done
for the soldier in Art what Mr. Kipling has done for him
in Literature". 58 Her significance - the significance of
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her works' popularity, praise and honour including from the
military - was that she expressed the dominant view of war
and was, as Meynell stated, "representative of her time".59
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iii. ELIZABETH BUTLER: NOTES
1. My account of Elizabeth Butler is partly from Wilfrid
Meynell, The Life and Work of Lady Butler (Art Annual,
1898); Elizabeth Butler, From Sketch-Book and Diary
(1909); An Autobiography (1922); Michael Lee, 'A
Centenary of Military Painting: The Life and Work of
Elizabeth, Lady Butler', Army Quarterly XCV (1967);
Germaine Greer, The Obstacle Race (1979). There is
more written, during her life and since, on her than
on any other Victorian battle painter. My account
concentrates on values expressed and contemporaraneous
responses, previously not so fully considered.
2. Butler 46, 95.
3. Meynell 3.
4. Northern industrialists were major patrons of Victorian
artists and she sold several works to them, but
considered them hardly worth mentioning in her
Autobiography.
5. Butler 95. Cf late 1920s, early '30s writing on the
Great War.
6. Annual Register 1874, 366; obituary, Times 3 Oct 1933,3.
7. Lee 93.
8. Meynell 6. On the fashion for collecting photographs of
celebrities (300 to 400 million sold annually),
H. & A. Gersheim, A Concise History of Photography
(1971) 117-8.




13. Wolseley to Louisa Wolseley, 17 Mar '85, Letters 207.
14. Meynell 11. On reproductions in an Australian military
club, Graham Mclnnes, The Road to Gundagai (1965,'85)
231.
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15. After the 'Roll Call''s success she sold two pictures
for £1,200: 'Quatre Bras' for £1,126 to Mr. Galloway,
'The Return form Inkerman' for £3,000 to the Fine Art
Society.
16. Bnzit claimed she was the English equivalent to Vernet,
"le peintre populaire anglais", Bênzit X 160.
G. Greer suggested she was, "perhaps the last European
painter to catch the imagination of the masses".
17. The only other noteworthy British woman painter of war
pictures was Lucy Kemp-Welch (1869-1958) who painted
mainly other subjects, but a few war pictures at the
turn of the century and during the Great War.
18. Armstrong	 ('87) 176.
19. Butler 194.
20. lb 331.
21-2. Obituary tribute, Times 4 Oct 1933, 17. Her religion
contributed to her attitudes.
23. Butler 245.
24. lb 168, 188.
25. lb 47, 205.
26. lb 142.
27. Diary 3 May 1875, quo i] 135.
28. lb 46.
29. lb 127, 138; Lee 90.
30. John Ruskin, Academy Notes (1875) quo Greer 84;
Greer 84, 108.
31. Times 3 Oct 1933, 7.
32. Meynell 12.
33. AJ ('74) 163-4.
34. AR 1874 366.
35. 1 .!:t ('79) 173.
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36. MA ('79-80) 278-9.
37. AJ ('81) 185.
38. MA ('81) 125.
39. MA ('81) 304.
40. AJ ('82) 211.
41. AJ ('82) 352.
42-3. AR 1984 366; Armstrong 176.
44. AJ ('75) 220.
45. AJ ('82) 352.
46. MA ('97) 157. The picture was one of her favourites, and
was acquired by the Regiment. Recent opinion of her
work has been largely favourable e.g. Wood 76,
Greer 83-4.
47. James L. Gaw, Scottish Painting (1908) 267.
48. Anon, 'The exhibition of naval and military works at the
Guildhall', Connoisseur XLII (1915) 248. Cf 	 Benzit
160.
49. E. McCourt, Remember Butler (1967) 140,158. Later
she destroyed the painting.
50. Butler 261, Meynell 16.
51. Butler 321-31, Lee 94.
52. Butler 329, 331, Lee 94.
53. Matthew Lalumia, 'Realism and anti-aristocratic sentiment




56. J. Keegan, The Face of Battle (1976 '78) 137; v his
comments on 'Scotland for Ever! 1 , plate 6. See also Boris
Mollo, 'The Depiction of Uniform' in Usherwood& Spencer-Smit
57. Meynell 8. Apparently she attempted to show the horror of war
through facial expression(e.g. 'Roll Call' ,'Balaclava')
58. lb 31.	 rather than wounds.
59. lb 30.
CORRIGENDUM (to p 59) Contrary to Autobiography 102, 111, .not
E. Butler but Charles Galloway, purchaser of 'The Roll Call'
sold its copyright, Paul Usherwood and Jenny Spencer-Smith,
Lady Butler: Battle Artist 1846-1933(N.A.M. 1987) 42-3.
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iv. CATON WOODVILLE
Another leading battle painter and war illustrator was
Richard Caton Woodville (l856_l927).1 He was born in London,
the son of an American artist of "English extraction" and
his half-German, half-Russian wife, also an artist. Woodville
studied painting and fought duels in Dusseldorf, and his
German experience may have influenced him towards militarism.
He wrote that, "I was brought up in the midst of Biblical
art, but I soon turned from it to battle pictures, for I had
always taken the keenest interest in military matters. 2 He
then travelled in the barbaric Balkans, by his own account
at great risk of murder. 	 Back in London in 1877 at the
time of the Russo-Turkish War, "when the British public was
taking one of its periodic fits of interest in battle paint-
ings and drawings", he offered a drawing to the Illustrated
London News, "the foremost illustrated journal in the world"
Its proprietor, William Ingram, liked his work, employed him
and became a close friend, and he continued on the staff of
4.
the I.L.N. for almost his entire working life, frequently
contributing full-page and double-page drawings, on a
limited range of subjects. 	 He did not portray the
impoverished, insubordinate or humdrum, and very seldom the
humorous.	 He was essentially, like the I.L.N. a chronicler
and celebrator of the Establishment. 	 He portrayed 'Society':
the sleek and glossy rich with their rounded statuesque
women, amusing themselves at Henley, skating or at balls.
He portrayed Prince Victor's coming-of-age ball at Sandring-
ham, and the Artists' Costume Ball at Prince's Hall with
the Prince and Princess of Wales, the Prince portrayed
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flatteringly less corpulent than the real 'Turn Turn'. 5 The
I.L.N. published fiction in its Christmas and Summer issues,
and he illustrated some of its historical romances with
swashbuckling scenes, and the western fiction of Bret Harte
with galloping cowboys.	 He also portrayed some foreign
events, especially German. 	 He drew a full-paged equestrian
portrait of Bismarck, with a background of massed troops, for
the obituary supplement, and in 1898 drew Wilhelm II, star-
ing, helmeted and white-cloaked, riding imperiously with his
entourage into Jerusalem. 6 However it was as a military
and war artist that he was most employed and became best
known.	 The I.L.N. also used other military artists, but
published more of his work than that of any other home-based
military artist, and because of its quality, especially its
vividness, and its quantity, he became probably the most
influential of the illustrated press military artists.
Probably more than any other artist he formed the public's
image of war, before 1914.
He drew imaginative reconstructions based in varying
degrees on imagination, special artists' and others' sketches
and photographs, his own observations, and informationavail-
able to him in London.	 He occasionally drew foreign con-
flicts: redskins galloping to attack a mailcoach by moon-
light, Spanish troops and Riff fighting in Morocco, cossacks
in Central Asia.	 Mostly, however, he drew British imperial
forces.	 He portrayed the Zulu War and the death of the
Prince Imperial.	 He drew royal reviews and a long series
of reconstructions of 'Battles of the British Army', showing
victories from the 17th to the 19th century, for example,
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Wolfe climbing the Heights of Abraham, and highianders with
broadswords about to charge the French.	 As 'Our Special
Artist' in Egypt in 1882, arriving after the fighting, he
portrayed celebrated charges or imagined dramatic episodes
of the campaign, usually with mounted troops or highianders.
He portrayed Tel-el-Kebir on a special four-page foldout
supplement; close-packed heroic highianders charging an
7
Egyptian battery.	 Back in England in 1885 he portrayed the
Sudan campaign, largely with dramatic incidents of mounted
troops.	 He drew, for example, 'An affair with outposts';
British cavalry with rearing horses and flashing swords,
attacking Mandists at a waterhole. 8 He drew 'A convoy of
wounded', the wounded riding on horses and supported by
walking soldiers: the wounds were hardly shown, conventiona-
used, without horror or agony. 9 He drew 'War in the
desert': a running fight, a fast-moving scene of camel-
mounted British pursing camel-mounted arabs, racing along-
side and aiming at each other: again a dramatic composition,
with heroic British and staring eyes. 1° He portrayed the
Matabele War, the Chitral campaign, the Sudan reconquest
and the Boer War, with repeated dramatic scenes of charges
and close-packed m1es.	 He drew the Cordons charging at
Elandslaagte amid exploding shells and rearing horses. He
drew the 5th Lancers charging at Elandslaagte: a dramatic,
packed mass of men and horses with Bugler Sherlock firing,
and a Boer being speared. 11 He drew 'A Night Attack':
close-bunched infantry, dramatically grouped, led by a
prominent officer with drawn sword and revolver, advancing
across rocks, under f ire.' 2	Some were falling, but again
there was no agony, and only conventional wounds. He drew
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'Boer Tactics', Boers using a white flag to lure British
troops; a Boer wearing a red cross armband waving a white
flag while near him, hidden bunched implausibly close behind
rocks, Boers waited to fire on British troops, advancing
13in the background, implausibly close to the Boers.
In addition to his I.L.N. work, he was also at the
same time a successful painter.	 As in the I.L.N., on canvas
he portrayed, largely from imagination, heroic incidents of
British wars, historical and contemporary. 	 As well as his
battle pieces, by which he was best known, he painted
"cabinet-sized single figure subjects, which, in their care-
ful manner and high finish, were rather suggestive of
Meissonier," 14
 and occasionally other genre, for example,
'Trial of a Woman taken in Adultery'. 	 At the 1879 Academy
he "first came to the front with his picture of Frederick
the Great before Leuthen" which was praised by Tom Taylor
in the Times) 5 From then on he exhibited there annually,
almost all war scenes, and later some royalty. 	 His success
led in 1882 to a commission from the Fine Art Society,
publishers of reproductions including of Lady Butler's work,
to paint the charge of the Household Brigade at Kassassin.
In Egypt for this, he designed uniforms for the new Egyptian
army and was commissioned by Queen Victoria to paint the
Duke of Connaught and the Guards at the battle of Tel-el-
Kebir: presumably intended partly for her plan to have
Connaught ultimately succeed Cambridge as Commander-in-
16	 .Chief.	 The painting of Connaught on horseback at the
head of his men, pleased the Queen and was exhibited at the
,,17Academy inscribed "painted for H.M. the Queen . 	 This led
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to further royal commissions, including painting the wedding
of Princess Beatrice in 1885, and Victoria, Edward VII and
George V continued to favour him. 	 Despite an ancestor who
signed the American declaration of independence, he proved
an accomplished courtier and was rewarded by a place in the
suite of Prince Albert Victor when he visited India. 	 Albert
Victor, nicknamed 'Collars and Cuffs' was educationally back-
ward, lethargic and so scandalously dissipated that it has
been alleged he was Jack the Ripper. 	 Woodville, however in
his memoirs omitted this and wrote of him in terms used by
non-courtiers for persons worthy of respect; and he continued
to paint royal portraits. 	 He gained further commisions from
Indian princes and Austrian and other foreign royalty. 	 His
success promoted by royal approval, he commanded high prices:
over a thousand pounds a canvas. 	 He also continued to work
for the I.L.N. as a London-based artist, not a special war
artist.	 He was a dapper man-about-town and clubman with
waxed moustaches and a house and studio in the fashionable
18
artists' quarter of St. John's Wood. 	 Though he chose to
omit it from Who's Who and from his memoirs, he was married,
with a son who also became an artist and illustrator. 19 He
moved with a fast bohemian and sporting set and, like
successful specials, shared the values and tastes of regular
officers and got on well with them. 	 He enjoyed drinking,
spearing boars and shooting elephants and other big game,
and he wrote articles on sport and travel. 	 He wrote that,
"Sport with gun and rod became a mania with me, and my
collection of sporting guns and rifles as well as fishing
rods became daily larger". 2° He was an enthusiastic
imperialist and eulogised British rule in India: "Nobody
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knows what England's power means until has he seen India.
Our splendid Indian soldiers are the envy of every nation;
the roads of the empire are unequalled, and its public build-
ings are magnificent". 21 He shared contemporary hostility
to miscegenation, and warned against English girls marrying
Indians,
"It is shameful how many young English girls are
misled by these Indian students who come over
here with lies about their nobility and riches,
and are persuaded to throw their lOt in with
these men, only to learn on reaching India and
their 'husband's' home, how shamefully they have
been hoodwinked.	 The wives of the man into
whose zenana they are forced, or the husband
himself when tired of them, soon put them out
of their way, mostly by doses of finely chopped
bamboo in their food, which causes them to die
in the greatest agony. 	 The life of English
girls who marry natives is seldom longer than
two or three years after reaching India".22
From 1879 he served as a Yeomanry officer and
acquired, "knowledge useful to painter of military
pictures". 23	His training included, "our duty in aid of
the civic power": he commented that, "This has not been
done since the bread riots in the early nineteenth century
at Manchester, for the riots were suppressed by the yeo-
manry so absolutely thoroughly that the authorities have
since not dared to repeat the experiment". 24 He was
tough-minded and brave, sometimes jocularly callous, and,
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as he proudly recounted in his memoirs, repeatedly risked
danger and had hair-breadth escapes from death, in duelling,
the Balkans and hunting in Morocco. 	 Though he visited
various campaigns he nevertheless, to his disappointment,
was never in battle.	 In Who's Who and elsewhere he sug-
gested but did not specifically claim battle experience
and as Villiers noted, "never witnessed a shot fired in
anger". 25 His work was popular and he became celebrated
as a battle painter.	 His paintings included dramatic
incidents from the Napoleonic wars, the Crimea, the Mutiny,
the Afghan War - his 'Maiwand: Saving the Guns' (1882) was
probably his best-known picture and was much praised - the
Egyptian compaign and the Gordon relief expedition.	 In
1898 he painted '"The Cock 0' the North": storming of
Dargai heights by the 1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders '.
He painted the charge of the 21st Lancers at Omdurman, and
well-known incidents from the Boer War including, 'A Chip
of the Old Block', Bugler Sherlock with the 5th Lancers
charging at Elandslaagte, 26 '"The Last Shot at Colenso",
Lieutenant Roberts earns his V.C.' and 'All that was Left
of Them', the heroic last stand in 1901 of C Squadron, 17th
Lancers, commissioned by the Illustrated Sporting and
Dramatic News and published with its 1902 Christmas issue7
These were reproduced as large photogravures, oleolitho-
graphs and chromolithographs.	 He also drew the 'Absent-
Minded Beggar' used by the "Absent-Minded Beggar" Fund to
accompany Kipling's verse. 	 It was much reproduced in
different media - including medals, wall plaques, ceramic
figurines and Mappin and Webb bronzes "in the well-known
khaki tint"28 - and became for contemporaries an enduring
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29image from the war, "everywhere remembered". 	 His I.L.N.
pictures were reprinted in the popular Harmsworth "instant
history" With the Flag to Pretoria, and his portrayals
influenced those of other artists who exploited the illu-
strated press demand for pictures of the war. 	 Indicative
of his perception of war as picturesque spectacle was his
dislike of the service dress introduced after the Boer War:
he wrote in 1913, "our men in service kit remind one of
navvies with a dash of the convict about them". 3° The
Great War he portrayed for the I.L.N. as he had earlier
wars: again highlanders, cavalry, dramatic charges and
heroic stands. 3' Throughout the war and after, he con-
tinued to exhibit at the Academy battle paintings: in 1918,
for example, 'The 2nd Battalion Manchester Regiment taking
six German field-guns near St. Quentin'. 32	After Villiers'
death in 1922 he was regarded as, "the last of the famous
war artists of the older school". 33	In 1927 his last
major painting 'Hallow-e'en: Stand of the London Scottish
on Messines Ridge', was hung in the Academy, and by royal
command at Buckingham Palace. 34 Soon after this - old,
ill, depressed, afraid of being an invalid and believing
35himself "a finished man", he shot himself.
Known as "a Bohemian with a brush" and "a true
Bohemian of the old school", he nevertheless researched to
meticulous accuracy the minutiae of military material
which so obsessed his royal patrons. 36 He preferred not
to use living models, worked quickly, and tended to leave
commissions to the last moment, then rush them. 37 His
style was distinctive. 	 His I.L.N. drawings were clean-
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lined and carefully finished, contrasting with the sketchy
smudgy style some favoured. 38 His were the most dramatic,
and strained, of the British battle pictures. 	 His paint-
ings were more detailed, more finished and less impressionis-
tic than others', though not than Lady Butler's or G.D.Giles'.
His pictures were dynamic and picturesque, the men grouped
and posed with eyes staring, defiant, lunging and thrusting,
swords and bayonets flashing, movement and excitement,
little blood, conventionalised wounds and no agony. 	 He
showed the British as dominant and triumphant - or, except-
ionally, in a heroic last stand, even in compaigns that
were, when he drew, not successful. 	 His 1882 I.L.N. draw-
ing 'Surrender' was typical; a shifty cringeing Egyptian
infantryman surrendering to a mounted British cavalry
trooper pointing a cocked revolver at his head. 39 His
1889 drawing 'Capturing enemy supplies' showed British
cavalry galloping with drawn swords towards arabs grouped
by laden camels, surrendering. 40	In November 1899 he
drew dejected Boer prisoners guarded by heroic, moustached
slouch-hatted mounted imperial troops. 41 His British were
tall and soldierly, their horses magnificent and high-
spirited.	 They were masterful, sometimes imperious, with
panache and never scruffy; if sometimes rather theatrical
and given to redundant gesture such as painting dramatically
towards a close and very obvious enemy. 42 He showed
officers as prominent and heroic and portrayed such military
celebrities as White and Baden-Powell as impressive and
heroic.	 His soldiers seldom took cover but bunched and
skylined picturesquely, even in the Boer War, and even when
they lay prone on the veld they still bunched close together.
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His 1894 I.L.N. double-page drawing 'A Critical Moment' was
typical: a few heroic, closely-grouped, moustached and slouch-
hatted Rhodesians outnumbered by a mass of Matabele warriors
43
- an archetypal image of colonial war. 	 When in 1899 he
portrayed Baden-Powell as 'The Defender of Maf eking' it was
by a conventional dramatic cavalry portrayal, with Baden-
Powell on a galloping horse, waving his sword in the air,
leading a charger The classic iconography of late 19th
century British imperialism was the work of Illustrated
London News artists and pre-eminently of Caton Woodville.
The late Victorian imperial "hero of heroes" was
Gordon, and memories of him revived with the reconquest of
the Sudan.	 While for Salisbury and the "official mind"
the reconquest was primarily the implementation of their
defensive Nile valley strategy, for many British it was,
as Villiers wrote, "Kitchener's expedition. . .to avenge the
death of General Charles Gordon" and the continuation of
his crusade. 45 Woodville painted several pictures of the
Sudan campaign. The Queen had long been emotionally
involved with Gordon's fate, and kept his Bible in an
enamel and crystal casket beside a marble bust of him:
after the memorial service at Khartoum she wrote in her
journal, "Surely he is avenged". 46	At the Queen's
request, Woodville in 1899 painted the Gorden memorial
service at Khartoum.	 He also expressed the emotional
imperialist attitude to Gordon in another, symbolic paint-
ing for the Queen. 	 In May 1899 Sir Almeric Fitzroy saw
it displayed at Windsor Castle, and described it in his
diary,
"Caton Woodville's picture, "At Last", was on view
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in the great corridor. 	 Across the waste
of desert lies the British bivouac after
Omdurman beneath the star-strewn canopy of
an African sky.	 The thin columns of
smoke rising perpendicularly from the
camp-fires express eloquently the still-
ness of the atmosphere; one or two High-
land soldiers sentinel the foreground,
and in the extreme distance a lurid glare
hangs over Omdurman...But these are only
accessories: in middle air, just above
the sleeping host, extended in the arms
of three celestial bearers, is the body
of the heroic Gordon passing to its
eternal rest.	 A symbol of struggle
tranquillised by achievement, of death
that receives a higher consideration
from the delay of its reward, of
apotheosis that will endure, and form
part of the nation's panoply, as it
awaits the trials that are to come".47
Woodville himself asserted the ideological role of his mili-
tary genre and in his memoirs, noting how many of his pic-
tures had been exported, complained of British indifference
to military pictures, in contrast to continental enthusiasm.
"It is a curious thing how little the English
public care for military pictures.. .After
such a war as ours in South Africa, if it
had been fought by the French or the
Germans, one would have seen miles of
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canvas covered with the brave deeds done
by their soldiers, to teach the heroic
history of the army to the future genera-
tions and to inoculate them with the
spirit of the defence of their countries"8
Nevertheless, he was fortunate in working when British enthu-
siasm for military art was probably at its zenith, and his
career was another example of the rewards, financial and
social, than attainable by the successful battle painter.
Like the specials, he was not modest: in Who's Who and his
memoirs he asserted his foreign decorations.
His work was sometimes criticised. 	 One critic
called it, "an artist's victory over many a British defeat,"49
and in 1883 the Magazine of Art reviewing the Fine Art
Society's exhibition of paintings of the Egyptian war, con-
demned his Kassassin as, "an ill-considered nightmare.. . its
draughtsmanship is melodramatic, its colour is far more
ingenious than real". 5°	 In 1908 Sir James Caw claimed his
battle paintings were vivacious and immediately effective,
but that his "chic and easy method is frequently suggestive
of the hurry of the weekly illustration". 5' Later the
Connoisseur claimed that though he put plenty of energy
into his painting of the 2nd Manchesters, "his combatants
are rather of the stage than the battlefield, each
strenuously exerting himself with voice and weapon at the
same moment in order to make as much tumult as possible.52
Despite such criticism, and some inaccuracies, his work
continued popular.	 His style was imitated by other
artists working for the illustrated press, especially those
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whom the Boer War gave unwonted opportunity for war pictures,
and his pictures were crudely copied for magic lantern
slides. 53	His pictures were used in Cassell's British
Battles on Land and Sea and other popular histories and
encyclopedias, becoming for millions their unquestioned
image of historical reality. 54 Many admired his work,
professional soldiers admired its accuracy of detail, its
colour and movement. 55 Foreign governments honoured it by
decorations, including the French Palmes acadmiques for
his Napoleonic battle scenes. 	 Millais praised it and said
he should be an R.A., and in 1882 he was elected R.I. 56 He
was praised as 'the English Meissonier". 57 In his 1887
Jubilee evaluation of British art, Walter Armstrong wrote
of the battle painters who followed Lady Butler: "Of these
certainly the most gifted is Mr. Caton Woodville whose
'Saving the Guns, Maiwand' and 'Kassassin' are among the
ablest pictures of battle our day has produced". 58	In
1897 the Art Journal praised his "remarkable power."59
In 1900 the Illustrated London News praised his 'Gordon
Memorial Service': "Lord Kitchener has never been portrayed
in a more impressive picture". 6° Later the Connoisseur
praised his 'Maiwand' as, "most spirited. . . it realises the
movement and action of frantically galloping horses with a
vigour that carries conviction." 61 Villiers claimed he
was the best British battle painter and wrote that, "Next
to de Neuville and Verestchagin the greatest painter of
war pictures is undoubtedly Mr. Caton Woodville.. . in his
62pictures is all the real dash and movement of war".
It was war as his contemporaries perceived it.
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V. ROBERT GIBB
Scotland had a proud military tradition and in the 19th
century, following the lead of George IV and Victoria, the
highianders, formerly despised as barbaric, became for the
English and lowland Scots romantically fashionable.	 New
tartans were Invented and Wilhelm II dressed himself in
tartan as an, albeit Wagnerian, Scottish chief. 	 Scottish
military enthusiasm was shown by the disproportionally high
number of Scots in the Volunteers.' Scottish regiments
were prominent in 19th century wars and, much featured in
the press, became royal and popular favourites, to the
annoyance of English county regiments. 2 After Dargal a
private of the Derbyshire Regiment wrote, "They will praise
the kilt regiment.	 It's no use an English regiment trying
to get on when there is a regiment with the kilts". 3 The
Irish contribution, despite Kipling's 'Soldiers Three',
never similarly captured the popular Imagination. 4 The
emphasis on highland regiments was continued by special war
artists and battle painters.	 Scotland had its own art
institutions, largely centred in Edinburgh and led by the
Royal Scottish Academy, and in the 19th century painting
flourished. 5 The subjects favoured were similar to those
at Burlington House: iandscape, 'genre', classical and
portrait.	 It was Indicative of the attitudes of British
artists that, despite Scottish military pride, there were
almost no Scottish battle painters. 	 The only notable
Scottish battle painter was Robert Gibb (1845_1932).6 As
Sir James Caw wrote, "Robert Gibb, taking the exploits of
the Scottish regiments as motives for a series of powerful
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battle-pictures, struck a patriotic vein of his own".7
Robert Gibb's career followed a pattern common with
successful professional artists, though typically of Scot-
land with its more open and meritocratic society, his family
origin was socio-economically lower than that of many
English artists.	 The son of a builder, he was apprenticed
as a lithographer, then art-trained at the Life School of
the Royal Scottish Academy.	 In the 1860s and '70s he
painted romantic genre, literary and historical scenes such
as 'The Death of Marmion' (1873) and 'The Death of St.
Columba' (1876).	 He also, like many other professional
artists, painted portraits: an important source of income
and useful contacts. In 1878, several years after Elizabeth
Butler's much-publicised initial success, and the year of the
Russian war scare and jingoism, he began to paint battle
pictures.	 Like Elizabeth Butler he chose Crimean scenes,
which he meticulously researched with reading, veterans,
uniforms and accoutrements. 	 His 1878 'Comrades' was
followed in 1881 by 'The Thin Red Line', inspired by his
reading Kinglake.	 Like the 'Roll Call', this picture was
a sensational success, and established his reputation.
Exhibited at the Royal Scottish Academy it caused a "furore",
and secured his election to full membership of the Academy.
The art press praised it.	 The Art Journal stated that
"the first place in the collection is taken by 'The Thin
Red Line", praised its detail and intensity and noted,
approving, that "the actual horrors of war are not made
prominent". 8 George Halkett wrote in the Magazine of Art
that it was "the success of the year": its subject
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"intensely dramatic" yet wisely avoiding melodrama by
"reticence in the ghastly parts of the picture": it "will
compare with the best work in a similar vein". 9 Exhibited
in 1882 at Burlington House, in the same exhibition as Mrs.
Butler's 'Floreat Etona!', it was further praised.	 "Sent
on tour, it carried his name far and wide", 1° and many
engravings of it were sold.	 It remained his most popular
picture.	 It was praised for its ideological and inspirat-
ional message: "this wall of brave men, this sentiment so
nobly expressed".	 Its lasting popularity probably
resulted from its vividly expressing a Victorian national
myth: the heroic, morally-superior British few defeating
the numerically superior enemy.
From then on he painted, intermittently, battle scenes,
though these remained a minority - only five from 1881 to
1916 - of the works he exhibited which were mostly portraits
with some historical, genre and scenes of Egypt.	 Yet it
was these few battle paintings which won him fame, and on
which contemporary critiques of his work concentrated)2
He painted scenes of the Crimea, Waterloo and, with 'Dargai',
of recent imperial war.	 They continued successful; for
example in 1900 at the Royal Scottish Academy, as the Art
Journal noted, "Mr. Gibb's large, stirring battle piece,
'Saving the Colours', has been viewed with great admiration"3
'Dargai', with its subtle tone of blue carried throughout
the picture, was considered by critics artistically superior
though, as the Connoisseur commented it would, "probably
never secure the same popularity as 'The Thin Red Line' or
'Saving the Colours' in which the human interest is more
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strongly emphasised". 14 His paintings were of infantry,
usually highianders, in battle "in their moments of sharpest
trial"; 15	in colourful, thrilling, dramatic episodes.	 He
emphasised individual and group heroism, self-sacrifice and
comradeship.	 He protrayed, "the human and pathetic side of
war, as well as its patriotic aspects". 16 He portrayed
pathos but, like Elizabeth Butler and Caton Woodville, he
conventionalised wounds and death, and did not portray the
sordidness, horror, or agony of war. 	 He was highly regarded
by contemporaries, and praised by critics.	 They noted that
he lacked war experience, but praised his observation,
thorough research, "clearness of statement and truthfulness
of detail" such as worn and soiled uniforms, and "the sense
of reality he conveys", and claimed he had "caught the
spirit of the scenes he has depicted".' 7	W.M. Gilbert
praised his "strong patriotic feeling" and claimed it con-
tributed to the success of his paintings) 8 Sir James Caw
emphasised the ideological factor: "In the class of picture
to which he is chiefly devoted purely aesthetic qualities
are less important, however, than clear setting forth of
the chosen incident, pictorial realisation of the heroic
spirit of a courageous act, and appeal to the patriotic
emotions: and in these respects he never f ails".' 9	Caw,
a fellow Scot and Director of the National Galleries of
Scotland, claimed that Gibb, though inferior in some
aspects to De Neuville and Detaille, was the only British
battle painter "who can be compared with the military
painters of France", and that he was superior to the other
British battle painters: less pathetic than Lady Butler,
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less "vivacious and immediately effective" than Woodville,
but more powerful and realistic, and technically superior,
to either. 2° Recognised as a leading Scottish painter,
he was rewarded by official posts: in 1895 Keeper of the
Scottish National Gallery, and in 1908 His Majesty's Limner
for Scotland.	 His battle painting was popular and brought
him fame and success. 	 Yet despite this, he remained the
only notable Scottish battle painter; indicative of the
differing attitudes, as in England, of artists and of the
public.
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vi. C.E. FRIPP, G.D. GILES ET AL.
The few British battle painters who had battle exper-
ience had almost all gained it as special war artists for
the illustrated papers. 	 One such was Charles Edwin Fripp
I
(1854-1906).	 Son of the landscape painter George Fripp,
he studied painting at Nuremberg and the Royal Academy,
Munich, and became a speca1 artist for the Graphic, and
later the Daily Graphic, covering the 9th Kaffir War, the
Zulu War, the 1st Boer War, the Suakin compaign, the Sino-
Japanese War, the Matabele Rebellion, the Spanish-American
War and the Boer War.	 Like Woodville and other special
artists he shared the attitudes and tastes of the officers
with whom he campaigned: he was a keen footballer and big-
game hunter.	 In 1883 H.V. Barnett in the Magazine of Art
praised his Zulu War sketches: "The battle with all its
romance and motion, its incidents and excitements, its
contrasts and amazing din, is delineated quite as fully as
need	 . .Mr. Fripp. . . is one of the ablest of figure-
drauumen; his South African sketches show a notable
grasp of character, both individual and racial". 2 He
used his war experience and sketches in his battle paint-
ings, and exhibited at the Royal Water Colour Society and
occasionally at the Academy.	 His most famous painting
was the much reproduced 'Last Stand at Isandlhula' exhi-
bited at the Academy in 1885. 	 In 1886 he exhibited
'The attack on General Sir John McNeill's force near
Suakim': a scene from the battle of Tofrek in 1885, a
dramatic desert mêlée of British troops in grey and khaki,
fighting Hadendowa.	 The Art Journal praised it as
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"true and life-like". 3	Despite his battle experience, he
followed the conventions of Victorian battle painting, show-
ing few British dead or dying, little blood, few and con-
ventionalised wounds, and no horror or agony.	 Battle was
colourful, exciting, dramatic and heroic. 	 As Michael
Barthorp has recently noted, he was "an accurate and dili-
gent illustrator of the fighting dress and equipment of the
late Victorian soldier". 4 He was among the last of the
Victorian battle painters but because he exhibited so few
major canvases - though they were praised by the art press -
he was less known than Lady Butler or Woodville and was
largely ignored in contemporary descriptions of the genre:
neither Armstrong in 1887 nor Spielmann in 1911 mentioned
him.
Edward Matthew Hale (l852-l924) studied painting in
Paris under Cabanel and Carolus-Duran, 6 was an I.L.N.
special artist in the Russo-Turkish and Afghan wars, then
worked in England as a genre painter, largely of army life
and of the sea, with some classical scenes in the style of
Alma-Tadema.	 He exhibited at the Academy and several
London galleries. His battle pictures were largely drawn
from his experience in India and Afghanistan, and included
'The Drumsof the Fore and Aft' and 'The Return of the Fore
and Aft', and 'Piper Findlater, Gordon Highianders, winning
the V.C. at Dargai'.	 He tended to emphasise individual
heroism, so giving his work more popular appeal. 	 Though
competent, his work was less finished and less dramatic
than Lady Butler's or Woodville's. 	 Like them he followed
the conventions of Victorian battle painting. An inferior
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painter, he was among the less reproduced and less known
battle painters.
Topography was a military study and from the 1740s
landscape painting was part of the Woolwich curriculum, and
there was also a tradition of officer amateur painters.
Occasionally, as with T.S. Seccombe, an officer became a
professional artist.	 One such was Godfrey Douglas Giles
(l857-l94l). Born in Karachi, son of an officer in the
Indian Navy, and educated at Cheltenham and Sandhurst, he
joined the Indian Army, served in the Afghan War, was
seconded to the Egyptian army and fought at El Teb. 	 He
left the army in 1884 and studied painting in Paris under
Carolus-Duran.	 He became a successful painter of horses,
hunting, racing and military scenes, and exhibited at the
Academy, the Royal Scottish Academy and the Salon, and at
various London and provincial galleries. 	 He painted
battle scenes initially from his experience in the Sudan;
in 1884 and 1887 two scenes of the battle of Tamai, and in
1886 the 19th Hussars' charge at El Teb. 	 The late 19th
century popular interest in the army led to numerous
illustrations of its uniforms, notably those by Richard
Simkin, and J.S. Virtue, publishers to the Art Journal,
commissioned a series from Giles which was published in
1890 as chromolithographs in Her Majesty's Army. 8 In
1899 he painted 'After the Battle of Atbara', the Emir
Mahmud prisoner before Kitchener, and published photo-
gravure reproductions. 	 His military paintings were
praised by the art press and favoured by patrons.	 His
'Charge of the 19th (Princess of Wales') Hussars at El-
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Teb', praised by the Art Journal as "true and life-like",9
was presented by the Princess of Wales to the regiment, and
his 'A patrol of the 10th Hussars pursuing Boers' was pre-
sented by the Duke of Portland to the regiment. 	 He usually
painted in a clear, hard, almost harsh quasi-photographic
style similar to Woodville's in the same period, but his
pictures - for example those of Tamai - tended to dif fuse-
ness of subject, lacking a focus of interest. 	 Though
realistically representing battle, this was artistically
less effective and lacked the impact of Lady Butler's or
Woodville's careful composition and grouping. Like them,
he followed the genre's conventions. 	 He was one of the
lesser-known battle painters. 	 He was successful but never
achieved the fame of Lady Butler or Woodville - and was
ignored by both Armstrong and Spielmann - probably because
his work was less dramatic and had less emphasis on indi-
vidual heroism; because, unlike Lady Butler, he never
achieved the celebrity of a popular Academy favourite
picture; and because, unlike Woodville, he painted
relatively few military paintings and his work was little
reproduced.
For some artists who came from non-military families,
like Elizabeth Butler, battle-painting led to involvement
with soldiers.	 For others, a military background apparent-
ly led to battle painting. One such was William Barnes
Wollen (1857-1936) who was "intended for the army but took
up art instead". 10 He studied at the Slade and became a
professional painter of portraits, sporting and military
scenes.	 He drew occasional hunting scenes and some
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military reconstructions for the Illustrated London News and
in 1900 was a special artist for the Sphere in South Africa.
He was a prolific military artist from the '80s to the 1920s,
painting scenes from the Napoleonic wars, colonial campaigns,
the Boer War and the Great War.	 These included 'Waterloo',
'The last stand of the 44th Regiment at Gundamuck, 1842',
'The Rescue of Private Andrews by Captain Garnet Wolseley at
the Storming of the Motee Mahal, Lucknow', 'The 21st (Empress
of India's) Lancers at Omdurman', and 'The Imperial Light
Horse at Waggon Hill'. He exhibited from 1879 at the
Academy, Royal Scottish Academy and elsewhere, and was
elected R.I. in 1888 and R.0.I. in 1897, but never to the
Academy.	 Some of his works were reproduced and he was among
the bett.er-known military painters, included by Spielmann in
his Britannica article.	 His work was well composed and
vigorous and followed the conventions of the genre, but it
lacked the pathos of Lady Butler's or the excitement of
Woodville's, and he never gained their reputation or
popularity.
Another battle painter from a military background
was Vereker Hamilton (l856_1931))1 From an army family,
son of a colonel and younger brother of Ian Hamilton, he
was educated at Loretto and Wellington, studied painting at
Dresdeti and Rome, tried coffee planting in Ceylon, then
studied at the Slade under Legros, winning the landscape
prize in 1886, and became a professional painter with a
house in St. John's Wood.	 He painted landscape, portraits
and, mostly in the '90s, large battle pieces, of the
Napoleonic wars, the Mutiny and the campaigns in Afghanistan
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and on the North-West Frontier.	 These included 'The attack
on the Peiwar Kotal', 'The 92nd at Kandahar', 'The Ambus-
cade', and 'Piper Findlater at Dargai'. 	 He was a devoted
brother to Ian Hamilton and stayed with him in South Africa
after Majuba, and in India.	 Roberts helped and encouraged
him in his battle painting and used him to meet other
artists: possibly partly to gain himself further publicity,
supplementing his press contacts. 	 He bought 'The attack orL
te Peiwar Kotal' and used it to illustrate his Forty-One
Years in India.	 Vereker Hamilton was meticulous to ensure
matriel accuracy.	 He questioned veterans and had unit
records checked, learning the fallibility of memory. 	 For
example most informants told him the Gurkhas at the Peiwar
Kotal wore khaki but one officer insisted they wore green,
and the records confirmed him.	 For his 'Storming of the
Kashmir Gate at Delhi' Hamilton visited the ruins, and also
tried to discover the type of button worn by the British
bugler.	 He painted a variety of genre and, unlike Lady
Butler or Woodville, did not identify himself as a military
painter.	 His style was quieter, less dramatic or strained,
than theirs, and like them he followed the conventions of
Victorian battle painting.	 His 'Attack on the Peiwar
Kotal' was dramatic, with movement, and light shining on
rifle barrels and bayonets.	 It showed Gurkha corpses and
a wounded Gurkha, but little blood and no ugly wounds,
horror or agony. 	 His '92nd at Kandahar' showed the high-
landers advancing in line towards smoke-wreathed forti-
fications, soldierly and heroic, with no dead or wounded.
A landscapist, and knowing soldiers, he was aware of
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terrain and it was often important in his battle pictures.
His work was respected by contemporaries. 	 He exhibited at
the Academy and the Paris Salon, and was elected R.E. in
1887.	 Like Lady Butler's and Woodville's, his paintings
were used in popular history books and encyclopedias.
However in the early '90s his pictures, he wrote, "became
unsaleable" and while he later sold 'An Ambuscade' to New
South Wales, his '92nd at Kandahar', although it had been
hung prominently "on the line" at the Academy, he failed to
sell.	 This should not be taken as indicating a reaction
against battle painting, but rather the discrimination of
purchasers.	 His work was inferior to that of Lady Butler,
Wollen or Woodville, and varied much in quality. 	 The
'Ambuscade', a fine, evocative if implausible work, was
sold.	 Even he later admitted that 'The 92nd' was "a
shocking bit of work".' 2 His battle pictures, compared
to the best of the genre, lacked drama, were inadequately
composed lacking a focal point and lacked individual human
interest.	 Later he returned to landscapes, and painted
more nudes and ballet dancers.
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4.	 ARTISTS, DEFENCE AND THE PAUCITY OF BRITISH
BATTLE-PAINTING
Despite the rewards of successful battle painters and
the popularity of battle paintings, there were few British
battle painters, apparently because of dominant artistic
values. Possibly indicative of national values, probably
of values within an artistic subculture, the greatest Vic-
torian painters chose not to paint battles. 1 Representa-
tive of dominant artists' values were those of Leighton,
President of the Academy from 1878 to 1896.2 He painted
largely classical subjects, seeking to represent the ideal
of beauty through scenes of ancient Greece. 	 He believed
that modern painting did not require modern subjects.
Commissioned in 1868 to paint for the South Kensington
Museum the fresco, 'The Arts of Industry as Applied to War',
he chose not modern armaments - though the forging of great
ordnance would have provided powerful images - but a quat-
trocento costume piece. 	 He did not attempt battle painting
but was not opposed to the genre and as P.R.A. agreed to its
exhibition.	 He supported military preparation, was among
the first members of the Artists' Rifles, rose through the
ranks and was from 1869 to 1883 their commanding officer
and largely responsible for establishing them as a leading
Volunteer unit, and continued devoted to it. 	 He was
typical in that his art was distinct from his military
values.	 He believed in national defence and that artists
should serve it, but never saw his art as expressing his
patriotic or military values.	 The world of art was for
him, as for most of his contemporaries, a largely autonomous
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subculture.	 Moreover, mundane factors of practicality and
cost may have deterred some artists from battle painting.
It was a relatively difficult genre demanding expenditure on
models, uniforms and accoutrements, research for the required
matrie1 accuracy, and the labour of painting the relatively
large number of figures usual in battle scenes. 3 Possibly
the standard of leading battle paintings deterred some artists.
Further evidence of artists' attitudes to war was
their role in the auxiliary forces. 	 In 1860 they formed
the Artists' Rifles, which included Burne-Jones, Hunt,
Leighton, Millais, Morris, Rossetti, Swinburne and Watts, with
Ruskin an honorary member .	 They were supported by the
artistic establishement and their headquarters were initial-
ly at Burlington House.	 They became well-known, and under
Leighton's command from 1869 to 1883 became a full battalion,
"among the best of the Volunteer Corps of the Metropolis"5
and part of the socially-exclusive 'Grey Brigade'. 6	In the
Boer War the Artists contributed the largest contingent in
the C.I.V., and individuals also served in the Imperial
Yeomanry. 7 Their 'lite status was shown by their de facto
officer-training function.	 In 1909 there were over two
hundred former members holding commissions; and in France
in November 1914 French, lacking officers, commissioned
fifty-two Artists privates. 8 Though the proportion of
artists decreased to a minority, the unit's artist con-
nection continued. 9 Artists included G.W. Joy who served
twenty-one years and C.E. Fripp who served thirteen. 	 Its
headquarters were at the Arts Club from 1868 to 1880, and
from then to 1889 at the West London School of Art. 	 When
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H.A.R. May joined in 1882, being, "a bona-fide Artist...was
(in theory at all events) supposed to be a necessary quali-
fication". 1°	 Leighton continued, while P.R.A., a keen
honorary colonel, and until 1903 the commanding officer was
an artist.	 The art press continued to feature "the Artists"
in articles such as 'The 'Artists' at Wimbledon Camp' •11 The
unit also acquired a collection of paintings, including
battle paintings. 12	In 1914 artists again rallied to the
unit and drilled at Burlington House. 13 Though less in
numbers than in reputation, the artist connection continued
important and indicative of the art establishment's attitude
to military preparation and war.	 Moreover artists also
served in other units. 	 Villiers and E.M. Hale were
officers in the Post Office Rifles, and Woodville in the
Berkshire Yeomanry, Volunteer Royal Engineers and North
Devon Hussars. 14	G.D. Giles, exceptional among battle
painters in that he was an ex-regular, was a captain in the
Suffolk Hussars. 	 In the Boer War some artists served in
the Imperial Yeomanry, among them Skeoch Cumming, a young
watercolorist with "a penchant for military subjects".15
The attitudes of artists to war, and of the public
to battle pictures, were further shown in the Boer War.
The middle and upper classes - with some 'pro-Boer'
exceptions - supported the war.	 They volunteered;
gave cash, artillery and machine guns to the C.I.V. and
Imperial Yeomanry; and from "patriotic benevolence" gave
to "the national patriotic funds". 17 These included
those of the Lord Mayor of London, the Daily Telegraph,
Scotsman and other newspapers, notably the Daily Mail
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"Absent-Minded BeggarFund which raised a quarter of a million
pounds. 18 The response of the artistic establishment was
typical of their class, and some artists volunteered. During
the Crimean War artists had donated works to be sold for
service charities, and in 1900 the artistic establishment,
through a committee including Alma-Tadema and Spielmann,
organised the Artists' War Fund, to which artists gave works
or money.' 9 Queen Victoria, who gave "two etchings from
her own hand", other royals, and "many, probably most, of
our popular artists", including Alma-Tadema, Dicksee,
Herkomer, Joy, Poynter, Prinsep, Riviere, Waterhouse and
Watts contributed. 20 Alma-Tadema gave a painting of a
girl with flowers, Riviere one of a fox terrier, and Watts
a sketch of Dorothy Dene. 21 The 328 works were displayed
at an exhibition, opened by Princess Louise, at the Guild-
hail.	 The works, which The Times claimed "would do credit
to any exhibition", were then auctioned at Christie's, and
£10,593 12s Od given to five service charities.22
The Franco-Prussian War had inspired a revival of
French military painting, and in 1900 the art critic A.C.R.
Carter suggested that the Boer War might similarly, in
Britain inspire, "a national school of battle painters...
the time is now as ripe for British painters as it was for
the French after 1870,, 23	 In fact, indicative of British
artists' continuing attitudes to battle painting, it hardly
affected "the world of Art".	 Artists supported the war,
and there was public demand for war pictures as was shown
by the sale of specials' sketches. 24 Yet almost no
artists followed the Art Journal's suggestion that enter-
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prising artists should go to the war and paint, "war sub-
jects, for which there would assuredly be a great demand".25
The art press commented on the war's minimal effect on the
Academy exhibitions: M.H. Spielmann noted of the 1901 exhib-
ition, "the Boer War has prompted a few canvases - fewer,
perhaps, than might have been expected". 26 Established
battle painters such as Woodville and Wollen painted Boer
War scenes, as did Joy and a few minor artists. 27 Joy's
'Dreams on the Veldt', painted in 1900 portrayed wounded
and dying British soldiers lying on the veld, and above
them angels. 28 Of the war pictures, only a minority were
of battle: the Art Journal commented in 1902 on those at
the Academy, "no artist has attempted to depict a scene of
actual carnage". 29	In choosing subjects most artists
ignored the war.
All this indicated that the paucity of a British
battle painting resulted not from artists' ideological
opposition to military preparation and war - for they large-
ly shared the values of the middle classes to which they
belonged - but from their artistic preference, the subjects
that attracted them as artists.	 It was widely assumed,
partly from the success and wealth of leading artists -
"the painters who wallow in gold" 3° - that artists were in
harmony with the wishes of the public. 	 The Magazine of
Art stated in 1882, "Our painters and their public under-
stand each other, and are in perfect sympathy. 	 The art-
1st paints to please". 31	In 1901 M.H. Spielmann claimed
that the Academy exhibition, "reflects with accuracy the
tendency of that art which appeals to the greatest number."32
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Vereker Hamilton claimed that, "it was the absurdly high
prices given by the rich middle-classes for the kind of pic-
tures they liked that reduced so many of the painters, and
made them give the public what they wanted". 33 However,
while it was true that successful artists painted subjects
the public favoured, it was also true that most artists
chose not to paint a genre for which there was public
demand - battle paintings. 	 Some assumed that the British
were uninterested in military art. 34	Woodville, for
example, claimed in his memoirs that the public cared little
for military pictures, that there were hardly any in public
or private galleries, and that the army, "would rather hang
the latest gaiety actress in their mess than the finest
episode in their regimental history". 35 Yet in fact the
public did favour battle paintings, as was shown by the
success of the leading battle painters and the high prices
paid for their works; by disproportionately many battle
paintings being commercially reproduced, and the engravings
selling so well. 36 Regiments and public galleries did
acquire battle paintings. 	 Leeds Art Gallery, for example,
acquired Lady Butler's 'Scotland for Ever!' and E.M. Hale's
'The Drumsofie Fore and Aft'.	 Lady Butler wrote in her
memoirs that, "nearly all my principal works are either in
the keeping of my Sovereign or in public galleries".37
Public interest In battle painting apparently fluctuated
with interest in war and defence, tending to increase with
wars and threats of wars.	 It revived in the 1870s with
the Franco-Prussian War and the perceived foreign threat,
then with the Russo-Turkish War when, Woodville claimed,
"the British public was taking one of its periodic fits
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of interest in battle paintings and drawings". 38 Through
these fluctuations, battle paintings continued popular, as
contemporaries noted.	 In 1887 Walter Armstrong wrote,
"Battle pictures are, at least, as popular with the English
public as they are with any other. 	 From my own observation
I should say they are vastly more popular than with the
public of France". 39 In 1906 Lady Butler exhibited her
pastoral scene, 'A Cistercian Shepherd' which she highly
regarded, but the public prefered her military paintings.
As she wrote, "the public didn't want idylls from me at all.
'Give us soldiers and horses, but pastoral idylls - no!
Popular taste and artistic production were inter-
connected, but with battle painting they diverged. 4' The
evidence suggests that popular demand existed but that most
artists within their artistic subculture and despite their
positive attitudes to military preparation and war, chose
from artistic preference not to paint battle paintings.
That, while British artists and critics so praised the lead-
ing French battle painters, the leading British battle paint-
ers were less paid and less honoured than the leading paint-
ers of other genres, probably resulted not from subject
matter but from their perceived relative inferiority as
artists.	 That even Leighton in his last years had works
unsold and that for some artists the late 19th century was
"the lean years", suggests that the market may have been
satiated for the artists' favoured subjects. 42 The public
liked battle paintings of the type offered by the British
battle painters, and that they did so was indicative of
their attitudes to war, and also of the influences on them.
110
4. ARTISTS, DEFENCE ETC: NOTES
1. There had been a few exceptions earlier e.g. Turner.
2. On Leighton largely from (Mrs.) A. Lang, Sir Frederick
Leighton, P.R.A. (Art Annual, 1884); (Mrs.) Russell
Barrington, The Life, Letters and Work of Frederick
Leighton (1906); Gaunt, Olympus; Ormond.
3. On battle painters concern for accuracy Gilbert, 'Gibb',
AJ ('97) 28; Meynell, Butler 101-3; obituary of
Caton Woodville, Times 18 Aug 1927,12; I.B.M.
Hamilton 84. Cf lb	 92-3.
4. On the Artists' Rifles largely from H.A.R. May,
Memories of the Artists Rifles (1929); B.A. Young,
The Artists and the S.A.S.(196O); Barrington; Gaunt,
Olympus. For their Volunteer context v Hugh Cunning-
ham, The Volunteer Force (1975). Other occupational
groups also formed units e.g. barristers, civil





8. R. Money Barnes, The Soldiers of London (1963)332;
Young 20.
9. In 1893 artists 4.54, architects and architectural
students 11.79; others included lawyers, doctors and
engineers, May XXXIX.
10. May 18.
11. H.V. Barnett, 'The 'Artists' at Wimbledon Camp', MA
('83) 389-94.
12. These included Fripp's 'Isandhlwana' and Wollen's
'Abu Klea', both later given to N.A.M.
13. Butler, Autobiography 328; Meiron & Susie Harris, The
War Artists (1983) 2.
14. Villiers, Personalities 42; Villiers 281; Woodville
251-64.
15. AJ (1900) 127.
16. On 'Pro-Boers' v Bernard Porter, Critics of Empire
(1968)62-94; Stephen Koss, The Anatomy of an Antiwar
Movement: The Pro-Boers(l973); J.W. Auld, 'The
Liberal Pro-Boers', JBr.Stud.(1975)78-1O1. On
111
middle class volunteering and pro-war demonstrations
v Richard Price, An Imperial War and the British
Working Class (1972) 146-53, 108-229; M.D. Blanch,
'British Society and the War', (ed) Peter Warwick,
The South African War (1980) 210-36.
17. An. Register 1899 234; Navy & Army Illustrated IX (1900)
490, 586; (ed) H. Pease, The History of the Northum-
berland (Hussars) Yeomanry 1819-1923 (1924) 25-7;
Rayne Kruger, Good-bye Dolly Gray (1959) 151.
18. R. Kipling, Something of Myself (1937) 150; R. Pound &
G. Harmsworth, Northcliffe (1959) 250. On the
"A.M.B." Festival band concert, ILN CXVI (27 Jan
1900) 116. The soap firm had its Vinolia War Fund.
'Pro-Boers' had their own funds.
19. Frank Rinder, 'A War Fund Exhibition', AJ (1900) 92.
G.F. Watts also declared his support for the war in
'Our Race as Pioneers', Nineteenth C. XLIX (May 1901)
849-57.
20. Times 22 Jan 1900, 4; AJ (1901) 96; Rinder 93; Joy 29.
21. Times lb. D. Dene was a well-known model and Leighton's
protege.
22. Rinder 92; AJ (1901) 157. A similar scheme operated in
the Great War, Michael Lee, 'A Centenary of Military
Painting'. Army Quarterly XCV (1967) 94; Harries 1.
23. AJ (1900) 251.
24,5. AJ (1900) 159.
26. M.H. Spielmann, 'Preface', R.A. Pictures 1901 ii; Frank
Rinder, 'The Royal Academy Exhibition of 1902',
AJ (1902) 206.
27. AJ, MA, R.A. Pictures 1899-1902.
28. Joy 51.
29. Rinder 206.
30. Henry James quo Ormond 81.
31. MA ('82) 257; cf Gaunt, Olympus 160.
32. M.H. Spielmann, R.A. Pictures 1901 1.
112
33. V. Hamilton 169.
34. AJ (1900) 251.
35. Woodville 79.
36. R.A. Pictures passim; Meynell, Butler 10. On the
popularity of battle paintings in the '60s see AJ
('64) 42.
37. Butler, AutobIography 185.
38. Lalumia 43-6; Woodville 13. Cl the fluctuations in
military commemorative ware Arch bc. cit.
39. Armstrong 187.
40. Butler 306.
41. My argument, though supported by available evidence,
Is not conclusive. Within the period there were
apparently fluctuations in the popularity with
artists of battle painting, Armstrong 176; AJ
(1902) 142; Woodville 12.
42. Ormond 119; AJ ('89) 185.
113
5. IMAGES OF WAR
"C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre"
The Magazine of Art, 18971
Battle painters selected certain subjects and portrayed
them in a certain way. 	 They portrayed achievement in war	 -
if sometimes the achievement of military virtues in defeat -
rather than the "friction" which Clausewitz claimed, "dis-
tinguishes real war from war on paper". 2 Repeatedly they
chose to paint certain favourite famous and dramatic con-
flicts: Waterloo, the charge of the Light Brigade, Rorke's
Drift, Tel-el-Kebir, saving the guns at Maiwand, Dargai, and
the 21st Lancers at Orndurman. 3 Balaclava was painted by
Barker, Lady Butler and Woodville; Rorke's Drift by Lady
Butler and de Neuville; Tel-el-Kebir by Lady Butler,
Villiers and Woodville; Maiwand by Beadle, Giles and Wood-
ville; Dargai by Gibb, Hale, Hamilton and Woodville; and
the 21st Lancers by Rowlandson, Wollen and Woodville. The
portrayal of battle, and responses to it, both resulted
from and influenced attitudes to war. 	 Victorians includ-
ing artists, critics and the public, had certain assump-
tions on the nature of war and its portrayal. 	 These were
usually implicit, suggested or mentioned in passing rather
than deliberately articulated.	 War was widely perceived
as largely evil, destructive, horrible and inflicting
great suffering, but nevertheless accepted as sometimes
necessary.	 Within war, resulting from and in contrast to
its negative aspects, were the noble and redeeming
qualities it engendered: patriotism, duty, honour, loyalty,
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endurance, courage, adventure, self-sacrifice and the noble
death, "Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori" - ancient
warrior virtues became Victorian cliches. 	 Victorians varied
in their emphases on the negative and positive aspects. 	 The
more extreme militarists and social darwinists in Britain, as
in Germany and France, emphasised and glorified the positive
aspects almost to the exclusion of the negative. 4 Wolseley,
obsessed with British decadence, believed that only a great
war could regenerate and ennoble the British: "War purifies
a degraded Nation". 5 The social darwinist Karl Pearson
claimed that when wars ceased, "mankind will no longer pro-
gress" and that a nation was, "kept up to a high pitch of
external efficiency by contest, chiefly by way of war with
inferior races". 6 Professor Cramb, London University and
drawing-room history lecturer, imperialist and later one of
Robert's writers in the compulsory service campaign, wrote
in 1900 of the British dead in the Boer War,
"Fallen in this cause, in battle for this ideal,
behold them advance to greet the great dead who
fell in the old wars!	 See, through the mists
of time, Valhalla, its towers and battlements,
uplift themselves, and from their places these
phantoms of mighty heroes of all ages rise to
greet these English youths who enter smiling,
blood yet trickling from their wounds".7
He defined war as, "a phase in the life-effort of the State
towards completer self-realisation. . .Destruction is not its
aim, but the intensification of life. . .War is thus a mani-
festation of the world-spirit in the form most sublime and
awful that can enthrall the contemplation of man". 8	In
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1905 the Spectator praised Ian Hamilton for "revelling, as
some old pagan hero would revel, in the grand game of war"
and for protesting against "the common theory that war is
horrible". 9 Others were more ambivalent and more concerned
with suffering and destruction, but still emphasised war's
positive attributes.	 The pictorial representation of war
was perceived and evaluated through these attitudes to war.
War was seen as a subject that should be reported, and as a
fitting subject of fine art, art that was inherently
superior to mere photographic copying. 	 War portrayal was
seen as descriptive, as historical record, and as inspirat-
ional.	 It was deliberately selective, emphasising the
noble qualities and omitting the repulsive aspects.	 Vic-
torian battle painting followed self-censoring conventions:
no ugliness or squalor; minimised, conventionalised wounds;
few British dying or dead; and no cruelty, horror or agony°
Meissonier declared that, "the man who has seen war
is the man to paint war", 	 and he and other continental
painters had battle experience. 	 In Britain battle exper-
ience though valued was not, even by soldiers and others
with such experience, believed necessary for battle paint-
ers.	 Some had such experience as special war artists:
Fripp, Giles and Hale.	 However the most highly-regarded
battle-painters - Lady Butler, Woodville and Gibb - had no
battle experience, and Lady Butler claimed that if she had
witnessed battle she could not have painted it. 12 There
was little discernible difference between the works of
those with and without battle experience. 	 Both portrayed
battle as colourful, dramatic and heroic, and followed the
same conventions of omission.	 Yet even when the battle-
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experienced were, like Hale, inferior painters to the
unbattled, their work had an authenticity the unbattled
could never quite attain. 	 The battle-experienced tended
more to show the milling confusion of battle, and had great-
er awareness of terrain and its significance: its harshness,
scale and dwarfing of the combatants. 	 In the paintings of
Lady Butler, Woodville and Gibb terrain was mere backgound
to dominant men.
	 In the works of the battle-experienced -
as for the troops - sand, rock, hills and distance were
crucial.	 Hamilton lacked battle experience yet his por-
trayal of terrain resembled that of the battle-experienced,
for he had lived with soldiers and been advised in his
battle-painting by Roberts: for example, in his 'Attack on
the Peiwar Kotal' the trees and the steep slope were crucia13
In battle painting quasi-photographic exactitude was
not expected, but matriel accuracy was required, and lead-
ing British painters researched assiduously to achieve it.
In 1875 the Art Journal criticised Philippoteaux for por-
traying 1815 highlanders in 1870s uniforms. 14	Battle
painting should appear realistic: in 1888 the Journal cri-
ticised a Crofts picture as, "so clean and neat, that the
battle seems conducted in a toy shop".' 5 The artist was
supposed to create, from his imagination as an artist, a
scene true to the spirit and moral quality of the battle,
and superior to the "mere mechanical reflection of a
photograph or mirror".' 6 Detailed information, right
attitudes, hard work and above all inspiration and imagi-.
nation, could create.
	 Lady Butler, for example, believed
in her creative "vision" and contemporaries praised her
117
"creative imagination" and her "dramatic imagination almost
Shakespearian")-7
 Victorian art told stories, sometimes
trivial anecdotes but in the most respected paintings, moral
tales.	 Paintings conveyed meaning visually, by images
different from words, and by visual metaphors.
	 Neverthe-
less artists sometimes, particularly when exhibiting his-
torical and battle paintings, provided explanatory text,
making verbally explicit their intended meaning.' 8 This
usually stated the artist's message of patriotism, imperial-
ism and military virtues: those stated in literature by, for
example, Newbolt and Kipling.	 Fripp exhibited 'The last
stand at Isandhula' with the text, "The brave defenders
stood their ground until the last round of ammunition was
spent.	 The death role of the Zulus showed how gallantly
the 24th had fought".
	 Giles' text to 'The battle of Tamai'
included, "Our troops met the onslaught with the utmost
steadiness".	 Lady Butler claimed, "I never painted for
the glory of war, but to portray its pathos and heroism",19
and in the texts to her paintings emphasised heroism: that
to 'Steady the Drums and Fifes' stated, "to stand under
fire, still and motionless, is a supreme act of will".
The chromolithograph of Woodville's 'All That Was Left of
Them' was published with,
"The odds were one hundred and fifty of our
Lancers to four hundred of the enemy - the
position was untenable; but answering their
young officers' shout of 'No surrender',
the 'Death or Glory Boys' upheld that
famous motto of their regiment by fighting
till they fell by explosive bullets at
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twenty, ten and five yards.	 Such deeds
may not win battles, but such courage
makes our nation".
Such pictures and text were not always entirely accurate,2°
but they were usually accepted, and praised.
Battle portrayal was selective and a comparison
between what was shown in paintings and the reality, insofar
as known, indicates the nature of the selection and the
21desiderata of battle painters and public. 	 One example was
the battle of Maiwand in 1880, a disaster in which the 66th
suffered appalling losses and some of them panicked and fled,
and of which Roberts wrote, "our troops were completely
routed". 22	Caton Woodville, J.P. Beadle and G.D. Giles all
chose to paint similar portrayals of the battle: not defeat,
casualties, mutilation and suffering but 'Saving the Guns',
with galloping horse artillery, heroism and excitement.
Possibly, as with the emphasis on the Rorke's Drift
heroism following IsandhJ.wana there may here have been
some attempt, maybe subconscious, to distract from and com-
pensate for the disaster: not to warn but to reassure.
Another notable example was the charge of the 21st Lancers
at Omdurman; because it caught the public imagination,
became famous and a favourite subject of battle painting,
and because it was well documented and has since been
evaluated by military historians. 23 The charge was a
blunder following inadequate reconnaissance.	 It nulli-
fied the Lancers' advantages over the Ansar, was milita-
rily unnecessary, contributed nothing to the defeat of the
enemy, and resulted in a large proportion of the British
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casualties at Omdurman, and reduced the British capability
to follow up their victory.
	
Kitchener, needing cavalry for
the pursuit, was angry. 24	In his original dispatch he only
briefly mentioned the charge, without praise but emphasising
their casualties: "the 21st Lancers lost heavily". 25	How-
ever correspondents and editors immediately praised the
charge as heroic.	 The Times for example called it: "the
brilliant charge of the 21st Lancers" and "a fine piece of
dashing cavalry work worthy of the best traditions of our
mounted arm". 26 Reuter's report called it, "the famous
charge of the 21st Lancers against enormous odds. . .This
maiden charge of the 21st Lancers is regarded as an extre-
mely brilliant aff air". 27 The Illustrated London News,
having already featured the 21st, the only British cavalry
in the Sudan army, in two full-page drawings by Woodville,
praised their "memorable charge" and published as a special
supplement a photogravure of Woodville's work, "an import-
ant picture representing the gallant charge of the 21st
,,28	 .	 .Lancers .	 The Annual Register reinforced this view,
praising the "conspicuous daring of the charge. . .the most
magnificent incident of the battle. . . a gallantry that has
rarely, if ever, been surpassed, and their splendid exploit
was marked by acts of personal devotion which enhanced
still further the glory that they won ,,29 Though favour-
able, the press reports also emphasised the casualties and
mutilations.	 Reuters reported, "They struggled through,
but every man who fell was immediately hacked to pieces by
the swords of the Dervishes.	 The British cavalrymen
rallied, bleeding and blown...the lancers having accomp-
lished their object, though at the cost of heavy
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casualties". 3° The Daily Telegraph correspondent reported,
"The severity of the action may be judged by. . .the total
loss which the 21st Lancers have sustained". 31 The Illus-
trated London News also emphasised the casualties: the 21st
Lancers "have bought their glory dearly. . .Every man who fell
in that desperate encounter was hacked to pieces by the
swords of the fanatics". 32 Moreover the negative aspects
were reported in two widely-read "instant histories" by
correspondents, those of Churchill and Steevens. 	 Churchill
reported that, "In 120 seconds five officers, 65 men and 119
horses out of fewer than 400 had been killed or wounded" and
described the wounded, "all covered with blood and many dis-
playing most terrible injuries - faces cut to rags, bowels
protruding, fishhook spears stuck in their bodies - realis-
tic pictures from the darker side of war". 3 However, as
an enthusiastic young cavalry subaltern who wanted another
charge "'pour la gloire' - and to buck up British cava1ry"4
Churchill claimed that, "there can be little doubt that the
moral effect of the charge had been very great, and that
these brave enemies were no longer unshaken". 35 Steevens
was more critical: he called the charge "indisputable folly"
and "a gross blunder". 36 The charge was both a costly
blunder and heroic: the press, public and authorities chose
to emphasise the heroism. 37 They did so probably not only
because of the attraction of the heroism and because of
popular imperialism: Baring noted "the rapid growth of the
Imperialist spirit, which about this time took place in
England" and the Annual Register reported of 1898, "Hardly
within living memory has England passed through a period
in which the national consciousness has been so deeply
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stirred by imperial issues.	 The attitudes to the charge
were also probably partly in response to the late 19th
century anxieties and perceptions of foreign threats. The
Sudan campaign was perceived partly in this wider context:
a repeated theme, for example, in Steevens' writings.39
Steevens stated that, "The blunders of British
cavalry are the fertile seed of British glory" and that,
"The populace has glorified the charge of the 2lst".4°
The battle painters continued that glorification. Though
knowing the facts from the published reports, none showed
it was a blunder, nor the extent and nature of the British
casualties.	 They portrayed it as colourful, dramatic and
without horror or agony.	 Woodville's painting, a dashing,
close-packed mle of men and horses, showed more lancers
than dervishes, lancers and swords waving in the air and a
single, unbloodied British casualty. 4' The focus of
attention was the clash between a British officer on a
white charger and a helmeted emir on a black charger.
Similarly E.M. Hale's painting showed no horror, and few
British casualties, dying conventionally without agony.
G.D. Rowlandson showed only two British casualties, with-
out blood or agony.	 All, however, showed movement,
excitement and drama.
Another example of selective battle portrayal was
Magersfontein.	 This was a disaster for the Highland
Brigade, which was "led into a butcher's shop and bloody
well left there", suffering 750 casualties. 42	Conan
Doyle wrote, "Never has Scotland had a more grievous
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day. . .it may be doubted if any single battle has ever put so
many families of high and low into mourning". 43 Woodville
portrayed neither the dying nor the fleeing, but "All That
Was Left of Them" the Highland Brigade re-forming after the
battle of Magersfontein': dramatically grouped highianders
lining up, defiant, determined and, in morale, undefeated;
the few wounded with no visible wounds or blood and no
agony, a single figure lying, his face averted, possibly
dead, and in the background, shadowy and indistinct,
prone figures that might be wounded or dead. 44 As the
Magazine of Art stated of battle paintings, "the more
ghastly aspect of the incidents of war are carefully sup-
pressed"
Contemporary comment on war portrayal emphasised
the "heart-stirring, dramatic, heroic and inspirational,
"the inspiring theme". 46 It was evaluated largely for
its expression of patriotic warrior qualities: it should
"conjure up the scenes of heroism and sacrifice" and show
"heroic deeds. . .glory and pathos". 47	Typical of contem-
porary comment was the critic A.C.R. Carter's The Work of
War Artists in South Africa (1900) which praised Wood-
ville's 'In the Trenches at Ladysmith', a typical work of
Woodvillian implausibility in which British infantry stood
bunched close together and prominent above their trench,
apparently oblivious of the need to take cover from Boer
rifle fire. 48 He wrote that "in this thin line of deter-
mined defenders Mr. Woodville sets down all that stolidity,
eagerness, coolness, and self-sacrifice incarnated in
Tommy Atkins.	 Each face here is national: it is the face
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of a British hero".	 He praised the war artists in the
Boer War for making their theme that, "So long as war exists,
the acme of human suffering must be endured, and fortunately
it can still remain our proud boast that no man is readier
to meet it in heroic silence, and in unflinching fortitude
than the Briton". 50 He quoted and agreed with the Comte
Delaborde's oration on Meissonier: "Let there be no dwell-
ing on the stern lessons of a terribe disenchantment, but
a noble encouragement in patriotic devotion, in well-doing,
in faith and in hope". 5' Battle was believed a subject
worthy of painting, "of the highest value in too commercial
days". 52 Alice Meynell argued battle painting should be
anecdotal and concerned with individuals since, "War seen
from a distance. . .is stupid; it is noble in detail only",53
and another critic claimed that its chief necessity was
"individual character"	 Mawkish sentimentality,
theatricality, melodrama and viciousness were deprecated.
M.H. Spielmann in 1901 praised the British paintings of
the Boer War at the Academy: "in none of them will you
find that unwholesome yearning after the morbid or the
cheap effort at illegitimate 'sensation' which contaminate
so many of the Salons in foreign countries". 55 Truth was
believed essential; Lady Butler was praised for, "a scrup-
ulous, quiet and close fidelity to the very smallest
accidents of individual character and peculiarity, a
truthfulness which is its own apology and its own
strength". 56	Successful battle portrayal was perceived
as realistic, but a realism limited by decorum, by
deliberate omission. 57	Robert Gibb's 'The Thin Red Line'
was praised for its "reticence in the ghastly parts of the
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picture." 58 Alice Meynell claimed that, "art must exer-
cise a certain reticence; the whole truth cannot be told, as
every one knows who has had a glimpse of a battle-field in
the absolute sincerity of the photograph". 59 Lady Butler
wrote that the battle painter should, "keep himself at a
distance, lest the ignoble and vile details under his eyes
should blind him irretrievably to the noble things that
rise beyond". 6° Carter praised Meissonier for avoiding
the gruesome side of war: "The depicting of such horrors
has been left to such a zealous realist as Verestchagin,
and to such an uncompromising recorder as the camera".61
He praised British war artists for avoiding sensationalism
and "declining to make cheap capital out of seething
realism". 62 He claimed that, "Art has no home among the
horrors of realism or of carnage. 	 The warrior asks for
no reminder of these. 	 He hopes that they may be buried
63deep beneath the paths of peace". 	 He denied that
"preachings on canvas" 64 against war would ever succeed.
This decorous selection and omission was the norm in pre-
1914 portrayal of war, in the illustrated press as at the
Royal Academy.	 Yet while its practitioners saw it as
proper and beneficial, to their pacifist critics it was
deliberate lying, the hiding of the real horror of war.
While battle painting was accepted by the art establish-
ment and popular with the public, a minority of critics
condemned it, asserting that its subject and necessity of
omission invalidated it as true art: "battle painting in
England can never be realistic, never even wholly sincere.
The subject is to be set down among those which are
"unpaintable", or, at least, which are to be treated with
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a reticence and selected with a fastidiousness that tie the
artist's hands and rob him of the freedom necessary for
successful accomplishment of the task". 65 Among the con-
demners of conventional battle painters was Helen Zirnmern,
who in 1885 claimed,
"They have depicted pretty uniforms, a monarch
or general on a prancing steed, waving banners,
a theatrical skirmish and puffs of kindly
shielding smoke wherever scenes of butchery
would otherwise be seen; official pictures, in
short, where victory is displayed but never
defeat, a species of art that lived by war and
which was calculated to immortalise it".66
In 1897 W.M. Gilbert wrote that, "when military
pictures are spoken of our thoughts invariably turn to
France". 67 France dominated 19th and early 20th century
art and since French military painting was most prestigious,
much British discussion of the genre was of French rather
than British battle painting.	 The genre's protagonists
among British painters and critics repeatedly praised French
battle painting as the world's best. 	 Alice Meynell, writ-
ing in 1882 of the effect of Franco-Prussian war, claimed,
"The French, who had the failure of war to
treat, far from shrinking from its pre-
sentment in Art, developed their school of
military painting in a manner which might
almost indemnify them for their defeat.
The triumph and caracolling and the glory
of Horace Vernet were indeed past and gone,
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but the pathos of loss produced the newer
and far more realistic French Art which
is emphatically the Art of our day, and
which has set an example to the world".68
Lady Butler and other painters and critics greatly admired
de Neuville. 69 Alice Meynell claimed he was "the leader
of modern military art", and Wilfrid Meynell claimed that,
"All the glories of France', flaunting in the halls of
Versailles, are not so glorious as a group of De Neuville's
soldiers keeping one another warm under a bank of snow".7°
Villiers claimed that de Neuville and Vereshchagin were
the greatest painters of war pictures, and Woodville
claimed that de Neuville, Detaille and Meissonier were the
leading French military painters and that, "their pictures
have never been equalled anywhere else". 71 Claude Philips,
however, considered Raffet, "one of the greatest of modern
Frenchmen.. .the inventor of modern military art". 72	The
art press repeatedly praised French military painters; for
example the Art Journal in 1888 claimed that, "The palm
must certainly by given to M. Detaille.. .He still exhibits
that marvellous precision of detail and that knowledge of
soldier-life which makes him the first of French battle
painters". 73	Their admirers and patrons included Ruskin,
Lord Hertford and the Queen; in 1881 she commissioned de
Neuville to paint the capture of Cetewayo. 74 Meissonier
was made an honorary Royal Academician. 	 While British
protagonists of the genre praised French battle painting,
British opponents of the genre castigated French works as
bloodthirsty, sensationalist and deliberately startling by
loathsome gory horror and carnage. 75 The Magazine of Art,
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for example, in 1897 claimed, "It is a military nation, is
France, and a people passionately devoted to 'sensation'; and
when these two main characteristics find common ground.. . in
the art or literature of the day, they resolve themselves
into an expression of the heroic, the startling or the
horrible". 76	Pacifists in Britain and on the continent
condemned conventional battle painting as deliberate lying,
hiding the reality of war. 	 However, the pacifists were a
small minority.	 Before 1914 the battle painters, not their
critics, still expressed the dominant view. 	 The Great War
finally changed public attitudes; as Lady Butler wrote in
October 1914, "Who will look at my 'Waterloos' now?"77
While within the "world of art" and art critics
attitudes fluctuated, pictures of battle - by special war
artists and by home-based battle painters - continued
popular and influential with the wider public. 	 They were
extensively disseminated through a variety of media includ-
ing periodicals, prints, postcards, advertisement, encyclo-
pedias, popular histories and textbooks. 	 They comple-
mented and reinforced the writings of the war correspond-
ents, and contributed to increased popular imperialism
and support for imperial wars and to the increased
popularity of the army.	 They greatly influenced the per-
ception of war of the public and of soldiers who themselves
had not yet experienced battle. 	 They influenced men
towards joining the army and contributed to the response
in 1914 and 1915.	 As Richard Holmes has written, "The
arts, in their broadest sense, play a more important role
in creating images of war than is generally recognised".78
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Often those affected were unaware of the influence: their
image of war was an unquestioned assumption. 	 One who
realised the influence of battle pictures on his own life
was Slim.	 As a boy in the 1890s, the son of a provincial
commercial lower middle class family without military
connections, he looked at the pictures in the Cassells'
part-work British Battles on Land and Sea and, as he wrote
in his memoirs, they began his interest In soldiering,
"Almost every battle, from Saxons and Normans
lambasting one another with great axes at
Hastings to Wolseley-helmeted British
soldiers firing steady volleys into charg-
ing Fuzzy-Wuzzies in the Sudan, was there.
I pored over these pictures and through
them I first began to daydream of myself
as a soldier."79
Many others of his generation, similarly influenced, did not
survive to write their memoirs.
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77. Diary 22 October 1914, Butler 327. She was right in
the longer term, but not as soon as she expected.
Though the Great War, largely through the official
war artists, produced new war art and though it
caused a reaction against the values of prewar
military painting, traditional 'academic' battle
painting by the established battle painters -
including Lady Butler, Wollen and Woodville - and
by other home-based artists continued, without
help from the official war artist schemes, through-
out the war and into the 1920s.
	 During the war
there was revived interest in traditional military
painting, with the 1915 Guildhall exhibition of
naval and military works.
	 Traditional battle
painting has never ended but, ignored by the art
establishment, continues for regiments and
collectors.
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2. Some responded differently: Victor Gollancz
claimed his hatred of war originated in childhood
revulsion from a Victorian history-book 	 picture
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6.	 ALTERNATIVE PORTRAYAL: VERESHCHAGIN
The 19th century world of art was international)
Leading British artists exhibited and sold on the Continent,
and were honoured by continental academies. 	 The work of
leading Continentalespecially French, painters, including
battle painters, was familiar to British artists, critics
and art-buyers.	 It was featured in the British art press
and sometimes exhibited in England. 	 British response to
continental war paintings indicated British attitudes to
the genre, and the British preferred image of war. 	 One
important example was the response to the leading Russian
war painter, Vassili Vereshchagin (l842_1904)2 whose work
became internationally known through one-man exhibitions in
western Europe, Britain and the United States, extensive
self-advertisement, press coverage, publicity and contro-
versy.	 Re maintained more contact with western Europe and
gained a wider international reputation than any other
Russian painter. 3 He was a nobleman, naval-cadet trained,
who studied painting in St. Peterburg and Paris.	 He
served with the Russian army in Central Asia and was deco-
rated for bravery.	 His experience of war inspired pic-
tures including 'The Apotheosis of War', a pyramid of
skulls, and 'Left Behind', a dying soldier deserted by his
fellows, while crows and vultures gathered. 	 He served in
the Russo-Turkish War and was wounded, then painted more
war scenes, exhibiting in the 'eighties in Paris, London,
Berlin, Dresden, Vienna and New York.
In 1887 he published an English translation of his
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Autobiographical Sketches which included his memoirs of the
Russo-Turkish War.	 He had a "great desire" for further war
experience and, "resolved to seize every opportunity that
should occur of going to the front", wanting to learn, "the
meaning of war". 4 With apparently boyish enthusiasm he
boasted of his military achievement, danger and courage
under fire.	 He praised Skobelev and his warrior heroism.
Describing his campaigning, in cliches he expressed uncriti-
cal enthusiasm for war and only briefly mentioned, without
condemning, its horror, suffering and destruction. 	 He
accepted military values and included no propaganda against
war.	 However, describing his painting after the war, he
then emphasised his depiction of war's horror "- impressions
of battles, wounds, disease and all sorts of misery, the
inevitable attendants of every war. 	 The result was that
people would not believe me; they said that I lied: that my
pictures were the work of my imagination". 5 He also
painted historical pictures of Bonaparte's invasion of
Russia, which were popular and much reproduced.	 Some
Russian artists, notably the Peredvizhniki (Wanderers) were
then attempting "purpose painting", for social change.6
Unlike these, Verestchagin kept apart from active politics.
Nevertheless his art was, he claimed, purposive. Influenced
by Tolstoy, and self-proclaimed "aptre de la paix", he
lectured, wrote pamphlets and painted against war. 7 He
asserted that he promoted peace by showing in his paintings
the reality and horror of war.	 In 1900 he tried unsuccess-
fully to gain the Nobel peace prize. Despite his "apos-
tolat antiguerrier" he continued fascinated by war, drawn
to successive campaigns: the Sino-Japanese War, the
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Philippines, and the Russo-Japanese War, in which he died
when the Russian flagship sank.
	 Fast and prolific, he
painted with a startling harshly-coloured quasi-photographic
realism that has been accused of sadism.
	 He wrote in 1888,
"These subjects I have treated in a fashion
far from sentimental, for having myself
killed many a poor fellow-creature in
different wars, I have not the right to be
sentimental. . .My intention was to examine
war in its different aspects, and transmit
these faithfully.	 Facts laid upon canvas
without embellishment must speak for
themselves" 8
His work was exceptional and controversial.
	 Though
Alexander II and Russian galleries owned paintings by him,
the tsarist authorities, at military request, suppressed
his 'Apotheosis' and 'Left Behind' and he once quit Russia
fearing banishment to Siberia. 9
	In 1882 in Berlin, where
he staged a spectacular exhibition with an oriental decor
and military music, the Kaiser forbad the Guard to attend,
and the right-wing press attacked his paintings as misrep-
resenting war by omitting its enthusiasm, heroism and
idealism. 10
His work was well known in Britain and repeatedly
cited in discussions on war pictures.
	 He exhibited at
the Crystal Palace in 1873, at South Kensington in 1879,
at the Grosvenor Gallery in 1887 and the Crofton Gallery
in 1900, attracting popular and press attention, praise
11	 .	 .
and some controversy.	 The Prince of Wales admired his
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work and commissioned paintings of India. 12 He became
known for his sensational realism, for "the delineation of
whatever is startling and horrible in war".' 3	In 1885
Helen Zjmrnern in the Art Journal claimed his realistic
depiction of war should prove epoch-making and that, unlike
conventional battle-painters, he painted realistic corpses
and men suffering hideous wounds: "he shows what a gory,
grimy, ghastly business it really is...Verestchagin spares
us on details.	 We are to see the revers de la mdaille,
and that war is something else than champing steeds and
flashing armour". 14	In 1887 the Art Journal, reviewing
his exhibition at the Grosvenor Gallery, called him "a
prince among illustrators" who had shown "real genius",
praised his "originality both of vision and treatment",
and claimed his Russo-Turkish War battle pieces were "bold
,,15innovations upon the ordinary practice of battle painters
His work was striking and poignant, and he was able to,
"treat his idea with all the resources of modern realism
and invest it with all the thrill of actuality"J 6	it
also, however, claimed he had major limitations. 	 His art,
though possibly the best of its kind, was not of the high-
est type, and he lacked the "grand or triumphant imagina-
tion" of the great artist: "He feels more deeply what is
humanly interesting and touching in actual scenes than
what is ideally noble on canvas". 17 Villiers, who met
Vereshchagin in the Russo-Turkish War and admired him,
also emphasised his unexpurgated realism and the contrast
with conventional battle painting,
"I think of all painters of war, for pure realism
of the ghastliness of the horrors of a battle,
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one must give the palm to that great Russian
painter.	 There was no mincing matters with
him, none of the ordinary, neatly-folded,
white bandage round a soldier's head, on
which is the red spot denoting that the man
is hors-de-combat; or the proverbial arm in
sling, or the swathed foot. He would give
the brutal course of a shell tearing men to
pieces, and all the horrible debris of its
track.	 It was the actuality of war with
18him".
In 1900 Carter contrasted Meissonier's ommision of the grue-
some with Vereshchagin's portrayal: "The depicting of such
horrors has been left to such a zealous realist as Veresh-
chagin, and to such an uncompromising recorder as the
19	 .	 .	 .
camera".	 British artists and critics greatly admired
him; Villiers believed him, with De Neuville, one of the
two greatest war painters.20
Perceptions of his work's message varied, indicative
of the extend perception of pictures was determined by pre-
conceptions.	 Those denouncing "the awful scourge of war"21
saw his paintings as condemning war. 	 Helen Zimmern, for
example, saw him as "the moralist among painters.. .he
fights against barbarism and despotism". 22 She condemned
conventional battle paintings and claimed that he "lifted
the curtain off all this braggart untruth", and that his
paintings, "preached ocularly, as it has never been preached
before, the horror and misery induced upon people by this
bloody sport of kings. . .Vereshchagin conceives war as one
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vast misery, one terrible dance of death". 23	To pacifists
also he was an eye-witness whose masterly paintings pro-
claimed evidence against war: "an artist who loves the truth
has portrayed war scenes which approach so closely to the
awful reality, that they deserve to be known by all who have
sons or other dear ones liable to be led out to slaughter in
the field". 24	Peace Society and other pacifist publications
reproduced his works.	 Yet those with conventional attitudes
to war and to battle painting saw his pictures as exception-
ally realistic rather than unacceptably anti-war. 	 The
Prince of Wales who admired Lady Butler's work, and Villiers
who admired Woodville's, both admired Vereshchagin's.	 His
work was seen as complementary to, not as contradicting or
invalidating conventional battle painting. His work was
more realistic, more emphatic on the horrors of war, than
was normally acceptable to his British contemporaries, who
condemned horrific French paintings. 	 Apparently he was
regarded as a special case, his horror redeemed by his
sincerity and moral purpose, whereas the French paintings
were seen as immoral sensationalism.
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7.	 THE PACIFIST CRITIQUE
Vereshchagin remained exceptional among battle painters
and no British battle painter attempted either his realism
or his anti-war message.	 Yet while the conventional war
artists, both special artists and home-based battle painters
presented the orthodox and most widely-disseminated image of
war, this was not unchallenged) -	In their propaganda
pacifists - and selective opponents of war such as some
socialists- presented war as immoral, unchristian, destruct-
lye and wasteful, and causing immense suffering. 	 They
condemned war correspondents and war artists as fire-eating
war-mongers who presented a false view of war. 2 They
attempted to show the horror behind the orthodox image.3
They criticised war artists' pictures, and they used
pictures, of peace and war, in their own propaganda.4
One example of such pacifist propaganda was a small
illustrated book published in 1892 by the Peace Society,
Wilhelm Carisen's War As It Is, a translation from Danish,
dedicated to the President of the Danish Society for Peace
and Neutralization: the pacifist movement had long been
supranational and internationalist. 5 A moralistic tract,
it condemned war as unchristian, evil and destructive, and
claimed it could be prevented by removing the causes.
Christian, emotional and sentimental, it appealed to
parents, especially mothers.	 It emphasised the horror of
war and the suffering caused, to combatants and civilians
in the combat area and to bereaved families. 	 It condemned
militarist agitation, the lethality of present and future
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weapons including aerial bombs, 6 armaments manufacture, and
expenditure on defence instead of against poverty and desti-
tution.	 It had many illustrations and its text was largely
commentary on them.	 First were pictures of mothers and
babies, illustrating maternal love; then pictures of the
horrors of war, including David harrowing the Ammonites.
Carlsen condemned war correspondents and public attitudes
to war:
"This picture shows a war correspondent outside
the line of battle.	 The bloodthirsty curiosity
which drew no wide a circle of spectators in the
days of ancient Rome is not dead. 	 We meet with
a great deal of it in the avidity with which
people follow wars - those loathsome massacres
of the inhabitants of any country". 7 (,l2).
The picture showed a topied, brassarded correspondent
scrambling among the smashed gabions, the wounded and dead.
Carlsen accused correspondents of becoming demoralised,
"intoxicated by scenes of blood at the seat of war". (l4).
However, a correspondent, he claimed, could show the nature
of war, and "he may expose the way in which art and poetry
and newsvendors veil the infamous reality of war; their
romantic phrases inducing even wives and mothers and
daughters to sacrifice at its altar, without so much as
admitting that it is something that ought to be protested
against" (ib).
	
Carlsen condemned "the sort of history
that is prepared for the use of courts" (pl5). 	 He condemned
Gros' painting of Bonaparte at Eylau as an example of such
falsehood, of "this official lie" çJ6): "Do you believe that
a field on which 60,000 men are stretched bleeding on the
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ground looks like that?" 	 He reproduced pictures of
cavalry charges and other battle scenes, and, using Tolstoy
and other sources, condemned the horror and suffering. 	 He
described the agony of the wounded, "military incendiarism"
32), sacrilege, killing and burial alive of wounded, robb-
ing of corpses, and wild animals eating wounded stragglers.
He denounced war as "brutal and shameless" 4,24). He repro-
duced some of Vereshchagin's pictures including the
'Apotheosis of War".	 He claimed that war artists deliber-
ately concealed the reality of war:
"I have collected pictures in eight countries,
but, with few exceptions, all labour to hide
something from us.	 Men who are murdering
are painted like actors in a play; the dead
and wounded as in a stage scene" (4O).
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries there was
increased defence and pacifist propaganda with sometimes a
curious similarity between the content, though not the
intended message, of each. 	 Defence propaganda had long
warned of the horrors of war, as necessitating military and
naval preparedness.	 The National Service League, determined
to overcome British antipathy to compulsory service, strove
to maximise its impact by emphasising the horrors of a
foreign invasion of Britain, with data essentially the same
as those used by their ideological opponents, the pacifists.
Both, for example, emphasised the plight of civilians in war
and t	 besr;cil behaviour of soldiers in previous wars.8
Possibly they influenced each other; but probably each if he
read the other's propaganda used the data to reinforce his
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own convictions, rejecting contrary conclusions. 	 Villiers
claimed Vereshchagin was one of the greatest war artists,
and especially praised his 'All is quiet on the Shipka',
a painting of a sentry frozen to death, reproduced and
praised by Carlsen as pacifist propaganda. 9 Yet Villiers
saw Vereshchagin's work only as exceptionally realistic, not
as anti-war.
The influence of the pacifists t propaganda and their
critique of the war artists' image of war, must be con-
jectural.	 However all indications, including volunteering
for the Boer War and the Great War, were that it was very
limited.	 Officially disapproved, without access to most
of the press, and with few pacifists and, despite Quaker
plutocrats, limited expenditure - pacifist propaganda was
on a small scale and reached only a minority. 	 Probably,
like defence propaganda, it largely preached to the
converted or, occasionally, the inconvertible. 	 Its
publications were bought probably only by those already
committed or sympathetic or, occasionally, by opponents
determined to attack them.	 They reached probably only a
heterogeneous minority of Quakers, residual Cobdenites
and miscellaneous adherents of ethical societies and
labour churches.	 The war artists, not their pacifist
critics, still expressed the dominant view of war.
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CHAPTER III.	 VICTORIAN WAR CORRESPONDENTS
Among those who influenced attitudes to war were
the war correspondents. 	 From the start they were contro-
versial, and they have been variously criticised: for lying
and faking news and, by some military authorities, as
"drones" and for unjustified harmful criticism of the
military and for revealing information to the enemy.
Pacifists and leftists criticised them as part of a press
conspiracy for jingoism, imperialism, armaments, aggression,
"scares" and war.
	 Before 1914, however, the view of them
largely accepted was that of the correspondents themselves,
propagated in their own writings, in press boosting of them
and in adulatory works such as F.L. Bullard's Famous War
Correspondents (1914), that they were heroic adventurers
who endured hardship and risked death to secure the news.
Joseph Hatton wrote in his Journalistic London (1882),
"The adventures of war correspondents, their perils by
flood and field, their splendid conduct in the heat of
battle, their marvellous rides with dispatches, their
strange escapes and their gallant deaths, would make a
,,lthrilling volume of heroic deeds . 	 In 1904 F.M. Thomas
wrote, "How many war correspondents have died.. .on the
field of glory since war correspondence first became a
recognised pursuit? One thing is certain: they run
more risks than soldiers"2
Attitudes to war correspondents were interrelated
with attitudes to the press as a whole. 	 Though some
traditionalists and some radicals despised the late 19th
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century new journalism, the press was generally accepted,
respected and believed. 	 The "Fourth Estateuwas believed
influential.	 W.T. Stead, a leading protagonist of the
power of the press, in his 1886 article 'Government by
Journalism' claimed the press, more than parliament,
expressed the national will, and that it decisively
influenced governments: "I have seen Cabinets upset.. .armies
sent hither and thither, war proclaimed and war averted, by
the agency of the newspapers". 3
 The Crimean War, the
Bulgarian atrocities agitation, jingoism, 'The Maiden Tri-
bute of Modern Babylon' and the Criminal Law Amendment Act,
the sending of Gordon to Khartoum, naval and invasion
scares and increased naval construction, were all seen as
proof of the power and influence of the press. 	 Despite
the 1880 and 1906 elections, press credibility, and that of
the war correspondents, largely continued.
"The news" in its modern sense was a 19th century
creation. 4 The Victorian war correspondents were, with a
few arguable exceptions, the first.
	
Previously war news
came largely from official sources: commanding officers'
despatches, published by government and sometimes, like
Bonaparte's bulletins, flagrant propaganda. 5 The Victorian
war correspondents were part of the great expansion of the
British press in the second half of the 19th century result-
ing from the combination of demographic, economic, social,
educational and technological changes including expansion
of the middle classes, advertising, and lower production
costs, 6 and favourable political and governmental attitudes:
the British became a "newspaperised people". 7 The Times,
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then from the 1860s the Daily Telegraph until overtaken at
the end of the century by the Daily Mail, had the world's
largest daily-paper circulation.	 Victorian war corres-
pondence developed from a relatively strong, prosperous and
free press and governmental acquiescence in its becoming
the primary purveyor or war news. 8 Victorian war corres-
pondence may be seen as a laissez-faire interlude between
18th and 20th century war-news control. 	 Throughout the
Victorian period the authorities continued to publish
commanders' despatches and sometimes a commander, notably
Wolseley in the Ashanti War, tried to scoop the correspond-
ents with his own version. 9	In the Boer War, with
increased military control over correspondents, official
despatches again became important sources of war news.
Throughout the period military concern continued at the
security risk from correspondents, and the issue was inter-
mittently discussed in the press. 	 The British authorities
retained their powers to control, censor and expel corres-
pondents, though in some colonial campaigns these were
minimally enforced: in the Sudan in the early 'eighties
correspondents were often given censorship forms already
signed.'° In the later 19th century the trend of opinion,
among the military and correspondents, was towards tighter
controls, and these were introduced in the Boer War and by
the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War. 	 By the 'nineties
such veterans as Russell and Forbes were lamenting that
real war correspondence had ended. 	 Forbes wrote in 1892
that in future the correspondent, "will be a mere trans-
mitter by strictly defined channels of carefully revised
intelligence liable to be altered, falsified, cancelled,
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or detained at the discretion of the official set in
authority over him"." By the time of the Russo-Japanese
War Repington, The Times military correspondent, believed
that, "more useful work could be done by a man who remained
at the London nerve-centre than by war correspondents of the
old type", whom the authorities would prevent telling the
truth.' 2 By then, however, an era of war correspondence
had ended, which had begun with Russell in the Crimean War.
Though not the first war correspondent, the first
important British war correspondent was William Howard
Russell (1820-1907) in the Crimea. 13	There he established
the concept and credibility of the war correspondent and,
by his revelations and the resulting changes, a belief in
the influence of war correspondents and a strong public
support for them.	 As Forbes later wrote, "England had
come to recognise that it was the pen of William Howard
14Russell which had saved her army from extinction".
Recognised as, "the first and greatest of war correspond-
ents", he set the pattern of British war correspondence
and influenced his successors.	 He wore military-style
clothes and was armed.	 He exposed the horrors of inade-
quate hospitals and other military faults but he indentified
with the army and, describing battle, emphasised glory,
drama and heroism and minimised horror and suffering.
He named officers but other ranks remained anonymous, and
he ignored the contrast between officers' and rankers'
conditions.	 As the most famous Times correspondent he
received credit for reporting in fact done by others,
notably the exposure of the Scutari hospital conditions by
151
Thomas Chenery, their Constantinople correspondent. His
reporting began the controversy in Britain on the role of
war correspondents, their security risk and the control and
censorship of them.
	 The allegation that his reporting
aided the enemy was made by Raglan and became part of the
"classic list" of cases cited in support of censorship of
war correspondents.' 5 Others cited his Crimean achieve-
ment in support of war correspondents: for example, in 1908
the Newspaper Proprietors Association objected that proposed
censorship legislation would have made it illegal to
publish Russell's reports on the conditions of troops in
the Crimea.'6
His reporting of this one war made his reputation
and established his career.
	 He returned "Balaclava Russell",
acclaimed and lionised, "the most famous newspaper corres-
pondent the world has ever seen".' 7 Following Thackeray's
example, in 1857 he lectured throughout the country on his
Crimean experiences, gaining £1,600, over double his annual
salary.	 The Times republished its Crimean war corres-
pondence in two volumes, and Russell published a series of
books based on his journalism though sometimes, as with
his Canada: Its Defences, Condition and Resources (1865)
from only brief and superficial acquaintance with his
subject.	 He reported the Indian Mutiny, American Civil
War, Austro-Prussian War, Franco-Prussian War, the Zulu War
and various royal and aristocratic tours.
	 He engaged in
public controversy, notably in 1880 with Wolseley over the
conduct of British troops in South Africa. 	 Success as a
war correspondent brought him fame, wealth and social
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advancement.	 Highly paid and pensioned, he was awarded
the Crimea and Mutiny medals, the Iron Cross, foreign orders
and an honorary doctorate from his alma mater. 	 In 1895 he
was knighted.	 Partly because he had "a genius for friend-
ship" and "an intense sense of enjoyment.. .like a great
happy schoolboy", 18 he became a friend of the Prince of
Wales and of the Dukes of Wellington and Sutherland and
other aristocrats. He wrote an unsuccessful three-volume
novel - he admitted in his diary, "there is frightful bosh
in it" - and his rich friends enabled him in 1868 to stand
as Conservative candidate at Chelsea where he was defeated
by Duke.	 In the Franco-Prussian War he failed to adapt
to increased competition, speed and telegraphing, and was
repeatedly scooped by Forbes and other Daily News corres-
pondents. Thenceforth his career as a war correspondent
declined, though he continued the honoured exemplar.
Following the Crimea he believed himself a military
expert, pronounced on military controversies and sometimes
disputed with generals. 	 From 1860 most of his working
life was spent editing the Army and Navy Gazette of which
from 1864 he was proprietor.	 Impressed by the Prussian
needle-gun, he urged British adaption of a similar weapon
and on this he was cited in Parliament by General Peel, the
War Secretary.' 9 He also advocated the readoption of
breech-loading artillery.	 His own experience mostly of
great-power war, his military attitudes were largely
continentalist.	 He advocated an army on a continental
scale, and conscription. 	 Little interested in the navy,
he argued that not British seapower but continental armies
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had defeated Napoleon.	 After the Boer War he criticised
those who advocated replacing cavalry by mounted infantry,
"as if we were never to meet enemies but Boers or fight
anywhere but in S. Africa.. .God help the British Army that
fights in Europe with 5.African tactics!" 2° As his
authorised biographer J.B. Atkins wrote, "he took the
characteristically Continental view of an Army rather than
the characteristically English view". 21	He also In the
'eighties and 'nineties warned against physical deterior-
ation and decline in the physique of recruits. 	 Atkins
claimed that Russell was "the auctor et fundator of all
the duties which special correspondents have since under-
taken". 22 Though never as successful and honoured as
Russell, Forbes and other correspondents largely followed
the pattern he set.	 Their careers and contributions to
military thinking and to the public image of war can be
fully understood only in the context of Russell.
War correspondence emerged as a profession during
and after the Crimean War, largely because of Russell, and
contemporaries regarded the period from the Crimea to the
Boer War as its golden age.	 There were frequent and varied
wars, minimal official restrictions on correspondents, quick
transmission of reports by telegraph and ocean cable, and
strong public demand for war news.	 Editors wanted it
because it Increased sales, though journalists sometimes
argued, against accusations of war-mongering, that war was
not in the press's interest as the return was less than the
exceptional expenses. 23 Exceptional war news - like
exceptional home news such as the Mordaunt verdict - brought
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exceptional sales increases: the Standard evening edition
reporting Tel-el-Kebir sold half a million copies, compared
to the usual 230,000 of the morning and evening editions
combined. 24 Reporting war, especially telegraphing -
during the Afghan War W.H. Mudford, editor of the Standard,
paid £800 for one cable despatch, and Lucy Brown has recent-
ly suggested that not the newspapers but the telegraph
companies were the chief beneficiaries from overseas wars 25
-was expensive for the papers and sometimes difficult for the
correspondents, "under wildly perplexing conditions" with
unclear and unreliable evidence and the pressures of com-
petition. 26 The necessity of speed rather than accuracy
caused correspondents to send unverified statements which,
if proved wrong, might discredit their papers: for example,
the Daily Mail's 1900 report of the massacre of the Peking
legations. 27
 After 1870 reliance on telegraphing sometimes
distorted reporting, as in the Boer War where correspondents
largely stayed by the telegraphs and missed important
operations elsewhere. 	 Occasionally correspondents falsi-
fied news and were denounced by their rivals: William
Maxwell, a veteran war correspondent, wrote of the corres-
pondent, far from the fighting, "in some distant and safe
retreat, he weaves romances out of official bulletins, and
meets the insistent demand for a daily 'story' by inventing
battles at any time and place".28
Those who worked primarily as war correspondents,
formed a relatively small group largely based on London:
J.J. Mathews later argued that war correspondence was,
strictly speaking, a profession only for a brief period of
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late nineteenth century colonial wars. 29	In larger wars
the professional correspondents were outnumbered by the many
other reporters.	 Maxwell wrote in 1913 that, "twenty years
ago the company of war correspondents was small and select",
but that in the 1898 Sudan campaign of the sixteen corres-
pondents "only six or seven were trained newspaper men",
and in the Boer War there was "a plague of bogus corres-
pondents". 3° Journalism was an open profession and pro-
fessional war correspondents were typical of journalists,
from varied middle-class families.	 For example Hilary
Skinner (1839-94), Russell's rival, was the son of a Queen's
Counsel, a London law graduate and a barrister. 	 An
exceptional linguist, he reported the 1864 Danish War for
the Daily News and became its leading war correspondent,
reporting the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars,
compiling books from his journalism, and standing as a
Liberal parliamentary candidate. War correspondents were
often Scottish or Irish.	 Sometimes staff-officers, boost-
ing their commander - for example Maurice as Daily News
correspondent in the Ashanti War - and sometimes ambitious
young officers, notably Churchill, functioned as war
correspondents, but neither were typical correspondents.31
Some became war correspondents by chance, from other
journalism: for example Russell or later G.W. Steevens.
Some already had military interests and experience: G.A.
Henty had served as a commissariat officer in the Crimea,
and Forbes as a private of Dragoons. 	 The successful
correspondents, "of the adventurous school of war corres-
pondents, of which Archibald Forbes was the leading
..,32	 .
spirit',	 had common characteristics.	 Though some began
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without military knowledge or experience of armies, they
were journalists with the qualities necessary for successful
journalism: intuition for what attracted editors and readers,
initiative and energy in procuring and transmitting news,
ability to socialise, gain and exploit useful contacts, and
ability to write vividly and dramatically. 	 They had
physical and mental toughness and stamina. 	 In an age of
hero-worship they saw themselves as heroic adventurers fac-
ing danger and death.	 This was a repeated theme of their
writings: they repeatedly cited Forbes' ride after Ulundi.
They were romantics who romanticised themselves and created
their own mythology, part of the wider 19th century mythology
of adventure, exploration, war and empire. 	 They expressed
this by their appearance: broad-brimmed hat or fur cap,
patch-pocketed jacket, campaign ribbons, straps, belts,
pouches and guns, upturned moustache and challenging
arrogant stare.	 Captain Cairnes wrote of a correspondent,
"dressed in the most curious parody of a military uniform."33
They were proud of their achievements and their man-of-the-
world toughness, and emphasised their hard drinking: Forbes,
exhausted, revived himself with champagne. 	 Their values
were largely those of the officers they accompanied, though
34
sometimes more bellicose, 	 and they presented themselves
as men of action not littrateurs.	 They were often armed
and in colonial wars such as in Ashanti and in the Sudan,
sometimes fought in battle.	 They resented Wolseley's
denigration of them as drones, and asserted their combatant
role and services: fighting, helping the wounded, providing
information and carrying despatches.	 As they repeatedly
insisted, their work was dangerous, with a high mortality
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from battle and disease. 	 Correspondents died with Hicks
Pasha, and on the Gordon Relief Expedition and reconquest
of the Sudan.	 Thirteen died in the Boer War. 	 Some con-S
sidered them a new type of eyewitness historian: Forbes
claimed their work was a crucial source of military history5
Most officers, however, disagreed with the war
correspondents' high opinion of themselves. 	 Officers had
ill-defined and varied relations with the press and with
war correspondents. 	 The press could benefit or harm
officers.	 Writing for the press - as did Wolseley, Roberts,
Wood, Kitchener, G.S. Clarke and others - brought income and
influence.	 The press could boost an officer's reputation
and advocate military change he wanted, or by criticism
could harm his prospects.	 Officers were much aware of the
press and while the Duke of Cambridge and some conservative
generals disliked war correspondence and what they saw as
press interference and regarded journalists as social
inferiors, ambitious commanders such as Wolseley and
Roberts tried to use the press.
	 Wolseley in the Zulu War
had officers on his staff employed as correspondents by
The Times and Daily News, a practice Russell deplored as
preventing impartial criticism and leading to the corrupt-.
ion of the press and destruction of its influence.36
With the notable exception of Kitchener officers were
usually friendly and helpful to correspondents who could
boost their reputations.	 Melton Prior noted Wolseley's
affability on campaigns and Roberts similarly helped them.
The relationship was more often symbiotic than adversarial.
Correspondents often depended on the army for transport,
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supplies, communications and information, and functioned
better with officers' goodwill, while acquaintance with
aristocratic officers offered the opportunity of social as
well as professional advantage. 	 Correspondents often
admired officers and willingly eulogised them, and the
press boosted the reputations of Wolseley, Roberts and
later French. 37 Correspondents were sometimes invited to
lecture to officers, at the Royal United Service Insti-
tution and elsewhere. Commanders disliked correspondents'
criticism and tried to prevent it by censorship or, that
failing, expulsion.	 During the Afghan War Roberts expelled
Macpherson of the Standard, and in the 1885 Burma War
General Prendergast expelled E.K. Hoylan of The Times.38
Following both episodes the press and politicians made
trouble for the generals responsible. 	 These episodes,
however, were exceptional.	 T.H.S. Escott, experienced
journalist and editor of the Fortnightly Review wrote that,
"Throughout the Victorian Age the relations between the
journalist and the general were on the whole those of
mutual goodwill and reciprocal assistance...The new entente
between sword and pen worked in the interests of all
concerned" .
Yet within the "new entente" there was ambiguity
and tension and public cordiality sometimes masked private
animosity: for example, with Wolseley. 	 He believed the
press influential, accumulated press cuttings, and
cultivated, helped and used journalists including war
correspondents: he gave Sala and Alfred Austin Zulu weapons.
His fame resulted largely from the press. Yet in his
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Soldier's Pocket-Book he denigrated war correspondents as
"curses to armies", "drones" who revealed information to the
enemy and who should be licensed, controlled and censored.4°
His hostility was reinforced by the trouble they caused him:
Forbes' 1878 exposure of Cyprus conditions, then Russell's
1879-80 exposure of troops' misconduct in Natal, and
criticism in the Army and Navy Gazette of his strategy in
1882 and 1884.	 Privately he condemned the press as a
"monstrous humbug" and stated his loathing and contempt for
war correspondents: as fawning, bribing, lying and reporting
rumour as f act. 41 Alleging they were ignorant camp-
followers, he dismissed their pretensions to military
expertise. 42 Nevertheless, ambitious to be Commander-in-
Chief, he continued to conciliate journalists.	 In 1887,
about to be interviewed, he wrote to his wife, "Shall I
never be strong enough to tell reporters how I dislike
their trade? What a world of shams and humbug we live
in, never telling the whole, seldom even half the truth!"43
In 1890 he entertained Stead who was writing an article on
him: "He is a sort of man who in days of active revolution
might be a serious danger.	 I looked at him, thinking if
it should ever be my lot to have to hang or shoot him".44
War-reporting offered opportunities and rewards.
The most successful correspondents gained wealth, fame
and honours and rose socially: loot, higher pay and
expenses, ribbons, medals and decorations, honorary
doctorates, royal and aristocratic acquaintances and
invitations.	 Following Russell's example, they gave
public lectures: "in their war-paint or in evening dress
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a la Forbes, their coats ablaze with foreign orders, or
hanging from ribbons round their necks.
	 They appear in
the limelight". 45
 They gained increased readership for
their books, more opportunities to express their views, and
the exultation of celebrity.
	 Escott wrote that Russell's
and Forbes' feats made them, "national heroes, to whose
familiar laurels no fresh leaf remains to add". 46
 Some
asserted themselves as military experts, pronouncing
analysis, prescription and even prophecy.
	 They influenced
public attitudes to war and defence through varied mutually-
reinforcing media: war correspondence with its impact of
immediacy, lectures, articles, books and sometimes fiction.
Henty became famous for his boys' fiction, and Forbes
wrote a novel and short stories.
Their success depended on the acceptability of
their copy to the military, editors and readers, but
because they largely shared the same values this was
usually no constraint on correspondents.
	
Their war
correspondence was determined more by their own values,
perceptions and self-censorship than by external controls.
They largely shared officers' attitudes and usually
identified with the forces they accompanied.
	 Maxwell
wrote that the correspondent, "in loyally serving the Army
he serves best in the end the public, his newspaper and
himself." 47
 Like many officers, they were enthusiastic
for more war experience, as was expressed in their memoirs
and by Kipling, a journalist who knew them, in The Light
that Failed.	 They accepted war and the army, and saw
war as justified, as a challenge, opportunity and
adventure; as a scene of courage, heroism and endurance.
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They did not ignore war's horrors but saw them in this wider
context, as a high but necessary price and as increasing
military achievement.	 The horrors of war were to them a
necessary part of war, but did not dominate it. 	 Their des-
criptions of them were usually not specific and detailed.
As newspaper sales indicated, the public shared their per-
ception of war as excitement and adventure, identifying and
participating vicariously.	 Some likened wars to spectator
sports.	 Kipling wrote of correspondents in The Light that
Failed, "You're sent out when a war begins, to minister to
the blind, brutal British public's thirst for blood. 	 They
have no arenas now, but they must have special correspond-
,48	 .
ents.'	 Through their varied media the war correspondents,
with the war artists and the studio-based battle-painters,
contributed significantly to shaping perceptions of war,
and also to the major military controversies. 	 However in
the serious consideration of campaigns, weapons, strategy
and tactics they were probably less influential than the
press defence writers, analysts and commentators, back in
Britain.	 Nevertheless these, like the public, depended
on the correspondents, whatever their faults. 	 Some men,
like Archibald Forbes, at different times attempted both
roles.
From the Crimea onwards, though war correspondents
were usually accepted and favourably regarded, there was
intermittent controversy on them, in which they participated:
largely repeating the controversy over Russell in the
Crimea.	 Some officers criticised them for ignorance and
pretension to military expertise, distortion, inaccuracy,
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under-mining morale and revealing information to the enemy.
Others criticised them for swaggering self-advertisement and
sensationalism.	 In 1885 the Saturday Review condemned the
excessive praise of them, their pretensions, demands for
admiration, and irresponsible boosting of certain officers
who helped them. 49 Radicals and pacifists condemned their
bellicist values: the Peace Society publication War as it is
(1892) condemned correspondents "intoxicated by scenes of
blood" encouraging support for war. 5° The correspondents
and others who championed them, argued their beneficial
achievement: informing the public, encouraging recruiting
and support for defence, revealing faults and failures,
and causing reforms. J.B. Atkins claimed that they were,
"the unofficial scrutineers, the umpires representing the
democracy. . .the Army cannot form an impartial estimate of
its own actions."5'
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CHAPTER IV. ARCHIBALD FORBES
1.	 THE CAREER OF ARCHIBALD FORBES
Excepting only Russell, the most successful and
famous Victorian war correspondent was Archibald Forbes
(1838-1900), whom Russell himself called, "that incom-
parable Archibald" .	 He "helped invent war correspondence
in the modern sense of the term" and, "with a halo of
journalistic romance", became the archetype of the adven-
turous war correspondent. 2 He was praised by other
journalists, honoured by foreign governments, "the most
decorated journalist who ever lived", 3 and in 1884 awarded
a doctorate honoris causa by Aberdeen University. 	 He was
deemed worthy of entries in Men of the Time , the D.N.B.
and Britannica,and of a memorial in St. Paul's Cathedral.
He was born in Morayshire, Scotland, one of nine children
of a Presbyterian minister, Lewis W.F. Forbes, a graduate
and in 1851 a D.D. of Aberdeen University. He grew up in
the highland village in the north of Scotland that was the
background of much of his later reminiscences and fiction:
throughout his life he loved the highlands. 	 Most Scottish
education was not socio-economically segregated as in
England and he and his brothers, with the laird's son and
the farmers' and labourers' children, attended the parish
school, which he later described in 'An Honest-Born Boy'.4
His father intended him for the ministry and he attended
Aberdeen University from 1853 to 1855. 	 He passed in
classics but failed in mathematics and, as he later wrote,
"follies and extravagance abruptly terminated my university
career", and he left without graduating. 5 A drifter,
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"one of the men who thrust poverty upon themselves", 6 after
his father's death he lived in Edinburgh and spent his
inheritance without deciding on a career. 	 In the winter
of 1857 he heard Russell lecture on the Crimea at the
Edinburgh Music Hall and Russell's description of Balaclava
inspired him with enthusiasm for the cavalry and later
influenced him towards enlisting in the Dragoons. 	 Coming
of age in 1859 he inherited a further £2,500, and emigrated
to Canada.	 Again he squandered his inheritance, allegedly
much of it on a love affair in Quebec and, working his
passage to Liverpool, returned penniless.
In London he enlisted in the Royal Dragoons. 7 He
was stationed in Ireland, largely at Dublin, and from 1861
at various provincial barracks in England, and his family
supplemented his pay by a small remittance. 	 Educated men
were then rare in the ranks and he became unit schoolmaster
and acting quartermaster sergeant.	 The Royals, the oldest
regiment of cavalry of the line, had distinguished them-
selves in the charge of the Heavy Brigade at Balaclava.
He bought beer for the old troopers who talked of the
Crimea: "I was saturating myself with practical soldierhood,
while the grizzled veterans were swilling my beer". 8 As
heavy cavalry the Royals were exempt from service in India,
and for forty-three years from the Crimea to the Boer War
had no active service. 	 In the 'sixties they were busy
with training, reviews and intermittent aid to the civil
power in England - sending detachments to assist the
magistrates at Guildford in 1863 and Nottingham in 1866 -
and in Ireland, a duty soldiers disliked and which Forbes
chose to ignore in his writing on the army. 	 In his spare
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time he studied military history and theory, in the evenings
devoting, "three happy hours in the regimental library over
the pages of Napier, or in the tougher wrestle with the
problems of Jomini", 9	and also wrote pseudonymous articles
on the army.	 He enjoyed the army: he later wrote that he
had a natural affinity for soldiering, and that for him the
glamour never died.	 He was always proud that he had been
a private of Dragoons.	 In 1867 he left the army, his
discharge paper marked "good" and became a journalist in
London.
Although the press was expanding, competition
among aspirant journalists was hard.	 Many "penny-a-liner"
journalists struggled but few could gain the relative
security of a salaried post on a leading paper. 	 At first
Forbes did miscellaneous journalism including for the penny
daily Morning Star and its evening edition the Evening Star
which published varied articles providing opportunities for
aspirant writers)° Started in 1856 with primarily
political purpose, The Morning Star was "the organ of the
party led by Cobden and Bright", first edited by Bright's
brother-in-law Samuel Lucas, with Bright on its board of
management and often in the editor's office; extreme radical,
demanding manhood suffrage, opposing war and annexation, and
denounced by opponents as "peace-at-any-price". 	 It was
edited from 1864 to 1868 by Justin McCarthy who accepted
the first article Forbes submitted to a daily paper. 	 It
seemed an unusual paper for Forbes, a bellicist ex-regular,
but it paid him.	 A struggling journalist, he largely
relied on the military sketches he contributed to its
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'Starlight' column. 	 He also part-owned, edited and wrote
an unprofitable weekly, the London Scotsman, for which he
wrote a serial story on the Indian Mutiny, based partly on
his conversations with a highland veteran, and which he
later published as a three-volume novel, Drawn From Life.
He also did miscellaneous journalism, including music
criticism of which he was ignorant, for the Morning
Advertiser, a 3d organ of the drink trade, Whig in politics
and edited by a fellow Morayshire Scot, James Grant.
In Britain and elsewhere the Franco-Prussian War
aroused much interest.	 Papers sent many correspondents -
the Daily News seventeen, the New York Herald allegedly
twenty - including their star reporters: The Times Russell,
the Telegraph G.A. Sala, and the Daily News Hilary Skinner
As Lucy Brown has shown, the war dominated and changed the
British daily newspapers, and it increased their circula-
12	 .tions.	 British concern was expressed also in the British
ambulances and private and later governmental relief opera-
tions in France.' 3 The Daily News French Peasant Relief
Fund raised £22,000: their red and black star badge was,
by permission, also used by the Quaker relief organization
and is still used by the Society of Friends. 	 The Daily
Telegraph, the Lord Mayor's Relief Fund and various ad hoc
organizations also contributed, and at the end of the war
the government sent food to revictual starving Paris.
Men eager for .iar experience hurried to France, among them
Kitchener and Dilke.	 Some of the lesser papers sent
correspondents and Grant, impressed by Forbes' war fiction,
'Drawn from Life' , sent Forbes. 	 He had long dreamed of
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being a war correspondent but not thought it possible.
	 He
spoke German and, impressed by H.M. Hozier's Seven Weeks'
War and his other reading on the Prussian army he believed
the Germanswould win, and accompanied their forces.
	 He
was an unknown correspondent with little money and no horse,
travelling by public transport or walking with his knapsack
on his back.	 He lacked the means to expedite his reports.
As he later wrote, "I saw then more, perhaps, of the
realities of actu/al hard fighting than I ever did later;
but to what purpose? All that I could do was to drop my
missives into the feldpost waggon, to a belated and pre-
carious fate". 14
 He reported well but in September Grant,
wanting to economise, recalled him and refused his last
despatch.	 Proud and angry, Forbes attempted to offer his
services to The Times but, unable to see the editor, left
for elsewhere.'5
Forbes next applied to the Daily News and was
16
immediately interviewed by its general manager J.R. Robinson.
The Daily News, founded in 1846 by Dickens and from 1868
priced at one penny, was a leading Liberal paper which in
1870 absorbed its Liberal rival the Morning Star. 	 It was
owned by a syndicate of rich Liberals which included Samuel
Morley and from 1869 Henry Labouchere with possibly a
quarter share, in which no one person was dominant. 	 As
Stephen Koss and Lucy Brown have recently shown, politicians
had close connections with the press and used their own or
party funds to subsidise papers. 	 The Daily News proprietors
from 1868 invested much to launch it as a mass-circulation
daily and organ of party propaganda. 	 It became a quasi-
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official party organ, its editor F.H. Hill briefed by Liberal
politicians including Granville, Dilke and Gladstone's
secretary Algernon West, and receiving both Instruction and
exclusive information.	 Thus 'political' money financed the
Daily News Franco-Prussian war correspondence, which had to
function within the constraints of Liberal Party policy.
The proprietors delegated the running of the paper to
Robinson, general manager from 1868 to 1901 and editor from
1887 to 1896. His biographer wrote that he acted "as the
proprietor acts when a paper belongs to an individual but
this was only partly true and he complained of the proprie-
tors' repeated interference.	 He appointed staff and
instructed correspondents. 	 A Unitarian and committed
Liberal in the Dissenting tradition, with "an intense faith
in Mr. Gladstone", he was in the London Liberal establish-
ment and was later awarded a knighthood by Gladstone.
Dynamic and enterprising, his journalistic success was
partly from his flair in selecting correspondents: for
example MacGahan to Investigate the Bulgarian atrocities.
Robinson was already impressed by Forbes' army articles
and war correspondence and had inquired about him. 	 When
Forbes offered his services Robinson seized his opportunity
and immediately employed him a a high salary, £20 a week,
and expenses, and sent him back to the war with £100 in
French gold coins.	 Previously correspondents had tele-
graphed brief summaries of their news and posted full
reports, so papers carried a confusing mixture of new and
stale news. Robinson, following the American example and
with finance probably provided by Labouchere, instructed
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correspondents to telegraph their full reports. 	 He also
made a reciprocal agreement with G.W. Smalley of the New York
Tribune which initially much benefited the Daily News through
the enterprise and use of telegraphing of the young American
reporters.	 Later in the war when the D.N. 'S coverage
improved and outstripped its competitors, the agreement was
more to the Tribune's advantage.17
Robinson's decision to employ him launched Forbes'
career.	 In France he attached himself to the Saxon army and
gained the goodwill and cooperation of the Crown Prince of
Saxony and his staff.	 He reported the war from the siege
and fall of Metz to the siege and fall, in January 1871, of
Paris.	 His reports were vivid, dramatic and outstandingly
successful.	 With the D.N. he had the resources enabling
him to use his ability as a correspondent. 	 Yet, as he
admitted, he and other British correspondents were initially
slow to change their methods, and missed opportunities. 	 In
October 1870 an unknown American, Muller, telegraphed news
of the fall of Metz from Luxembourg to the D.N. 	 Forbes
claimed it was, "the greatest journalistic coup of our time
on this side of the Atlantic" which "at a stroke revolution-
ised war correspondence in the Old World". 18 Forbes,
shocked, learned from it and improved his methods of expedit-
ing his copy, including telegraphing from outside the area
of military control. His contacts with German officers,
ingenuity and planning of his communications, and his own
riding and endurance, enabled him to repeatedly scoop his
rivals including Russell and other Times correspondents.
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The Times tried to hire him but he refused. 	 He later
proudly described some of his methods in 'War Correspondence
as a Fine Art', including his arrangement with the telegraph-
master at SaarbrUcken to whom he posted his reports, which
were then telegraphed. 19
 He did not there mention however,
one of his methods.	 He received information on forthcoming
operations from the Prince's staff, telegraphed reports of
them before they happened to the D.N. which set them up in
print, then when they began telegraphed to London to print
"intelligent anticipation as a record of accomplished f act".2°
Thus at Avron and St. Denis he was able to report the German
bombardments before his rivals. 2' After the surrender of
Paris he entered the city and reported the situation: accord-
ing to Bullard, "one of the most thrilling stories a daily
newspaper ever printed". 22	In March he reported the German
review at Longchamps then returned to London and began to
hurriedly compile from his war correspondence a rushed
'instant history', My Experiences of the War btte rranc an Germany,
his first book.	 Robinson urged him to report the Commune
but he refused until he had completed his book, then in May
went to Paris.	 With his usual ingenuity and daring he
managed to enter Paris and meet the Commune's last commander
Dombrowski, witnessed some of the final fighting and narrowly
escaped summary execution as a communard. 	 He later wrote
that conditions for correspondents there, "were more full
of peril than one could incur in any battle of which I have
had experience...in the seething turmoil of the last days
of the Commune, bullets were flying from front, flanks and
near.	 There was a universal raving lust for blood".23
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The Franco-Prussian War was decisive for Forbes and
for the Daily News.	 Before the war Forbes had been a
drifter and a failure, one of the many struggling to survive
on the fringes of London journalism. 	 The war established
his reputation as a leading war correspondent and began his
career as the Daily News star special correspondent which
continued until he retired.	 The D.N. 's war correspondence
excelled that of its rivals: Morris of The Times lamented,
24
"The D.N. has beaten us hollow, and continues to do so".
The journalistic lesson of the war was apparently that corn-
petently-writLen	 long personal despatches by special corres-
pondents attracted readers and were worth the expense,
25
including that of telegraphing: in the following years
Robinson applied this lesson, using Forbes. 	 Public interest
in the war increased newspaper circulations and led to the
launching of new papers, some of which ended in 1871 with
the ending of the "feverish demand" for war news. 26 The
D.N. 's Franco-Prussian war correspondence trebled its
sales - from 50,000 to 150,000 though after the war falling
27
to about 90,000 - and so increased its advertising revenue.
The war ended its financial troubles and raised it from a
struggling second-rank paper to a firm position as one of
the four leading London daily papers with the Times, Tele-
graph and Standard, though it never attained The Times'
prestige or the Telegraph's circulation: by 1880 the Tele-
28
graph's circulation was 300,000, the D.N.'s 100,000.
Nevertheless the war "lifted the paper from a losing
property into a haven of fame and prosperity" and estab-
lished it as a financial success, "a power in the land and
a splendid commercial property" paying some twenty percent
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and yielding its proprietors "a princely revenue". 29 The
'seventies were its heyday of profit, fame and influence.
Its circulation increased advertising revenue: the 'seventies
City boom brought lucrative company-promotional full-page
advertisements. 30	Its financial success in turn enabled
further journalistic success through sending special corres-
pondents and paying high telegraphic costs. 	 In 1876 it
achieved its greatest influence when its reports, especially
by J.A. MacGahan, led to the Bulgarian atrocities agitation.
Forbes' D.N. employment contributed to and coincided with
its heyday: after retirement, with the competition of the
halfpenny papers and other advertising media and the decline
of middle-class Liberalism, the D.N. declined.
The Daily News continued to employ Forbes largely
overseas and as a war correspondent, and Robinson continued
to praise and encourage him.	 Forbes enjoyed his work: it
was, he wrote, "an avocation of singular fascination", its
31drama contrasting with "the tameness of civilian life".
His success resulted from "a rare combination of qualities"2
He had "a splendid physique that enabled him to perform
feats of endurance that would have killed other men". 33 He
was confident, brave, physically and mentally tough, and a
good horseman.	 He realised the importance of speed, and
expedited his copy: he later wrote, "The best organiser of
the means for expediting his intelligence, he it is who is
the most successful man". 34 Disregarding Robinson's
advice to "keep away from those 'shell-swept slopes" 35 he
repeatedly risked death, and he accomplished exceptional
journeys with his reports.	 Villiers wrote that he was
176
"a man of grand physique and great courage, and never seemed
to know what fatigue was.. .he never spared himself. 	 It was
a sheer impossibility for any colleague to attempt to comp-
pete with Forbes". 36 His exploits, publicised by the Daily
News and other papers, brought him fame: F.M. Thomas later
wrote, "all these things are written in the history of his
time, and will ever form part and parcel of the annals of
journalistic enterprise". 37 His correspondence was clear,
vivid and dramatic.	 He was proud, immodest, truculent
and critical, and made enemies as well as admirers. 	 Some
resented as presumptuous his criticism of generals: "Some
of his criticisms of Lord Chelmsford were held in certain
quarters to have been unnecessarily of fensive...he had
outgrown any semblance of diffidence in passing judgement
upon difficult military operations". 38 Contemporaries
agreed on his quality as a correspondent, but disagreed on
his character.	 Frederick Villiers, long his friend,
admired and repeatedly praised him. 39 Harry Furniss,
however, hostilely caricatured him and vilified him as
bad-tempered, arrogant and exhibitionist, and he was
accused of over-readiness to prophesy, rashness in forming
opinions and claiming for himself other correspondents'
40feats.
In the years after 1871 the London dailies faced
declining or static post-war circulations, and competition
among themselves and from the provincial papers which -
with provincial prosperity and loyalties and using Reuters,
the Press Association and news from the London press - were
in their heyday, pushing back the circulation of the London
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papers.	 The London dailies wanted exclusive copy to retain
public attention.	 The provincial papers - small-staffed
and unable to afford the high costs, especially telegraphic,
of overseas reporting - could not compete in war and other
overseas news with the London dailies, which tried to
exploit this advantage. 	 So they apparently tried to repeat
their success in the Franco-Prussian War by using their
special correspondents on assignments which would arouse
41public interest and increase circulation. 	 The Daily News
used Forbes, their star correspondent. 	 In 1872 he reported
Joseph Arch's agricultural labourers' movement: Arch believed
his "powerful articles" crucial in bringing public sympathy
42
and donations.	 In 1873 he reported the Vienna exhibition,
and from 1872 to 1874 he reported the Carlist wars at
various times with the Carlist, Republican and Alfonsoist
forces: on which later he was oddly silent, unlike with his
other wars neither writing articles nor citing it. 	 In 1874
he reported the Bengal famine - where he met Roberts then
Deputy Quartermaster-General and supervising relief
operations - and in 1875 and 1876 the Prince of Wales' tour
of India.	 In 1876 he reported the Serbian War, where he
met and befriended the young special artist of the Graphic,
Frederick Villiers: "I adopted him as 'my boy' before our
first interview was over. 	 We loved each other from the
first".	 They worked together and remained close friends.43
Villiers described Forbes there as, "the most striking
figure in the whole of this busy scene. • .a tall, well-knit
man in knickers and jacket of homespun with tam-o'-shanter
bonnet cocked over his handsome, sunburnt face and a cherry-
wood pipe protruding from beneath his tawny moustache".44
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In 1877 with Villiers and the American J.A. MacGahan, famous
for reporting the Bulgarian atrocities, reported the Russo-
Turkish War with the Russian armies, risking death in battle
and from marauding bashi bazouks.	 His feats included his
epic ride in August bringing the first news of the fighting
on the Shipka.	 He was then presented to the Tsar, who
complimented him and awarded him the Order of St. Stanilaus
for bravery.	 Answering the Tsar's questions on his military
service, Forbes proudly stated that he had been a private
trooper in the cavalry of the line. He witnessed most of
the principal operations and was continuously in the field
until, after the Russians' September attack on Plevna , he
succumbed to malarial fever, was invalided back to Bucharest
and was delirious for seven days, but survived. 	 His report-
ing was an outstanding success and confirmed his reputation.
His status was shown by the banquet given in London in his
honour in December 1877 and attended by leading journalists,
distinguished soldiers, the Duke of Sutherland and other
aristocrats: and at the Press Fund dinner in May 1878 he
was among the honoured guests.45
In July and August 1879 Forbes reported the British
occupation of Cyprus and exposed the sickness and mortality
of the British garrison.	 Later in 1878 Robinson sent him
to India for the Afghan War.	 In the winter he accompanied
Browne's Khyber Pass force into Afghanistan to Jalabad,
witnessed the capture of Ali Musjid, marched with several
expeditions against the hill tribes and, for helping the
wounded under fire, was mentioned in despatches.	 He was
selective in his criticism, identifying with the force he
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accompanied.	 The Khyber force had inadequate numbers,
transport and medical equipment but, as Repington later
wrote, "Though we had with us up the Khaibar Archibald Forbes,
46the great war correspondent, nothing of this came out".
Early in 1879 Forbes visited Burma and at Mandalay inter-
viewed King Thibaw.
In 1879 Robinson sent him to report the Zulu War.
He arrived after Isandhlwana, criticised Chelmsford's
strategy, reported the scene at Isandhlwana four months
after the battle, the finding of the Prince Imperial's body,
and the advance on Ulundi. 	 He witnessed the battle of
Ulundi and immediately wrote a vivid succinct account of it,
praising both sides' bravery: "The Zulus dashed with great
bravery into close quarters amidst the deadly hail of
Martini bullets and the volleys of cannister, and stubbornly
assailed us on all four faces of our square, which stood
like a rock".	 He described the British cavalry's charge:
"the Lancers and Buller's Horsemen.. .burst like a torrent
upon the broken enemy. . .the British cavalry effectually
vindicated its reputation".	 He concluded that, "The
success of the day is unquestionable". 47 Chelmsford
decided against sending despatch riders that evening, but
Forbes rode alone through hostile territory, 120 miles in
fifteen hours, to the telegraph station at Landman's Drift.
His telegram was the first news of the battle received in
Britain, and was read by ministers in both Houses of Parlia-
ment.	 By this "ride of death" Forbes achieved his greatest
fame.	 The press eulogised him.	 The Illustrated London
News printed on its front page a full-page dramatic picture
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by Caton Woodville of him galloping through the bush, and
48
proposed that he be awarded the V.C., or at least the C.M.G.
Peter Clayden described his ride as, "one of the most strik-
ing efforts of energy and endurance in modern times".49
However, this was his last campaign. 	 He had overstrained
himself by excessive hardship and exertion: as he wrote,
"My personal experience is that ten years of toil, exposure,
hardship, anxiety and brain-strain, such as the electric
fashion of modern war correspondence exacts, suffice to
impair the hardiest organization".5°
From then on he exploited his earlier experiences,
studies and writings.	 Following Russell's precedent, since
the Franco-Prussian War he had lectured intermittently on
his war experiences - often to packed audiences, though once
only one man came51 - and from 1880 to 1882 he lectured in
Australia, New Zealand and the United States. 	 Public
lectures were lucrative for Victorian celebrities, and he
allegedly gained twelve thousand pounds from his Australian
tour. 52 The Times stated, "He was a good lecturer, though
not a remarkable one; his fine military figure and the
adventures which he had passed through counted for more
with popular audiences than any amount of polish and ref me-
53
ment of style".	 He lectured in evening dress and decorat-
ions, "across his evening-dress coat, in a double row, no
fewer than fourteen medals or crosses, including the Iron
Cross of Prussia". 54 He used his honorary doctorate on
the title page of his later books.	 He valued medals and
decorations and resented not being awarded them by the
British authorities.	 He applied for the Afghan and Zulu
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war medals.	 As Russell, only an observer, had been awarded
Crimea and Mutiny medals, Forbes, who had been mentioned in
despatches for helping the wounded in action in the Afghan
War and who had carried official messages in the Zulu War,
had a strong case.	 However, he met lies and obstruction
from War Office officials and finally, through an influential
friend, learned that Childers had decided that, "civilians
who attach themselves to an army ought not to be deemed
eligible for war medals". 55 He later described the episode
in his acrimonious article, 'My Campaign in Pall Mall'.
Visiting the United States, Forbes met and married
in 1882 Catherine, daughter of General Montgomery Cunningham
Meigs, Quartermaster-General of the United States Army from
1861 to 1882, a distinguished engineer and administrator who
constructed major public works and during the Civil War had
a crucial task supervising the procurement, supply and trans-
port of the federal army: William H. Seward claimed that,
"without the services of this eminent soldier the national
cause must have been lost or deeply imperilled". 56 From
him Forbes could learn of the Civil War and of industry and
logistics in mass warfare. 	 However Forbes was by then a
confirmed Prussocentric continentalist and, like most of
his compatriots, he insufficiently heeded the lessons of the
Civil War.	 Forbes wrote miscellaneous journalism -
'sketches', short stories and articles on his experiences
and famous persons he had met or seen - and "recast his
correspondence into innumerable books". 57 He repeatedly
used his material, cannibalising his novel for stories and
sketches and reprinting the same pieces in a succession of
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books.	 He also, from his days as a dragoon private through
into the 'nineties, contributed articles on military and
related subjects, some controversial - including some def end-
ing the role and integrity of war correspondents - to the
serious reviews, and these were among his best work. 	 He
contributed The Great War of 189-(1892) and to Battles of
the Nineteenth Century (1896) 8and wrote five derivative
biographies of famous military men. 	 He never wrote an
autobiography, but published several autobiographical articles.
Journalists were useful to those wanting favourable
publicity, and a small minority of journalists, including
Escott and Sala, were accepted into 'Society 1 .	 Members of
the royal family wanting a good press cultivated journalistic
contacts and this facilitated some journalists' social
acceptance.	 Others, however, though well-known and believed
influential, remained unacceptable, such as Stead. 	 War
correspondence could lead to social elevation, as with
Russell and Villiers. 	 However, like Melton Prior, Forbes
did not receive any British honours and was not accepted by
'Society' or favoured by royalty, despite being Scottish,
the most famous war correspondent after Russell, and writing
adulatorily about royalty. 	 His lack of social elevation
probably resulted from both personal and political factors.
Whereas Russell charmed and amused, Forbes' arrogant,
truculent and sometimes bad-tempered personality grated and
offended.	 Russell was Conservative in politics: Forbes
worked for the Gladstonian, atrocitarian and anti-Disraeli
Daily News when the court was 'jingo' and the Queen loathed
Gladstone.	 Russell had criticised bungling in the Crimea
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and the Queen, concerned about her soldiers, had valued this.
However Forbes, writing on the Zulu War, criticised Chelmsford
who continued a royal favourite awarded a succession of
honours including Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian
Order.	 Forbes, in contrast, was refused even the Zulu War
medal.	 He resented his lack of honours, blaming politicians
rather than royalty.	 He wrote to J.R. Robinson that, "the
Liberal party was far too remiss in rewarding those who were
steadfastly loyal and faithful to its cause". 59	Some
attempted to use success as a war correspondent to become an
M.P.: for example, Russell, Charles Williams and later
Winston Churchill.	 Forbes did not.	 He regarded himself
primarily as a journalist and long continued busy with
journalism and lectures.	 No politician, by chance he had
worked for Liberal papers, the Morning Star and the Daily
News, and his contacts were largely with Liberals, yet in
the 'eighties and 'nineties he diverged from Liberal Party
values and expressed more those of the 'New' Right.	 He
did not attempt to establish himself as a country gentleman:
his income was insufficient and he preferred London, the
centre of journalism and publishing. 	 Moreover in his
latter years he was limited by the decline of his health:
in 1892 he described himself as, "an invalid in quest of
health...reduced to dodder about a mineral spring". 60 His
final years were of painful illness. 	 When Robinson
visited him in March 1900 he found him delirious, shouting,
"Those guns, man: don't you see those guns? I tell you
the brave fellows will be mowed down like grass". 6' He
died a few days later.
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His war correspondence achieved extensive circulation.
It was reprinted in the Illustrated London News and other
weeklies and, sometimes by agreement but sometimes
plagiarised, in the provincial press. 	 The Daily News
claimed its Russo-Turkish War correspondence was, "more
widely reproduced than any communication ever despatched
from the fields of battle". 62 Exploiting the popularity
by its war correspondence the Daily News reprinted it in
book form, on both the Franco-Prussian and Russo-Turkish
wars.	 The Daily News reports were also used by the Annual
Register and it quoted Forbes. 63 His war correspondence
impressed contemporaries. 	 He was quoted and cited in other
papers, in parliament and in election speeches. 	 From his
descriptions of the Zulu war orators drew quotations to
denounce Disraeli's policy and sometimes war itself, notably
during the 1880 election campaign. 	 Joseph Arch, for
example, contesting the rural constituency of Wilton, in a
speech condemning the Zulu War quoted Forbes,
"In the Daily News, some weeks ago, I read a
statement which made my blood almost boil in
my veins.	 It was a letter from their special
correspondent, and had reference to the unhappy
affair at Isandula, a spot visited four months
after the unfortunate of fray. 	 He says: 'A
strange dead calm reigned in this solitude of
nature; grain had grown luxuriantly around the
waggons. . . in soil fertilized by the life-blood
of gallant men.	 So long the grass in most
places had grown that it mercifully shrouded
the dead, whom for four long months we had left
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unburied'.	 And who were the unfortunate men
whose bones were left there bleaching in the
intense heat of an African sun? They were
chiefly the sons of agricultural labourers.
And what thought for the mother whose son had
been engaged in that sad conflict - the
thought that the child whom she in pain bore
and in anguish brought forth, whom she
nourished in his boyhood, and hoped to have
seen grown up to have formed and have played
some significant and useful part in the body
politic, had lain weltering in his own life-
blood on an alien shore, and his body had
been open to the penetrating sun four months"4
His war correspondence was long remembered.	 As The Times
obituary stated, "Even after an interval of 30 years, his
accounts of the battles round Metz are remembered as among
,,65the most vivid records of those tremendous days . 	 In
1922 in his memoirs St. Loe Strachey described his father
reading to him from the Daily News "Forbes's vivid account"
of the battle of Sadowa. 66	In fact it was not by Forbes
but by Hilary Skinner, who when Forbes began reporting had
been the leading Daily News war correspondent ranking with
Russell as the 1ite of the profession and later praised
by Forbes as "brilliant and versatile". 	 Similarly in the
Franco-Prussian War Forbes received credit for the Daily
News' brilliant description of Bazaine's surrender at Metz,
in fact by an unknown American, MUhler 7 and later the
I.L.N.obituary credited him with being, "the first to
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recognise the importance of the telegraph in war corres-
pondence".	 The attribution of others' deeds and sayings
to the famous is a process familiar in history and
mythology.	 It was indicative of Forbes' reputation that,
having gained fame as a war correspondent, outstanding war
reporting, then still anonymous, even though by others
was attributed to him.
His achievement as a war correspondent gave
credibility to his further articles on military topics
in the serious reviews and in his books, by which he
reached a partially different readership. 	 His influence
can only be conjectured but as a leading journalist
writing on war and the army, though the quality of his
contributions was inferior to those of such experts as
G.S. Clarke or Spenser Wilkinson, he helped shape Victorian
civilians' perception of war and military issues.
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2.	 'A PRIVATE DRAGOON': FORBES' FIRST JOURNALISM
While serving in the Dragoons Forbes began his
journalism by contributing articles on military subjects
to periodicals.	 Newspapers then contained mainly news
with few 'features' and were apparently intended to comple-
ment the serious quarterly and monthly periodicals, the main
organs of ideas and comment: prestigious, influential and
selling extensively. 1 The periodical press expanded, and
among the new publications was George Smith's Cornhill
Magazine, launched in 1860.	 In the later sixties public
interest in the army revived with the Austro-Prussian War,
the Abyssinian campaign and the demand for military reforms
including the abolition of purchase and of flogging.
Rankers seldom stated their views in print, 2 but in 1864
the Cornhill published Forbes' anonymous article 'The
Limited Enlistment Act' which he claimed stated the views
common among the rank and file. 3 He stated that too few
enlisted, as civilian wages were higher, civilians feared
army discipline, especially flogging, and "the fillip which
war gives to the hot blood of youth is wanting"(209).
Soldiers did not re-enlist, because of pay, conditions,
inability to marry, excessive drill, and N.C.O.s' tyranny.
He emphasised the harm to morale of injustice, a recurring
theme.	 He opposed short service because of veterans'
superior quality, and advocated long service, another recurr-
ing theme, and better pay and conditions. 	 He thus stated
grievances which continued throughout the century, and
demanded reforms which army reformers continued to demand.4
In rejecting short service he failed to consider a reserve
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for major war: his military thinking was not yet dominated
by Germany.	 His 1860s army articles presented information
and ideas new to many middle-class readers.
Another new periodical, Saint Pauls, published in 1868
his 'The Private Soldier as he is. By a Dragoon on Furlough'
again stating rankers' conditions and grievances, including
that most could not marry: the condition of soldiers' wives,
"insults womanhood"(1O3).	 The soldier was still a "social
pariah"(ib) and bitterly resented it. 	 Forbes, an atypical
soldier because middle-class, presented army life as the
negation or the middle-class ideal of family, independence
and respectability.	 Men from the slums responded
differently: Joseph Williamson never had an overcoat until
he enlisted and,"thought army life was wonderful". 6	In
1869 Saint Pauls published Forbes' 'Christmas in a Cavalry
Regiment', a sympathetic portrayal of rankers. 7 Victorians
loved Christmas and Forbes, an opportunist journalist,
repeatedly wrote articles on Christmas themes.8
In 1869, with renewed public concerns with army reform,
Saint Pauls published Forbes' 'Army Reform, by a Private
Dragoon', 9 arguing for the status quo against the middle-
class meritocratic transformation of the army demanded by
Sir Charles Trevelyan, then well-known as the author of the
Trevelyan-Northcote report and as an advocate of army reform.
Forbes again claimed to express ranker opinion. 	 He claimed
that "the dregs" made good soldiers whereas middle-class men
often did not, that the existing system was cheap and used
men useless elsewhere, and that rankers, "arrant snobs",
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would resent 'mushroom" parvenu officers. Forbes' argument
on the soldiers' adequacy was, with most soldiers' functions
pretechnical, probably valid, but the reformers' quest for
the better class of recruit continued. 	 Whether better
educated men made better soldiers was to be discussed again
during and after the Boer War, when the British were repeated-
ly outfought by men they believed backward) 0 Forbes had
the independence to challenge the ascendant reformers and
their doctrine that more middle-class and more educated
necessarily meant better.'1
A recurring topic in Forbes' writings was soldiers'
wives, a controversial issue.' 2 Official policy was that
most rankers be unmarried, a continuing rankers' grievance:
W.E. Cairnes noted that, "the question of permission to
marry is a burning one in the barrack room".' 3 However
apologists of the status quo emphasised its benefits to army
14	 .
wives.	 In 1870 he published in Saint Pauls as 'a Private
Dragoon' his article 'Soldiers' Wives'.' 5	He criticised
the married quarters' overcrowding and lack of privacy,
the wives' irreligion and chaplains' neglect of them, and
he emphasised the hardships of wives not on the strength.
As often, he generalised from inadequate data. 	 His claim
that a considerable number of soldiers married prostitutes
was probably exaggerated, and this was not permitted in such
regiments as the Royal Welsh Fusiliers) 6 He also omitted
the problem of venereal disease)	 His writings contri-
buted to public awareness of army wives, though Kipling
most changed attitudes towards the rank and file and their
families.	 Forbes' portrayal of army life was largely
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harsh and unromanticised, and increased middle-class aware-
ness of rankers' lives and army reform issues. 	 His articles
attracted some notice and controversy and helped his career:
they predisposed Robinson in 1870 to hire him as a war
correspondent 18
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3. THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR
Forbes' reporting of the Franco-Prussian War established
his reputation and he was quick to exploit his new celebrity
to publish signed articles.	 In 1870, while still with the
Prussian army in France, he wrote an article, published under
his name in the December Saint Pauls, 'The Victorious
Prussians' briefly analysing causes of Prussian victory.
He was, "essentially a private soldier, although I no longer
wear the Queen's uniform"(,282), and had been much with the
Prussian troops at the front. 	 He praised the Prussian
military system and its, "furnishing an almost inexhaustible
supply of soldiers"ç0283).	 The reserves were trained, and
superior to the British Militia.	 The Prussian army, drawn
from all classes, was unlike any other. 	 He praised the
soldiers' interconnected moral and physical qualities,
emphasising patriotism and individual responsibility: "where
every man is a soldier, no man is a mere mercenary"(286).
Because of their sobriety they were fitter and marched better
than British troops.	 Individual courage, or cowardice, was
less important than usually supposed: "discipline and com-
panionship will force a weak-kneed coward through an action
without disgracing himself"ç.288). 	 Prussian enthusiasm and
refusal to admit defeat gave them a "formidability" against
which French impetuosity failed. 	 He noted that in recent
wars, "there has been less and yet less actual bayonet
fighting, owing to the Increasing efficiency and deadliness
of arms of precision"Q289).	 The Prussians admitted the
superiority of the chassepot yet they attacked and "the
Prussian nerve neutralised the superiority of the chasse-
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pot"(1290).	 The Prussian fired steadily and effectively from
the shoulder: the French excitedly "blazed into space" from
the hip.	 Forbes stated it was, "not my business to venture
on military criticism"(29O) but did so nevertheless, praising
Prussian strategy and generalship, except that of General
Steinmetz, which he discussed critically. 	 He praised
Prussian vigilance,cavalry scouting and sudden attacks.	 He
condemned French troops' inferiority, and agreed with Chesney,
"that the reputed military superiority of the French has been
a myth for years"4291). 	 The French army had no recent test:
"Successes in Algeria are nothing as evidence to cope with a
great military power"c292).	 The French army was weakened
against the Germans by retaining of large forces in the major
towns to suppress opposition to the regime. 	 Under the
second empire drunkenness immensely increased, especially in
the army, and drink ruined discipline. 	 The officers were,
"too often ignorant, reckless, lustful and votaries of
absinthe"p293), and they harmed discipline by their "itch
for personal popularity with the rank and file"(ib). 	 He
concluded that Britain, "as a military nation", should draw
lessons from the war, but did not there specify them.
Forbes' article was competent, clear and forceful.
It marked the beginning of his writing in the reviews as a
military commentator, rather than as previously a soldier
writing primarily from his own experience, and it had the
qualities and limitations which characterised his oeuvre.
It was informed, dogmatic, condemnatory and in places
generalised from inadequate data,and bellicist. 	 It
asserted Forbes as witness and expert. 	 His reference to
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his service as a private soldier was typical: he repeatedly
stated it, even to the Tsar. 2 Before and at the beginning
of the Franco-Prussian War British opinion largely favoured
the Germans, then during the war became more sympathetic to
the French. 3 Forbes, however, continued a sympathetic
admirer of the Germans. 	 His eulogy of German education
and moral qualities and condemnation of French vices in part
expressed the Scottish puritanism of his manse upbringing.
He stated what he believed the crucial military qualities:
patriotism, responsibility, sobriety, endurance, unit
cohesion and steadiness rather than individual heroism or
dash.	 While not explicitly raising the issue of con-
scription in Britain, he praised German conscription and
implied its superiority to the British system. 	 Like
Russell, whose experience also was primarily of great-power
war, Forbes was continentalist in his military thinking: in
his eulogy of the German military system, his assertion
that Britain should learn from the Franco-Prussian War, and
his dismissal of colonial campaign experience. 4 The
Franco-Prussian War was apparently the formative experience
of Forbes' military thinking, and he continued his Prusso-
centric continentalism throughout his military writings.
The German army remained his exemplar and the standard
against which he assessed the British army, and he became
a leading populariser of continentalist military doctrine.
He rightly noted the decline in importance in battle of the
bayonet but, in Bxitain as on the continent, the military
authorities continued to emphasise it. 	 Writing largely
from his own limited experience of the war and so impressed
by Prussian virtues and success against the French armed
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with the superior chassepot, he ignored German numerical
superiority and understated matriel factors in German
victory: railways and artillery. 	 Emphasising Prussian
"nerve" he ignored the artillery's neutralising the chasse-
pots' superiority by breaking up French infantry attacks
5beyond the chassepots' effective range. 	 While always
believing soldiers' fighting qualities crucial, in his
military writings he fluctuated in his assessment of the
relative importance of firepower.	 In the Franco-Prussian
War he tended to minimise it, the Russo-Turkish War caused
him to emphasise it, then later he again emphasised fight-
ing qualities rather than firepower as crucial to victory.
In his later years Forbes frequently cited the Franco-
Prussian War, and wrote more articles and stories on it than
on any other war. 6 These reinforced the message of his
earlier writing, his role as correspondent, his adventures,
dangers and military expertise.	 He condemned the Second
Empire as meretricious and immoral. 7 He was vague on the
horrors of war8 but, in sad and sentimental tales, emphasised
its sorrow, the effects on the bereaved. 9 He did not
question war itself or allege its futility. 	 He emphasised
the scale of continental war and its casualties, German
military qualities, and the qualities necessary for victory.
Patriotism and self-sacrificing courage were insufficient,
planning and preparedness were crucial. 	 He again portrayed
war as noble and glorious, and eulogised the military virtues
and the noble death in battle.	 lie wrote of Bazaine, "Ah!
why did heaven deny him then a straight thrust from the
beautiful 'white weapon' to give him the good death a man
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so soldierly had surely earned"° His perception of the
Franco-Prussian War continued fundamental to his continent-
alist military thinking.	 His message to his compatriots
was often not explicit, yet implicit in his writings on
the Franco-Prussian War was his message of fitness for war.
3. FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR: NOTES
1. 'The Victorious Prussians', S. Pauls (Dec '70). Forbes'
Franco-Prussian War reporting is not here fully con-
sidered (his Russo-Turkish War reporting is taken as
the main sample of his war correspondence), but rather
his message on the war and the war's effect on his
military thinking. For his Franco-Prussian War cor-
respondence see My Experiences of the War between France
and Germany (1871) 2 vols; for his later evaluation,
William of Germany (1888). See also Michael Howard,
The Franco-Prussian War (1961).
2. Memories 34.
3. Annual Register 1870 93; Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the
Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914 (1980)23,63,81,92-3.
Carlyle was a notable exception, e.g. letter to The
Times (11 Nov '70) rp Thomas Carlyle, Critical and
Miscellaneous Essays (1903) III 242.
4. On continentalism see 'Military Controversies II' section.
5. B.H. Liddell Hart, 'Armed forces and the art of war-
Armies', NCMH X (1960) 306.
6. e.g. 'Moltke and Moltkeism', Nineteenth C. (Dec '91);
'Napoleon the Third at Sedan', lb (Mar '92); 'Soldiers
I Have Known', Memories.
7. e.g. Souvenirs 70-2; Memories 66.
8. e.g. Memories 69. He had been more explicit In his
reporting, e.g. Experiences I 142,249. In 'The Crush-
ing of the Commune', Memories he emphasised the horrors
of reprisals, executions and massed corpses, but was
inexplicit.
9. e.g. Memories 113-4,310; 'Matrimony under Fire', Camps
1-12.
10. Souvenirs 95; cf Memories 303. Cf Wolseley's desire to
die in battle, and The Light that Failed.
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4.	 THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR
In 1876 Forbes reported the Serbo-Turkish War, and there
met the Graphic's young special artist, Frederick Villiers,
whose attitude indicated the reputation Forbes had attained
in the Franco-Prussian War: "the hero I had worshipped since
a boy, to me the central figure of Sedan, Gravelotte and Le
Bourget".' The Serbo-Turkish War aroused little interest
in Britain. 2 However the Russo-Turkish War which followed
in 1877 aroused great interest and emotion. 	 The Daily News
had publicised Pears' and MacGahan's reports on Turkish
atrocities in Bulgaria, which led to the atrocitarian
agitation. 3 Most Liberals loathed the Turks and wanted
their defeat.	 Conservatives were divided, with Disraeli
and other imperialists alarmed at the Russian threat to
Constantinople and the route to India. 	 Jingoism rose.
Soldiers and other defence-minded men were concerned with
the lessons of the war, and especially the siege of Plevna
and the effect of repeating rifles on battle. As during
the Franco-Prussian War, newspaper circulations increased
and new papers were started.4
In the summer of 1877 some eighty correspondents of
various nationalities, the British the largest group,
accompanied the Russian forces. 5 The Russian authorities
imposed minimal control and censorship. 	 They issued cor-
respondents with passes and brassards. 	 The Daily News
sent Forbes, MacGahan - whom Forbes later called, "the most
brilliant correspondent I have ever known" 6 - and other
experienced correspondents, and later recruited young
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Americans who during the Franco-Prussian War had helped
introduce American methods and speed to British journalism.7
As in the Franco-Prussian War, Robinson spent lavishly to
optimise the Daily News'coverage, on horses, wagons, servants,
couriers, presents, bribes and telegrams. 	 Forbes wrote that,
"The purely telegraphic charges were enormous, for almost
everything was telegraphed. 	 But there was no stinting".8
The Daily News team and its communications were well organised,
with a courier service to Bucharest. They were also, largely
because of the Daily News anti-Turkish policy, favoured by the
Russian military and had much helpful contact with Russian
generals.	 As Forbes wrote, "General Ignatieff was very kind
in giving me hints as to impending events". 9 Following a
tip he was one of two correspondents who saw the beginning
of the Russian assault on Plevna. 	 He usually travelled
with his polyglot Serbian servant and translator Andreas,
and with Villiers.'°
The Russo-Turkish War further increased the reputation
of Forbes and of the Daily News, though it failed to overtake
the Telegraph's circulation lead.	 As in the Franco-Prussian
War, the Daily News war correspondence excelled its rivals'
in earlier arrival and quality, and was extensively repro-
duced in other papers.' 1	Forbes' reports were typical of
his war correspondence. 12 They were written when he was an
experienced correspondent, still at the height of his powers,
and in them he displayed the traits which characterised his
writings and which their success showed were acceptable to a
wide public.	 They were written in the first person and
often personal.	 He described his own experiences: his
meetings with the great, his problems, dangers and hardships,
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and his long rides to ensure transmission of his reports. He
described his wagon, equipment, horses and servants. He des-
cribed how alone, ahead of the advancing Russians 1 he rode in-
to a Bulgarian town and was welcomed when he told the towns-
people he was a correspondent of the Daily News. He described
his anxiety when Villiers was missing and possibly killed by
the Turks.	 He emphasised that he himself witnessed events,
claiming, "I am not fond of accepting hearsay evidence"(286).
He emphasised also his own danger at the front line or beyond
it and under fire. 	 He reported that he had ridden between
the Russian and Turkish lines under fire from both and then
ridden to the Russian line and been briefly held prisoner.
He reported that before Plevna he accompanied Russian
infantry on an attack and was then with the Russian artillery,
under fire: "Men were dropping fast around me in the battery
already, for the position of the guns was greatly exposed"
ç311).	 He wrote, "amid the groaning of the wounded and the
whistling of shells"(,373). 	 lie described his thirty mile
ride armed with a revolver and defying the danger of Bashi
Bazouks; his ride of over three hundred miles in six days,
never taking his clothes off; and his exhaustion following
his exertions.
Proud of being a war correspondent, he included
observations and opinions on them. 	 He emphasised his
ensuring his communications back to his newspaper, sometimes
by his own epic rides: "A correspondent without means of
communication is a contradiction in terms",225). 	 He denied
allegations in the British press that the correspondents
with the Russian forces were not independent of the Russian
authorities.	 The authorities, whose press policy and treat-
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ment of the correspondents he praised, allowed them to write
as they wished, even criticism, but not to write prematurely
of impending events: "that stipulation which does not require
to be inculcated on a war correspondent who realises his
responsibilities"ço228). 	 He praised the "manly candour of
the Russian military authorities" in publishing his report
of the Russian failure against Plevna. 	 He asserted that as
a war correspondent he, "never submitted to the sacrifice of
my independence"(ib). After other British papers published
reports differing from his, he asserted his accuracy: "never
in my experience have sensational telegrams availed to alter
facts"427).	 His report on the unsuccessful Russian August
attack on Plevna was "plainspoken" and "strove to tell the
truth without fear or favour".	 He emphasised his military
judgment, stating his forecast of the failure of the Russian
attack on Plevna was proved correct.
He stated some of the problems of war reporting. The
correspondent, because he had only limited access to infor-
mation and especially because he could be in only one place
at a time, had difficulty in forming a balanced, undistorted
overall picture.	 He wrote that, "a person belonging to or
accompanying any part of an army, save its principal head-
quarters, knows rather less of the doings of that army as a
13
whole.. .than.. .any community in Europe who care to read"(157).
The correspondent had to try to select that sector which was
"making history".	 Before Plevna he noted that action was
on so extensive a front that the correspondent could not see
the entire battle, and had to choose the place likely to be
most interesting.	 He noted the limitations inherent in the
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immediacy of' battle-reporting: "I have to record the events of
today, the results of which it is not possible dispassionately
to estimate with the din of battle still ringing in one's
ears"(467).
Forbes believed himself a military expert, and that it
was his function not only to report war but to comment,
analyse and criticise.	 He was patriotic and when with the
British forces identified with them. 	 In the Russo-Turkish
War he favoured the Russian but in reporting he was objective
and, while willing to report faults on either side, did not
vilify the enemy - unlike, later, the much-praised
G.W. Steevens.	 Forbes criticised what he believed were
faults, and named those he believed were to blame. 	 He only
incidentally in passing comparisons, mentioned the British
army, usually critically: though, as his other writings
showed he was loyal to it. 	 He referred to the Dartmoor
manoeuvres, "which were mainly memorable for the vacillation
of Sir Charles Staveley"c.51). 	 He praised the practicality
of the Russian accoutrements, in contrast to the British.
Remembering his own experience, he noted of the Russian
soldier, "His belts are black leather, so he escapes being
a chronic victim to pipeclay"(46).	 He stated, "Everywhere
the British scarlet is more conspicuous than any other.
The true fighting colour is the dingy kharki of our Indian
irregulars"ç,197).	 Here he differed from British army
orthodoxy led by Cambridge and agreed with Wolseley and
other military progressives who wanted less conspicuous
uniforms and were to obtain in the 'eighties the experimental
15
use though not the adoption of grey uniforms. 	 However he
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was not a Wolseleyite.	 He contrasted Russian impartiality
towards units with Wolseley's favouritism: "It is not with
them always 'The 42nd to the front' as was the standing
order in Ashantee"(215).
Despite his liking for the Russians and their friend-
liness to him, he criticised their faults. 	 He praised their
medical service, but noted that in the heavy rain their
soldiers were without tents.	 He criticised their ineff 1-
ciency, compared to the Germans in the Franco-Prussian War,
in defence: the lack of adequate patrols and sentries, so
that the Turks could have made a successful surprise attack.
Despite its qualities, the Russian army, "has much to learn
even of the rudiments of the art military...a surprising
slackness seems to pervade the army in regard to the every-
day duties of modern warfare"(216). 	 He criticised them for
cutting enemy telegraph wires rather than, as the Americans
had in the Civil War, tapping them. 	 At Simnitza in early
July he criticised their delay, largely blaming, "the potter-
ing rearrangements of commanders in order that young gentle-
men of the blood imperial may gain military fame and St.
George's Crosses"ç246). 	 Before Plevna at the beginning of
August he criticised their attack claiming their planning
was faulty with the two attacking forces too far apart,
insufficiently co-ordinated, and too weak. 	 He condemned
I'
the generals' rashness and errors of judgment. 	 Later, on
the 19th August, he criticised the Russian commander's
"carelessness and stupidity"ç,354) in failing to occupy
Plevna when he had the opportunity: "a blunder the like of
which can only be found in the early stages of the American
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civil war when armies were commanded by lawyers, doctors,
merchants and politicians"ç.350). 	 He criticised the Russians
for advancing without sufficient reconnaissance and flank
defence: "The imbecility displayed in this by educated milit-
ary men Is of that kind which simply surpasses belief and
defies explanation"(ib). 	 He blamed their "carelessness,
recklessness and incapacity", dispersal of forces and
inadequate reconnaissance, for the failure of their attack
on Plevna.	 He claimed that after the Crimean War the army
had been unpopular and neglected, so inferior men had gained
promotion to key positions.
From the years when, a young dragoon, he had read
Napier and Jomini, Forbes had studied intermittently the con-
duct of war.	 In his war correspondence he stated his
opinions on the lessons of the Russo-Turkish War, and the
changing nature and future of war, drawing on both his read-
ing of military history, and his experience of earlier cam-
paigns.	 He claimed that, "There are rules of warfare for
which experience has given warrant, and respecting which
experience tells us that their disregard, in nine cases out
of ten, results in disaster"373). 	 Like his contemporary
military commentators and theorists, and in contrast to his
own earlier published opinions during the Franco-Prussian
War, he was obsessed by the effect of increased firepower on
battle, emphasizing the discontinuity with the past. Before
the attacks on Plevna, in May he stated that the Turks had
previously fought well in fortified places, and that, as the
Franco-Prussian War showed, rifled weapons had ended the
traditional storming of fortifications. 	 He commented that,
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"Rifled arms of offence are sad foes to unscientific heroism.
A maid of Saragossa is incompatible with Krupp and Armstrong
as contemporaries"(53). 	 He contrasted the past, "when a
man's strong arm and stout heart went for something", with
the present when war was, "a thing of cold science, and the
reduction of a place. . .a question of mathematical calculat-
ion"ç67).	 Later after the failure of the earlier Russian
attacks on Plevna, he stated they had shown the advantage
conferred by modern firearms to raw undisciplined troops
fighting from trenches on the defensive, enabling them to
shoot down bayonet charges by veterans: "With modern f ire-
arms, a simple mob, individually brave men, without dis-
cipline and without organization, can hold intrenchments
against even the best troops in the world, as long as they
are only attacked in front"(365).	 He claimed the solution
was for the attackers also to entrench, gradually advancing,
"tactically on the defensive"(361).	 He stated that, as the
Spanish war showed, artillery was ineffective against infantry
in trenches.	 The effectiveness of modern artillery had been
exaggerated: it had a moral effect on raw troops but little
material effect.	 Shells were smothered in soft ground and
in the Franco-Prussian War the Prussian artillery had
inflicted not more than five percent of the French casualties.
Yet despite his emphasis on the effectiveness of the Turkish
defence, he claimed the Russians would win. 	 He also con-
sidered possible future strategies of the Russians. 	 He was
much interested in cavalry and, "an old heavy cavalry man
mysel f"(4 43), particularly in heavy cavalry.	 He described
the Russian cavalry, comparing the heavy cavalry with those
of Germany and of Britain.	 He praised the inconspicuousness
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and lack of glitter and jingle of Russian cavalry uniforms
and equipment.	 He condemned the recent British craze for
light cavalry, arguing from the Crimea and the Franco-Prussian
War that in combat between cavalry, the heavier would tend to
win.	 Later, arguing from the experience of Plevna, he
claimed that increased infantry firepower, "made cavalry, as
cavalry, nearly useless, except for outpost and scouting duty,
and rendered bayonet and cavalry charges impossible"(367).
In the Russo-Turkish War, as in most other wars, battle
occupied chronologically only a small part of the war, and
this was reflected in Forbes' war correspondence, of which
only a minority described battle. 	 Forbes' response to war
was to some extent ambivalent. 	 He accepted it, not question-
ing the necessity or origins of that particular war or of war
in general.	 He did not moralise nor, unlike in some of his
later writings, sentimentalise.	 He described its faults and
its attractions.	 He wrote sometimes in the traditional
cliches of the glory of war, and he praised the military
virtues.	 He wrote, for example, "the gunners were to earn
honour and glory"ç,295). 	 He condemned the Bulgarians'
cowardice, which he attributed to their oppression. 	 He
praised Russian courage, claiming in August that the failed
Plevna attack was "glorious for Russian soldiers"ç.354). He
emphasised the excitement of battle; "The moment was dramatic
with an intensity to which the tameness of civilian life can
furnish no parallel"c,413).	 He described the Russian shots,
"making the blood tingle with the excitement of the fray"
(313).	 His description of battle was relatively distanced,
its language conventional, omitting and concealing much of
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actions, emotions, agony and horror.	 He wrote of "cold
steel", "hard fighting", "very hot fighting, sabre and bayonet
both being used freely", attacking Russians "falling fast"
and that, "the fell fury of battle has entered on its maddest
paroxysms"(.313).	 Yet with such traditional attitudes and
language, he also realised human limitations in war. 	 He
noted in September after the unsuccessful Russian attacks
and heavy losses, that the Russian troops - knowing the
possibility of wounds, humiliation, torture and mutilation -
were discouraged and reluctant to attack. 	 Soldiers could
not repeatedly face, "more than the fair chances of war"C489).
Forbes, even if he was seldom sufficiently explicit and
detailed to distress or shock his readers, emphasised the
destruction, horror and suffering of war. 	 Basically he
accepted this.	 Early in his reporting of the War, he wrote
that war was necessarily destructive: "omelettes, of course,
cannot be made without the breaking of eggs"(43). 	 He noted
the high cost in lives of some operations. In June, after
the failure of the Russian attempt to cross the Danube, he
wrote, "The crossing of the Danube in 1827 cost 12,000 men!
in 1853 it cost 15,000 men! a significant comment on the
resisting capacity of the Turks"(r201).	 He noted the risk
to the troops from Danube fever and stated that in every war
disease killed many more than battle, "and there is no like-
lihood that in this campaign there will be any respite from
the inexorable law"ç188). Yet while he, in effect, omitted
the inflicting of wounds, he described the suffering of the
wounded.	 His description of the wounded - in any descrip-
tion of battle, indicative of the writer's attitude - was
limited; not concealing, but not specific and detailed, and
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leaving much to the reader's experience or imagination. 	 He
described the wounded and the dead. 	 He wrote of "shattered
creatures" awaiting medical treatment, and of the dead,
collected together, "swelling and blackening under the fierce
heat"(197).	 When the Russians retreated after an unsuccess-
ful attack, "the wounded died like flies from fatigue and
sunstroke"4274). 	 He reported, "the sufferings of the poor
wounded, weakened by loss of blood, faint In the prostration
which follows so inevitably the gunshot wound; foodless,
without water, lying in the damp grass by the wayside in
their blood-clotted clothes",321).	 He reported the killing
of wounded by Bashi Bazouks who "butchered them in their
helplessness"(Ib).	 He described the Russians wounded after
the fighting in late August in the Shipka Pass,
"The wounded came trooping steadily back with
wounds In their heads, arms and bodies. 	 Some
were on litters...Some were limping along by
themselves, presenting a most pitiable spectacle,
covered with dust, smoke-begrimed, haggard,
wretched.. .Besides these were the poor fellows,
too severely wounded to be moved, who will
probably fall into the hands of the Turks, to
be murdered, tortured and mutilated"(424-5)
As in the Franco-Prussian War, he reported that he was with
the surgeons, but did not describe what he was there. 	 He
noted but did not detail Turkish atrocities. 	 He liked the
Russians, claimed they treated civilians well, repeatedly
reported their hospitality and kindness to him, and stated
his hope to Russian victory.	 He praised Russian courage
in battle, especially that of Skobeleff whom he much admired,
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and of the rankers. Nevertheless, following the repeated
Russian failures against Plevna, by early September he had
concluded the battles showed that, "The Turks are better
soldiers individually than the Russians"(489). Turkish and
Russian strategy were equally bad, but the Turks were better
armed and were tactically superior.
Forbes' reports were of a high standard: long, clear,
vivid but not hyperbolic or sensational. 	 They were often
personal but also usually dispassionate and, compared to
G.W. Steevens' later excitement, relatively cool in tone.
Sometimes he described in detail: for examplecossack uni-
forms.	 However he was not specific on types of weapon and
their capability, probably because he knew this would be
unacceptable to the Russians.	 He knew when to be tactful.
He listed Russian units, though with only approximate numeri-
cal strength, and he discussed possible Russian strategy.
He described terrain and noted that an attractive landscape
appeared different to "a soldier's eye" considering how to
attack across it and the probable human cost of the attack.
Forbes' military comment and analysis, though not exceptional
among military commentators, was competent and sometimes
prescient.	 At Plevna he rightly saw the effect of Increased
infantry firepower and trenches on conventional attack by
infantry or cavalry.	 He sometimes from his observation drew
conclusions for the near future, but did not think through
possible further change.	 At Plevna, he had the data for a
Blochian analysis of the future of war, but did not so
extrapolate from his observations.	 In the Franco-Prussian
War and again at Plevna, he observed the relative ineffective-
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ness of artillery against entrenched infantry yet, despite
living in an age of change in military materiel, he failed
to consider the possibility of more effective artillery. He
wrote as a journalist primarily concerned with reporting the
present, not as a military theorist or prophet. 	 The jour-
nalist's function was to seek out and report the news as he
saw it, and this Forbes - despite danger, hardship and
exhaustion - did well.	 His reporting of the Russo-Turkish
War was an impressive achievement. 	 That it did not further
consider possible future development was not a fault, but it
indicated his limitations as a military thinker. 	 The image
of war he presented was essentially conventional: an activity
that happened and so should be reported; important, interest-
ing though often harsh and unpleasant with blunders, des-
truction, suffering, death and atrocities. 	 At the same
time implicit in his reporting was the perception of war as
a challenge and an opportunity for the military qualities he
so admired: initiative, courage and self-sacrifice. 	 War is
partly man's perception of it.	 Forbes' reporting was large-
ly objective and realistic - if a limited, expurgated realism -
with passages on the fate of the wounded that could have been
used in pacifist propaganda.	 Yet complementing the realism
and the nastiness of war, was its excitement, romance,
adventure and fascination.
A journalist rather than a military thinker, Forbes was
flexible and inconsistent and possibly too influenced by his
latest experience or the most recent data. 	 Plevna made a
great impression on his military opinions, as also on those
of some of his contemporaries.	 Initially what he perceived
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as its lessons dominated his view of future war. However as
it receded into the past and he became more influenced by the
writings of continental, especially German, military experts,
he modified his ideas. 	 His priorities and emphases shifted
and he came in the 'eighties and 'nineties to hold opinions
on infantry and cavalry attacks different from those of 1878,
For example, whereas he had observed that Russian infantry
became discouraged and reluctant after repeated failures and
losses, in the 'nineties he argued that British infantry
should accept more casualties.	 In the Russo-Turkish War he
had claimed that infantry firepower made cavalry ineffective
against infantry, but in the 'nineties he argued, largely
from the Franco-Prussian War, that cavalry could be decisive
against infantry.	 The Russo-Turkish War was an important,
though not a dominant stage in his military thinking.
Forbes returned from the Russo-Turkish War with his
reputation enhanced, and published in the November 1877
Nineteenth Century 'Russian, Turks and Bulgarians: at the
theatre of war'.' 7 Asserting he was an unprejudiced
observer, he claimed Russian soldiers were good military
material, but because uneducated and stultified lacked
ability to think and needed leading. He blamed the officers
for the Russian lack of greater military success, condemning
their corruption, favouritism and intrigue, and contrasting
them with Germans.	 He condemned the Turks for their atro-
cities and the Bulgarians as the most repulsive people he
had ever met, arrogant and extortionate. His article was
outspoken and controversial, far exceeding his war corres-
pondence in criticising the Russians: he had not there
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alleged corruption.	 Differing from theDaily News inter-
pretation it indicated his independence and, as he noted, was
likely to be detrimental to him, as offending atrocitarians
and Turcophils.	 His criticism of the Russians showed his
belief in the importance of moral, organizational, and per-
sonnel factors in military capability.	 His criticism of the
Turks for not using a scorched-earth policy showed the tough-
mindedness which recurred through his military writings.	 As
in his other polemical writing he omitted data not fitting
his case: refuting Turkish allegations of Russian atrocities
he omitted Russian "refusing quarter", though later he
admitted this.18
As weapons changed, officers studied recent wars for
useful lessons.	 The Russo-Turkish War aroused much pro-
fessional interest, and in 1877 the Royal United Service
Institution invited two correspondents to lecture on it: in
November Forbes on the Bulgarian caznpaigi9and in December
C.B. Norman, late Times correspondent, on the Armenian cam-
paign.	 That they were invited indicated.their status and
the belief of some professional soldiers that they could
learn from correspondents. 	 Forbes said he would confine
his lecture to military matters, not political, that the
only politics the soldier needed was devotion to his sover-
eign and duty to his country, and that as a war corres-
pondent he had always tried to confine himself to, "the
treatment of military topics, and the description of what
bears upon them directly"(11065).	 He described and con-
demned Russian strategy. 	 He condemned the tactics of their
July attack on Plevna. 	 Their infantry advanced in
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unmilitary confusion, more a mob than a swarm attack. 	 They
were brave but inexperienced, lacking fire-discipline and
with too few good officers and N.C.O.s to control them, and
were uselessly sacrificed.	 He warned that the British must
learn from this: "take the word of a man who has seen much
fighting both by trained and untrained soldiers"41O82). The
British army was small and "an army of boys" and, "if we
would escape disaster in the hour of trial"(ib) it must
retain its N.C.O.s with the colours and not reduce the number
of officers: leadership was crucial. 	 He concluded that
ultimately the Russians would probably take Plevna: "In war,
the weight generally tells sooner or later"ç4083). 	 His
lecture differed from his war correspondence and most of his
military articles in its concentration on strategy and tactics,
and showed his competence, though not exceptional originality
or insight, in discussing them. 	 He expressed doubts about
the short-service army and its fire-discipline, a subject he
later developed.	 As with the Franco-Prussian War he
emphasised soldiers' fighting qualities rather than materiel,
and showed what he believed the qualities necessary for war.
He had not mentioned Clausewitz among the authors he had
studied as a young soldier, and his statement that as a
correspondent he confined himself to military topics
apparently indicated a narrow un-Clausewitzian attitude to war.
The Russo-Turkish War confirmed Forbes' reputation, and
his continentalism.	 He repeatedly drew on it for his later
writings: for anecdotal and biographical sketches and,
though less than the Franco-Prussian War, for more analytical
and biographical sketches and, though less than the Franco-
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Prussian War, for more analytical consideration of war.2°
He again emphasised glory and heroism, but also Turkish war-
time atrocities, "aggravations of barbarity and torture such
as cannot be described" 1 His later articles for popular
periodicals concentrated on personality and human interest,
but in them he continued his message of the qualities
necessary for war.
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5.	 THE ZULU WAR
The Zulu War, unwanted by the government and denounced
by the Liberals, continued controversial.'	 Chelmsford was
criticised, privately by Disraeli and Wolseley and publicly
by the press.	 Forbes' Daily News reports contributed to
this: his first report from Zululand, condemning Chelmsford's
strategy for denuding Natal of defence, had caused a sen-
sation. 2 Later Chelmsford alleged that correspondents'
criticism of him was politically motivated, and Forbes
replied to this "calumny on an honourable profession"Q216)
in another polemical article, 'Lord Chelmsford and the Zulu
War', in the February Nineteenth Century condemning Cheims-
ford's conduct of the war and blaming him for Isandhlwana.
He alleged that Chelmsford instead of concentrating for the
decisive blow, had dangerously divided his force, despite
available information had underestimated the Zulus, had failed
to fortify Isandhlwana, and after Ulundi had failed to
exploit the victory and finish the campaign. Ulundi was won
by his troops, "a soldier's, not a general's fight"ç.231), and
he had, "neither merited nor achieved success"(218). Forbes'
article was a damning indictment and, though debatable in
detail, valid in essence. 	 It showed again his ability as
a polemicist, and confirmed the majority view of the war.4
His polemical articles were among his best but, presumably
considering them no longer topical, he did not reprint them
in book-form, using instead often mediocre reportage and
fiction.	 Indicative of Forbes' reputation and impact, his
polemical articles drew replies. 	 Lieutenant-Colonel
Arthur Harness, who commanded the artillery in the Zulu War,
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replied with 'The Zulu Campaign from a Military Point of View'
in Fraser's Magazine. 5 He denied Chelmsford was "culpable"
since, he asserted, he had committed "no voluntary error"
He claimed Chelmsford's attitude to the Zulus was
natural since, "the Zulus also were savages"(478), that he
rightly divided his troops and that he was not responsible
for Isandhlwana, and that correspondents were Ignorant.
Harness' case was obviously inadequate: with impartial
readers, the controversy increased Forbes' reputation.
The death of the Prince Imperial in the Zulu War,
following the flight of Lieutenant Carey and his escort, was
a cause clbre which Forbes reported and later recounted in
his memoirs. 6 He questioned the returned troopers though
Carey refused to talk to him.	 He believed Carey guilty and
was "very wrath". 7 His report to the Daily News condemned
Carey, a judgment to which he adhered. 	 In Britain the
Prince's death caused much concern, 8 while the case of
Captain Carey aroused controversy and raised crucial issues
of the proper conduct of an officer in war. 	 Officers, the
service press, the newspapers and public were divided and,
like the Tichborne claimant, Carey gained popular support
9from those who believed him the victim of aristocrats.
When Forbes lectured at Shoreditch and dismissed Carey as
a coward, most of the audience disagreed and some gave,
"three cheers for Captain Carey".'° 	 In his 1885 article,
'The Emperor and his Marshal' Forbes praised the Prince,
"poor gallant lad", condemned Carey's "desertion" and
asserted the "good death" In battle." 	 In his 1895 article
'The Death of the Prince Imperial' he described the return
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of the escort, his questioning of the troopers, and the army's
reactions, and he again condemned Carey as a coward. 	 Forbes,
brave and experienced, admired heroic commanders who fought
courageously among their men. 12 He knew men could break
under the strain of battle 3 and he revered the warrior
virtues of courage, honour and loyalty to comrades-in-arms.
His response was typical of many of his contemporaries, and
his typicality was crucial to his appeal. 	 Like Queen
Victoria, the United Service Gazette and others who believed
Carey guilty, he was angry that a British officer lacked
those virtues 4 As when evaluating the Nile expedition,
he ignored data which did not fit his interpretation, here
including issues such as command and 'sauve qui peut' raised
in the debate on Carey.	 Forbes, a son of the manse, con-
demned Carey, as he had the Second Empire, for moral failure.
He also showed his inconsistency and that possibly he some-
times wrote for effect rather than from conviction, in his
peroration on the Prince's death: in 1885 he described it
as happy, in 1895 as miserable.
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6. MILITARY CONTROVERSIES I
Through the 1870s and '80s Forbes pronounced, in the
serious reviews, on some of the major military controversies
of the day, largely responding and publicising rather than
initiating, but making a significant, and heeded, contribution
to the debate.	 In 1878 the British occupation of Cyprus was
a controversial political issue.' 	 The Gladstonian Daily
News which opposed the occupation, sent Forbes to report it.
Established as a leading war correspondent, he was proudly
judgmental and angered Wolseley, the first High Commissioner -
who had hoped for favourable publicity from him 3- by reporting
the extent of the garrison's sickness. 4 Though denied by
Wolseley and the government and attacked by Conservative
papers, Forbes' reporting was correct. 5	In October 1878
the Nineteenth Century published his article, 'The 'Fiasco'
of Cyprus'. 6	Ignoring Gladstone's moralism, he argued an
imperial and strategic case against the occupation. Cyprus
was unsuitable as a base, with no adequate harbour, insuff i-
cient food resources, and so unhealthy that it incapacitated
or killed the troops there.	 He condemned the strategy of
attempting to defend India through Turkey: the Russians
would attack through Afghanistan and should be stopped there.
His article showed he was more than a reporter: a capable
and trenchant controversialist, willing to pronounce his
opinions and able to write convincingly on imperial strategic
questions.	 He showed himself, unlike his employer, no
Gladstonian but a tough-minded imperialist, contemptuous of
politicians especially Disraeli and Cross. 	 He favoured the
Afghanistan strategy advocated by Roberts and others in India,
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against the Turkish strategy of Wolseley and Maurice.
Flogging was an emotional, controversial issue, dis-
puted by abolitionist radicals and retentionist officers, and
much used in Chelmsford's force in South Africa. 7	Its
cruelty was a theme of Forbes' army fiction, though he did
not condemn flogging itself.	 In 1879 he published his
article 'Flogging in the Army' in the October Nineteenth
Century.	 He asserted the necessity of retaining flogging
on active service, because of the type of unpatriotic lower-
class recruit who enlisted as he could not do any better:
without flogging, "it would be impossible to make war"(612).
It did not deter recruiting, and the entire army favoured
retention.	 He condemned party politics, politicians and
especially radical "claptrappists", and warned of the
decadence of patriotism and parliament which endangered
Britain's military capability for a European war. 	 He dis-
missed colonial campaign experience as irrelevant to great-
power war, condemned short service and advocated conscription.
The article showed his tough-mindedness, dogmatism, and
unsubstantiated generalization.	 Forbes, famous as a war
correspondent, was increasingly a bitter conservative
polemicist.
In the period of Forbes' military journalism new
weapons, increased firepower, foreign and especially German
examples, caused much professional discussion and writing,
in books, pamphlets and the service press. 8 As Howard Bailes
has shown, several schools of military thought emerged. 	 The
continentalists were German-influenced "Prussophiles", who
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included Charles Brackenbury and F.N. Maude, and asserted
the primacy of continental wars and military practices and
the relative unimportance of colonial experience. 	 They
emphasised the massed offensive, the necessity of casualties
and the importance of morale, and condemned British "tactics
of timidity", cover and attempted casualty-minimization.
Opposing them were the traditionalists led by the Duke of
Cambridge, and the imperial and British schools which included
Wolseley, Maurice, Roberts, Hamilton and Henderson. 	 Critical
and selective towards continental examples, they condemned
slavish imitation of the German and asserted the relevance
of colonial war and, especially Henderson, of the American
Civil War, and argued for cover, skirmishing and open order.
German influence was probably greatest in the 'seventies
following the Franco-Prussian War, then decreased. 	 Never-
theless, as Henderson wrote, "English soldiers of the present
generation" were "accustomed to have held up to them the
supremacy of Prussia in all things warlike". 9 The conti-
nentalist minority continued vociferous and critical of the
British army's training, tactics and failures.
The Franco-Prussian War was the first Forbes reported,
and had a lasting influence on him.	 His war correspondence
emphasised Prussian fighting qualities rather than firepower.
In the Russo-Turkish War, like many contemporaries, he was
impressed by the defeat at Plevna of the Russian assaults
against entrenched troops with modern rifles, by increased
firepower. He asserted discontinuity with the past, the
dominance of weaponry over moral factors, the futility of
frontal assault on entrenched riflemen, and that firepower
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had outdated "unscientific heroism". 	 He asserted the
necessity of losses to win war, but also reported that Russian
infantry became discouraged after repeated failures and losses.
Later he reported only colonial campaigns - the Zulu and
Afghan wars - but with more great-power than colonial war
experience he continued to believe great-power war was crucial
and colonial campaigns relatively unimportant. 	 He re-entered
the controversy on firepower and tactics with his article
'Fire-Discipline' in the December 1883 Fortnightly Review°
arguing from military history and his own battle experience.
By fire-discipline he meant, "that conduct of the soldier
under the stress of actual battle which is expected from him
as the crowning result of assiduous moral and professional
training"(218).	 It was the true test of soldiers. 	 As the
Germans knew, the purpose of battle was to win and for this
casualties, sometimes heavy losses, were necessary: "the
Germans have realised how much easier it is to spoil the
omelette by not breaking eggs enough"(236). 	 For this troops
needed fire-discipline, from training, close-order tactics
and being "blooded" by battle casualties. 	 The Germans knew
it was, "good for soldiers to die a little occasionally...
their death does not discourage, but hardens their comrades.
It seems brutal to write in this tone, but is not war all
brutal?"(223).	 Most soldiers were cowards who would run
away if they dared, but were constrained by the group, and
fire-discipline decreased in loose order using cover, when
more depended on the individual: when "physical contact is
lost, the moral touch is impaired"(222). 	 In battle, in
attack and defence, close order though sometimes suicidal
was sometimes effective.	 The British, as earlier wars
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proved, were intrinsically good soldiers but their recent
tactical training - "the paramount duty of dodging and sneak-
ing...the 'cover at any price' training"(225,8) - unlike the
German, demoralised and decreased fire-discipline, especially
of inexperienced young soldiers, and caused the checks,
panics and defeats at Isandhlwana and elsewhere in Zululand,
at Tel-el-Kebir and Majuba.
	 Afghan war experience did not
enhance fire-discipline since the Afghans usually "played the
dodging game" at long range.	 Though cavalry were "out of
fashion with many professors of modern war"ç.239), the Germans
rightly used them against infantry.
	 As Mars-la-Tour showed,
cavalry could succeed, despite heavy losses.
Forbes' article was a tough-minded, intransigent con-
tinentalist assertion of morale over firepower. 	 It showed
how his opinions had changed since the Russo-Turkish War, to
emphasising the offensive rather than the defensive and argu-
ing not the lethality of modern firepower, but the possibility
of successful assault. 	 He argued for 'cold steel' against
firepower, for tradition against innovation. 	 A cavalryman,
he apparently refused to admit that firepower fundamentally
changed battle. Despite Plevna he had become insufficiently
concerned with firepower: too concerned with troops accepting
casualties and insufficently concerned with their inflicting
them.	 Like many contemporaries, he underestimated the
lethality of machine guns. 	 His article again showed Forbes
an intransigent continentalist.	 Like Maude and others of
the school, he cited continental, especially German,
exemplars and authorities, praised German troops, stated a
tough-minded stoic or callous belief in the necessity of
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sacrifice in war? emphasised the importance of morale, cavalry
potential against infantry and the necessity of losses in the
attack, and criticised British tactics as excessively con-
cerned with cover and minimizing losses rather than, like the
Germans, with winning.
	
Forbes was the publicist and
populariser of the continentalists, reaching a wider reader-
ship, and especially civilian readership, than Maude or others
of the school.	 Unlike the imperial school of military
thought, he saw no special value in colonial war experience:
it was significant only relative to great-power war. 	 He
cited colonial campaigns less than European wars, and used
them or data to support his continentalism. 	 Despite his
knowledge of the Civil War - his father-in-law was an American
general - Forbes did not see the Civil War as having specific
lessons for the British army, but used it to support his con-
tinentalism.	 Like other traditionalists he believed con-
temporary British soldiers inferior to their early 19th
century predecessors.	 However in his article, unlike else-
where in his writings and unlike the Jeremiahs of British
physical and moral deterioration, he claimed this was not
intrinsic but only from wrong training. 	 In his article he
argued plausibly, but his use of evidence was selective and
ignored other, crucial factors.	 He had reported the Zulu
War and visited Isandhlwana after the massacre, but avail-
able evidence contradicted his claim that fire-discipline
was inadequate and there was no "vigorous attempt at a rally?!.
He was right about the formation used, but ignored the
crucial factor of inadequate firepower due to insufficient
available ammunition.	 His assessment of Majuba was
similarly distorted by monocausal explanation to support his
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case.	 He rejected the interpretation that the British failed
there from inadequate musketry.	 Yet the evidence suggested
that the crucial factors were British complacency, underrating
the Boers, tactical inferiority and inadequate use of cover
and especially of firepower. 12	Similarly with Tel-el-Kebir,
the initial British failure was argually as much because of
inadequate fire-power as inadequate fire-discipline. 	 In its
qualities as in its limitations his article was typical of
his better military journalism, and it increased public
awareness of a major military debate.
Through the 'eighties, no longer employed as a war
correspondent, Forbes wrote intermittent articles on military
13
subjects, of varied quality and originality. 	 Among the
grievances of rankers and the concerns of army reformers were
rations.	 Forbes' short articles 'Soldiers' Rations' in the
Nineteenth Century of December 1888 claimed rations had
improved since he served, and "the British soldier appears
to fare moderately well". 14	Soldiers deserved good treat-
ment and there should be further improvement. 	 So remember-
ing his own experience, Forbes continued concerned for the
welfare of other ranks; he never fully identified with the
officer corps.	 He showed himself a moderate reformer,
emphasising the improvements already made.
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7.	 MILITARY CONTROVERSIES II
Forbes was prolific and sometimes inconsistent, notably
in his published opinions of Wolseley.' Before the Ashanti
War Forbes had in the Daily News, arguing from the Red River
Expedition, recommended Wolseley's appointment for Ashanti.2
He resented Wolseley's Pocket-Book criticism of war corres-
pondents, and publicly disagreed with him on the sickness of
the Cyprus garrison.	 Yet he praised Wolseley's 1882 campaign
and in 1885 published a panegyric, 'Wolseley: A Character
Sketch', praising him as brave, "a heaven-born soldier",
praising the efficiency of the 'Ring' and claiming the Nile
failure was not Wolseley's fault. 3 Forbes was proud, inde-
pendent and undeferential and, in asserting his own and his
profession's expertise, was willing to challenge high-ranking
and famous officers, including Wolseley and Maurice.4
Maurice, as Staff College professor, official historian and
military journalist, continued Wolseley's propagandist, his
"second and in many respects his most able pen". 5 During
his ascent Wolseley had used the press, as Forbes noted,
"writing slightingly and opprobiously of a profession, and
at the same time. . .making assiduous endeavour to be well-
spoken of by that profession". 6 Forbes had not forgiven
his gibes.	 In 'Errors of the Experts', in the March 1889
Contemporary Review Forbes, sarcastically and specifically,
attacked Wolseley's and Maurice's writings for historical
and military inaccuracy and false conclusions. 	 He alleged
their errors incurred continental experts' contempt, "the
strident laugh and guttural sneer of the Kaiserplatz"(134).
He condemned the Pocket-Book as erroneous and largely
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obsolete, and Wolesley's use of heavy cavalry and guardsmen
for his 'camelry'. 	 Forbes' was a damning indictment, con-
vincingly argued.	 It showed his extensive, if sometimes
superficial, knowledge of recent military history; his
acceptance of continental orthodoxy, as on the forward
deployment of artillery; and his underrating, possibly from
cavalry prejudice, of firepower.	 It was inopportune for
Wolseley and probably contributed to the decline of his
reputation.
The Gordon Relief Expedition was the most publicised
and controversial Victorian small war7 and, following
publication of the official history, Forbes considered it
in 'The Failure of the Nile Campaign' in the January 1892
Contemporary Review. 	 He criticised the official history
as inaccurate and muddled, and condemned Wolseley for blun-
dering, delaying and causing the expedition's failure.
Forbes alleged that Wolseley despised, "the average Tommy
Atkins from Whitechapel"(42) and bungled the camel corps by
using socially elite troops instead of line infantry, "the
real fighting men of the British army"%41). 	 Forbes' article
was a convincing polemic though he omitted much which could
have strengthened his case, including the route chosen and
the inexperienced Canadians. 	 In criticising the Household
troops he expressed widely-held army attitudes. 8 He was a
journalist rather than a military analyst: quick, effective
but sometimes superficial, and his articles, though com-
petent, lacked the depth and insights of G.S. Clarke's
analyses.	 Indicative of Forbes' lack of thoroughness, he
did not fully take into account previous contributions to
233
the debate, oversimplified, and ignored data that did not
fit his interpretation.	 He ignored Clarke's 1892 article,
accepted unquestioned the Nile route, and ignored the con-
troversy on Wilson.	 This flawed his article and lessened
its impact on informed readers.	 Nevertheless it probably
contributed to the further decline of Wolseley's reputation.
It drew a reply from a Wolseleyite journalist, Charles
Williams, an experienced war correspondent who had been
involved in controversy and litigation over his reporting
of the Nile expedition. 9	In 1892 he published in Maurice's
largely Wolseleyite United Service Magazine, 'The Nile
Campaign.	 A Reply to Mr. Forbes') 0 He praised Forbes
as "a brilliant correspondent", but alleged his criticism
of Wolseley was unsupported by the evidence, and that he
relied on the official history, "this bogus work" which was
falsified to vindicate the politicians. 	 He attempted to
vindicate Wolseley, blaming Gladstone. 	 Thus he rightly
showed the politicians' responsibility which Forbes had
ignored, and that Forbes had concentrated too exclusively
on Wolseley.	 Nevertheless Williams had not disproved
Forbes' allegation that Wolseley had blundered. 	 He
indicated one fault of Forbes: that, common in the pole-
micist and crusading journalist, of taking an insufficiently
wide view, and blaming too narrowly and exclusively.
The Victorian army almost never obtained sufficient
recruits, and problems of recruiting and recruits' poor
physique were of continued concern to military reformers
and received intermittent press publicity. 1	In another
polemical article, 'The Recruiting Problem' in the March
234
1891 Nineteenth Century 12 Forbes condemned short service and
the inadequacy of the present troops, unlike their long-
service predecessors, for great-power war:"your narrow-
chested, 'herring-bodied', undersized gutter-weed is pure
trash on campaign"(4OO), and great-power war was "incom-
parably more formidable"(r399) than colonial war.	 He cri-
ticised politicians', especially Campbell-Bannerman's,
ignorance, denied the army was truly voluntary, and warned
its discipline was precarious, maintained with difficulty
against "the spirit of demagogy which is being so sedulously
instilled into the lower classes"(4O3).	 Short service was
disastrous for imperial defence.	 He praised the old East
India Company European regiments and advocated a short-
service home army, raised by conscription - "the sacrifice
all other European nations make for their fatherlands "( 4O4 ) -
and a better-paid long-service imperial army. 	 Forbes'
article was competent but unoriginal, expressing ideas
already widespread, without reference to those who had
already proposed them.	 Here he aligned himself with
Roberts, Dilke, Wilkinson and other dual-army advocates, and
against Wolseley, Campbell-Bannerman and other defenders of
the Cardwell system.	 Attitudes to the Company European
regiments were a shibboleth: Roberts, himself ex Bengal
Horse Artillery, praised them, but Wolseley condemned them
13
as, "the worst and most dangerous body of men we ever had".
Criticism of Campbell-Bannerman was widespread among army
reformers.' 4	Since the 1870s conscription had been inter-
mittently advocated, often by retired officers, though
usually believed politically unacceptable. 15	In 1889
Charles Brackenbury noted the demand for, "conscription
235
under the fashionable name of universal service": he opposed
the "grinding blood tax".' 6 However Wolseley, Roberts and
the 1892 Wantage Report claimed that it might be necessary.'7
Forbes' article was bitter and denunciatory: still German-
influenced continentalist, and increasingly expressing the
attitudes similar to those of Wolseley and the 'new' Right:
contempt for politicians and a pessimistic belief in the
decline of Britain and the threatening rise of radicalism
and other anti-national, disintegrative forces.
In the late 19th century military planners attempted
to adapt to increased firepower and to foresee the warfare
of the near future.	 Journalists are seldom original think-
ers but they sometimes see the significance of new ideas and
publicise them.	 Forbes was militarily conservative and in
his later years, unlike in the Russo-Turkish War, tended to
underestimate the effects of increased firepower. 	 However
in his May 1891 Nineteenth Century article 'The Warfare of
the Future' he took up ideas discussed in the service press
though less publicised outside it. He argued the relative
inconclusiveness of modern land warfare compared to that of
the smoothbore period: with machine guns and magazine rifles
the decisive advantage was to the defence. 	 In future the
successful offensive would prove impossible and there would
be stalemate.	 Citing G.S. Clarke he claimed that future
fortifications would be low earthworks. 	 Arguing from the
Franco-Prussian War he claimed that cavalry would no longer
be effective in battle, "Magazine and machine guns would
seem to sound the knell of possible employment of cavalry
in battle". 18 He concluded that war would be more costly
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than the costliest preparation.	 His article was a perceptive
analysis which later war was to justify. 	 Yet in his 1894
Blackwood's article on cavalry he advocated cavalry charges.
Such inconsistency or apparent inconsistency might be justi-
fied by his omission of any time-scale from his future-war
article.	 Possibly he was an inconsistent journalist who,
rather than forming a consistent corpus of military thinking,
took up an idea and argued a case, then later took up a
different idea.	 Apparently there were continuing themes and
prejudices, rather than consistent thinking, in his military
writings.	 His article also again showed his extensive
military knowledge and that, to keep up to date, he read
recent works: for example, his citing of G.S. Clarke and, in
his 'Errors' article, of Brialmont.
	 His article in part
anticipated Bloch though Forbes, a more limited thinker,
failed to follow his ideas through to the conclusions
Bloch reached.
The Victorian era was one of progress, increased
humanitarianism and refusal to tolerate formerly-accepted
miseries.	 There was medical progress and, largely due to
Russell's reports, changed attitudes to the fate of other
ranks in war.	 Armies improved their medical services,'9
and as reserves were the voluntary Red Cross societies and,
in Britain since 1878, the St. John Ambulance Association.20
In war foreign volunteers sometimes provided additional
medical services: in the Franco-Prussian War Duke served
with a Prussian ambulance unit, and Kitchener with a French
unit. 2' There was in this period much discussion of the
laws of war and the humanization of military practice, and
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some international agreement, notably the 1864 Geneva Con-
vention, on the treatment of the wounded. 22 Meanwhile
weapon innovation, increasing firepower and lethality led
to discussion of future war: largely on tactics, cavalry and
later, with Bloch, on stalemate.	 Troops' ability to accept
heavy losses and the possibility of casualties demoralising
them were also discussed in the service press, and by Forbes
in 'Fire-Discipline'.	 Opinions differed on whether future
war would increase casualties. Some argued modern weapons
would make war less destructive: for example, the anonymous
short article in Chambers's Journal in May 1897, 'Science
and Slaughter'. 23	It claimed that more recent wars had a
lower proportion of casualties and that in land war, unlike
naval war, increased destructive power was counteracted by
other changes.	 In attacking, tactics - with open order,
rapid movement and cover - would neutralise machine-gun and
rifle fire.	 The dominant opinion, however, was that f ire-
power would increase battle losses, even if the prevalent
short-war illusion led some to assume that total war losses
might not increase. 	 Bloch, who had studied the Russo-Turkish
War, exceptionally postulated both increased battle casual-
ties and long war.24
In June 1892 Forbes attended a lecture at the R.iJ.S.I.
by Mr. John Furley on 'Ambulance Work and Materiel in Peace
and War'. 25 Furley, a veteran of the Red Cross and
voluntary medical assistance in foreign wars, lectured on
vehicles and equipment and the role in war of the voluntary
medical organizations.	 Citing German authorities, he
claimed that with more casualties more stretcher-bearers
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would be needed.	 In the discussion following Sir V.K.
Barrington claimed that modern weapons would not increase
the proportion of wounded. 	 Forbes spoke, first asserting,
"My own experience covers the battle-fields of three conti-
nents, and some ten years of my life were spent in caring
for wounded men". 26 He disagreed with "my friend" Furley
and stated his own views. 	 From this he later wrote his
article, 'The Future of the Wounded in War', published in
1895.27	 In it he claimed that the "amenities of warfare",
deliberately limiting its lethality and suffering, were
artificial, incompatible with Its true nature, and In theory
preposterous.	 He had heard Furley lecture, "apparently in
the full conviction that the wounded of the future would
fare as do the wounded of the present"4247). Forbes had
stated that in a future great battle the number of wounded
would enormously exceed the capability of the medical ser-
vices and that after It, "he would probably find a wounded
brigadier-general competing for a share of a country dung-
cart"(ib).	 Others disagreed: "The Philistine audience,
which Included sundry brigadier generals, gibed at me"(Ib).
However, later he found the best continental authorities
agreed with him and claimed that future stretcher-bearer
losses would prevent the removal during battle of the wounded.
In the Franco-Prussian and Russo-Turkish wars he had already
recognised this, and stated in his war correspondence that
from the losses of medical personnel the service already
"approached impracticability" and in future war would be
impossible as improved weapons would in the first battle
"wipe out the bearer organization"(248). 	 It was impossible
to picture the reality of the next great battle. 	 Weapons
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would be more lethal with new explosives,quick-firing artil-
lery, machine guns, high-velocity rifles, and possibly air-
craft bombing. Future war would probably be "short, sharp
and decisive"(1252) but the battles prolonged with immense
numbers of casualties: too many to cope with. 	 They would
have to be left until after the battle, when minimal army
medical services and the Red Cross would tend them, while
the army moved on to continue fighting. 	 There would no
longer be military bearer companies as the men would be
needed as combatants.	 Nevertheless many wounded would sur-
vive.	 He asserted his own experience - "I have bandaged
and attended to more wounded under fire than any man in
Europe who is not a professional military surgeon"(1254) -
that wounded were sometimes better left than moved. 	 In
contrast to Peninsular War soldiers' toughness and suffer-
ing, in British colonial campaigns, "the soldier is coddled
nowadays to the extent of being really deteriorated by over-
tenderness"(254).	 He concluded that future war might one
day force the peoples of the civilised world to choose
between leaving tens of thousands of wounded unattended on
the battlefield, or ending war - and so might end war.
The article was typical of Forbes: competently argued
from extensive knowledge; citing his experience, military
history and continental military writers; continental-
influenced, tough-minded, controversial and claiming the
present was softer and easier than the past. 	 Much was
widely accepted including the lower casualty rate of recent
wars, the deterioration from former mental and physical
toughness and the future importance of artillery, though
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he emphasised this less than Bloch, and, unlike Bloch, the
assumption of a short war of movement and decisive battles.
His grim message of the future of the wounded was, despite
the continental experts, exceptional in Britain and new to
most of his readers. 	 As in his Russo-Turkish War reporting
he again emphasised the lethality of firepower, which he had
tended to understate in his writing on cavalry. 	 Like Bloch
he portrayed future war as grimly unromantic, as mass but-
chery not individual adventure and heroism. 	 His article was
typical of him also in its assertion of his own experience
and expertise; and in its limitations, his failure to con-
sider alternatives.	 While emphasising weapon development
he failed to consider the possibility of some defensive
counter to this, of different types of battle, or of major
medical development. Though elsewhere in his writings con-
cerned with morale and possible demoralization, he failed to
consider the effect on soldiers' morale of knowing that if
wounded they would be virtually abandoned. 	 Possibly he
assumed from his experience of Russian troops that this would
not be decisive, but he failed to relate it to his pessimistic
view of modern British soldiers.	 Nevertheless the article
was among his more original and controversial contributions
to the debate on the future of war and to public awareness
of defence issues.
Forbes further criticised the condition of the army
in 'The Bogus Apotheosis of the British Army' in the April
1894 Contemporary Review. He condemned as inaccurate and
dangerously optimistic the quasi-official Army Book of the
British Empire and warned that the army was unready for war,
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with soldiers physically inadequate, localization failed,
an "unsafe" subversive element, an insufficient reserve,
unsuccessful Militia with much desertion, and cavalry under
strength.	 The army was neither national nor voluntary but,
"a mercenary army, and all but wholly a helot army"(523)
enlisted from individual necessity. 	 He claimed conscript
armies were superior to non-conscript. His article was
polemical, dogmatic, exaggerated and generalised without
adequate data: another truculent assertion of his military
expertise.	 While loyal to the army he did not romanticise
it, but emphasised its faults.	 His article publicised
important issues already much discussed in military circles
and the military press.	 In fact men enlisted from varied
motives including "the clothes" and even desire for a miii-
28tary funeral.	 Some were forced by necessity but others,
like Hector MacDonald, chose freely. 29 The claim that the
army was not truly voluntary was repeatedly made, and was
later used by advocates of compulsory service: George Shee
30quoted Defoe, 'It is poverty makes men soldiers". 	 The
plight of reservists already concerned military reformers
and publicists, and Forbes exaggerated with his unsub-
stantiated allegation that one third were tramps: in 1894
9.6 percent of reservists were unemployed. 31 He ignored
the common expedient, publicised by Kipling, of re-enlist-
ment under an assumed name. 32 He understated the Militia's
contribution to the regular army and, possibly extrapolating
from civilian unrest, exaggerated discontent within the army.
He again expressed his continentalism and pessimistic 'new'
Right perception of internal and external threat.
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Since the 1860s the nature, tactics and weapons of
mounted troops had been controversial: whether they should
remain primarily traditional shock-action arme blanche cavalry,
or change to primarily mounted infantry. 33 Among cavalry
officers, the orthodoxy was traditionalist: the primacy of
the charge with sword and lance.	 The traditionalists, who
included such continentalist military theorists as F.N. Maude,
were encouraged by continental, especially German, examples.
Differing from them were the relatively few officers such as
Sir Henry Havelock and Colonel George Denison who argued for
the total or partical replacement of cavalry by mounted
rifles or mounted infantry; and those, including Wolseley
and Roberts who favoured cavalry training for both mounted
infantry and shock roles. 	 Some civilians claimed that f ire-
power had nullified traditional cavalry, 34 and in 1894 Shaw
ridiculed the cavalry spirit and arme blanche in Arms and the
Man.	 Also in 1894 Forbes entered the controversy on cavalry
with an article in Blackwood's Magazine. 	 Blackwood's was
tory, prestigious, and old-fashioned in format and contri-
butors ?
 anonymity.	 Its eminent military contributors
included Hamley, Wolseley, Kitchener and Lugard. It was
indicative of Forbes? status and his conservatism that he
contributed to it.
In his article ?The Cavalry Arm of the British Service?
Forbes stated that the Franco-Prussian War showed cavalry?s
achievement against infantry, and revolutionised continental
attitudes to cavalry.	 The war showed that in battle there
could be times of crisis when cavalry were decisive against
infantry:"when, in spite of the fire of breech-loading rifles,
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the bravest infantry, if assailed at the right movement, may
be ridden over like a flock of sheep". 35
 Since then the
continental powers agreed that cavalry were essential in war.
Their role was to protect, screen, and gain information, and
in battle to attack flank or rear or create diversion. 	 He
cited von der Goltz on the necessity of their defeating enemy
cavalry in order to achieve their own functions. 	 He asserted
the importance, shown in the continental wars, of cavalry
morale.	 Experts doubted the British cavalry's competence,
and the 1882 Egyptian campaign had warned of the "chaos in
which our cavalry organization is allowed to stagnate".36
Inferior to German cavalry, inadequately trained, under est-
ablishment in men and horses, their faults shown by manoeuvres,
the British cavalry were unready for war and Inadequate
against continental cavalry.
	 They still had their tradi-
tional faults, as under Wellington, of indiscipline and dis-
order.	 Forbes proposed reforms: more cavalry officers in
high positions, more supervision by senior officers, officers
more professional, more and better training, and fewer but
stronger regiments with seven at war strength. 37
	Forbes'
article was critical, pessimistic and dogmatic, generalising
without producing evidence. 	 It again showed his incon-
sistency and changing opinions on major issues. 	 When
reporting the Russo-Turkish War and again In his 1891 future-
warf are article he had claimed that firepower made effective
cavalry charges impossible. Later his 1895 article 'The
Future of the Wounded in War' emphasised the lethality of
modern firepower and was apparently incompatible with his
cavalry article. 	 The latter ignored the American Civil War
and colonial campaigns and was dominated by German military
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thought, as indicated by his citing German writers and
practice and F.N. Maude, one of the most extreme continent-
alist British military writers.	 It was not comprehensive
and omitted much including the best-weapon controversy and
the dismounted firepower role.	 It was conservative cavalry
orthodoxy.
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8. FORBES ON WAR CORRESPONDENCE
In the nineteenth century technical change and other
innovation brought about new professions whose practitioners
attempted to raise their status.	 War correspondence emerged
as a "craft" or "profession" during and after the Crimean War,
largely through Russell.' He wrote about war correspondence
and its controversies, notably security and censorship. 	 His
approach was largely personal, defending his own conduct and
citing his own experience.	 In this as in much else his
example was followed by other correspondents. 	 Forbes also
wrote intermittently, largely centred on himself, on war
correspondence and its controversies. 	 Proud of being a war
correspondent, he tried to boost his profession's reputation.
In reporting the Russo-Turkish War he asserted themes which
recurred through his writings: the dangers, difficulties,
hardships, endurance and exceptional rides of correspondents,
especially himself, and the supreme importance of communicat-
ions. 2 He asserted his own integrity and accuracy, criti-
cising those of some of his rivals. 3 He noted the difficulty
of objective assessment following battle experience and the
correspondent's lack of an accurate overall picture. 	 In his
1877 lecture to the R.U.S.I. he stated that as a war corres-
pondent he tried to confine himself "to the treatment of
military topics, and to the description of what bears upon
them directly", apparently implying this was the corres-
pondent's proper function. 4 Like other correspondents and
war artists, he asserted his commitment and experience and
the contrast with the stay-at-home newspaper reader. He
wrote in 1886, "I have spent the last decade almost wholly
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in campaigning, and have witnessed cannon-smoke almost as
often as I have seen the peaceful smoke from the domestic
grate" .
From 1870 Forbes was friendly with Russell: in 1899,
when both were retired and old, Forbes wrote advising him to
have his teeth extracted: "many years ago, I had every tooth
in my head pulled out, and in comfortably fitting false teeth
have been dentally happy ever since". 6 He acknowledged
Russell's pre-eminence and in his lectures in the 'seventies
praised him with "a sustained panegyric". 7 He continued
this theme in his later writings on war correspondence,
though emphasising that he himself, in contrast to Russell,
was of the post-telegraphic "newer school" who faced greater
difficulty, danger and risk of death. 8 Russell in the
Crimea had established the role of the war correspondent as
the critic of military authorities and exposer of military
faults and abuses and, to a lesser extent, Forbes continued
this role.	 In the Russo-Turkish War he criticised Russian
faults.	 In Cyprus he revealed the inadequate medical
facilities, and in the Zulu War he criticised Chelmsford's
strategy.	 Retired from war correspondence, in his two final
decades, he continued as a military critic and defended
correspondents.
Some senior officers had long disliked war corres-
pondents and wanted to ban or limit them. 	 By 1880 such
antipathy had been increased by the criticism of Chelmsford
and by the Macpherson affair in the Afghan War. 9 Macpherson
of the Standard, a leading Conservative paper, evaded censor-
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ship and alleged British atrocities including the burning of
villages and shooting of prisoners, comparing them to the
Bulgarian atrocities. 	 Roberts expelled him, the Opposition
exploited the issue and there was public controversy. Forbes,
who had reported the Afghan War, entered the controversy with
his article in the January 1880 Nineteenth Century, 'War
Correspondence and the Authorities'.' 0 He criticised the
new regulations for war correspondents and replied to alle-
gations. Lying war correspondents were rare, though there
was recently in Afghanistan one who "branded with atrocious
cruelty the soldiers of a noble regiment", an allusion to
Macpherson.	 Telling the truth could never be detrimental;
if there were disaster the nation should know so that it
could demand reform.	 Criticism of commanders did not harm
morale since the army formed its own opinions. The argument
of providing the enemy with information applied only against
a civilised enemy, not in colonial war, and since the Crimea,
"We have only been slaughtering barbarians, with the occas-
ional alternative of being slaughtered by them"(188). 	 In
"real war" - a phrase indicative of his continentalism -
there was risk of correspondents providing information to
the enemy, but the Germans and Russians believed the advant-
ages of correspondents outweighed the risks, and Forbes
agreed with them.	 He eulogised his profession: "Is this
craft of ours, not less noble than that of the clergyman
himself, not less patriotic than that of him who gladly dies
for his country?" The public should know what was happen-
ing and the troops should know that they know. 	 Better the
truth than a "fool's paradise"; the nation, if informed,
could demand reform, as following Russell's Crimean
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revelations.	 Correspondents by providing information and
suggestions on their own and foreign armies assisted officers
and contributed to military effectiveness: "the cause of
military science is benefitted by the presence in the field
of intelligent and impartial correspondents". 	 Officers
crowded to hear correspondents lecture on foreign armies at
the United Service Institution. Also war correspondentst
reporting stimulated "the martial ardour of a nation" and
encouraged enlistment by the adventurous, not "feckless waifs
and strays".	 Forbes' article ably defended his profession.
He asserted war correspondents' status, that they were not,
as Wolseley alleged, ignorant prejudiced camp-followers, but
military experts from whom officers could learn.	 His argu-
ments, later research suggests, were largely though not
entirely valid.	 As he himself later realised he was wrong
on the risk in European war of correspondents providing
information to the enemy. 	 He was right on the benefits of
press exposure of faults, as in the Crimea, and on corres-
pondents' support for war and encouragement of recruiting.
Replying to Forbes' article and stating the authori-
ties' case was Viscount Melgund's 'Newspaper Correspondents
in the Field' in the March 1880 Nineteenth Century." lie
praised Forbes as "among the best military critics of the
day"(435), but claimed others were ignorant liars and that
correspondents should be controlled. 	 He claimed, "the
English press is a great power"(f437) and that correspondents
could by lying or inopportune truth harmfully affect public
opinion, by criticising commanders harm troops' morale, and
give information to the enemy.	 Public knowledge of the
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horrors of war would reduce support for it. 	 Correspondents
were inaccurate, irreponsible, and boosted their favourite
officers while maligning others. 	 Melgund's article was a
capable attempt to minimise correspondents' credibility.
His attitudes, though held by some in authority including
Wolseley, were seldom publicly stated by them when the press
was probably at the peak of its influence and they more often
flattered than criticised it.	 Though some of his points
were valid, he failed to fully answer, still less destroy,
Forbes' case.	 He ignored Forbes' argument that corres-
pondents, as in the Crimea, exposed faults and contributed
to reforms.	 His basic premise was the authorities': that
the public should accept the official version, and that
criticism was unnecessary.
In the following years Forbes wrote intermittently on
war correspondence. 	 In 'Doughtown Scrip' he briefly con-
sidered the impact of war correspondence, describing how New
Zealand miners, largely Scots, identif led with the British
forces in colonial war: "They stand with Chard and Bromhead
inside the frail stronghold of Rorke's Drift, and in fancy,
with flushed faces and sparkling eyes, they charge home with
the big troopers at Kassassin".' 2 In his pieces on the
Russo-Turkish War and Afghan War he again emphasised the
dangers and heroism of correspondents especially himself,
and the Czar's awarding him the Order of St. Stanilaus for
bravery.	 He mentioned that war correspondence often
engendered jealousy and ill-f eeling, a point which he usual-
ly ignored but which Villiers and others stated. 	 His
'Wolseley: A Character Sketch' denounced his criticism of
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correspondents as "drones" as an "unfounded aspersion". 	 He
asserted that the correspondent was, "the servant of the
public for whom he toils harder than any soldier; to whom
rest and ease are strangers, and who faces danger and meets
death in the line of duty with a courage as gallant as that
shown by any soldier".' 3	In his 1889 'Errors of the Experts'
he argued the fallibility of Wolseley's and Maurice's mili-
tary writings and, by implication, his own superior expertise.
He asserted the reliability of correspondents' campaign
narratives and claimed that on the Russo-Turkish War
Wolseley insufficiently used them.
Forbes returned to the relationship of correspondents
and military authorities in his article 'My Campaign in Pall
Mall'.'4 He claimed that newspapers "dread a war because
of the huge expense it entails without adequate compensation":
a doubtful claim, but made repeatedly by journalists. 	 He
stated that now controls had ended the war correspondent with
British forces, replacing him by the war reporter enslaved by
censorship.	 Forbes favoured this since war correspondence
could inform the enemy and in European war the alternatives
were news or victory.	 Before such controls, the corres-
pondent had advantages - he could "stir the nation with
revelations of maladministration" and might win "fleeting
fame" - but if he were independent not sycophantic, officials
treated him insolently, contradicted his reports and impugned
his veracity.	 Officials usually had the advantage and
tended to be believed. 	 Sometimes correspondents were vin-
dicated, as were Russell in the Crimea and MacGahan in
Bulgaria, but in other cases though correspondents were
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correct, lying official denials were widely believed, as with
Russell's reports of troops' misconduct in Natal and Forbes'
own revelations in Cyprus.
	 Moreover a correspondent who
reported news contrary to public beliefs could be vilified
by the public and press.
	 In the 1882 Egyptian campaign a
correspondent reported a British picket had panicked.
	 In
Britain public and press indignantly denounced him as "the
vilest of calumniators" and his paper sacked him.
	 Forbes
claimed his conduct had been silly and unnecessary, since
such incidents happened in all armies and were not worth
reporting.	 Forbes had seen them in successive wars and
knew of but did not report those in Zululand.
	 The corres-
pondent should not have "looked at events microscopically".
Most of Forbes' article was on his claim to the Zulu War
medal and his treatment by the War Office, which he claimed
showed, "the tergiversations and tortuosities officialdom in
its relations with the war correspondent".
	 Thus Forbes,
while accepting the present controls were necessary for
great-power war, again attempted to vindicate correspondents,
claiming that officials misrepresented them and deceived the
public and that while correspondents should report the truth
they should do so selectively, omitting unimportant events
which the public, ignorant of war, could misunderstand. It
was a tenable argument but a dangerous one, for omission
could distort for propaganda, denying readers information
on which to evaluate.
	 Forbes, in the relatively free
society and press, was apparently insufficiently aware of
the danger of manipulation within the press.
In his 1891 articles 'A War Correspondent's Remini-
scences' he described his experiences as a correspondent.15
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He claimed that the Franco-Prussian War "brought about the
revolution in the methods of war correspondence", beginning
a new period in war correspondence.	 Previously it had been,
because "pre-telegraphic", less arduous, and because of
weapons' shorter ranges, less dangerous. He again emphas-
ised - "pace Lord Wolseley" - his and other correspondents'
hardships and dangers, and his own bravery, Ulundi ride and
mentions in despatches.	 He claimed that correspondents
endured more risks and had proportionately higher casualties
than average soldiers, and cited correspondents' war deaths.
He stated his desiderata for the ideal correspondent: langu-
ages, "a competent judge of warfare, conversant with all
military operations", an instinct for coming battle, and
ability to ignore fire and to judge a battle's result before
it ended and so leave early with the news, and to ride
exceptional distances and then write. 	 The profession of
war correspondent impaired the hardiest constitution and
prematurely aged the correspondent, but was "of singular
fascination".	 He described himself in 1892 as, "an invalid
in quest of health.. .reduced to dodder about a mineral
spring".' 6	In his 1892 article 'War Correspondence as a
Fine Art' 17 he stated that war correspondence as he had
practised it had, after its "brief term" ended, with new
controls and censorship. 	 He agreed with them, preferring
"victories to news"ç.216). 	 He outlined the history of war
correspondence, emphasing Russell in the Crimea and his
saving the army there.	 In the Franco-Prussian War a few
reporters achieved scoops by telegraphing and so, "revolut-
ionised war correspondence in the Old World"(223).	 Thence-
forth speed and organization were crucial: "In modern war
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correspondence the race is emphatically to the swift...the
best organiser of the means of expediting his intelligence,
he it is who is the most successful man" ç225). 	 He des-
cribed his own ingenuity and success in routeing his reports
to England, and again his epic rides: for example, "during
the four days I had ridden 280 miles in a heat as fierce as
that of India, over tracks from which the dust rose so dense
as to obscure the sun"(p240).
Writing of war correspondence Forbes repeated certain
themes, writing largely of his own experience and achieve-
ment and emphasising correspondents' dangers, hardships,
drama and adventure.	 He portrayed himself and others of
the lite as heroes, so differing from the pattern set by
Russell and largely initiating "the adventurous school of
war correspondents". 18 He again emphasised the importance
for correspondents of speed, ingenuity, foresight, organi-.
sation and money in arranging communications and expediting
reports.	 He praised correspondents and attempted to refute
criticism of them.	 While criticising rivals as inaccurate
and sensationalist, he claimed that correspondents seldom
lied.	 His favourable portrayal minimised correspondents'
rivalry and sharp practice.	 In the 'seventies and 'eight-
ies he argued against control and censorship, asserting the
benefits of unrestricted reporting: revealing faults, caus-
ing reforms, stimulating, recruiting and providing data use-
ful to officers.	 Later he accepted the need for control
and censorship in European war to prevent the enemy gaining
information, here agreeing with the trend of opinion among
the military authorities and among correspondents including
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Russell.	 He saw war correspondence as changing with cir-
cumstance and the period of his success as a temporary phase,
characterised by the telegraph and minimal control and
censorship.	 He stated that war correspondence continued
because of public demand, and asserted the influence of the
press on the public.	 He reaffirmed the role of the
correspondent as an expert and critic, and assumed he
should support his country's forces and stimulate "martial
ardour", should reveal faults and failures but not attack
the army or war.	 A man of action rather than reflection,
he did not write about the emphasis and explicitness with
which a correspondent should report the horrors of war,
but accepted the conventions of his age. 	 As a leading
correspondent he was accepted as a spokeman for his
profession. The positive, heroic image of the corres-
pondent which he presented reinforced the orthodoxy and
was repeated in articles and books on the press and on
correspondents.	 He was important in shaping attitudes
not only to war but also to war correspondents and in
reaffirming the credibility, established earlier by
Russell, of their portrayal of war.
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9.	 BIOGRAPHIES
Biography was among the oldest and most popular
literary forms.' Victorians saw history largely as "the
essence of innumerable Biographies", the achievements of the
great.	 So they erected more commemorative statues than ever
before or since, of Victorians and their historical heroes.
As Olive Anderson, A.O.J. Cockshut and C.I. Hamilton have
shown, Victorian biography was characterised by the pre-
sentation of its subjects as heroes, if sometimes flawed,
and by hero-worship.	 From the time of the Crimea naval and
military biographies identified Christianity with heroism
and emphasised the Christian warrior hero, a concept with
its heyday in the 'fifties and 'sixties though influential
long after.	 Heroes fulfilled Victorian emotional needs.
Contemporaries believed they inspired; and, as Hamilton has
suggested, they comforted against anxieties aroused by
religious doubt, social darwinism and foreign threats.
Victorian biography varied much in subject, type and quality.
Subjects varied from emperors to the poor and humble heroes
of the Protestant sects and the temperance movement. 	 One
such was Billy Bray, the Cornish miner and Bible Christian
preacher whose biography by F.W. Bourne, Billy Bray: The
King's Son (1871) sold a thousand copies every month for
thirty years. 2 Samuel Smiles wrote that, "The chief use
of biography consists in the noble models of character.. .a
book containing the life of a true man is full of precious
seed". 3 Biographies were usually eulogistic, and often
hagiographical and inspirational, both religious and
secular: 4 the latter included Smiles' Self-Help (1859) and
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other 'success' literature. 5	Their format and quality
varied but few, like Edwin Hodder's "classic Victorian
biography", the Life of Shaftesbury, achieved excellence.6
Filial and uxorious biography sometimes falsified, as did
'Soapy Sam' Wilberforce's life of his father.	 Biographers
were limited by current standards of reticence and decorum,
which were most restraining from about 1840 to about 1875
then diminished. 7
 Reticence and bias sometimes caused
omissions: for example by Forster of Dickens' adultery or
by Morley of Gladstone's flagellation. 	 Biographies were
often inaccurate.	 Parasitic on the large standard bio-
graphies were the many shorter plagiarised 'pot-boilers' of
which Lady Carbury's Criminal Queens was typical. 8 The
public's 'biographic appetite' continued, and biographies
continued profitable.	 In the late 19th century there was
a vogue for better, though still derivative, short bio-
graphies and publishers produced series, for example
Macmillan's	 'English Men of Action'. 	 So many biographies
were published as to arouse criticism.
	 Edmund Gosse
complained that, "there was unquestionably an excess, and
even an abuse, in the habit of biography".9
Retired from war correspondence Forbes wrote more
journalism and books, including five relatively short bio-
graphies.	 They were derivative and superficial, but
expressed his attitudes: as Cockshut has written, "in bio-
graphy it is the whole man who writes, with all his
instincts, ideas and prejudices") 0 Forbes' first bio-
graphy was Chinese Gordon rushed out in 1884 and admittedly
compiled from others.	 He eulogised Gordon, placing him in
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the tradition of Christian warrior heroes including Hedley
Vicars, whose best-selling biography by Catherine Marsh
helped establish the Victorian cult of the Christian warrior
hero. 1 ' He praised Gordon's courage, example to his men,
and his military studies. 	 He commented that the art of war
needed experience but that some exceptional commanders -
including Napoleon, Sheridan, Skobeleff and Gordon - had an
"innate genius for war". 	 He condemned the Taiping rebels
and the imperial officials. 	 He condemned the Egyptian
regime in the Sudan as cruel, corrupt and oppressive, and
praised Gordon's achievement against the slave trade, his
bringing peace and progress.	 He condemned the Mandist
regime for its slavery and oppression, contrasting the
beneficence of Gordon's rule.	 He also criticised the
"cliquism and favouritism" of British India. 	 His book,
restating the orthodox view of Gordon, was superficial,
insufficiently critical, and failed to portray Gordon's
complexity and motivation.	 Ignorant of most of the
countries where Gordon served, Forbes' account, especially
of the Sudan and Uganda, was simplistic and more favourable
than Gordon's own assessment.	 Forbes again judged by
moral criteria, and emphasised the warrior virtues of
courage and devotion to duty.	 He expressed his patriotic
and racial beliefs and, while not advocating extension of
British rule, his condemnation of native rule could be read
as implicit justification of the Empire. 	 His emphasis on
the Pall Mall Gazette's role was typical of Victorian belief
in press influence. He included some comments from his own
experience and military studies, but failed to analyse the
"innate genius for war",	 lie habitually ignored seapower,
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and his comment on the Essex forts showed he still accepted
the 1859 assumptions and was uninfluenced by the ascendant
navalism.	 His book, competent hurried journalism, did
justice to neither Gordon nor Forbes. It both expressed
and reinforced the public adulation of Gordon and concern
at his fate.
Macmillan's 'English Men of Action' were mostly the
heroes of imperialist 'drum and trumpet' history, and Forbes
was chosen to write on two heroes of that imperial epic the
Indian Mutiny, Havelock and Campbell.' 2 Havelock was
adulated as a Christian warrior, the pre-eminent popular
13hero of the Mutiny.	 Forbes compiled his Havelock (1890)
from earlier biographies, adding his own comments. 	 He
praised Havelock's study of military history as contributing
to his later victories: the art of war was "constructed out
of innumerable instances of actual experience"(7). 	 He
praised Havelock's "innate capacity for war"(ib), courage
and concern for his men. 	 In his biographies Forbes included
much conventional campaign narrative, not specific on horrors
and suffering and not attempting to communicate soldiers'
experience: the written equivalent of the Victorian battle
painting.	 He again condemned the mutineers' atrocities,
justified British reprisals, praised British heroism and
achievement, but noted that British soldiers looted and
14	 .	 .	 .burned.	 He emphasised regimental tradition, esprit de
corps and morale, and noted that even fine troops could
falter under fire, and the importance then of leadership.
Though superficial and lacking insight and analysis, it was
a vigorous narrative and was favourably reviewed. 	 Forbes'
Cohn Campbell, Lord Clyde (1895) was similarly derivative
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and eulogistic.	 He praised Campbell's bravery and mini-
mization of casualties, partly by using artillery.	 He
praised the good relations between officers and men in the
old long-service army, and especially praised the high-
landers.	 He continued to sympathize with the rank and
file, to condemn those who maltreated or needlessly sacri-
f iced them, and to praise those concerned for their welfare.
He never saw the army or war exclusively from the commanders'
and officers' viewpoints. 	 He continued a continentalist,
believing the Mutiny and other colonial compaigns held no
lessons comparable with those of the Franco-Prussian War,
which he most cited, or the Russo-Turkish War.	 The Times
review suggested that Forbes' war experience helped his
writing the book, but in fact the Mutiny was a different
type of war from those he had experienced, and in writing
on it he made little overt use of his experience. 	 However
his experience informed his perception and evaluation and
increased his credibility. 	 The two biographies were
favourably reviewed, sold well, and reinforced existing
attitudes to the Mutiny, the Empire, military heroes and war.
After 1871 Forbes continued to admire the Germans; a
continentalist, the German army his exemplar.' 5 Cassells,
publishers of an extensive list including popular bio-
graphies and illustrated military histories, commissioned
him to rush out a life of Kaiser Wilhelm I, William of
16	 .Germany (1888).	 It was adulatory, praising his courage
under fire and his contribution to army reform, victories
and unification.	 Forbes praised the German army system
based on, "three great principles.. .short service, universal
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obligatory service, and territorial service"(1120), and its
speed in mobilising huge armies.	 Danish and later French
courage were insufficient against German military power, and
to the Prussian army, "the use of victories was to teach it
how to win other victories"(?204).	 He emphasised the
importance of transport, of the needle-gun against the
Austrians and of artillery against the French.	 He stated
that French republicans had believed in, "the delusion that
republican institutions and untrained hordes of patriots"
(p282) could defeat the German armies. 	 He wrote conventional
campaign narrative, minimising and muting war's horrors and
emphasising its glory and achievement. 	 He emphasised the
French cavalry's failure, despite courage, against German
infantry.	 He praised Prussian conscription but, writing of
1848, noted one disadvantage: making an insurrection more
dangerous because the insurgents had military training.17
Yet he did not develop this, and believed the advantages of
conscription outweighed it.	 Like theRealpolitiker Germans
he emphasised the role of force in international relations.
Prussia gained because its rulers prepared for war, a
lesson some nations ignored, apparently believing the
millenium was near: "They would have their millenium on the
cheap - an aspiration of the folly of which time will
sternly convince them"(p163). 	 However he ignored naval
preparedness and, assessing Britain's contribution to
Napoleon's defeat, he ignored seapower - despite the Armada
tercentenary and the navalist agitation. 18 He showed his
political conservatism and hostility to radicals and mobs -
probably reinforced by the 'eighties London riots - and his
identification with William and his values, in praising
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William's suppression of the 1848-9 revolutionary movement.
He condemned the Prussian Liberals, including "the Pro-
gressists, roughly equivalent to our Radicals"(1133) for
opposing the government's military policy. 	 Unlike most
British Liberals with their moralistic attitude to inter-
national relations, he accepted uncritically Bismarck's
Realpolitik.	 His attitudes were indicated by predator and
weaponry metaphors: for example, "the wolves. . .wrangled over
the carcase" and "her sword was rusty in the scabbard".
William of Germany was derivative, superficial, lack-
ing insight on William himself, and with unsubstantiated
generalizations: not scholarship but competent journalism,
sometimes perceptive on politics and war. 	 He shared the
Prussian rulers' militaristic values and expressed his
tough-minded bellicism and rejection of the Cobdenite
millenium.	 He warned of the decisiveness of force in
international relations, the possibility of disastrous
national and military deterioration as earlier in Prussia,
and the necessity of military strength and preparedness.
He again praised the warrior virtues, but warned they were
inadequate without sufficient organization, strategy,
matriel and numerical strength. 	 He emphasised the
crucial importance of Prussian weapon superiority, but
ignored industry and finance in war, understated the
19importance of railways and, unlike Spenser Wilkinson,
almost ignored the General Staff.	 Again he functioned as
a publicist contributing to the popularisation of continent-
alism and increasing defence awareness. 	 He later praised
William in his article 'Soldiers I have known' and there
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described the Franco-Prussian War as, "the most memorable
20
and most colossal conflict of the century". 	 It continued
to dominate his military thinking.
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10.	 FICTION AND MINOR ARTICLES
In the 1860s Forbes wrote for his London Scotsman a
serial story, published in 1871 as a three-volume novel,
Drawn From Life. He used his Scottish boyhood and army
experience, and the Mutiny experience of James Hollowell
who as a private of the Ross-shire Buffs (later the Seaforth
Highlanders) had won the V.C. at Lucknow, then worked as a
commissionaire, and whom Forbes paid five shillings per
weekly two-hour interview. 1 The novel was a romantic
melodrama.	 The conventional handsome hero Hector Mac-
Donald, son of a highland laird, quarrelled with his father,
enlisted in a light dragoon regiment, served heroically in
the Mutiny, married his sweetheart and inherited the family
estate.	 It was poorly-written, verbose and with cardboard
characters.	 His hero had the warrior qualities Forbes
admired and later asserted as necessary for Briti5h fitness
for war: endurance and courage.	 Expressing dominant values
the hero was a landed gentleman and the caddish villain,
Fitzloom, a parvenu with industrial wealth. 2 Possibly
responding to the Victorian taste for vicarious 'low life',
Forbes' portrayal of army life emphasised the nastiness,
brutality and injustice, the antithesis of respectability:
brutish, foul-mouthed soldiers; corrupt, bullying tyrannical
N.C.O.s: unjust floggings, "drink and low debauchery".	 He
was limited here, as with Fitzloom, by the standards of
literary decorum. 3 He described the hardships of wives
married off the strength.	 Yet he also showed that for some
the army provided an adventurous, satisfying life. Describ-
ing the Mutiny Forbes, as in his war correspondence, was not
explicit or detailed on its horrors. 	 He emphasised the
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mutineers' evil and atrocities, the justification for British
reprisals, and the British troops' yearning for revenge:
"There has been nothing like the Indian Mutiny in modern war-
fare.	 It was not war, it was extermination". 4	He also
described British troops drunk and looting. 	 His portrayal
was sufficiently true to the British participants' perception
for Havelock to state it must have been written by a deserter
Later he condemned the inefficiency and unhelpfulness of
officials at the War Office which he called, in Dickensian
terminology, the Circumlocution Office.
Forbes portrayed the nastiness of rankers' lives and
the dangers of war, but also war's attractions: war as excit-
ing, adventurous, heroic and justified. 	 His portrayal of
the Mutiny was familiar, but his novel was exceptional
because it was about the rank and file, by one of them. 6 His
only novel, it was unsuccessful: "this poor hand-to-mouth
story which has long sunk into deserved oblivion". 7 He
omitted it from that mirror of vanity and deception, Who's
Who.	 Nevertheless in it he stated values and themes which
continued throughout his oeuvre, and he later cannibalised
it for short stories for magazines.	 Moreover it influenced
Grant of the Morning Advertiser to employ him: like Stephen
Crane and Kipling, Forbes became a war correspondent
because of his war fiction.
Responding to the demand for magazine fiction and
articles, Forbes wrote miscellaneous pieces largely on mili-
tary themes, some of which he reprinted in book form. 8	In
them he stated, sometimes hyperbolically, his opinions,
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including his contempt for London militia officers: "the
Colonel Commandant would be a soap-boiler engaged in the
active duties of his odoriferous profession. . .a militia com-
mission has always been more or less a useful item of stock-
in-trade to a man living by his wits". 9 He criticised field
days as inadequate preparation for war. 	 He criticised the
'Ring' and recent unjustified awards and promotions: "There
is a fortunate young gentleman in the service to-day (he is
in 'the ring', of course) who has three medals for as many
campaigns, the C.B., the Khedive's Octopus, and the Osmanlie,
who has been the recipient of two steps in rank by brevet,
I0
and who has never seen a shot fired in anger". 	 Again he was
not explicit and detailed on the horrors of war, and used the
conventional language of battle narrative. 	 Similar to the
popular genre of future-war fiction was one of his longest
stories,	 'Absit Omen!' about the anti-British villain
L'Estrange, a Russian agent who helped the Afghans, Boers,
Arabi and the Mandi: he, "mainly planned and conducted the
annihilation of Hicks Pasha's ill-fated army".' 1 He worked
with Oronzha, a leader of "anarchical socialism...the great
International organization which has for its aim the funda-
menta subversion of the political and social order
L'Estrange instigated a mutiny in the British army - promis-
ing soldiers, "a fine free-and-easy regime of lawlessness
and unlimited drink".' 3 However the mutiny failed and he
was killed.	 It stated Forbes' belief that bad characters
in the army could be used for subversion, and in the super-
iority of long- over short-service soldiers. He especially
criticised short-service N.C.O.s, "flashy young short-service
men, 'jumped-up non.-coms", dissipated and discontented.14
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His account of L'Estrange's role in colonial wars expressed
current racial attitudes.
Forbes wrote for the market, when popular fiction was
still dominated by Dickens: Kipling called Forbes' fiction,
"watered Dickens and water".' 5 In it were social rise and
fall, sadness and sentimentality, moral imperatives, good
and evil.	 He wrote largely from his experience of Scotland
and the pre-Cardwell army, and of the two wars which
dominated the news when he was young, the Crimea and the
Mutiny.	 As a fiction-writer he lacked creativity, insight
and literary skill, and produced largely cardboard-
charactered melodramatic potboilers.	 His portrayal of the
army continued the message of his articles and novel: the
unpleasantness and injustice of rankers' lives; the glory
and heroism of war and, implicitly, that it was justified;
the danger from treachery, and the qualities necessary for
fitness for war.	 He again asserted the traditional values
of loyalty, honour, duty and courage. 	 He reinforced British
views of the Mutiny.	 He portrayed the post-Cardwell army
as easier and inferior to the old army, and short-service
soldiers as inferior to long-service veterans. 	 A continu-
ing theme was the abuse of power in a hierarchy, and the
vulnerability of the hierarchical inferior.' 6 He showed
what few middle-class readers realised, N.C.O.s' power over
private soldiers.	 He provided a truer picture of the rank
and file than did Kipling with his quasi-officer perspective.
Forbes anticipated Kipling in portraying sympathetically
other ranks, and contributed to the increased, if still
ambivalent, late 19th century popularity of the army.
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Though he was sometimes opportunist and though he changed
his views on some issues, notably firepower, and apparently
became more conservative and concerned with internal and
external threats, nevertheless there was, through continuing
themes and values, a basic unity throughout his oeuvre. His
fiction, its credibility enhanced by his reputation as a war
correspondent, complemented and reinforced the message of his
other writings.	 Fiction, even poorly-written and implausible,
may be influential, and his fiction was significant for its
contribution to the forming and reinforcing of popular
attitudes to the army, war and defence.
He also wrote slight 'sketches' - reportage, fiction
and a mixture of both - on various subjects including London
low life, and aspects of the Empire.	 The former were
characterised by hostility to the residuum, portrayed as
repulsive and deserving poverty: a reaffirmation of widely-
held middle-class views.' 7 He did not explicitly connect
this to his concept of fitness for war, though showing those
who were unfit.	 That he did not, unlike later social-
imperialists, see poverty as undermining military strength
and so requiring reforms was probably because like most of
his generation - before Booth, Rowntree and the Boer War -
he did not realise the extent of poverty and physical unf it-
ness and assumed that if necessary Britain could raise a
physically adequate mass army.	 His articles expressed his
tough-mindedness and conservatism.	 His articles on India
further reinforced the accepted view of the Mutiny, and those
on Burma condemned Thibaw's massacres and praised British
rule.' 8 He showed the Empire providing opportunity for
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young men.' 9 His writings were implicit imperialist propa-
ganda though, unlike Steevens' later, an imperialism of
acceptance rather than assertion.	 Indicative of his
priorities, his articles on the Empire were much shorter and
inferior to those on the Franco-Prussian and Russo-Turkish
wars.
From the 1860s he wrote for popular periodicals various
short, slight, dogmatic articles on military topics, largely
repeating themes from his other writings and asserting the
qualities necessary for war.	 He wrote retrospective articles
on the wars he had reported, reinforcing the message of his
war correspondence. 	 For example, 'Soldiers I have known'
showed the qualities he valued in a commander: courage,
strategic and tactical capability, and inspirational leader-
ship. 2° His articles on colonial war emphasised British
heroism. 2 '	 He wrote, for example, of a young officer, "a
few months later, among the bloody embers of the Residency
at Cabul, he was himself to die, confronting to the last,
with the calm, cool smile on his young English face, the
fierce surge of the maddened fanatic horde" 2 It was a
classic image of imperial war, portrayed visually by Caton
Woodville and others. 	 He also wrote derivative, unschol-
arly short 'popular' historical articles, again asserting
the military virtues and presenting battle as heroic and
glorious. 23 He had excelled as a war correspondent, and
was a competent military polemicist. 	 Yet he had neither
the informed intelligent clear thinking of G.S. Clarke nor
the intuitive insight of Orwell later. 	 Forbes seldom went
beyond the reporter's habit of writing ad hoc and rushing
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copy, to scholarly thorough research. 	 His work varied much
in quality, and even potboiler journalism revealed his
attitudes and reinforced his message.	 His message
continued, in his worst work as in his best.
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11.	 CONCLUSION
After varied failure Archibald Forbes suddenly in 1870
achieved success and fame as a war correspondent, by merit:
by initiative, hard work and the quality of his product.
His war correspondence deserved its praise. 	 From 1870 to
1879 he consolidated his reputation as an outstanding war
correspondent.	 His success was made possible by the Daily
News' prosperity, to which his reports contributed, which
financed his assignments and expensive telegraphing, and it
resulted largely from his character and professional quali-
ties.	 He could socialise and gain useful contacts, respect
and affection from officers and journalists though - proud,
truculent and critical - he also made enemies. 	 His success
came from his expertise, from soldiering and military studies,
his ability to write quickly, under adverse condition, clear,
vivid and dramatic copy, and his securing - by ingenuity,
subterfuge, telegraphing and exceptional rides - its quick
despatch to London.	 His celebrity resulted also from his
courage under fire and especially his epic rides, publicised
by the press and by his lectures. 	 He fitted the age: there
was "the public craze for 'news" especially of war, and
adulation of heroic exploits.	 His success was not due to
fundamental originality. The pattern of his and other war
correspondents' careers had largely been set by Russell, who
established the concept of the war correspondent as celebrity,
himself newsworthy, and as military pundit and contro-
versialist: the public expectations from which Forbes pro-
fited.	 Forbes' methods - telegraphing and otherwise
expediting his reports - were, as he admitted, mostly not
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original, but followed American journalists. His success was
rather because he adapted, and excelled. 	 His originality
was in, more than any other British correspondent, establish-
ing the concept of the war correspondent as adventurer and
hero.
The Franco-Prussian War transformed his career, and
was apparently the decisive influence on his military think-
ing, establishing his continentalism and admiration for
German military theory and practice. 	 Success as a corres-
pondent enabled him to publish signed articles on military
subjects, further publicising himself and his opinions, and
reaching influential readers.	 He was a prolific journalist
and the quality of his work varied much. 	 His reporting and
his articles in the serious reviews were usually of high
quality, but he also produced much inferior hack work, non-
fiction and fiction.	 His achievement as a war corres-
pondent gave credibility to his articles, but his hack work
later diminished his reputation and contributed to the cool-
ness of much of the obituaries.	 He became possibly judged
too much by his pot-boiling sketches which he reprinted, and
insufficiently by the review articles which he did not reprint.
An evaluation of Forbes should consider his quali-
fications as a reporter and as a military expert and his
achievement, both intrinsically and in its results. 	 When in
1870 he began war-reporting he was unusually well qualified,
better than Russell when he went to the Crimea, or G.W.
Steevens when he went to Thessaly.	 He had experienced
soldiering though not battle, talked to combat veterans and
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read military history and theory.	 He was tough, a good rider,
and had the qualities of an effective reporter. 	 As a war
correspondent he gained acquaintance with commanders and other
officers, and observed the varied aspects of armies in the
field including weapons, transport and hospitals. 	 He
experienced battle, under fire.	 No correspondent could wit-
ness an entire war or an entire battle, and the scale of the
Franco-Prussian and Russo-Turkish wars meant that he missed
much, though he also witnessed much. 	 In smaller-scale
colonial war he saw proportionately more. 	 At Ulundi, for
example, standing on a wagon he could see most of the battle.
He undoubtedly did experience battle, as was abundantly
corroborated including by mention in despatches: had he
falsely claimed experience his rivals and enemies would have
exposed him, as later correspondents exposed Lieutenant
Wagner of the Reichpost.	 Though he was criticised as self-
advertising, arrogant and bad-tempered, no-one impugned
Forbes' battle experience, or his courage.
Was he more than a reporter? Was his implicit claim
that was a military expert, justified? He had served in the
ranks and he read British and continental military history
and theory.	 He knew the British, German and Russian armies
and, less well, the French, Spanish and Turkish. He had
extensive varied war experience: great-power and colonial;
all-arms battles, siege and trench warfare, dressing stations
and field hospitals.	 However - like the contemporary miii-
tary publicists Dilke, Arnold-Forster - he was not officer
or staff trained and had not commanded troops in battle.
Though brave and risking death in battle, experiencing much
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greater danger than line-of-communication and service troops,
his own experience of battle differed in kind from that of
front-line combatant soldiers. 2 As a correspondent he had
options denied them and significantly less risk of death or
wounding.	 Correspondents were not in the most dangerous
positions, for example with infantry attacking trenches, but
watched from a distance.	 If danger increased a correspondent,
unlike a soldier, could decide to leave; he was paid to report
not to die.	 He could weigh the odds and choose the danger
he faced.	 Occasionally correspondents made themselves con-
spicuous and drew enemy fire - like St. Leger Herbert of the
Morning Post, shot in his red jacket at Abu Kru in 1885, or
Steevens with his white pony at Elandslaagte - but Forbes did
not.	 Possibly with a regular's distaste for "tinker's mufti"
he did not affect the military style of Villiers or R.H. Davis,
but dressed as a Scottish gentleman travelling abroad, in
homespun tweed and tam-o'-shanter and so was inconspicuous
relative to soldiers and especially officers. Experience
alone does not bring expertise: like Frederick the Great's
pack mule a much-experienced person may remain ignorant.
The military expert, the analyst and commentator, needed more
than knowledge and experience.	 He needed receptivity and
ability to learn from evaluate data and experience; judgment,
proportion and informed imaginative insight, ability to see
the wood for the trees, to select priorities and goals, to
perceive and concentrate on essentials, to see specific
problems in the context of their whole. 	 Forbes had know-
ledge and experience: did he have these further qualities?
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Forbes achieved success and fame by his qualities as a
war correspondent, including his ability to obtain information
and to write clearly, vividly and dramatically, his willing-
ness to criticise where he believed it necessary, and his
relatively high degree of honesty and objectivity. 	 As a
military commentator he had the qualities of his war corres-
pondence. He was experienced, mature, had long studied his
subject and continued to read on it, and so was able to make
comparisons and draw data from military history and from
earlier campaigns he had witnessed. 	 While he admired great
commanders, he refused to kowtow to rank or official status
and was sufficiently independent-minded and undeferential to
criticise a viceroy, senior officers such as Chelmsford and
Wolseley, officials in Britain and India, and official or
quasi-official publications including the official history of
the Sudan campaign and the Army Book of the British Empire.
He had moral values, a heritage of the manse, by which to
judge, even if sometimes his judgments distorted his view of
his subject.	 He was willing, despite his loyalties and
preferences, to state the faults of those with whom he iden-
tified: for example, Russian faults in the Russo-Turkish War,
and British soldiers' pillaging in former wars. He was not
always consistent, and some of his opinions fluctuated over
time: for example on flogging, Wolseley, firepower, cavalry
and the British authorities' awarding of honours.
A continuing problem for a journalist reporting
defence and war is obtaining secret "inside information" and
concealing his sources. 	 For Forbes this was a minimal pro-
blem.	 He established good relations with officers and did
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not prematurely reveal information and jeopardise his military
hosts' goodwill.	 He reported wars in which officers wanted
a favourable press and did not consider him a security risk.
In the Franco-Prussian and Russo-Turkish wars senior officers
gave him information.	 In the colonial campaigns he reported
there was little need for secrecy or for journalists to obtain
inside information.	 He received information from officers
but though this facilitated his reporting it was not crucial.
By chance he was never in war in a position - like that of
Charles Williams on the Gordon Relief Expedition - of obtain-
ing from soldiers crucial controversial confidential infor-
mation.	 Though he criticised Russian faults they accepted
this, possibly partly because information harmful to one
group within the army could be used by a rival group. 	 When
he criticised Chelmsford, it was not from secret information.
Forbes' one Russellian muck-raking success was his revelation
of the situation in Cyprus.	 There he used information from
military personnel but it was so widely known on Cyprus as to
be no secret and not require concealment of sources.	 Forbes
was selective in his criticism: for example, he did not
criticise the faults of the force he accompanied in the
Afghan War.
Forbes' achievement resulted from his qualities, but
he also had faults and limitations which became more apparent
in his articles than in his war correspondence, and which
flawed some of his work. 	 In part his faults derived from
his qualities as a journalist, and from his own character.
Though he studied military history and theory he never
acquired the scholar's attitude: the thoroughness, the
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willingness to take time over research and to take into
account other versions and interpretations even if they did
not agree with his own. 	 He had a high opinion of his own
views, which tended to his disregarding others' inconvenient
views.	 Like Carlyle he had the Victorian fault of opinion-
ating dogmatically from inadequate data. 	 He tended to super-
ficiality, insufficiently questioned, investigated and
analysed, and sometimes exaggerated and distorted. 	 He
ignored data that did not fit his case and usually did not
name his sources or others who had contributed to the parti-
cular controversy.	 Occasionally he apparently wrote for
effect rather than from conviction. 	 Nevertheless his writ-
ing was usually competent journalism and his comment often
valid and prescient, but he lacked the insight and origin-
ality of a great writer. 	 His work as a military commentator
lacked the quality of that of G.S. Clarke or Spenser Wilkinson.
Lacking the advantages of high-placed friends, influence,
social status or official position, Forbes was a proud self-
made man who achieved eminence by merit. 	 A repeated theme
of his writings and lectures was self-advertisement: insist-
ence on his achievement, experience and expertise. 	 He was
proud to be a correspondent and repeatedly defended corres-
pondents against their critics.	 He asserted their hard-
ships, dangers and achievements and claimed that they bene-
fitted the army and the country.	 They caused reforms, and
provided information from which officers could learn.
Forbes knew war, battle and the wounded. 	 He had
studied military history and theory and talked to veterans
of varied wars.	 Always proud of his service as a private
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soldier, he never saw war exclusively from the commander's or
officer's viewpoint, praised commanders who tried to prevent
unnecessary casualties and condemned those who unnecessarily
sacrificed their men.	 He took a narrow, un-Clausewitzian
view of war, usually restricting himself to its conduct, not
its causes, aims and politics.	 His view of war was apparent-
ly essentially formed by the Franco-Prussian War, the war on
which he wrote most and which he most often cited. 	 It
established his continentalism, to which he continued to
adhere though in later years continentalism waned among
officers and other military commentators. 	 The Prussian army
remained his exemplar and great-power war his standard. His
continentalism limited him as a military commentator. Though
proud of his personal independence he was intellectually too
dependent on, and uncritical of, German orthodoxy: in his
later years to the exclusion of his own experience of the
Russo-Turkish War.	 Though he had reported the Carlist
war and colonial campaigns, he relatively seldom cited them,
and he dismissed colonial war as irrelevant to great-power
war.	 He praised the warrior virtues of heroism, courage
and discipline, and condemned cowardice. 	 He claimed that
with leadership, discipline and group-cohesion, even the
cowardly could function effectively in battle. 	 He
emphasised the importance of morale, of "fire-discipline"
and of acceptance of casualties.	 Though he wrote the con-
ventional language of campaign narrative and was not speci-
fic or detailed on such subjects as wounds, showed war as
horror, suffering and destruction, yet this did not dominate
his writing on war.	 His writing on war complemented and
reinforced, not contradicted, the images of the special
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artists and the studio-based battle painters: the symbiotic
relationship between war writer and artist was epitomised in
his relationship with Villiers.	 He tough-mindedly accepted
the evils of war and the necessity for soldiers to overcome
them, by the warrior qualities he so admired, in order to win
victory.	 His was a traditional view which accepted war -
though he condemned some particular wars, notably the Afghan
wars, as unnecessary and wasteful - and that war was nasty.
War was a test which those with superior military qualities
won. However though they might also be morally superior, as
the Germans over the French, this was not necessarily so, for
he believed the Russians morally superior but inferior as
soldiers to the barbarian Turks.	 He was tough-minded on the
nature of war but also sentimental on its human cost: the
effect of a soldier's death on his sweetheart, family and
friends.	 He considered the qualities of a great commander:
strategic ability, leadership, courage, concern for his men's
lives, study and knowledge of military history and theory,
and what he termed innate genius for war.
He considered some of the military controversies of
his day, and his views on them shifted over time, within the
parameters of his continentalism. During and after the
Franco-Prussian War he emphasised morale as against matriel.
Then impressed by the Russo-Turkish War and especially the
defence of Plevna, he argued the dominance of firepower,
especially entrenched firepower, and the ineffectiveness of
infantry assault and cavalry charge against it. 	 Later,
agreeing with continental orthodoxy, his opinion again shifted
and he emphasised morale and the possibility of successful
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infantry and cavalry attacks. 	 His 'Warfare of the Future',
emphasising firepower and the futility of assault, was excep-
tional though, lacking a time-scale, possibly not inconsistent.
In his defence thinking a man of the 'sixties and 'seventies,
influenced by his continentalism he ignored the navy and sea-
power.
Forbes was primarily a reporter of war, and largely
of his own impressions and experiences of it - he noted that
correspondents tended to undervalue what they had not wit-
nessed - and this apparently flawed him as a military analyst
and commentator. The core of war news was battle, and he saw
war primarily as battle.	 He realised other factors, such as
mobilization were important but, despite his father-in-law,
tended to understate them. He expressed minimal awareness
of the role in defence and war of finance and industry: for
example, of the extent to which German industrial development
contributed to victory in 1870.	 Like his contemporary
Dickens and unlike some of the younger late Victorian writers -
Kipling, Wells and Steevens - Forbes was not thrilled by
machinery and technology.	 He accepted and used railways, as
he did telegraphs, but, a countryman and cavalryman, was more
interested in horses.	 He portrayed war as drama, especially
the drama of battle and - unlike Steevens with the Sudan
Military Railway - saw no drama in railways.	 He understated
the role in war of transport and communications. 	 Despite
his extensive reading and his awareness of the variety of
factors affecting war, he was too limited by his own exper-
ience to see war as a whole, in proportion. 	 He was a
reporter of battle rather than an analyst of the totality of
war.
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Forbes' view of the army was shaped by three factors:
his own experience, his continentalism and his increasing
conservatism and pessimism. 	 His early articles, written
during and shorty after his own service, concentrated on the
faults and disadvantages of the conditions of rankers and
their families and implicitly favoured reform. 	 His conti-
nentalism caused him to evaluate the British army by the
standard of continental armies and especially his exemplar,
the German army. 	 He alleged the inadequacy of the British
army for great-power war and the insufficient quality of
recruits.	 The present soldiers were inferior to those of
the old long-service army, and their soft treatment contri-
buted to their inadequacy.	 He did not generalise about the
quality of British officers but condemned the failings of
specific commanders. Usually unconcerned with details of
matriel, he favoured practical inconspicuous uniforms and
equipment as taking less of soldiers' time and more effect-
ive for battle. He stated that the British army was not
truly voluntary since recruits were compelled by poverty.
He favoured conscription but did not overtly advocate it,
presumably because of his connection with the Daily News
and because he believed it politically unacceptable. 	 He
condemned existing short service and advocated a dual army
with separate home and imperial forces. 	 He criticised
British unit favouritism, notably by Wolseley, but himself
especially praised his compatriots, the highlanders.
Though identified with no group in the army, his views
agreed in part with those of the traditionalists and in
part with those of Roberts and his followers. 	 Though he
worked for a reform-minded paper, he himself did not usually
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advocate reforms.	 He offered criticism and diagnosis rather
than proposals.
As a correspondent Forbes worked for the leading Glad-
stonian paper and he continued friendly with its fervently
Gladstonian general manager, J.R. Robinson.	 Later he wrote
for periodicals of varying politics, including the Conserva-
tive Blackwoods. 	 He asserted his independence of politics
and that as a correspondent he was unconcerned with political
factors, only with military. 	 Critics alleged in the con-
troversy following the failure of the Nile Expedition, that
he was the apologist of the Liberal ministers. 	 During his
years as a correspondent he tended to favour the Liberals,
though he was sufficiently independent-minded to oppose
party orthodoxy on occasion, for example by his criticism of
Bulgarians.	 In his later years his published views became
more pessimistic, critical of politicians, concerned with
deterioration, internal and external threats, and more
similar to those of the imperialist 'new' Right. 	 Although
he reported colonial wars, Indian famine and the Prince of
Wales' visit to India, in his articles - possibly because
of his continentalism or the influence of Daily News Little
Englandism - he wrote relatively little on the Empire.	 He
accepted British superiority and the Empire without the
necessity to argue or assert it.	 He condemned the faults
of native rulers and peoples - the misgovernment, oppress-
ion and atrocities of Indian mutineers, Taiping rebels,
Turks and Mandists - and by implied contrast justified
British rule.	 Unlike G.W. Steevens later, he was not
overtly a propagandist of empire. 	 His was a mid-Victorian
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imperialism of acceptance rather than assertion. 	 Not
imperialism but fitness for war was Forbes' message to his
compatriots.
From 1870 onwards, through his varied writings, Forbes
stated a message for his compatriots. 	 As a young man he
lived through the period of two wars which much impressed
the British public, the Crimea and the Mutiny. 	 The Mutiny
was the first war he studied and wrote about. 	 It differed
from most 19th century colonial wars in that the British did
not have a decisive weapon superiority. 	 They believed they
won by heroism, and Forbes shared this belief. 	 The Franco-
Prussian War, the first he experienced and reported, set the
pattern of his military thinking and his message. 	 It showed
him heroism was not enough.	 Both sides had heroism, but the
Germans had in addition a complex of qualities, an overall
fitness for war, which won them victory. 	 Forbes' message
thenceforth, implicit through his military writings, was the
necessity of Britain having such fitness for war. 3 Like
Chesney's Battle of Dorking his military thinking was funda-
mentally a response to the Franco-Prussian War.	 In later
years with further change and experience his emphases
shifted, but his basic message remained constant. 	 His
message was fitness for war and his criteria were great-
power war and the German army.	 Indicative of his lack of
systematic military thinking, he did not In his writings,
unlike Wilkinson and Dilke, question the role and priorities
of the British army.	 His own experience primarily of "real
war", great-power war, he assumed it as the army's ultimate
purpose.	 His message was not apparent in his earliest
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'Dragoon' writings but gradually, as he shed their blinkers
of barrack immediacy, emerged through his war correspondence,
articles, sketches, fiction and biographies, through warning
and exemplars, specific instances and generalizations. 	 He
stated his premises in one of his later books, William of
Germany when he stated that the Prussians won because they
lived ready for war, with an "attitude of preparedness".
His message derived from Scottish puritanism, traditional
warrior virtues, Prussian qualities and the lessons of
military history and experience. 	 War fitness resulted from
certain attitudes and values, and was essential for victory
in war.
War fitness was a complex of interrelated qualities.
They were necessary because of the possibility of war, which
he assumed, and the nature of battle, which he described and
evaluated.	 Battle was horrific, imposing great stress on
combatants, and future battles would be worse, with immense
casualties.	 Such casualties were necessary for victory.
Yet the natural tendency of men in battle was to be cowardly
and flee, and even brave soldiers became reluctant to attack
after repeated casualties and failures. 	 So war fitness
included the qualities necessary for battle: "fire-discipline",
courage, endurance, loyalty and willingness to accept
casualties - the qualities of Prussian "formidability".
They should be strengthened through esprit de corps and unit-
cohesion - which he believed more important than individual
heroism - training, leadership, example, and being "blooded"
in battle.	 War fitness was largely not inherent, but had
to be created and maintained. 	 Yet battle qualities, though
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crucial, were by themselves insufficient, as recent wars
showed.	 Danes, French, Russians and Zulus all fought bravely,
accepting heavy casualties, but lost.	 War fitness included
intelligence and thought in preparation for war: planning,
organization, mobilisation, matriel and medical facilities.
Though Forbes fluctuated in his assessments of firepower and
infantry and cavalry assaults, he continued to assert weapons
as a key determinant sometimes, though not always, decisive
in battle.	 Battle performance was largely determined by
the combatants' basic physical, intellectual and moral quali-
ties, so far fitness included health, physique, education,
sobriety, initiative, responsibility, patriotism and "martial
ardour" - qualities he perceived in the Prussians. 	 Converse-
ly, moral and intellectual failings harmed war fitness:
corruption, inefficiency, insufficient education and pro-
fessionalism, vice, drunkenness degeneracy and treachery.
Traitors - a recurring theme of his fiction - and a subver-
sive "unsafe element" also harmed war fitness. 	 Such faults
largely caused French and Russian military failures. 	 War
fitness included ability to resist the reductions and sub-
versions of peace, as well as the stress of war, and should
permeate the nation since the army was its product. Defence
was a national duty which the British, unlike the Germans,
neglected.	 Numbers were crucial in great-power war, and
for full war fitness Britain required conscription.
Untrained levies, however patriotic and brave, were inade-
quate.	 Forbes' war fitness, though having much in common
with the conventional desiderata of the defence-minded,
differed from them in its emphases and its totality. Though
it shared values with militarism, it was not militarism, but
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a tough-minded bellicism, an intelligent, motivated, prepared
toughness.	 His message was largely muted and implicit
because he worked for a Gladstonian paper, because he
believed that to state it more strongly could be unaccept-
able and counterproductive, and because of his time-scale:
writing from the 'seventies to the mid 'nineties he did not
see an immediate danger, but a longer term necessity for
adequate defence.	 For later writers, such as G.W. Steevens,
there would be greater urgency.
Was Forbes a scholar to be taken seriously, or a light-
weight polemicist? He was neither. He was an experienced,
informed competent war correspondent with exaggerated pre-
tensious of military expertise.	 He was not a scholar
because, despite extensive reading, he was insufficiently
thorough and accurate, took Insufficient cognizance of
others' contributions, and used too narrow a data-base for
his generalizations.	 While lacking Duke's ponderous Grad-
grindery, he also lacked the Informed insight of such mili-
tary analysts as G.S. Clarke or Spenser Wilkinson, and was
never a great military thinker.	 He was not just a pole-
micist: most of his work was not polemical. 	 Polemic, how-
ever, is often significant.	 It is usually about important
Issues, draws public attention and, to be effective, requires
construction of a strong case and presentation in vivid
language.	 While polemic was only a small minority of his
writing, Forbes was an effective polemicist. 	 Was he
lightweight? Evaluation is not easy: criteria are largely
arbitrary and subjective. 	 Much of his later journalism,
miscellaneous reportage and sketches, were very lightweight,
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though even lightweight journalism may be significant in
revealing the journalist's attitudes and in projecting or
reinforcing a message.	 His controversial military articles
were journalism, shorter and less thorough than their sub-
jects required, and of a lower standard than those of G.S.
Clarke or Spenser Wilkinson.	 Nevertheless, within those
limitations, they were informed, competent and argued a
reasonable and sometimes excellent case: not great, but more
than lightweight. 	 Was Forbes lightweight in his impact?
Reporting, like generaliship, is partly luck. 	 He never had
the opportunity and influenced opinion and policy as did
Russell with the Crimea or MacGahan with the Bulgarian
atrocities.	 Nevertheless he did influence his
contemporaries.
As a leading war correspondent, writing for a popular
paper, and whose reports were extensively reprinted in other
papers, and as a writer, whose experience gave credibility,
in the respected and influential reviews, Forbes - although
his reputation was diminished by the hack-work of his later
years - helped shape attitudes towards war, defence, the
army and specific military controversies, and influenced
towards his ideal of war fitness.	 Contemporaries' estim-
ation of his importance was indicated by the replies to his
controversial articles, his writing for the prestigious
Blackwoods and contemporary comment on him. He contributed
to increased awareness and concern at the conditions of the
rank and file and their families, the inadequacies of the
existing short-service army, and the faults of commanders
on specific controversial compaigns. 	 Villiers claimed that
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Forbes' publicising meritorious officers, notably Wolseley
and Stewart, contributed to their fame and success: this was
probable, though perhaps to a lesser extent than Villiers
suggested. 4 As well as contributing to and exploiting the
increased public concern and awareness of the army and
defence, he reinforced traditional values: pride in the army
and the traditional warrior virtues of discipline, courage
and heroism.	 He was also the most widely-read publicist
and populariser of continentalist military opinion. 	 He
probably increased recruiting, and contributed to the
decline of Wolseley's reputation.	 For over twenty years
he informed and influenced the Victorian public, though the
extent of his influence can only be conjectured.
11. CONCLUSION: NOTES
1. Wolseley, Pocket-Book 225.
2. On combatants' battle experience v Keegan, Ellis,
Holmes; Ronald Lewin's review of Keegan, Times
(17 June 1976) 16.
3. The section on war fitness is a conjectural inter-
pretation of Forbes' writings.





1. EDUCATION & EARLY JOURNALISM
Although popular interest in war was then probably at
its zenith and war correspondents continued to be much
admired, no war correspondent of the late 19th century
achievedthe pre-emirienceof Russell or Forbes. 	 For a few
years, from 1896 to 1900 probably the best-known and most
eulogised, and possibly most influential journalist, was
George Warrington Steevens (1869-1900),who was intermit-
tently a war correspondent, and sometimes wrote on defence.
According to A.E. Douglas-Smith, "Before the First World
War, he was usually considered the greatest of all war-
correspondents and even since then has been described as
'in some ways the greatest of all journalists")	 He
wrote for the largest-circulation daily newspaper,
Harmsworth's Daily Mail, and through his articles in the
reviews and his books he reached a readership that includ-
ed politicians and other decision-makers. 	 Lionel Abrahams
wrote that he had, "endeared himself to hundreds of thou-
sands of newspaper readers," 2 and the Spectator obituary
that, "no journalist, indeed no writer of recent times,
had a wider or more varied circle of readers". 3 His
writings were significant, though unquantifiable, factors
In the formation of the public's attitudes to defence and
Image of war.
Steeven's career was continued success, earned by
merit. 4 From "good, sound, middle-class stock", and a
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"well-known nonconformist family" 5 he was born in 1869 in
Sydenham and raised in Clapham, and attended private school!
He later claimed his boyish ambition was to be a greengrocer,
but he won a scholarship to the City of London School: one
of his obituaries claimed, "His career was an object-lesson
in the usefulness of those educational endowments which link
the humblest with the highest seats of learning in the
country.	 If he had not been able to win scholarships he
would have had to begin life as a clerk in a bank or a house
of business". 7 The City of London School, under the head-
mastership of Dr Abbott and from 1883 in its new Embankment
building, was one of the best schools in London: middle-
class, meritocratic and progressive, and with impressive
successes at the ancient universities. 	 Steevens was there
from 1882 to 1888 and distinguished himself in the classics,
Sanscrit, games, fencing, debating and acting, and edited
the school magazine.	 The senior boys were much interested
in politics and In the early 'eighties GladstonIanism was
strong among them. 8	In the school 'Parliament' 9 Steevens
was a leading Radical and became Prime Minister: he advo-
cated Home Rule, disestablishment and women's suffrage.
He Immensely Impressed his contemporaries and won a
succession of distinctions culminating in the captaincy
of the school and following Asquith earlier, a scholarship
to Balliol, then under Jowett at the height of Its Victorian
pre-eminence.	 At Oxford he so continued his success that
he was called 'the Balliol prodigy": firsts in Mods and Greats,
proxime accessit for the Hertford Prize and, at the same time,
a London B.A. with "first place1' and "highest honours" then,
despite starting the examination paper half an hour
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after his rivals, a fellowship at Pembroke. 	 The Spectator
later commented, "Mr. Steevens's academic achievements
fairly entitled him to be considered a prodigy, - the list
of his honours and medals, scholarships and classes, is
10
enough to take one's breath away." 	 He was also active
in undergraduate societies, journalism and the exclusive
undergraduate Liberal political club, the Russell Club,
where he was secretary and regarded as "a great man".
According to Lionel Abrahams, his friend at C.L.S. and
Balliol, he had, "a complete, almost a fiery, sympathy
with democratic principles"." At Pembroke he was, Henley
wrote, "a rather gloomy and socialistic junior don". 12 He
was befriended by Oscar Browning, always eager to help
attractive young talent. 	 Browning, politically radical,
"though with a strong tinge of imperialism", in 1892 con-
tested Worcestershire East against the dominant Chamberlain
interest, and Steevens helped his campaign, acting as his
secretary and editing an electioneering paper.'3
From the 1860s the press expanded, journalists' pay
and status improved, and more Oxford and Cambridge graduates
entered journalism.' 4	Jowett encouraged this and, as
Steevens' Balliol contemporary J.H. Millar wrote in 1897,
"a little army of Oxford men has within the last fifteen
years invaded the realm of London journalism".' 5 Steevens
considered an academic career as a historian but decided
instead on journalism.	 Helped by Oscar Browning, in 1893
he began his journalistic career by briefly editing a
weekly paper for undergraduates, the Cambridge Observer
which, "treated football matches with indifference, and
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16therefore.. .achieved no popularity in the University".
Befriended by Henley, imperialist, anti-decadent and also
eager to help young talent, he wrote for the National
Observer, where he became acquainted with H.G. Wells.17
Again helped by Browning, later in 1893 he obtained employ-
ment on the Pall Mall Gazette. 	 He wrote intermittently
for Henley's New Review, its sales declining despite Wells'
fiction, and also contributed to Blackwood's, M'Clure's and
Harper's.	 As a young journalist he came into "an atmos-
phere of sound toryism" and his political attitudes
apparently shifted to the right, though they were not
18
explicit and were to be disputed after his death. 	 Through
Henley he met a widow "many years his senior", Christina
Rogerson.	 An old friend and allegedly former mistress of
Duke, she had been involved in the Crawford divorce case
and possibly had instigated Mrs. Crawford's allegations in
order to ruin Dilke) 9 She was an unusual choice for so
eligible and so young a bachelor as Steevens. 	 They married
in 1894 and settled in suburban Merton.
The Pall Mall Gazette, Steevens' first experience of
daily journalism, was in the 'nineties pre-eminent among
the many London evening papers. 2° Following its 'eighties
crusading sensationalism under Stead, from 1892 it was again
Conservative, owned by the American millionaire W.W. Astor
and edited by Harry Cust, Conservative M.P. "of legendary
charms". 21 Valued as a humorist, Steevens wrote "the
funny paragraphs" and also articles on foreign policy. 	 In
1895 Cust and Astor quarrelled over editorial policy and
the Venezuelan dispute, Cust patriotically opposing
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Cleveland's intervention. 22	In December Cust and principal
members of his staff, including Steevens, resigned.
Abrahams wrote that Steevens' resignation was "dictated by
a high sense of professional honour" and resulted in a
period of small and precarious earnings.23
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Influenced by the ascendant navalism and advised by
Duke whom he first met in 1894, Steevens wrote articles
on naval defence, and used the time after his resignation
from the Pall Mall Gazette to compile from them his first
book on contemporary issues, Naval Policy (1896), apparent-
ly the only book he researched: a competent if largely
unoriginal statement of navalist orthodoxy citing Colomb,
Wilkinson and other navalists, which he admitted was
"borrowings" and collation.' He claimed that Britain and
the Empire, isolated and almost friendless, depended on
naval supremacy and command of the sea. 	 Italy was a fee-
ble friend and Japan a possible ally, 2 and Britain would
have to rely on her own naval strength; her weakness
invited foreign aggression. 	 He asserted battleship pri-
macy and the importance of coal in war. He praised
British naval personnel, criticised politicians, and
asserted the importance of the economy and of public
opinion in defence, "if only public opinion speaks loud
enough"(2O4).	 He opposed abandoning the Mediterranean,
and demanded a naval staff and the scrapping of obsolete
vessels.	 He warned against foreign hostility, naval
threat - from France, Russia, Germany and the United
States - and possible surprise attack without declaration
of war. 3 He warned that British naval strength was
inadequate for war, and demanded a stronger navy. 	 His
message was essentially that of his fellow navalists and
the recently established Navy League, and of the imperial-
ists of the 'new' Right, and underlying his navalism was
his social darwinism.
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Naval Policy largely lacked any exceptional insight
or prescience.	 He underestimated torpedo and submarine
potential and ignored aircraft. 4 Advocating battleships
having more and lighter guns, he underestimated the
potential decisiveness of heavy guns and long-range gun-
fire. 5 Though prescient on United States naval potential,
he underrated that of Germany, Russian and Japan. However,
like Hozier and later Mackinder, Amery, Garvin and other
tariff reformers, he saw the crucial long-term intercon-
nection of economic and naval strength. 6 He considered
the major naval controversies, usually accepting the
majority opinion.	 In ignoring convoys he accepted
Admiralty policy, unlike some officers and navalists,
including Dilke, Wilkinson and G.S. Clarke: 7 Steevens was
too prone to accept, unquestioning, orthodox opinion. 	 On
ships against fortification he stated what was, following
Clarke's Alexandria report and his magnum opus Fortification,
the received opinion. 8	Gibraltar and the Mediterranean
were controversial navalist issues, with W.L. Clowes advo-
cating withdrawal from both. 9 His Gibraltar proposal was
attacked by Clarke and rejected by most navalists.'° Most
supported efforts, notably by Arnold-Forster,to improve
the defences of Gibraltar.' 1 On wartime withdrawal from
the Mediterranean navalists were more divided, and again
Steevens agreed with the majority. 	 Navalists agreed that
obsolete vessels should be modernised or scrapped, but
Steevens was exceptionally emphatic, especially on their
risking vital naval manpower: views shared by Fisher and
12
underlying his later policy.	 On the naval staff
Steevens agreed with Wilkinson and the initial policy of
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13the Navy League.	 His contemptuous hostility to poii-
ticians was widely shared by navalists and other defence
publicists and reformers and by many serving officers
including Wolseley and culminated in the denigration of
Lansdowne during the Boer War. 14	It was characteristic
of the late 19th and early 20th century 'new' Right, whose
views Steevens largely held. 15 The efficacy of public
opinion in influencing government naval policy was a
repeated navalist theme and justification for navalist
propaganda and for the Navy League and later the Imperial
Maritime League. 16	H.W. Wilson, Steevens' Daily Mail
colleague, was exceptional when in his Ironclads in
Action - citing the Captain built, he alleged, despite
Admiralty opposition, because of press and public
pressure - he suggested that public opinion might harm
17the navy.
Navy Policy was exceptional among Steevens' works.
Competently researched and cogently argued, it showed his
capability with a major subject and, unlike his later works,
was not based on his chief journalistic asset, vivid des-
criptive writing.	 It also indicated his continuing limit-
ations: a tendency to accept rather than Innovate, question
and investigate.	 To what extent this resulted from his
character, school and Oxford training, or journalistic
desiderata, is conjectural. 	 As academic success and con-
temporaries attested, he was intelligent and able: but his
was, apparently an orthodoxy-restating brightness, lack-
ing originality and imagination.
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He continued his navalist message with his anonymous
article, 'A Naval Utopia' in the June 1896 Blackwood's)8
He argued that the French admiral Fournier's proposed
cruiser fleet could not defeat Britain, and reasserted
battleship supremacy and command of the sea. 	 Guerre de
course would fail against Britain if the British had ade-
quate morale to endure increased food prices, and shortages.
Differing from his Naval Policy he advocated convoys, and
he claimed the British could eliminate commerce raiders
partly by depriving them of bases and supplies. 	 His
article, again citing Colomb and Wilkinson, was largely
orthodox navalism and orthodox laissez-faire; arguably too
accepting on the food issue.	 As elsewhere he presented
morale, a form of toughness for the struggle, as crucial.
Basically an unimaginative writer his forte was description
and, unlike Wells, not what might what might be. 	 He was
vividly prosaic.	 He again failed to consider weapon
development, and submarines and aircraft threatening
battleship supremacy and British naval supremacy.	 He
again insufficiently considered guerre de course and
failed to consider the argument that it had never been
attempted against a state as vulnerable to it as had
become Britain.' 9 Following government and Admiralty
orthodoxy, he ignored possible government intervention on
food supply. The Venezuela and Kruger telegram crises
renewed concern for wartime food supply, with warnings,
"many alarmist articles", 20 and demands for government
stockpiling.	 The demands, resisted by the Admiralty,
government and many navalists, aroused controversy.2'
Steevens ignored this, confident in the Navy and that
304
British fortitude would suffice to endure "a dear loaf" and
shortage.	 In his writings he showed little concern for
the lower classes, 22 He did not consider the effects on
them of increased food prices and minimised the possible
results - suffering, famine, unrest and insurrection - of
even temporary diminution of food imports, despite such
warnings as Yerburgh's and H.W. Wilson's: Wilson warned
that, "an empty belly knows not patriotism". 23 He failed
to envisage the possible human disaster, unlike two later
sensational works of future war fiction published in 1898,
H.W. Wilson's and Arnold White's When War Breaks Out and
Charles Gleig's When All Men Starve. 24	Steevens' brief
dismissal, in his article as in his book, of the food
issue, showed that despite his ability he was sometimes
too accepting of official orthodoxy and too unwilling to
consider dissenting proposals; and his lack of imagination,
speculative thinking, and sympathy.
In his anonymous review article in the March 1897
Blackwood's25 he again asserted the navalist orthodoxy of
naval primacy in imperial defence and of command of the
sea, warning that the "only barrier between the empire
and its ruin was its Navy"(,.410). 	 He criticised the
Admiralty for insufficient reform, and British diplomacy
for weakness, and claimed that recent naval increases
resulted from public pressure.	 He praised the works of
navalists including Philip Colomb, Mahan, Thursfield and
Clarke: another example of navalists reinforcing each
other. 26 He also favourably reviewed Naval Policy,
indicating his view of his own work.	 He stated Steevens
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was the least expert of those reviewed, his work was
popularization and as such would probably succeed: candid,
clear and well-written, "with ease and point, sometimes
with humour.	 He is able to make his subject interesting"
çpl44).	 However, arguably this flawed his work as he
relied too much on style and insufficiently on research.
His April 1897 Blackwood's article 'The Navy Estimates'
criticised Goschen and the Admiralty for lacking a definite
naval policy based on possible enemy strength including
increased Russian naval power. 27 British naval strength
was inadequate with too few cruisers or seamen: the govern-
ment was neglecting imperial defence. 	 His message was
again that of the Navy League and other navalists, and
his criticism of the Unionist government showed his
alignment with the 'new' Right, not with the Tadpoles
and Tapers of party politics. 	 All his naval writings,
if basically unoriginal and flawed by omission, were
knowledgeable, well-written and persuasive, and reinforced
existing navalism. 	 He continued navalist and his last
28despatch from Ladysmith praised the Navy.
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3.	 'DAILY MAIL' AND 'LAND OF THE DOLLAR'
In May 1896 Alfred Harmsworth, the 'young Napoleon'
of Fleet Street, launched the Daily Mail, soon an outstand-
ing success with the largest circulation of any daily news-
paper. 1	It circulated initially in London and the south of
England then extended into the provinces, gaining readers
from the largely Liberal provincial dailies and weakening
the provincial press.	 Financed largely by lucrative advert-
ing and using some of the American innovations introduced in
the 'eighties by Stead on the Pall Mall Gazette, it deliber-
ately retained the conservative external appearance, with
the first page covered by advertisements, of the model of
morning dailies, The Times.	 It was the first halfpenny
morning paper with a news service competing with those of
its higher-priced rivals, and its news was more edited into
a coherent body, and more brightly and briefly displayed.
It was lighter, livelier, more readable and trivial than
its older rivals, with less parliamentary and political
reporting, more 'Society' gossip and sales stunts. Though
radicals disapproved, 2 contemporary journalists agreed that
Harmsworth succeeded by providing what the public wanted.3
A.G. Gardiner wrote that he had, "the common mind to an
uncommon degree". 3' Norman Angell,who despite disapproval
of Harmsworth's politics worked for him, emphasised his
"genius for reaching the popular mind" and claimed that
more than any other of his generation he influenced the
public and became "an immensely powerful force in the shap-
ing of the mores and values of his time". 4 Despite
Salisbury's gibe, it was a paper of the middle classes and
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gained circulation largely from the Daily Telegraph.5
Though Harmsworth stated it was to be written for men with
or aspiring to £1,000 a year, it was largely aimed at clerks,
and expressed and exploited lower middle class attitudes and
anxieties. 6 German clerks, in the context of German hosti-
lity and commercial rivalry with Britain, became for many a
scapegoat and an obsession: the Mail emphasised the issue.
Economically insecure and struggling to maintain appearance
and status - Christina Steevens wrote of "the wretched
struggle to look and dress on a hundred and fifty pounds a
year as if they had three or four hundred" 7 - many in the
middle class felt threatened by change. 	 They responded
variously.	 A few turned to socialism and Clarion cycling.
Mr. Pooter painted the bath and hoped. 	 Most remained loyal
to their middle class identification, individualism, self-
help and respectability. 	 Following the bourgeoisie many
left the Liberals for the Unionists.	 They also responded,
as Price has noted, by jingoism and imperialism: hence,
later, clerks' leading role in Boer War demonstrations.8
The Daily Mail was from the start imperialist,
defence-minded and bellicist, devoting to imperial affairs
double the space of any other London daily. 	 In February
1896 it claimed, referring to the Sudan, that, "a little
blood letting is good for a nation that tends to excess of
luxury". 9 Harmsworth knew the popularity of description
of war, reportage and fiction, and their potential for
increasing newspaper sales. 	 Before starting the Mail he
had sensationally exploited future-war fiction: in 1894 in
Answers with Le Queux's 'The Poisoned Bullet' later
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published as The Great War in England in 1897, and in 1895
to promote his Portsmouth candidature with Clowes' 'The
Siege of Portsmouth'.	 He combined his fiction, itself
ostensibly defence propaganda, with navalist warnings of
Britain's vulnerability. 	 In its imperialism and bellicism,
as In its Germanophobia, the Mail was probably responding
to rather than "manipulating" Its readers, and reinforced
rather than initiated the widespread support for the Empire,
imperial war and defence: as Sydney Dark wrote, the Mail
'was certainly what the public wanted' 10
Among Steeven's London acquaintance, and one of those
with whom he discussed naval defence, was his wife's old
friend, Duke.	 In May 1896 Duke, having just met Harms-
worth, wrote to Steevens comparing Harmsworth to Bonaparte
and calling him "perhaps the most remarkable man I have
ever seen", and suggesting that, with the similarity of
Steevens' and Harmsworth's ideas, he might work for Harms-
worth. 11	Steevens applied and was accepted by the Mail.
Unsuccessful at leading articles, in June he was sent to
report Richmond Horse Show. Harrnsworth later wrote,
"Genius was shown in that report, and I at once saw that
here was a man of extraordinary power of observation, with
an entirely new way of recording what he had seen". 12 He
was a "cameo" writer who "took immense pains over his worktt.
Outstandingly successful in descriptive writing, he was
sent on a series of assignments in the United Kingdom and
overseas, and worked for the Mail for the restof his life.
As the Illustrated London News obituary stated, "his
qualities as a special reporter and as a describer of
current history were brought into full play, and received
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their full recognition from a public that wearied of the
old conventions".' 3 His writings for the Mail made him
famous.
From September to November 1896 he reported on the
United States and its presidential election, then from his
reports compiled The Land of the Dollar (1897), the first
of his six books of overseas reportage: a mixture of travelo-
gue, impressions and opinion.' 4
 He respected the Americans,
admired some aspects of the United States and condemned
others including political corruption, industrial violence
and, despite his social darwinism, the trusts. 	 He empha-
sised the differences from Britain and warned that McKinley's
protectionism would harm Britain. 	 Expressing imperialist
populationism, he condemned American family limitation.'5
He condemned American negroes as inferior, lazy and like
monkeys, and advocated segregation and disenfranchisement)6
He noted American fascination with war: "no nation in the
world is more fond of playing at soldiers"ç0137).	 He
suggested their bellicosity was partly because their last
war was, "not far enough off to be inconceivable, while it
is just too far for the personal recollection of its
horrors"(ib).	 This concept of knowledge of war deterring
from war he had included in his Blackwood's article on
arbitration, but he later omitted it from his war corres-
pondence, which minimised war's horrors and emphasised its
positive qualities.	 He again condemned arbitration.	 He
admitted, "I know nothing of military affairs"ç0208). 	 He
continued his message of social darwinism, navalism and
defence with warnings against United States Anglophobia,
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expansionism, bellicosity and naval potential: they might
gain world naval supremacy. 17 He wanted improved relations
but disliked the price they might demand. 	 His American
reportage set the pattern of his later work: vivid, some-
times perceptive, dogmatic, impressionistic, sometimes dis-
torted, superficial, written from relative ignorance and
inadequate research.	 His style was original but his message
largely orthodox, and acceptable to Harmsworth and Daily Mail
readers. After Steevens' death contemporaries disputed his
politics: writing on the United States he had criticised the
rich and powerful and sympathized with the exploited.
Steevens' American reporting was successful and est-
ablished his career as a Daily Mail 'star' reporter. 18 His
book was favourably reviewed, and praised by Harmsworth)9
Steevens became a friend of Harmsworth: "the schoolboy in
Alfred went out to meet the schoolboy In Steevens" and,
Christina Steevens wrote, Harmsworth forwarded any scheme
likely to benefit Steevens' career.2°
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4.	 THE GRAECO-TURKISH WAR
Before 1897 Steevens had shown no interest in armies
and land war.	 At school and Oxford he had been politically
radical with views often associated with hostility to
defence.' His school had no cadet corps and he chose not
to join the University Rifle Volunteers. Though he became
a war correspondent his predominant interest was elsewhere.
The brief Graeco-Turkish War of 1897 aroused little concern
in Britain.	 British opinion was largely philhellenic and
Turcophobe and some young liberals including F.W. Hirst and
'Norman Angell' went, as did Italian Garibaldini, to help
the Greeks.	 The press, knowing war increased sales, sent
correspondents and artists, including Villiers. 2 The
Liberal press, especially the Daily Chronicle, favoured the
Greeks.	 Harmsworth sent Steevens.	 His friends were
anxious lest his physique were too weak for the hardships
of a war correspondent but he, like Kipling, was eager for
manly experience and welcomed his opportunity.	 Unlike most
western correspondents he accompanied the Turkish army, and
from his experiences and reports wrote his Blackwood's
article 'What happened in Thessaly' and his book With the
Conquering Turk, both published in 1897.
His reporting and his book were typical of his jour-
nalism: descriptions of his own experiences and impressions;
the vivid vignettes which so impressed contemporaries; and
the polemical denunciations.	 He was partisan: Forbes had
been a more objective and better reporter. 	 Steevens iden-
tified with the Turks, alleged the British press misrepre-
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sented them, and praised their warrior qualities and good
behaviour.	 He condemned the Greeks as arrogant liars, "a
race of swaggerers and cowards"(18O), their peasant huts no
more civilised than those of Ashanti: yet, "whom nothing
apparently will deprive of Britain's sympathy as long as he
quotes Byron and lives in the land of the Alcibiades". 4 He
dismissed the Armenian massacres, refusing to, "discuss the
wrongs of Armenian usurers and Anarchists"çpllO).	 His
partisanship was indicative of his unreliability as a
reporter: such commitment tends to omission and distortion.
He described and evaluated the Turkish army, more vividly
but less informatively than Forbes had the Russian. 	 He
alleged that British correspondents, misled by their
scruffy appearance, underestimated Turkish soldiers. 	 They
were tough, enduring, disciplined and fearless, and their
organization and logistics adequate. 	 However their com-
manders were ignorant, inefficient, slow, and failed to
exploit the successes won by their men: most generals were,
"hopeless. . . insubordinate, absolutely incapable of corn-
bination"ç3O5).	 He alleged, echoing Forbes on the
Russians, "The Turks have the best soldiers and worst
officers in the wor1d"(3OO).	 They won, despite their
commanders, because of their soldiers' qualities.
As in the writings of other war correspondents there
was much on his own experience: his problems, servants,
meals, accommodation, transport, thirst, boredom and other
emotions.	 He claimed that Levantines lied and so he
determined, "to state nothing on any authority unless I had
either seen it myself or had heard it from a European who
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had seen it"Cf118).	 His description of the war was arguably
more revealing of his attitude than of the war itself, and
at the same time indicative of the attitudes of those who
continued to employ, read and praise him. 	 The wide accept-
ability of his attitudes was itself significant. 	 It was,
though he did not mention it, his first experience of war.
He was enthusiastic for war, and continued so throughout.
He described himself as "childishly happy" before battle,
and he wrote of the battle of Pharsala, "there was one very
fine bit of fighting which it was worth coming all the way
from England to see"(228). 	 He wrote of a period of bore-
dom, waiting in town for further action, "But you do not
realise the full value of battle until you get a spell of
war without it"(r2l4).	 His descriptions of battle, inferior
to Forbes', were distanced: those of an observer lacking
empathy with men in combat.	 He was vague on the sights of
battle, omitting detail and horror. 	 He once wrote that
the battle he was watching, "became a bore"(p140). 	 He
claimed that war was like "coming of age" 5 and could
improve men, writing of a Turkish officer, "War had taken
hold of that stupid, sponging, unmannerly cub, and made a
man of him"c2O7).	 While vague on the scenes of battle,
he was sometimes specific, if partially expurgating, on
the scenes of its aftermath.	 He described Greek bodies
in a blockhouse,
"heads caked in blood. . . flesh puffed and
swollen, skin yellow like wax; flies feast-
ing on the half-decomposed faces; hands
clenched, looking curiously small and smooth,
like hands at Mme Tussaud's; wounds dry, but
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dirty and gaping; one man's face torn and bashed
into a mass of squashy red, - that is enough,
once and for all, to say of the dead"(147).
His final chapter he entitled 'What War feels like'. 	 It
was not about what it felt like for the combatant, a
question he failed even to consider, but for Steevens, the
privileged, distanced and relatively safe observer. 	 He
claimed much of war was like peace, and that the horrors of
war, in contrast to one's expectations, "leave you quite
unmoved"(3O7).	 He wrote, "It was interesting to see masses
of men trying to kill one another, but not surprising; you
knew before that was what they did in war"ç.310). 	 When
seeing the dead,
"you were not even sorry. . .they only looked
like strange shapes turned out of a mould,
and you cannot weep for shapes out of a
mould.	 When a shell had ripped all the
features off a face, it was not pleasant
to look at; but there was nothing left
about it to stir compassion"(3O8).
He stated that one's attitudes changed in war, becoming
concerned with the bare essentials of food and shelter,
regardless of how obtained, a "return to the naked state of
nature"(312).	 War was attractive and enjoyable: "the only
quite complete holiday ever invented"(313).
So in his first war correspondence Steevens showed
himself biased and bellicist.	 He minimised matriel
factors and emphasised morale, claiming the Turks won
because of their superior moral qualities. 	 Preoccupied
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with his own personal response, he was insensitive and
incurious as to the combatants.	 He presented war as excit-
ing, adventurous and undistressing.	 He accepted war
unquestioning and, implicitly, saw it as a test of nations
that revealed and judged their true qualities. 6 Underlying
his writing was his unspoken assumption of social darwinism.
He was exceptionally intelligent and able, as his academic
career proved, and he was a successful writer whose style
greatly attracted his contemporaries. 	 Yet, as comparison
with Forbes indicated, he had major limitations as a war
correspondent and apparently failed to recognise them, and
relied too much on his ability as a writer, as a painter of
vivid word pictures of what he observed. 	 Yet, ignorant,
he observed less than would a knowledgeable man. 	 He was
capable of acquiring competence in a subject, as he had in
naval policy.	 But unlike Forbes he did not study warfare.
Like his less privileged contemporary H.G. Wells, Steevens
was arguably the victim of his own brilliance and an early-
acquired reputation.	 Clever but ignorant, he too often
saw only the surface.	 He did not question, nor usually
see beyond his own immediate experience. 	 War was for him
a series of happenings, sometimes boring and sometimes
exciting, that he witnessed and described. 	 He showed
little interest or awareness of the conduct of war - of
materiel, tactics and strategy - and was unconcerned with
the possible implications for future warfare of what he
witnessed.	 His book was impressionistic, skimpy in data,
and lacked systematic description of such relevant matter
as uniforms, weapon, equipment and transport which, even
if censored from his original reports, could have been
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added to the book: here he differed from Forbes. Steevens'
was a very limited form of war correspondence. 	 That it
was published, when it so contrasted with the earlier writ-
ings of Forbes, indicated the values and relative triviality
of Harmsworth's "new journalism".
Steevens' attitude to the Turkish massacre of
Armenians, which he so briefly and cavalierly dismissed,
further revealed his attitudes and message as a war corres-
pondent.	 It showed his rejection of his family's non-
conformity, and his bias and callousness. 	 Such callousness
may or may not be necessary in a war correspondent but it
affects the image he presents and excessive callousness may
cause distortion by ignoring and omitting human factors
basic in the experience of war.	 If the extent of the
7
massacres was uncertain, their reality was not. 	 Salisbury,
Gladstone and British public opinion were horrified.
Steevens knew of the massacres, yet chose to dismiss them,
contemptuously challenging British humanitarian opinion by
his book's subtitle Confessions of a Bashi-Bazouk. 	 Forbes
was from the age of Dickens; Steevens, so proud of his
modernity, from that of Nietzsche. 	 Forbes, extensively
experienced in war, was sometimes, apparently, callous and
brutal in writing on war, especially in his late articles
on the future of war.	 Yet he saw the human cost of war,
the tragedies behind the casualty statistics. 	 His report-
ing of the wounded and his sad and sentimental tales of
girls whose sweethearts died in battle, indicated a differ-
ent attitude from the callous detachment - possibly a
deliberate defensive insensitivity - of Steevens, to whom
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the dead were as waxworks and who, apparently, ignored the
bereaved.	 The contrast may in part have resulted from
individual character and experience.	 In 1897 Steevens,
unlike Forbes, had not known the death in battle of his
friends.	 It may in part have resulted from different per-
ceptions of Britain's world power position. 	 Both were
patriots and imperialists. 	 However, while Forbes' for-
mative years were the zenith of British power, Steevens'
were when it was declining and threatened. 	 The motive of
his tough-mindedness - which possibly may have been a
deliberate pose, as may have been Forbes' sentimentality -
he later stated in two articles crucial for understanding
his attitudes and message: 'The New Humanitarianism' in
1898 and 'From the New Gibbon' in 1899.	 Yet despite its
faults and inferiority to Forbes' work Steevens' work was
valued by many of his contemporaries. Harmsworth was
sufficiently pleased to again employ him as a war corres-
pondent.	 Reviewers praised his book: the St. James's
Gazette for example called it, "remarkably bright and
vivid".	 Later in his Morning Post obituary tribute
Spenser Wilkinson praised Steevens' Thessaly war corres-
pondence as, "a series of descriptions of battles which
have, perhaps, never been surpassed for the truth and
force of the impression they conveyed of what a battle
looks like".8
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5. GERMANY AND FRANCE
In 1896 the Kruger telegram aroused British fury, and
Steevens' response was typical of this. 1	His short signed
article 'The Indiscretions of the Kaiser' in Henley's New
Review denounced it as an insult by an enemy. 2 He stated
themes which he repeated through his later writing: the
assertion of British interests and the necessity of def end-
ing them, and German emnity and threat. His proposal of
the diplomatic isolation of Germany by winning over Italy
and so ending the Triple Alliance was an ill-considered
response he did not repeat. 	 Thenceforth he warned against
the German threat.
The launching of the Daily Mail coincided with popular
Germanophobia following the telegram and the 'Made in
Germany' economic anxiety.	 Harmsworth shared and, believ-
ing readers "liked a good hate", exploited this, and the
Mail warned against German militarism and aggression. 3	In
1897 It sent Steevens as a special correspondent 'Eye-
Witness' to Germany.	 He wrote sixteen articles, the first
headed 'Under the Iron Heel', emphasising the differences
between Britain and Germany, warning against the German
threat and again expressing his social darwinist view of
international relations. 4 He emphasised the domination
of Germany by the army, and warned of German economic
competition, Anglophobia and world-power ambition, and of
the possibility of Germany dominating the Netherlands and
China and of a German-led continental alliance against
Britain. 5 He warned of the German army's power and its
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ability, if landed, to conquer Britain: the British Volun-
teers were inadequate. 6 War was not inevitable but the
British should beware.	 He praised the benefits of German
conscription - improving peasants mentally and townsmen
physically - but, unlike Spenser Wilkinson, did not draw
7
specific lessons for Britain.	 Characteristically his
reporting was vivid samplings, sketches and generalizations,
sometimes perceptive but largely superficial and lacking in
data.	 In 1898 he published in Blackwood's 'German Country
Life' regretting the replacement of paternalist agrarian
society by inferior urban and industrial society. 8 He
claimed the Franco-Prussian War was an enriching experience
for the German combatants, that battle, "hardened them from
boys to made men", another expression of his bellicism.9
Like Harmsworth, Garvin, Amery and other imperialists, he
combined respect for German qualities with concern at the
German threat.'°
In the autumn of 1898 he briefly and contemptuously
reported aspects of French life for the Mail. 	 He criti-
cised the French as immoral, grasping and provincial,
divided and demoralised by the Dreyfus affair, and no
danger to Britain." Contrasting with his view of German
conscription, he noted without comment French allegations
of the harmful effects of conscription: disease, physical
ruin and anti-patriotism.' 2 Despite his philosophic
training he was not always a consistent thinker but
rather responded to specific situations and prejudices.
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The Dreyfus affair, "the biggest newspaper story
since the crucifixion",' 3 combined moral issues, militarism
and anti-semitism, with the bizarre implausibility of a
Le Queux melodrama.	 British responses combined moral con-
cern, titillation and schadenfreude.	 In the summer of 1899
Steevens reported for the Mail the retrial of Dreyfus, then
compiled his longest book, The Tragedy of Dreyfus) 4 Like
most British he believed Dreyfus not guilty, and he criti-
cised the conduct of the trial.	 He emphasised the differ-
ences between France and England, and claimed the affair
showed the rottenness of the French government and generals
and - repeating his theme of the city weakening the nation -
of Paris though not of the provinces, but that with declining
population the provinces could not indefinitely save France:
Paris would suck them dry.	 The affair weakened France,
destroying trust in its institutions. 	 Implicit was his
theme of the indivisibility of national life and the import-
ance of morale and of apparently non-military factors in a
nation's military capability, its strength for the inter-
national struggle.	 He noted the different responses to
conscription: a minority, "still smarting from the petty
brutalities of sergeants who delight to bully boys of a
better class"ç0296) hated the army, but the majority adored
it and allowed the generals excessive power. He stated
that if in England treachery were discovered in the navy
and the admirals took one side and the "little Englanders"
the other, he would trust the admirals.' 5 His Dreyfus
reporting had his usual qualities and flaws: "good copy"
but dogmatic, superficial and insufficiently researched:
the Spectator rightly criticised his book as "largely
16impressionistic".
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6.	 EGYPT AND THE SUDAN, 1898
In the winter of 1897 to '98 Steevens reported on
Egypt, then compiled Egypt in 1898.1 	 He praised the British
working there: "Our record is one which any other nation
would be proud of, which no other nation could achieve"(195).
However he criticised British businessmen's failure to com-
pete effectively for the Egyptian market, and functionless
rentier tourists. 2 He despised the Egyptians as morally
inferior, idle and cowardly: "backsheesh, backsheesh - the
national anthem of Egypt"(217).
	 Many disliked the British,
whose presence was based on force and, "Britain will never
quit Egypt"4,188).	 Since Gordon's mission the British press
and books had denounced the Mandist regime and justified war
against it. 3	Steevens likewise denounced it for slavery,
atrocities and genocide, and claimed this justified the
reconquest, though Britain would not significantly gain
economically. 4 His book was favourably reviewed. 	 It was
vivid, impressionistic, superficial, largely unoriginal
journalism, imperialist apologia and cliche. 	 His non-
military writings formed the context of his military writ-
ings, and it complemented his next book, With Kitchener to
Khartum.	 Unlike Chamberlain he lacked the imaginative
vision to see future potential. 5 Like Dilke with Uganda,
he failed to see the Sudan's potential. 6 Though he lacked
Kipling's genius, much of his message and tone were similar
to Kipling's: the denigration of some natives, the assertion
of British qualities and the beneficence of British rule,
the white man's burden. That such writing was so popular
and so praised indicated current attitudes and anxieties:
the perception of Britain and the Empire endangered.
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With strong popular imperialism the 1898 Sudan campaign
was extensively reported.	 The Mail sent Steevens, well
supplied with drink and Fortnum and Mason provisions. 	 It
boosted the reports from "our brilliant correspondent" and
they increased its circulation, allegedly gaining more read-
ers among the richer middle class: in October it printed an
analysis of its circulation from March to September in
relation to its war news. 7 From his reports Steevens com-
piled With Kitchener to Khartum (1898), an influential best-
seller and his most popular work. 8	It was description,
largely first-person narrative, of his experiences and of
the campaign, concentrating on the latter stages and
especially the battle of Omdurman, and repeating themes from
his Egypt in 1898 including praise of the British, condem-
nation of the Mandists and justification of the reconquest,
despite the Sudan's economic unprofitability. 	 He condemned
the Mandist regime as anachronistic, cruel, destructive
tyranny which ruined the Sudan, oppressed its conquered
peoples and perpetrated slave-raiding and slavery: 'the
fourteen years of dervish devilry"ç077). 	 He emphasised
Mandist massacres and depopulation. 9 He condemned the city
of Omdurman: "planless confusion, shiftless stupidity, con-
tented filth and beastliness"43OO). He emphasised Mandist
lust and filth, disgusting to his respectable readers: "the
whole city was a huge harem. . . a monstrosity of African
lust.. .And foul.	 They dropped their dung where they
listed.. .The stench of the place was in your nostrils.. .the
accursed place was left to fester and fry in its own filth
and lust and blood"(r301,309). 	 The nature of the regime
justified British reconquest: "its abominations steamed up
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to heaven to justify us of our vengeance",309). The British
saved Egypt and the Sudan from Mandism: "The Sudan's gain is
immunity from rape and torture and every extreme of misery"
,324).	 Victorian heroes had fought the slave trade, and
the British were proud of its suppression: in Britain anti-
10
slavery was still emotive and influential. 	 Steevens con-
demned the Mandist state as a slave-raiding, slave-exploiting
regime, where men were kidnapped, "sold in the slave-market,
shipped up the Nile to die of Fashoda fever, cut to pieces,
crucified, impaled"(320).
Victorians were moralistic and perceptions of causat-
ion and justice - whether a particular war was morally
justified - were crucial in Victorian attitudes to war. 	 In
Britain, while retention of the existing empire was generally
accepted, any imperial expansion - and especially any war of
imperial expansion - was controversial. 	 Critics of imperial
expansion alleged economic greed. 1 '	 Steevens did not name
such critics and their allegations yet his book in part
implicitly answered them.	 It was more than campaign report-
age.	 He argued the imperialist case for the reconquest -
that it was a just war - from the nature of the Mandist
regime and the benefits of its destruction to Egypt and the
Sudan.	 The Sudan would benefit from peace and civilised
government.	 Egypt would benefit from lower defence costs
and so more economic development.	 Britain would gain,
though not to any significant extent economically. 	 It would
have been economically advantageous to Britain to abandon the
Sudan, but British motives there were not economic. 	 Britain
sacrificed lives and money, and fought for national honour
and self-respect: "The vindication of our self-respect was
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the great treasure we won at Khartum, and it was worth the
price we paid for it"j318).	 The war was "the tardy ven-
geance for a great humiliation"(217). 	 Like Wolseley and
Duke earlier, he believed the Sudan economically profitless.
Even under British rule its trade would be insignificant to
the British economy: the Sudan "was always a poor country,
and it always must be...a God-accursed wilderness"ç325).
Imperialists seldom isolated imperial policy, but saw
specific imperial problems in the wider context of British
interests.	 Steevens perceived the Sudan war partly in the
context of late 19th century British anxieties and foreign
threats.	 In Egypt in 1898 he had seen the Sudan as a
source of military manpower for Egypt, but in his Sudan book
he claimed that, though the reconquest was not undertaken for
this, the Sudan could provide military manpower to strengthen
Britain and the Empire,
"The occupation...would open up some of the
finest raw fighting material in the world...
the rawest savagery you can imagine...To put
the matter brutally, having this field for
recruiting, we have too many enemies in the
world to afford to lose it. . .we should now
make...an African second to our Indian army,
and use it, when the time comes, to repay
12the debt to ourselves".
Steevens was a leading journalist and a skilled persuader,
appealing to the beliefs - including their established image
of Africa - and the fears of his largely middle-class read-
ers, to justify an imperial war.	 His work was significant
largely for what it showed of dominant British attitudes,
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for the justification of a war as well as the image
presented of the campaign itself.
As in Egypt in 1898 he repeatedly criticised non-
Europeans, especially Egyptians, and asserted their
inferiority to the British. 	 He wrote of Egyptian officers,
"it is the exception to find a man both capable and incor-
ruptible"(7321).	 Egyptians were unfit to rule the Sudan,
which would have to be ruled by Britons: "To put Egyptians,
corrupt, lazy, timid, often rank cowards, to rule the Sudan,
would be to invite another Mandi"(ib). 	 He praised the
British officers of the Egyptian army who achieved so much
with "inferior material"ç.20).	 The negroes were brave but
savage: "The black is a perennial schoolboy, without the
schooling"(29).	 In the Sudan, "Its people are naked and
dirty, ignorant and besotted.	 It is a quarter of a con-
tinent of sheer squalor",325).	 As in Egypt in 1898 Steevens
eulogised his compatriots. 	 He especially praised Kitchener,
despite what he saw of his less attractive traits and his
treatment of correspondents.	 Kitchener was arrogant,
ambitious and tactless.	 He believed he could achieve his
ambition through contacts with leading Unionist politicians,
and he despised public opinion and the journalist who
influenced and expressed it. 	 Unlike Wolseley or Roberts,
he did not attempt to conciliate and use correspondents but,
apparently deliberately, antagonised them. 	 In January 1898
he confined them to base areas and lines of communications
but after John Walter, proprietor of The Times, appealed to
Salisbury, he had to cancel his order. 13 The twenty-six
correspondents were refused official transport, limited in
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telegraphic facilities and given no briefings or help.14
They were ordered not to go on reconnaissances or near the
Sirdar) 5 Terse and irritable in part from overwork
because he refused to delegate, Kitchener insulted corres-
pondents: "Get out of my way, you drunken swabs". 16 After
the battle of Omdurman he sent them back to Egypt. Villiers,
one of them, wrote that Kitchener regarded them as a great
nuisance and seldom disguised his aversion, but was treated
loyally and leniently by them.' 7 However, he was more
favourable to two usefully-connected correspondents of Con-
servative papers, the Hon. Hubert Howard, son of the Earl
of Carlisle, the Times correspondent, and Steevens. 	 In his
reports and his book Steevens, as did most of the press,
eulogised Kitchener and presented him as hard, efficient,
almost superhuman in his ability.	 He contrasted the fail-
ure of Wolseley's "Empire-ballet business" with Kitchener's
success: "the extempore, amateur scrambles of Wolseley's
campaign and the machine-like precision of Kitchener's...
It is exactly the difference between the amateur and the
professional"ç0196).	 He wrote of Kitchener, "the brain and
the will are the essence and the whole of the man. . .he is
more like a machine than a man.. .the Sudan Machine".' 8 He
was a master of management who would be "a splendid manager
of the War Off icer"(?146).	 He initiated and made the rail-
way.	 Steevens praised Kitchener's initiative, his defiance
of accepted opinion to achieve what had been believed
impossible: for example, his use of river gunboats. 	 He was
ambitious: "the man of destiny - the man who has been pre-
paring himself sixteen years for one great purpose"ç,51).
He was ruthless with his officers, refusing to allow married
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officers, or officers to go to Cairo in the season. 	 Yet he
was not unpopular, for he defeated the enemy: "Other generals
have been better loved: none was ever better trusted"(ib).
Steevens did not mention that Kitchener never spoke to pri-
vate soldiers; but then neither did Steevens. 	 Kitchener was
a man of decisive action: "all patience for a month, all
swiftness when the day comes"(4,160).	 He omitted Kitchener's
indecision in April before Mahmoud's Atbara position; after
the Atbara he wrote of "the perfection of the Sirdar's
strategy"(16O).	 His success resulted from having "never
given battle without making certain of an annihilating
victory"ç,lll).	 Steevens claimed that, "the Sirdar is the
only English general who has known how to campaign in this
country"(111).	 Perhaps from ignorance, Steeven did not
mention what so alarmed Baring, the possibility, in the
period between the occupation of Abu Hamed and the final
advance on Omdurman, of enemy attack cutting the line of
communication: "the somewhat perilous position in which Sir
Herbert Kitchener's army was unquestionably placed" 9 He
did not criticise Kitchener, nor his treatment of corres-
pondents.	 He stated that his refusal of transport to cor-
respondents was "most natural and proper" and that he helped
him and gave him information, "grave as always, gracious and
courteous, volunteering facilities"214).	 Tactful, Steevens
did not give the impression he was specially favoured by
Kitchener.	 After Steevens' death Kitchener praised him:
"He was with me in the Sudan, and, of course, I saw a great
deal of him...He did his work as correspondent so brilliantly,
and he never gave the slightest trouble - I wish all corres-
20pondents were like him".	 Kitchener later admitted
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privately that he had plagiarised Steevens' reports for his
own dispatches.	 He told Riddell, "That G.W. Steevens who
died was a genius.	 I often made use of his stuff. 	 He had
real insight into military affairs". 21	Though there was
much in the book on Steevens' own experiences and hardships
as a correspondent - his problems with animals, natives, heat,
dust and thirst, often jocularly told and, unlike Prior or
Villiers, modestly not presenting himself as heroic or in
great danger - the dominating hero of the book was not
Steevens but, as its Hentyesque title suggested, Kitchener.
Most famous Victorian commanders established their public
reputation by a single campaign: Gordon in China, Wolseley
in Ashanti, Roberts in Afghanistan, and Kitchener in the
Sudan.	 Reporting in the press and in books, was crucial to
this.	 Steevens' account, so laudatory of Kitchener, far
outsold Churchill's with its criticisms, and contributed
much to establishing Kitchener's reputation, especially for
efficiency 22
He also praised senior British officers: for example,
he praised General hunter as a fighter, courageous in battle,
"the true knight-errant - a paladin drifted into his wrong
century. . .When there was fighting he always led the way to
it with his blacks, whom he loves like children, and who
love him like a father"ç055).	 He praised the British
officers and N.C.O.s of the Egyptian army and claimed
Sudanese negro units should be British-off leered: "There is
no better regimental officer than the Englishman; there is
no better natural fighter than the Sudanese"(ib). 	 They
respected the British because they believed them contemptuous
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of death: "They have seen many Englishmen die, they have
never seen an Englishman show fear"491). 	 He praised the
British engine-drivers with their hot unpleasant life: "but
they stick to it like Britons...They, too, are not the mean-
est of the conquerors of the Sudan"c,29).	 He praised the
British army and naval contingents, especially the young
naval officers: "Impudently daring in attack...they were just
the cutting-out heroes of one's youth come to life. 	 They
might have walked straight out of the 'Boy's Own Paper"ç,183).
He praised the military qualities of the British including
their endurance, marching across the desert. 	 Throughout his
reporting, like that of Russell and Forbes before him, he
named and described as individuals only officers. 	 Other
ranks, praised en masse and occasionally briefly quoted for
Kiplingesque colour, remained anonymous tommies. 	 He called
their march to Berber "one of the great forced-marches of
history"c,66).	 He emphasised the heat and dust. 	 He noted
the hardship and strain of campaigning in the Sudan and its
physical effects on the British: skin scaled off, hair
bleached, eyes bloodshot,	 He emphasised "the white man's
burden". British self-sacrifice for Egypt and the Sudan.
He listened to British N.C.O.s and raiiwayman: "Their talk
is half of the chances of action, and the other half of
their friends that have died"41O).	 He noted the cemetery
at Haifa: "see merely how full it is. 	 Each white cross is
an Englishman devoured by the Sudan"4l69). 	 He claimed,
"The Sudan is a man-eater - red-gorged, but still insati-
able...and we have watered it with more of our blood than
it will ever yield to pay for",169,lO).
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Though without military training, Steevens recog-
nised the obvious important factors in war. 	 He saw that
logistics, and especially the Sudan Military Railway, were
crucial to the campaign and praised Kitchener's recognition
of this: "It is the great discovery of the Sirdar...that in
the Sudan the communications are the essence and heart of
the whole problem"çplG9). 	 Steevens saw the significance of
terrain and distance, and claimed the real enemy was the
Sudan itself.	 He praised Girouard's achievement, called
the railway, "the deadliest weapon that Britain has ever
used against Mandism"Ct22).
Steevens continued his themes of eulogy and condem-
nation through his book's climaxes, the descriptions of
battle.	 He described two major battles, the Atbara in
April and Omdurman in September. 	 He praised Kitchener's
decision to attack Mahmud's zariba at the Atbara, claiming
that, "with a savage enemy, I suppose the rule holds that
it is better and cheaper in the end to attack, and attack,
and attack again"ç0130).	 He described the bombardment, then
the infantry assault with Union Jack flying, pipes, and
bugles playing, volley-firing into the enemy - "volleying
off the blacks as your beard comes off under a keen razor" -
then charging with bayonets: "Bullet and bayonet and butt,
the whirlwind of Highlanders swept over"c148). 	 Excitedly
he described the British enthusiasm and triumph, quoting a
British officer, "now I call that a very good fight"j,149).
He shared their emotion, ending his description, "Once more,
hurrah, hurrah!"151).	 He presented battle as enjoyable
enobling experience; after it the soldiers were "drunk with
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joy and triumph...Two hours had sobered them from boys to
men in that Godlike moment"(152).	 He had again given a
vivid, mainly visual impression, showing the movement, noise
and pattern of the battle. 	 But he omitted much: the British
losses - mentioned, but wounds and suffering not described -
the soldiers' experiences, the fear before, the emotions
during combat.	 He concentrated on the losses inflicted on
the enemy,
"And unless you are congenitally amorous of
horrors, don't look too much about you...
heads without faces, and faces without any-
thing below, cobwebbed arms and legs, and
black skins grilled to crackling on smoulder-
ing palm-leaf, - don't look at it"ç.151).
He did not criticise Kitchener's tactic of infantry assault on
an entrenched position.	 After the battle he noted the
British losses: typically he named and described only
officers.	 Briefly he described the wounded - omitting agony,
or hideous wounds - most "might have been lying down for a
siesta"(pl64). 	 Identification with his compatriots and the
exultation of victory, apparently nullified his critical
sense.	 His was the verbal equivalent of the images created
visually by his contemporaries, the Victorian battle-painters.
He described the force - strength, composition and
weapons - that advanced on Omdurman, again praising the
British troops, and noting the poor condition and high pro-
portion of sick, of the unacclimatised Guards and Rifles.
He showed his admiring pleasure at the army: "There are not
many more pleasing sights in the world than the young British
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subaltern marching alongside his company...confident in the
traditions of his service and his race"ç210). 	 He began his
account of the battle of Omdurman by describing the terrain
and the position of the British and Egyptian units, then
described the Mandist attack.	 The British, "poured out
death as fast as they could load and press trigger", and the
Mandists died: "It was the last day of Mandism, and the
greatest.. .It was not a battle, but an execution",,266). 	 He
noted the British losses, relatively few, from the fire of
the advancing enemy, blaming them largely on the British use
of the zariba instead of trenches, but he blamed no commander.
He noted the killing of the Mandist wounded and claimed it
was necessary because they continued to fight.	 Again, he
had presented a vivid but distanced, external and selective
account of the battle, omitting its horror, the nature of the
wounds and suffering again, the written equivalent of the
Victorian battle paintings.	 He admired Mandist courage.
At the battle of Omdurman, he wrote, "No white troops would
have faced that torrent of death for five minutes, but the
Baggara and the blacks came on"(264). He despised their
military incompetence.	 He described Mahmud's fortified
camp at Metemmeh as "merely childish - as planless as his
zariba on the Atbara"ç229).	 He attributed the relative
ease of the British victory at Omdurman largely to the Mah-
dists' faults.	 The Khalif a's generalship was "a master-
piece of imbecility" for not attacking at night or fighting
in the town: "instead, he chose the one form of fight which
gave him no possibility of even a partial success"289).
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Like his other books of reportage, With Kitchener to
Khartum was largely Steevens' impressions and opinions, some-
times in the vivid word-pictures for which he was renowned,
for example his description of Kitchener's force at the
Atbara,
"All England and all Egypt, and the flowers
of the black lands beyond, Birmingham and
the West Highlands, the half-regenerated
children of the earth's earliest civili-
sation, and grinning savages from the
uttermost swamps of Equatoria, muscle and
machinery, lord and larrikin, Balliol and
Board School, the Sirdar's brain and the
camel's back - all welded into one, the
awful war machine went forward into
action"g142).
In war battle is relatively seldom and, like his fellow cor-
respondents, Steevens had to largely fill his reports with
other information and opinion, on the terrain, climate,
natives, camps and marches. He described his experiences
as a war correspondent, emphasising the heat, dust and thirst,
with contemptuous, humorously - intended interludes on native
servants.	 He had written similarly on servants in the
Graeco-Turkish War, as had Russell and Forbes earlier: Joseph
Mathews later noted, "the servant's vital role as chief
comedian in the war correspondent's drama". 23 He presented
himself as enduring hardship but - unlike Forbes' or Villiers'
self-presentation - not as heroic.	 Though he did not state
this in print, privately he was contemptuous of the old type
24
of war correspondent and his "mutual admiration society".
He accepted the limitations on war correspondents, implicitly
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contrasting them with Forbes' era: "Why did you not make a
dash for the front? the guileless editor will ask. 	 But the
modern war correspondent is not allowed to make unauthorised
dashes"ç,212).	 Though modest on his own role, he praised
Hubert Howard of The Times who was killed at Omdurman, while
not stating that the "chance shot" which killed him was
British and naval.	 He praised him as brave and adventurous:
"He was foredoomed from the cradle to die in his boots, and
asked no better...Ten minutes before he was killed he said,
'This is the happiest day of my life'"4288).	 He also
praised Cross of the Manchester Guardian who died of enteric,
another Oxford man and, "the type of an English gentleman"ç,289).
Again Steevens showed himself biased and bellicist,
and again he showed his qualities and his limitations as a
war correspondent.	 His account of the war was competent,
vivid and superior to that of the Graeco-Turkish War. 	 His
analysis and criticism were perceptive, though seldom pro-
found.	 An imperialist enthusiast for the war, he was not
a debunker and did not write to attack the British authori-
ties.	 His reporting was not intended as hostile exposes,
and was largely eulogistic of his compatriots. 	 Neverthe-
less he criticised them - though in a tone different from
his strident denunciations of native failings - where he
believed necessary.	 His criticism was not of morality or
ideology, but of method and matriel: he condemned as
scandalous the inadequacy of army boots despite over four-
teen years' compaigning experience in the Sudan, and blamed
contractors and War Office officials: "the history of the
army is a string of such disgraces".	 He showed Anglo-
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Egyptian losses at the battle of Omdurman were largely the
fault of British commanders: the use of the relatively slow
and vulnerable Camel Corps with the Egyptian Cavalry,
Gatacre's placing his troops behind a zariba "as easy to
shoot through as a sheet of paper"394), and Colonel Martin's
blunder in ordering the charge of the 21st Lancers. 25 His
tone was of regretful explanation, not denunciation. 	 More-
over he did not criticise Kitchener, though his was the
ultimate responsibility.	 He defended Kitchener's Berber
triumph with Mahmud in chains - which radicals criticised -
as convincing the natives of Mahmud's defeat: "You may call
the show barbaric if you like, it was meant for barbarians"
(p167).	 He supported Kitchener on what became, partly
because of Churchill's criticisms, the most controversial
aspects of the battle of Omdurman: the killing of the Mah-
dist wounded and the disposal of the Mandi's remains. 	 He
claimed that in self-defence the soldiers had to kill the
Mandist wounded because they continued to fight.	 Though
the Spectator review claimed, "he tells the story, omitting
nothing and slurring nothing", 26 Steevens did omit.	 He
did not mention the Mandi's remains. 	 Also he omitted some
criticism which he made privately, notably the inadequacy
of the medical services, which he raised with Harmsworth
and with the authorities in England. Most of the corres-
pondents expressed dissatisfaction, alleging favouritism,
criticising the censor and claiming they were given too
little information or freedom to obtain it. 	 Controversy
on the justification of specific imperial wars was not
usually expressed by war correspondents though they some-
times criticised the conduct of a war. 	 However in 1898
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Newnes' Liberal Westminster Gazette sent a 'Little Englander'
opponent of the Sudan war, E.N. Bennett, to criticise it.
He criticised the British forces, the treatment of Egyptian
officers as inferior to British, and portrayed the war not
as romantic adventure but as sordid destruction. 	 Veteran
war correspondents such as Burleigh of the Telegraph con-
demned him. 27 Steevens did not mention him but his entire
reporting of the war formed an implicit rebuttal and
reached many more readers.
The Sudan campaign was the first British war that
Steevens reported.	 It was fought at a time of foreign
threat and British anxiety, of the emotions of Anglo-French
antagonism and possible war which culminated in the Fashoda
crisis.	 The campaign thrilled and reassured many British,
and Steevens expressed this. Enthusiastic, he expressed
patriotic pride and an aggressive and emotional bellicism.
He described an ethnocentric masculine society and asserted,
unquestioned, its military values. In his Graeco-Turkish
reporting he had largely identif led with the Turks; in the
Sudan he totally, unquestioningly identified with his com-
patriots.	 His paeans of imperial praise - possibly the
type of boasting against which Kipling had recently warned
in 'Recessional' - were probably to counter his own and
national doubts and anxieties.	 His references to British
military qualities and future war were similar to Kipling's
message in Stalky & Co.; "India's full of Stalkies -
Cheltenham and Haileybury and Marlborough chaps - that we
don't know anything about, and surprises will begin when
there is really a big row on". 28 The Boer War was to
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shatter, for many, such hopes.	 Steevens' account was,
within limitations, competent.	 But the Sudan war was
relatively easy to describe competently, because of its
essential simplicity.	 Issues, strategy and tactics were
all relatively simple.	 The relative complexity of the Boer
War was to be a harder test of war correspondents. 	 Despite
its pace and vividness, the book showed again Steevens'
limitations and his inferiority to Forbes. 	 Too ignorant of
war, he failed to question and to interpret the Sudan war in
the context of wars.	 He drew no lessons on weapons or
tactics - for example on machine guns or cavalry - and made
no suggestions on the war of the future. 	 His reporting had
a specificity and immediacy that was also a myopia.
Contemporaries nevertheless admired it. 	 His earlier
works had been favourably reviewed, and With Kitchener to
Kharturn, probably his best book and expressing the popular
view of a popular subject, was eulogised. 	 The Spectator
called it, "a masterpiece, and of a new kind", and claimed
his description of the battle of Omdurman attained "the
high-water mark of literature" and that he had, "pierced
the intricacies of military tactics, and even soldiers who
were present admit the perfect justice of his description...
this spirited and well-written book. . . should fill the most
slothful Englishman with pride". 29 The British Weekly
claimed it was, "a book to buy and keep and to turn to if
ever the flame of patriotism burns low". The Scotsman
claimed It showed Steevens was "among the foremost of his
brethren of the press as a painter of battle-pieces".
Henley later called it "a classic unsurpassed" and it was
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used and quoted by historians. 30 Steevens' Sudan reporting
was influential.	 His criticism of army boots led to
questions in the Commons and to Lansdowne's announcement in
May 1898 that an improved type would be introduced. 3' His
criticism to Harmsworth of the medical service led Harmsworth
to offer, "regardless of expenses, an ambulance to the
Soudan. . .which would secure, for our sick and wounded,
skilled nursing on modern lines, such nursing as the system
in vogue at the War Office denies to them". 32 The War
Office rejected the offer.	 Moreover Harmsworth continued
impressed with Steevens and sent him on further overseas
assignments, including as a war correspondent to South Africa.
In 1898 Steevens, though he had not attained the
reputation of Forbes at his zenith, was a celebrated corres-
pondent.	 Forbes had lectured to officers, and Steevens'
status was indicated by his being invited to lecture, in
November, the army officers of the Aldershot Military
Society on "The Downfall of Mandism". 33 The chairman,
Major-General Barnard, introduced him as a brillian corres-
pondent: "most of us are familiar with his vivid and life-
like descriptions"çol).	 His lecture was a succinct account
without the colourful vignettes of his reporting, its
message largely that of his reports and book. 	 He again
praised Kitchener, the British troops and the railway.
Having stated, "It is not the part of a civilian observer
to offer	 criticisms of military operations before a pro-
fessional audience", he tactfully criticised British faults.
He noted, a continuing grievance within the infantry, that
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the English county regiments, regardless of military achieve-
ment, were less favoured by the authorities and press than
more fashionable units. 	 He criticised the Lancers' charge
but suggested that, "such heroic actions often do more for
the moral of an army than less brilliant operations more
correctly conducted"ç,22). 	 He proposed that the British
should maintain an Egyptian army sufficiently strong to
defend against Abyssinia, France and other European powers.
He emphasised British sacrifice to gain the Sudan, and
asserted that in future Britain should, "reap a harvest from
the sacrifice of our many good men who have given their
blood to the thirsty sands of the Sudan"cj23). 	 Following
the lecture General Barnard praised Steevens' "admirable,
interesting and valuable lecture"26). 	 The invitation to
lecture and the response to his lecture indicated, as had
Kitchener's treatment of him, Steevens' acceptability to
the military: probably especially because he expressed
their imperialist and martial values.
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"Gentlemen come from England, spend a few
weeks in India, walk round this great
Sphinx of the Plains, and write books
upon its ways and works, denouncing or
praising it as their own ignorance prompts"
Kipling,
'On the City Wall'
In the winter of 1898 to '99 Steevens reported on
India, then from his reports compiled In India (1899).1 His
reporting was not investigation but travelogue, impressions,
vignettes and opinion, an apologia for the Raj: "we have
administered it with a single-minded devotion to the inter-
ests of its people which has never had a parallel"(r353).
He praised the British, especially those on the frontier.
He castigated Indian lying, corruption, inefficiency, babus,
politicians and press. 2 He praised Indian soldiers and
especially their British officers.	 He noted the import-
ance of India to the British army - "to find the real
British army you must go to India"ç049) - and the scale of
manoeuvres.	 He considered defence and frontier policy,
warning of the threat, increased by railway construction,
of Russian invasion, advocating a forward policy, holding
3Chitral and fighting Russian invasion in Afghanistan. 	 He
claimed there was no longer risk of a Mutiny and that the
army in India should be modernised and concentrated. He
suggested that in the long term the British had to choose
between conscription and the loss of India. 4 He again
expressed his bellicist values: "War was the salt that kept
India from decay"ç,356).	 His views were Anglo-Indian
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orthodoxy, largely similar to those of Kipling. 5 His views
on defence were those orthodox among senior officers there,
and assiduously propagated by Roberts. 6 His coverage had
'new journalism' vividness of superficiality and, like his
other overseas reporting, showed the limitations of the
briefly-visiting journalist. 7 Psychologists have recog-
nised the stages of 'culture shock' in a foreign country:
initial excitement and pleasure, then angry criticism at
strangeness and frustration, and finally adjustment.
Steevens arguably was never long enough in a new country
to pass the second stage and so, psychologically as well
as from paucity of information, was incapable of calm,
reasoned and informed appraisal.	 Instead he again wrote
his diatribes and clich gs, which so expressed the attitudes
of his readers.	 His book was favourably reviewed: for
example, the Morning Post praised its "brightly coloured
word-pictures".
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on Indian defence, sometimes almost verbatim from his
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8.	 1890s ARTICLES
In the 1890s Steevens wrote a variety of journalism
which included descriptive reportage for the Daily Mail
and longer, weightier pieces for the serious reviews.'
For the Mail he wrote impressionistic pieces on horse races,
hospitals, prisons and Ireland. 2
 His articles were dog-
matic and expressed the modernity on which he prided himself,
his quality of being in tune with the latest ideas, which
both bunkered him and contributed to his popular appeal.
In 1893 he published 'The Futile Don', a hyperbolic piece
claiming Oxford and Cambridge dons were so remote they were
as dead.	 For Henley's New Review he assessed Balfour's
philosophy, praised Ibsen and Zola, and criticised Wagner.
The belief that war was unnecessary and preventable and
that disputes could be settled by peaceful arbitration, was
fundamental to 18th century rationalism and to the 19th
century liberalism and pacifism that grew from it. 3 Since
the early 19th century the Peace Society and other pacifists,
and Cobdenite and Gladstonian Liberals, advocated inter-.
national arbitration.	 It was increasingly used, for fron-
tier, territorial and fishery disputes, by Britain, despite
the 'Alabama' decision and mostly for colonial disputes,
more than any other state. 4 Between 1880 and 1900 there
were ninety arbitrations. 5	In the late 19th century,
partly in response to the increased financial burden of
armaments, international hostility and continental militar-
ism, British advocates of arbitration renewed their
ef forts. 6	In his short anonymous article in Blackwood's
of October 1896, 'Arbitration in Theory and Practice',
Steevens argued against international arbitration. 7 He
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noted in democratic politics the rise and decline, like that
of popular songs, of catch-words like "municipalization't.
That year arbitration was presented as, "the herald of every
blessing. . .on the altar of the same holy cause the 'Daily
Chronicle' is willing to sacrifice all that nations hold
worth fighting for". 8	It became popular for no reason:
"Why did the whole world sing 'Ta-ra-ra-boom-de-ay'?"9
Earlier arbitrations had left bitter memories and, "in some
cases, such as that of Delagoa Bay, its legacy may be more
perilous than that of war".'° Experience showed arbitrat-
ion was not impartial and, since most states disliked
Britain, they would arbitrate against her. 	 Reliance on
arbitration would lead to military weakness, so provoking
foreign aggression, while lack of military preparation could
also, in a democracy, decrease apprehension of war and so
facilitate ignorant bellicosity, as recently in the United
States, or a hot-headed rush into wanton hostilities.
There was neither agreed international morality nor inter-
national law.	 Arbitration on issues believed vital would
not be accepted if contrary to national interest, while
issues not perceived as vital did not need arbitration to
prevent war: "Modern war is its own deterrent". 11 Steevens'
article was in part his response to the 1896 foreign threats
to Britain and the Empire: the Morning Post wrote, "We have
12
no friends and nobody loves us".	 Though short, his
article was significant as a statement of his view of inter-
national relations, the role of armaments and the main-
tenance of peace.	 He shared the widespread belief that
arbitration, most notably on the 'Alabama', had been dis-
advantageous to Britain.	 He also shared the 'hard-minded',
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sometimes cynical, social-darwinist realpolitik assumptions
of his fellow imperialists, including rejection of 'moralis-
ing internationalism',' 3 and belief that only force could
defend national interests from hostile predatory foreigners,
that weakness invited attack and that arbitration on vital
interests was contrary to national interest.' 4	Steevens'
emphasis on the irrational in mass politics, traditionally
part of tory contempt for democracy, was becoming increas-
ingly prevalent among political commentators and was used
by anti-imperialist radicals to explain the popularity of
imperialism, notably, a few years later, by J.A. Hobson in
The Psychology of Jingoism. 15	Steevens' attitudes to
international relations and to arbitration and his criticism
of the Daily Chronicle, further showed his divergence from
his family's nonconformity and from the Gladstonian Liberals
he had once supported.
Proudly monarchist, patriotic and imperialist, the
newly-established Daily Mail shared the popular enthusiasm
for the 1897 Jubilee.	 Steevens described the Jubilee
procession with prolonged panegyric on the British imperial
forces.	 He praised the navy as "the finest force in the
16	 .
whole world".	 He praised Roberts, British officers, the
British nation and its imperial achievement: "And each one
of us...is a working part of this world-shaping force".17
He praised the colonial statesmen, "the men who are build-
ing up great nations, new big Englands on the other side
of the world".' 8 He also enthusiastically described the
Jubilee naval review, "the most wonderful assemblage of sea
power there had even been", 19 and claimed the navy held the
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Empire together.	 Yet he warned of the fleet's vulner-
ability, that torpedoes, flying-machines and turbine-craft
might destroy battleships: "All the tons of steel, the
labour of years, the millions of money...gone in five
minutes.	 That is the pathos and beauty of a warship: it
is so very strong and so very weak". 2° His other Jubilee
article, 'To view the illuminations' was different: a
fictional sketch of an agricultural family visiting London,
a patronising 'humorous' piece.	 Despite his eulogies of
the British, Steevens was ignorant and contemptuous of those
he considered his social inferiors. 2' He was proud he was
a Londoner, and in 1899 wrote for the Mail a series of
articles on aspects of London: vivid, interesting reportage
but largely superficial impressions, not investigative or
crusading journalism. 22 He was insufficiently curious,
and omitted and distorted. 	 For example, writing on London
at night he did not mention prostitution.
His two Blackwood's articles, 'The New Humanitarian-
ism' and 'From the New Gibbon' were crucial for understand-
ing him and his message.	 In 'The New Humanitarianism'
published in January 1898, he claimed that since the early
19th century the British had changed their values and
become too tender-minded and soft, obsessed with the avoid-
ance of physical pain and believing that, "death and pain
are the worst of evils, their elimination the most desirable
of goods". 23	He cited opposition to hunting, vivisection
and vaccination, and concern for prisoners, cripples and
incubator-babies. 24 He denounced faddists and fashionable
cant and asserted that, "the same blind horror of physical
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pain may be found at the bottom of half the 'isms of the
day". 25 Such attitudes were "throttling patriotism and
common-sense and virility of individual character". 26 His
article harshly asserted his continuing rejection of his
family's nonconformity, and asserted his tough-minded
social darwinism.
His 'From the New Gibbon' in Blackwood's of February
1899 was a fin-de-sicle jeremiad on the decadence of the
British, in the form of a history written in some indef i-
nite future, a literary device popularised by the future-
war genre from Chesney's Battle of Dorking on. 27	It told
how at the end of the 19th century Britain had great pro-
sperity and empire, but within were "the latent causes of
decay and corruption". 28 The British were excessively
concerned with cheapness and profit, and saw the Empire as
a means of money-making: "Where they had once resolved to
possess, they now aspired but to trade". 29 He especially
criticised Chamberlain for believing "British Empire was
synonymous with British commerce". 3°	 Ironically, however,
at the same time British commerical efficiency and com-
petitiveness was declining, as "the degeneracy of the
people" spread to commerce.	 Insufficiently educated, in-
sufficiently dynamic, retaining, ostrich-like, obsolete
practices and failing to adapt to customer's requirements,
they were losing to German, Belgian and American competition,
and some foresaw economic disaster.	 Free trade principles
were undermining Britain.	 They ruined agriculture and
drove the population to the towns, where "the pestilential
circumstances of an unnatural existence" caused "this
hideous process of degeneration". 31 History showed
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national defence depended on "the preservation of a robust
and high-spirited peasantry". 32 British farm workers had
the qualities necessary for soldiers, but the industrial
population did not.	 They were ' t feeble in body, insubor-
dinate in temper, and habituated by experience to a mode
of life which rendered them awkward and discontented in the
field". 33	In sport also the British rapidly degenerated,
with the rise of spectator sports. 	 The "prevailing
deterioration" affected poor and rich. 	 No longer with
happy homes, the poor went to public houses, while smart
society was arrogant, vulgar and scandalous, the women
painted and immodest. 	 Literature was mediocre and perio-
dicals trivial.	 Then as "the warlike and manly force of
the white races succumbed to the enervating influence of
industrial civilisation", British governments relied
increasingly on non-white colonial mercenaries, "subject
barbarians". 34	So, "The British Empire entered upon the
'35twentieth century under the gloomiest auspices' . 	 Most
contemporaries did not realise it, but its fall was impend-
ing.	 It lacked men: "Britain was indeed peopled by a race
of pigmies, and the puny breed awaited only the onset of
the first crisis to become the woeful patient of defeat
36
and ruin".
The 'New Gibbon' was a jeremiad in the tradition of
Carlyle, who in Steevens' formative years was still admired
and influential as a prophet and for his prose style.
Carlyle also had hyperbolically looked back to a superior
past and denounced British materialism, commercialism and
decadence, and had praised strong heroic leaders. 	 The
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'New Gibbon' was not a consistent political statement but a
series of disparate reactions - some current prejudices and
myths and some valid if unoriginal comment - to changes he
he disliked, grouped round the theme of degeneration.
Central to it was his conviction, as in the Graeco-Turkish
war that, rather than economics or materiel, the martial
qualities of the fighting soldiers were crucial in war.
Like the purposive future-war fiction, it was intended as
warning.	 It was hyperbolic and in parts historically
inaccurate.	 His section on attitudes to empire reversed
history: the trade-based 'informal empire' was followed by
possession, not desire for possession replaced by desire
for trade.	 His attitudes were typical not original. His
was one expression among many of late 19th century pessimism
and anxiety at the trends and possible future of Britain, a
response to perceptions of Britain's relative decline and
of foreign hostility and threats. 	 Concern at urban dete-
rioration and urban inferiority to rural population was
widespread and was expressed in Europe and in the United
States, notably by Roosevelt.	 The German military autho-
rities believed urban recruits physically and morally
inferior and also socialist and subversive, and so con-
scripted disproportionately from rural areas. 	 In Britain
it was frequently expressed, 37 including by Booth and, in
fiction, by Wells' Time Machine.	 Cardwell had attempted
38to reverse the decline in rural recruiting and the mili-
tary implications of urbanization were publicised, includ-
ing by purposive fiction of future war. 	 In 1882, for
example, Colonel William Butler published anonymously his
Invasion of England in which Britain, weakened by rural
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depopulation and urban "physical and moral degeneration",
was invaded and defeated by Germany. 	 He denounced "the
national greed for money and.. . the spirit of mercantilism"
and, "all the corruptions and contaminations inseparable
from the life of large cities; the gutter became the cradle,
the brothel became the school, the gin palace was the
recreation-ground of millions of human beings whose natural
homes had been the furze-clad hills and smiling valleys of
the country". 39 Urban soldiers were inadequate; Majuba
resulted from the replacement of highlanders by "the modern
sweepings of Lowland cities"° W.H. Russell also warned of
the decline in the physical quality of recruits. 	 There
were also warnings in the serious reviews. For example,
in 1887 Lord Brabazon published a short article in the
Nineteenth Century, 'Decay of Bodily Strength in Towns'.
He cited army recruit-rejection rates and claimed there was
a horrifying physical degeneration of the urban population,
endangering Britain economically and militarily, "an evil
which would ultimately lead to a degeneration of the race
and to national effacement", 4' and he called for reforms.
Others also saw the connection between the condition of the
urban masses and British power. 	 Moreover, there was also
a wider consciousness of malaise, and pessimism and anxiety
about the imperial future expressed, for example, in
Kipling's 'Recessional'.	 In his 'New Gibbon' Steevens
was expressing ideas already current and which were to reach
a crescendo during and after the Boer War, and which were
further publicised by the advocates of 'Efficiency', the
radical Right and the National Service League.
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Steevens' view of colonial troops was exceptional
and probably original.	 Like his contemporaries he had
been impressed by native troops and praised the Jubilee
contingents and the Indian army.	 He had argued the mili-
tary advantage of the Sudan reconquest in providing poten-
tial recruits.	 The usual view of native troops - in
defence studies and in future-war fiction such as Le Queux's
Great War in England in 1897 - was that they strengthened
imperial defence.	 H.G. Wells, however, in his 1899 dysto-
pia of a distant future, When the Sleeper Wakes described
South African black mercenaries used by a tyrannical govern-
ment to suppress revolution in England: an exceptional view
of their potential.	 Classically-educated and modelling his
article on Gibbon, Steevens like so many of his contempor-
aries, saw the fate of Britain as analagous with that of
Rome and so, though his main argument was on the deterior-
ation of British troops, suggested the potential of
colonial barbarians as a related threat. 	 Though eulogistic
accounts of Steevens by his friends praised his sweetness
and kindness, the persona expressed in his writing was
different: callous, harsh and vindictive, unsympathetic and
lacking compassion.	 It had similarities to that expressed
in Kipling's writings and was presumably at least in part a
response to his awareness of British vulnerability and the
necessity of increased strength.	 Contemporaries praised
his articles and the selection published after his death in
the Memorial Edition was favourably reviewed. 	 The
Spectator, for example, noted the literary superiority of
his articles for the reviews over his Mail journalism and
books compiled from it, praised his "sense of remarkable
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papers on the Jubilee" and eulogised his 'New Gibbon' as a
"brilliant tour de force".42
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9.	 THE BOER WAR
The South African crisis and the Boer War caused much
press activity.	 Harmsworth, imperialist and intensely com-
petitive, 1 sent correspondents, hired trains and called them
Daily Mail war expresses, launched the Absent-Minded Beggar
Fund, and later, when he learned of them, criticised War
Office faults Including the inadequate medical services.2
He sent his star writer Steevens, famous from the Sudan and
still under thirty though looking older, as his "chief
special". 3	Steevens arrived in South Africa in October,
less than a fortnight before the war began. 	 He arrived too
late, knowing too little.
	 Comparison with Leopold Amery
showed Steevens' disadvantages.	 Amery, another brilliant
Balliol man, Oxford fellow turned journalist and former cor-
respondent in Germany, went to South Africa as The Times
chief correspondent, arriving in September. 4
 He travelled,
met Milner, Rhodes, Cape politicians and Boer leaders includ-
ing Kruger, and visited Joubert and the Boer army.
	 After
the war began he travelled more, meeting the British comman-
ders and seeing British troops in action. 	 Steevens, how-
ever, arrived too late to travel much, never visited Boer
territory and, lacking the status and contacts of The Times
correspondent, failed to make adequate contact with the
British decision-makers.	 Moreover, possibly like the
contemporary British army, he had had too many easy victories
and grown slack.	 In the Sudan he had much time and a
relatively simple subject and his observation and vivid
personalised writing - despite the superficiality of his
knowledge - had brought him success. 	 In South Africa he
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faced a bigger more complex subject, for which verbal snap-
shots were inadequate, and which he did not research. 	 He
arrived too ignorant and started reporting too soon. 	 Then
the war began and he was caught in events he inadequately
understood, and in a position where he could not gain an
adequate perspective.	 He reported on the Cape before the
war, and the battles of Elandslaagte and Nicholson's Nek.
At Elandslaagte, though he did not report this, leading a
conspicuous white pony he continually exposed himself -
whether deliberately, is unknown - and drew Boer artillery
f ire. 5 When Ladysmith was besieged he decided to stay
there, like Melton Prior and other correspondents but
unlike the veteran Bennet Burleigh of the Telegraph who
knew he would see more of the war if he were mobile. 	 The
correspondents had to send their reports through the Boer
lines by native runner, at high prices: Steevens paid
seventy pounds to his first runner. 6 He became increasing-
ly bored and frustrated. 	 With other correspondents he
published The Ladysmith Lyre, a thin tabloid spoof newspaper
which claimed, "Our news we guarantee to be false. 	 In the
preparation of falsehoods we shall spare no effort and no
expense".	 He visited the wounded and sick to cheer and
encourage them.	 Ladysmith had many cases of enteric and
dysentery and a high mortality from them. 	 He contracted
8
enteric and in January 1900 died, bravely. 	 He was one
of several correspondents who died in the war, and more
preparation might have prevented his death, since
innoculation was available.9
Until the siege he was never able to offer more than
superficial impressions. 	 He was typical of most corres-
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pondents in largely Ignoring the non-Europeans and their
role in the war. 	 His evaluation of the Bantu lacked depth:
"The niggers are very good-humoured, like the darkies of
America"(3).	 Possibly his racial opinions predisposed him
towards a relatively favourable attitude to the Boers. 	 He
knew little of them. 	 He had time for only a few brief
interviews - including with a Dopper pastor who told him a
Boer view of South African history - before the war started,
and then he saw them, the enemy, from a distance, or briefly
as prisoners of war.	 In the Sudan he had loathed the Mah-
dists, but his South African reporting was not hostile to
the Boers and, like that of Amery and others, showed his
respect for them: "They were manly and courteous, and
through their untrimmed beards and rough corduroys a voice
said very plainly, 'Ruling race"464).	 He praised their
military qualities, especially their shooting, and believed
British soldiers should learn from them. 	 He alleged no
atrocities, and praised their treatment of British prisoners
of war.	 He noted, however, their relative inefficiency
against Ladysmith, their limited bombardments and failure
to attack, "But the Boers have the great defect of all
amateur soldiers: they love their ease, and do not mean to
be killed"c1O1-2).	 In Capetown he saw British miners from
the Rand, returning to England.	 He showed his ignorance
and inadequate investigation by his remark that they "only
wanted to make a hundred pounds to furnish a cottage and
marry a girl"48).	 Just as, in his Sudan reporting, unlike
Kipling, he hardly bothered with the army rankers except
when fighting or for occasional colour, so he was ignorant
of those he regarded as his social inferiors in Britain.
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A middle-class man might furnish his house for a hundred
pounds: the same sum could buy an entire working-class
cottage.
Steevens' own attitude to the Boer War is uncertain,
but his reporting did not question its rightness. 	 Despite
his and his employer's imperialism and in contrast to his
condemnation of the Mandists, his South African reporting,
excepting praise of British soldiers and sailors, was
relatively unpropagandist. 	 The Sudan had been a simple
war, easy to understand and describe. 	 The Boer War was
complex, confusing, inconclusive and seemingly lacking a
clear pattern.	 He apparently failed to comprehend the
war as a whole, and admitted,
"I too was lost, and lost I remain. . .My small
experience has been confined to wars you
could put your fingers on: for this war I
have been looking long enough, and have not
found it.	 I have been accustomed to wars
with headquarters, at any rate to wars with
a main body and a concerted plan: but this
war in Cape Colony has neither"(14).
In his Sudan reporting he had a theme and a message. 	 In
South Africa he had neither, but floundered apparently
overwhelmed by events he insufficiently understood. Unlike
Amery he did not see British military faults as the theme
and the necessity of military reform as the message. 	 In
the Sudan he had eulogised British commanders, and praised
British troops and achievement.	 In South Africa his tone
was different.	 He still praised British officers and men,
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but saw no British achievement.	 British generals were
strangely absent from his account.
	 White commanded at
Ladysmith.	 Though praised by the popular press and later
mobbed by London crowds as the "hero of Ladysmith", he was
an ineffective commander, dispirited and passive.
	 He was
criticised by others but not, in writing, by Steevens.
Steevens hardly mentioned him; Bullard later noted that
Steevens was "not given to censure")° His criticism was
by implication or omission. 	 He noted British military
unpreparedness and vulnerability in South Africa at the
beginning of the war before the army corps arrived,
repeatedly noted the inferiority of most British artillery
to that of the Boers.	 However, he praised colonial troops,
and the Navy.
In the late 19th century as Britain and the Empire
seemed more threatened, so imperialists looked more to the
Empire to contribute to defence, and the press and books
increasingly featured Indian and colonial units. 	 In the
Boer War the press repeatedly praised colonial troops,
later sometimes contrasting their qualities with British
military ineptitude - a theme of Kipling's verse. Steevens
praised colonial troops. 	 He described the Border Mounted
Rifles as, "swift and cunning as Boers, and far braver,
they are the heaven-sent type of irregular troopers"(,68).
The British were proud of their Navy and of the exploits
of the 19th century naval brigades, though Colomb and
Fisher believed they wasted naval manpower doing Soldiers?
work. 1 ' The naval brigades in the Boer War, like their
predecessors, gained much press and public attention, and
Captain Percy Scott of the 'Terrible' became famous. 	 At
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a time of army failure, the press emphasised naval achieve-
ment. Steevens praised the naval contingent at Ladysmith.
There most of the British guns were small and obsolescent,
"as useless as catapults"4d00), outranged by the newer
Boer guns.	 Only the six naval guns had the range to ans-
wer them. The last report he wrote, in December, praised
the naval gunners and their high morale: "Trust the sailor
to keep his self-respect, even in five weeks' beleaguered
Ladysmith"ç135).	 The naval contingent was crucial, main-
taining morale by replying to the Boer bombardment: "this
handful of sailors have been the saving of Ladysmith.
You don't know, till you have tried it, what a worm you
feel when the enemy is plugging shell into you and you
can't possibly plug back"(4,141).	 He claimed that, "The
Royal Navy is the salt of the sea and the salt of the
earth also"(143).
Description of battle was considered the supreme
task and test of the war correspondent. 	 In October 1900
he witnessed the battle of Elandslaagte. 	 He described
briefly the arrival of the British troops, the accuracy of
the Boer guns, outranging the British, and the noise.
Sometimes he wrote clich: "the first gun barked death"(48).
He noted the inconspicuousness of the khaki-uniformed
British and described the infantry attack emphasising the
intensity of the Boer rifle fire, and its results,
"on the stone-pitted hill-face burst loose that
other storm - the storm of lead, of blood, of
death.	 Men stopped and started, staggered
and dropped limply as if the string were cut
that held them upright"4,53).
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He described the continued advance, the sounds of battle -
"the pipes shrieked of blood and the lust of glorious death"
and the confusion with units, "all mixed, inextricably...all
drunk with battle, shoving through hell to the throat of the
enemy"(154).	 He described the cavalry pursuit: "There also -
thank Heaven, thank Heaven! - were squadrons of Lancers and
Dragoon Guards storming in among them, shouting, spearing,
stamping them into the ground"(25). 	 He noted the intensity
of the battle experience, "half an hour crammed with the
life of half a life-time"(ib).	 He had conveyed something
of the movement and confusion of battle, and the intensity
of Boer fire.	 Yet his was an outsider's impression, dis-
tanced, of the sight and sound of battle; an incomplete
picture, largely failing to convey the battle as soldiers'
experience, or the human cost, the wounds and suffering and
dying.	 While identifying with his compatriots and rejoic-
ing at the cavalry pursuit, he lacked the exultation of the
Atbara.	 He neither questioned nor criticised British
tactics, the massed attack into enemy rifle fire. 	 He then
described the aftermath of the battle, after nightfall: the
confusion, the cries of the wounded, the single doctor
treating them, and the soldiers' good treatment of the Boer
wounded and other prisoners.	 Again he gave a vivid but
incomplete account. He hinted, but failed to describe the
condition of the wounded: his description conveyed far less
than had Churchill's of the 21st Lancers after their Omdur-
man charge.	 He noted the inadequacy of medical provision,
but neither questioned nor criticised. 	 Later, reporting
Nicholson's Nek, he emphasised the humiliation of the
defeat: "The cursed white flag was up again over a British
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force in South Africa.. .What bitter shame for the camp!
All ashamed for England!"(79-80).	 Again he did not quest-
ion, criticise or blame - British generalship, reconnais-
sance or tactics - nor attempt to learn lessons from it.
Much of his Boer War reporting was of the siege of
Ladysmith.	 He described, initially jocularly, the bom-
bardment and its ineffectiveness - "a hollow terror" - and
the pompom's ineffectiveness. 	 Rifle fire was decisive:
"there is nothing to stir the blood like rife-fire. 	 Rifle-
fire wins or loses decisive actions"(,.106). 	 The Boers tried
to shoot officers: "Their riflemen would follow an officer
about all day with shots at 2200 yards"ç410). 	 That it was
unwise for officers to continue so dressed and accoutred
that they could be identif led over a mile away was a con-
clusion reached by some officers during the war, but not by
Steevens.	 While, unlike Amery, Wilkinson and others writ-
ing on the war, he deduced no lessons from it, he noted
that the British infantry were learning from their
experience: "When this siege is over this force ought to
be the best fighting men in the world. We are learning
lessons every day from the Boer. . .nothing but being shot
at will ever teach men the art of using cover, but they
get plenty of that nowadays"çoll7). 	 They had learned to
use thin firing lines of good shots, with supports shel-
tering hidden.	 The gunners like the Boers split their
batteries, and sheltered except when firing.
Confined in Ladysmith by the siege that dragged on
apparently indefinitely, he wrote of his own emotions.
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His morale sagged.	 He was not apparently in danger,
neither in combat nor near the front line and, as he empha-
sised, the bombardment killed few.	 He was apparently
unconcerned at the danger of disease.	 On his travels he
had risked disease - indeed, such killer diseases as typhoid
and tuberculosis were still relatively common in Britain -
and had survived.	 He had no real function: his function
was to report, and there was nothing new to report.
	 He
visited the sick and wounded to cheer and encourage them.
Yet for all his qualities and knowledge of philosophies -
12
unlike the cheerful philistine Melton Prior - apparently
he lacked the inner resources to cope with the experience
of Ladysmith.	 He repeatedly lamented the dullness of the
siege, such that he almost welcomed enemy shelling: "It was
almost a relief.	 At anyrate it was something to see and
listen to"ç116).	 He wrote, "I am sick of It.	 Everybody
Is sick of it...a weary, weary, weary bore...I feel it will
never end"ç125).	 He felt imprisoned, isolated from the
world, "Nothing to do but endure"(433). 	 He missed his
accustomed life of bustle and change, of familiar persons
and new assignments.	 He felt homesick.	 The sound of a
telephone bell momentarily brought images of home: "The
mountains and the guns went out, and there floated in that
roaring office of the 'Daily Mail' instead, and the warm,
rustling vestibule of the playhouse on a December night"4,138).
British politicians, press and public were divided
on the Boer War.	 Steevens' view of the justice, or injust-
ice of the British cause was presumably influenced by his
political beliefs and affected his entire attitudes to the
war.	 His political allegiance, if any, in his latter years
376
was not explicit in his writings, and is uncertain. 	 Glad-
stonianism was the creed of 'Little Englanders' and possibly
Steevens' increased experience of other countries, together
with the influence and possible constraint of Conservative
friends and employers and of his own prosperity, eroded his
schoolboy and undergraduate radicalism. 	 While party-poli-
tical allegiance may shape a person's attitude to defence,
his concern with defence may change his political allegiance,
as with Spenser Wilkinson, and Steevens' increased defence
awareness probably also influenced his wider politics. His
attitudes to war, defence, naval expenditure, arbitration,
social darwinism, party politicians, free trade and agricul-
ture, Turks, Greeks, Armenians and Indian politicians, all
showed his divergence from the Gladstonianism of his youth.
Such attitudes were largely held by the 'new' Right of con-
structive imperialists, a significant number of whom -
including Chamberlain, Mimer, Strachey, Arnold White and
Spenser Wilkinson - had been Liberals.' 3 However, Steevens
did not always agree with them and he criticised Chamber-
lain's imperialism.	 His views, though possibly more
bellicist than most, were also similar to those of the
defence-minded Liberal Imperialists, including Duke who
could not see his way clearly on the Boer War. Steevens,
unlike his wife, in his writing did not condemn socialism,
and possibly might have had a vague lingering sympathy for
it, but he did not advocate reforms other than for economic
competitiveness and defence. 	 Rushing from assignment to
assignment, from book to book, possibly he did not have
time, or inclination, to formulate a coherent political
philosophy, but rather retained a set of disparate, possibly
ambiguous, responses to specific causes and issues.
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Steevens' own view of the causes and justice of the
Boer War is not known, and he did not state it in his
reports.	 After his death one of his Oxford friends wrote
that before the war they had discussed it and, "I dare not
tell his views on the political question of the war. 	 They
would surprise most of his friends and admirers". 14
	In
March 1900 the Athenaeum's anonymous reviewer, believed to
be its proprietor Duke, infuriated Henley by alleging
Steevens' private opinions had differed from the message of
his journalism, that he had remained a political radical
"attached to peace" throughout his "warlike and even Jingo
writing for the Daily Mail" and that privately he had "dis-
sented at heart from the whole policy of the war".' 5 Henley
wrote privately that Duke was "a bloody liar" for thus
16
alleging Steevens was a hypocrite, which he was not. 	 In
his valedictory 'Memoir' Henley wrote that he had read
allegations that Steevens did not approve British policy in
the Sudan or South Africa, but wrote to please the public.
Henley, "as one who knew him intimately", indignantly denied
this: "He was too good an Englishman and too poor a hypo-
crite".' 7 From the evidence of Steevens' writings, Henley
was most probably right about his attitude to the Sudan.
His attitude to the Doer War is more problematic. Possibly
Henley knew him less well than he thought and Steevens,
knowing Henley's imperialism and commitment to British
policy in South Africa - Henley called Kruger "mad and
criminal" 18 - chose not to disillusion his old friend and
benefactor. Possibly, knowing Harmsworth's ruthlessness
in sacking, and the dependence of his wife and himself on
Harmsworth's erratic goodwill, Steevens may have made the
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mental adjustment which enabled journalists to work for
papers whose politics differed from their own; as Max Pem-
berton, experienced journalist and Harmsworth's employee,
later wrote, "1 do not find men so ready to fight with
their bread and butter".' 9 This is conjectural. Steevens
had earlier in 1899 in his 'New Gibbon' denounced Chamber-
lain's imperialism. 	 His reporting of the war suggested
that he may have disagreed with it or had reservations.
Unlike in his Sudan book, he had no clear message. 	 He was
silent on the background, causes, justification and possible
results of the war, and did not condemn the Boers. 	 He
praised the British troops and lamented their defeats, but
was silent on the British commanders. 	 He did not analyse
or criticise.	 Though not fully comparable as his Sudan
book was a finished work and his Boer War reporting an
uncompleted series of despatches, the similarities and con-
trasts between the two are indicative of his attitudes. In
both he identified with and praised the British forces,
assumed British superiority over natives, and accepted the
warrior ethos.	 In his Sudan book he placed the campaign
in its historical context, and presented it as moving
inexorably towards it final goal: the campaign was British
victories, and the regime they destroyed was evil. He
eulogised the British commanders, especially Kitchener,
reinforcing the Victorian public's view of successful
generals as heroes.	 His reporting of the Boer War was
different, almost the opposite.	 Possibly he had starred
with doubts as to the justification of the war then become
disillusioned with its conduct, but felt unable to state
this, possibly from loyalty when the war was so obviously
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unsuccessful.	 The certainty of his Sudan reporting had
gone.	 He conveyed no sense of purpose or achievement. He
was less interested than in the Sudan campaign, which had
fascinated him.	 He ignored the British commanders.	 He
identified with the Sudan campaign but apparently never
came to terms with the Boer War. Possibly had he survived
he might have become a 'pro-Boer' or, like Amery, a military
reformer.	 Possibly, trapped in the immediacy of his own
experience, he could not yet see clearly and decide.
Possibly partly from lack of motivation, he was a
flawed reporter of the war. 	 Omitting historical context,
his work lacked depth. 	 He failed to investigate, analyse
and criticise.	 He omitted much.	 He showed the effect of
firepower, and the changing British tactics, but largely
ignored other ranks and hardly showed the horror and suffer-
ing.	 He presented vivid, but partial and superficial,
impressions, and his impressions were insufficient by them-
selves to adequately describe a war such as the Boer War.
Myopic and unperceptive, he portrayed a war without shape.
More could reasonably have been expected of a man of his
ability, advantages and experience.	 Possibly had he sur-
vived he might have written a different better book. After
his death his reports were hastily compiled into a book, "an
unfinished record", From Capetown to Ladysmith, which was
favourably reviewed. 	 As a reporter of the war and contem-
porary historian he proved inadequate. 	 Yet he is signif i-
cant because he wrote for the paper with the highest daily
circulation, because his books were widely read and
because he was so highly regarded by contemporaries.
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10.	 CONCLUSION: MESSAGE AND RESPONSES
Steevens, who won academic success then fame as a war
correspondent, came from a family neither academic nor miii-
tary but suburban lower middle class; higher in the gradat-
ions of Victorian snobbery than Wells', and aspiring to clerk-
ing rather than shop-walking. 	 He was saved from Pooterdom
by a scholarship at the City of London School. Academically
brilliant, he won a Balliol scholarship and university
success and could have had an academic career, but entered
journalism.	 His 1893 article 'The Futile Don' expressed
his reaction from academia and conviction that real life was
elsewhere: he apparently overreacted, rejecting scholarly
research criteria and so flawing his books after Naval Policy.
Sympathetic, humorous, witty, exceptionally able and glowing
with Oxonian kudos, he attracted patrons and helpers: the
scholarship boy entered smart society. 	 Befriended by Oscar
Browning and by Henley he began his journalistic career at
Cambridge, then on the Pall Mall Gazette. 	 In 1896 he was
launched into final success when Harmsworth employed him on
the Daily Mail, then sent him on overseas star reporting
assignments including the three wars. 	 In his "aureum
guinguennium" he produced an exceptionally large, varied and
impressive oeuvre, and achieved fame)'
Steevens wrote much.	 His articles in the reviews,
better written than his daily journalism, and his books -
rather than his daily journalism - stated what he believed
important, his chosen message. He gained fame as a des-
criptive writer, but his was seldom neutral description.
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He had been a leader-writer and navalist propagandist, and
he continued to dogmatise and persuade. 	 At school, Oxford
and Cambridge he had been a political radical. 	 However as
a London journalist he worked for Unionist papers and his
message was minimally radical and became dominated by con-
cerns of navalism and imperial defence. 	 The Gladstonian
schoolboy was succeeded by the imperialist, bellicist,
social-darwinist adult. 	 His social darwinism resulted from
his experiences and the influences on him. The London lower
middle class well knew that life was a struggle for survival.
His school, if less immediately darwinist than Kipling's,
and his college were intensely competitive. 	 Classically
educated and having rejected his family's Christianity, he
was probably influenced by the harsh assumptions of anti-
quity, and he shared his generation's awareness of the Roman
Empire analogy.	 He wrote at a time of increased inter-
national hostility and threat, with colonial, naval and
economic rivalry and Britain having unusually bad relations
with other great powers.	 Social darwinist declarations and
"unspoken assumptions" were widespread and pervasive through-
out Europe and the United States, with an effect of self-ful-
filling prophecy. 2 Traditional military ideology had much
in common with social darwinism, and as a war correspondent
he was probably further influenced by the officers with whom
he campaigned.	 Forbes was sentimental, repeatedly referring
back to childhood memories.	 Steevens, possibly because he
was so young, was in his writings unsentimental and little
concerned with the past, except insofar as he wanted to pre-
serve traditional rural society not because of the past but
because of the future. 	 He was proud of his strenuous
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unsentimental modernity, and wrote enthusiastically of
machinery, Zola and Ibsen.	 Social darwinism - tough,
unsentimental, modern and fashionable - fitted his pre-
dilections and his perception of Britain's need.
The continuing unifying theme of his writing was
social darwinism: the assumptions of conflict, struggle, sur-
vival, deterioration or strengthening, victory or defeat and
destruction. 3	It underlay his message on foreign states,
international relations, arbitration, the navy, empire, race,
social change and war.	 It underlay his suspicion, apparent
pessimism and paranoia, and tendency to worst-case analyses
of foreign intentions towards Britain. 	 He saw international
relations as conflict and stated that weakness invited others'
aggression.	 He viewed foreign states primarily as rivals
and threats or possible allies in the international struggle.
He despised those nations and peoples he believed failures
lacking the qualities necessary for the struggle. 	 He con-
demned arbitration because states would fight for what they
believed vital and because it was not impartial but a conti-
nuation of the struggle by another means, to Britain's dis-
advantage.	 He advocated a stronger navy as vital for
defence against predatory foreign powers. 	 He believed the
Empire necessary for British survival in the great-power
struggle, and British imperial expansion the triumph of the
superior over the inferior: the Empire resulted from British
fitness to be an imperial power.	 He shared the social-
darwinist assumption of evolutionist racial hierarchy. 	 He
was proud of his own race, respectful of Americans, Germans
and Boers, and contemptuous of those he believed inferior
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and unfit: American negroes, Greeks and Egyptians. 	 His
social darwinism pervaded his writing on Britain. Holistic,
he believed in the indivisibility of national life and that
apparently non-military factors could weaken for the military
struggle.	 He advocated national toughness and that the
unfit should not be assisted to survive since this would
weaken the nation.	 His tough-minded attitudes - and he
apparently assumed that not to be tough-minded was a national
and imperial betrayal - led to harsh and apparently callous
and cynical views, in contrast to his own kindness in per-
sonal relationships, and to his condoning the Armenian
massacres and his condemnation of faddists and pauperising.
He emphasised morale: Britons had to be tough and tough-
minded for Britain to be fit to survive. 	 Sympathy and
sentimentality were debilitating luxuries. 	 Since weakness
invited aggression Britain had to both be and appear to be
strong.	 He attacked politicians who failed to prepare
Britain for the stuggle, and he despised his social infer-
iors when he believed inadequate, mentally and physically,
for the struggle.	 He condemned rural depopulation and
urbanization, despite his own affection for London, because
they weakened the nation militarily.	 He warned that Bri-
tain was endangered by physical and moral deterioration.
Like others, Steevens had mixed motives, prejudices and
priorities.	 He did not proclaim "social darwinism" as
such but his thinking and his message were based on its
assumptions.	 It pervaded his writings: preparation for
the struggle, especially military, was his continuing cri-
terion.	 He was not totally and consistently social dar-
winist.	 His residual radicalism occasionally defeated
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his ascendant social darwinism: in America he condemned
the trusts and their crushing of the weak. 	 He was also
influenced by other popular attitudes and their accept-
ability to his readers.	 His justification of the Empire
was based not only on British fitness to rule and the bene-
fit to Britain, especially in military power, but also on
the benefit to the subject peoples, "the white man's burden".
While he condoned Turkish massacre of Armenians, he con-
demned on moral and humanitarian grounds Mandist rule in
the Sudan and so justified its destruction by the British.
His praise of the British was possibly partly to counter
his anxieties about the coming struggle; his emotion and
diatribes because he saw Britain endangered and unprepared.
His social darwinism was apparently reinforced by the
influence of Clausewitz, largely through Spenser Wilkinson.
Clausewitz's emphasis on the nation, on moral forces and on
war as the continuation of policy, all reinforced Steevens'
4	 .	 ..
convictions.	 His bellicism was integral with his social
darwinism.	 War was part of international relations and
the ultimate test, for individuals and nations, of fitness
to survive.	 One had to prepare and face the challenge,
and accept the horrors of war.	 Overemphasis on them,
rather than on war's positive attributes, might demoralise;
the fighter and the nation needed inspiration and encourage-
ment.	 He portrayed war as necessary, acceptable, heroic,
challenging, exciting and adventurous: its negative aspects
minimised and countered by its positive - the written
equivalent of the Victorian battle painting.
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Briefly at the end of the 19th century Steevens was
probably the best known and possibly the most influential
British journalist.	 Contemporaries exceptionally praised
him and his writings. 	 Journalists, soldiers, defence-pub-
heists, navahists and imperialists; in private correspon-
dence, memoirs, and obituaries in varied publications,
eulogised him. 5 Kitchener described him as, "a model
respondent, the best I have ever known...a genius. ..he had
real insight into military af fairs". 6	E.S. May, who knew
him at Ladysmith, wrote that of the correspondents he was
"most gifted of all". 7 Harmsworth claimed his war corres-
pondence "should be read by everyone commencing journalism"
The Spectator called With Kitchener to Khartum "a master-
piece". 9 Churchill described him as, "the most brilliant
man in journalism I have ever met", and H.L. Mencken called
him, "the greatest newspaper reporter who ever lived".'0
Other correspondents praised by attempting imitation,
though achieving only a debased "bang-bang" sensationalism.
After his death Henley wrote that since Dickens died, "no
death that one can recall in letters has so moved the
English-speaking world"." Kipling wrote valedictory
verse, and Steevens was deemed worthy of a memorial edition
and biographies in the standard reference works. 	 Some
modified their praise by gentle criticism: The Times,
Henley, Sidney Lee and J.B. Atkins claimed that, straining
for effect and writing too easily and hurriedly, he failed
to achieve his full potential and that only a small
fraction of his work did justice to him.12
Such eulogy may puzzle later readers, for there were
others against whom he could be measured and of whom he
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fell short.	 He had limitations partly explicable by his
youth - hence possibly his dogmatism and intolerance -
relative inexperience, 'culture shock' and attempting too
much, too quickly, and possibly in part from the journalist
career pattern.	 Young gentlemen from Oxford or Cambridge
were not sent out to learn reporting, but set to write
leaders, which encouraged pontificating without compilation
of evidence.' 3 Despite his care and effort with his writ-
ing, 14 he was neither a great writer nor a great journalist.
He lacked sufficient research, expertise, analysis and pro-
found insight.	 His work lacked historical depth and per-
spective.	 He lacked sympathy, imagination and ability to
envisage future potential and development: his mind seemed
blinkered by immediacy.	 His work was often superficial,
tending to oversimplification and reductionism, and some-
times hyperbole.	 He denounced much but, excepting his
naval writings, offered few constructive proposals. Despite
reviewers' claims he never, unlike Kipling, attained to
literature.	 He accepted too much and inquired too little.
Stead claimed, "A journalist is, or ought to be, a per-
15petual note of interrogation".	 Steevens failed to
question and investigate and, unlike Russell, MacGahan or
Stead, he never pioneered and revealed and so influenced
opinion as to change government policy: he lacked their
achievement.	 Bullard called him, "an almost unique com-
bination of scholar and journalist") 6 Yet in abandoning
an academic career - his attitude indicated by his article,
'The Futile Don' - he largely abandoned academic standards.
His approach was unscholarly: after Naval Policy he did not
research his subjects.	 In 1896, before he became a war
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correspondent, he had admitted he knew nothing of military
affairs yet thereafter apparently did little to remedy this.
His reputation was largely from his war correspondence, but
he lacked the experience, knowledge and insight which enabled
Archibald Forbes to present so much fuller a picture of a war,
and to relate a specific campaign to wider military Issues
and problems.	 He failed to relate his war reporting to the
issues debated by the military and defence-minded - by con-
servatives and reformers, 'continentalists' and 'imperial' -
including the effects of increased firepower, infantry tactics
and capability, cavalry armament and role, mounted infantry
and, much publicised in 1899, the ideas of Bloch on the
future of war.' 7 On conscription he was inconclusive. He
failed to ask the right questions.	 He was insufficiently
interested in defence and war: his ambition was elsewhere,
to write his magnum opus on London "in its various and con-
tradictory aspects".' 8 His avoidance of the technical,
though praised by contemporaries, flawed his reporting.
Intelligent, able and with critical faculties unconstrained
by military training and tradition, he might reasonably have
been expected to be more perceptive and critical, especially
on the Boer War.	 The best journalism was based on study,
expertise and experience. 	 Steevens apparently assumed that
intelligence, flair and style sufficed.	 They did for the
'new journalism' - The Times obituary noted he had "a style
well suited to the journalism of the newer kind" - and to
evaluate Steevens is to evaluate the standards of the 'new
journalism' of which he was the most praised writer and
whose faults he partly shared.	 But they did not suffice
for the journalism that from the quality of Its Information
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and ideas was taken seriously by national decision-makers:
that of, for example, Wilkinson, G.S. Clarke or Amery.
According to the Spectator obituary, "he cherished serious
literary ambitions and looked forward to emancipation from
the tyranny of his journalistic popularity". 	 Although at
Balliol he had read some ancient history and considered
becoming an historian, and although through his books he
functioned as a contemporary historian, he was not an his-
torian, and his values were a journalist's. 	 His priority
was "good copy" and this he provided. 	 However Daily Mail
"good copy" and books compiled from it without further
research, were inadequate as serious journalism or as con-
temporary history.	 The Times obituary listed his books and
commented: "This is a remarkable list for a man who has died
at the age of thirty".	 He had been a young man in a hurry,
rushing from assignment to assignment without time to know
any in depth.	 The price of his impressively extensive
oeuvre was superficiality, quantity at the cost of quality.
His achievement was limited: his journalism and books were
largely superficial impressions. 	 Yet his reputation was
disproportionate to his achievement.
He early gained success and fame, and his reputation
continued to grow. 	 Why he was so highly regarded by con-
temporaries is significant, indicative both of his quali-
ties and his contemporaries' values.	 "The past is a for-
eign country": his reputation is explicable primarily in
terms of the specific complex of contemporary attitudes, the
spirit of the age.	 In part his reputation derived from his
Oxonian success, then probably more valued than before or
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since, and from the boosting of Henley and Harmsworth:
Harmsworth, who never attended university, was possibly over-
impressed by academic achievement. 20	In part Steevens'
reputation derived from the attractions of his personality,
conversation and wit; in part, including the Harmsworth
hyperbole, from his friends' shock at his unexpected early
death and lost potential, their Lycidas. 21	His reputation
was largely from potential rather than achievement. Abrahams
wrote that, "all that can be put down on paper of the events
of his life is, of course, a very inadequate measure of his
great gifts. . .all his friends regarded such successes as com-
paratively slight episodes in his career". 22 Contemporaries
valued him for hs character, style and message. They praised
his friendship, sweet nature, magnanimity, sincerity, courage
and honour: his logical, curious mind, "never satisfied with
23his knowledge"; his hard work, wit and humour.
Contemporaries praised him as a journalist and writer,
and for his style. 	 He was seen as an innovative writer, and
his success was partly from novelty. 	 Oscar Browning claimed
that, "He initiated not only a new conception of journalism,
but a new style of English writing, never seen either before
or since", and Black and White praised his writing as,
"modern to the last degree of up-to-dateness". 24 Contem-
poraries praised his writing for its vigour, vividness,
pictorial and cinematographic qualities, and "power of
literary impressionism". 25 Abrahams praised his "avoidance
of whatever was pretentious, technical or irrelevant".26
The Spectator praised his "seeing eye" and Spenser Wilkinson
wrote that, "even the dullest of readers could hardly fail
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to see what he wished them to see". 27 Contemporaries
claimed his writing attracted both the million and the elect.
Henley compared him to Dickens, Stevenson and Kipling, claim-
ing he could "both understand and see", praised his imagina-
tion and "peculiar capacity for vision and realisation" and
claimed, "he stood alone among English journalists". 28	It
was suggested that after his wanderings he would have settled
and written some great work, that he might have been "the
Kinglake of the Transvaal". 29 Abrahams claimed that, "if
he had lived, he would have been recognised as one of the
leaders of thought among his contemporaries".30
Steevens' message was central to his success and
reputation.	 lie succeeded largely because of the quality of
his writing and because he wrote what his readers wanted.
He often responded emotionally, and his emotion was that of
his readers.	 Abrahams noted that he wrote of, "the count-
ries in which Englishmen are most deeply interested, and
the stirring events which are changing in our generation
the position of the British Empire". 3 '	 Henley wrote that,
"he had identified himself so keenly and so intimately with
32	 .the greatness of England". 	 Contemporaries praised his
patriotism and imperialism, his increasing of popular
imperialism and educating the public to, "a pride in our
country's imperial destiny". 33 One contemporary claimed,
"What Mr. Kipling has done for fiction Mr. Steevens did for
fact.	 He was a priest of the Imperialist idea, and the
glory of the Empire was ever uppermost in his writings".34
The Morning Post tribute claimed that, "It is given to some
journalists to wield great influence, and few have done more
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to spread the imperial idea than has been done by Mr. Stee-
vens during the last four or five years of his brief life".35
It was claimed that he could have taken a leading role in
36influencing the public to press for military reform. 	 Con-
temporaries largely praised his qualities and minimised his
faults.	 His significance was that, despite his limitations
relative to outstanding contemporary writers for the press,
he was so praised.	 It was as the publicist of what so many
of his contemporaries believed and wanted confirmed - for
his patriotism, imperialism, ethnocentrism, bellicism, naval-
ism, tough-mindedness, prejudices, antagonisms, pride, pes-
simism and optimism, hopes and fears, that he was so valued.
He presented war as his contemporaries wanted to perceive it.
None of his admirers wrote that his death condemned war. His
historical significance was his typicality of his age, as a
spokesman: he articulated a zeitgeist. 	 His content unori-
ginal and largely superficial but his style novel, he bright-
ly repackaged the conventional wisdom.	 Contemporaries -
journalists, politicians and soldiers - believed the 'Fourth
Estate' influential and able to change history, and his
admirers claimed he had great influence. 37 The Spectator
claimed his reporting was very popular and that, "no jour-
nalist, indeed no writer of recent times, had a wider or
more varied circle of readers". 38 Recently H.J. Field has
claimed that Steevens was characteristic of "homo imperiosus"
and that his Daily Mail journalism was crucial in "co-opting
the masses" to imperialism. 39 However his influence,
though extensive and considerable, can only be conjectured.
The Daily Mail was the largest-circulation daily, read by
middle class, artisans and politicians though, as Garvin
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told Harmsworth, the political lite was influenced by The
Times not the Mail.	 Steevens' articles in the serious
reviews were read by the lite, and his books were reviewed
by papers read by them, including The Times and the
Spectator and read by some of them.	 His influence was
further spread, and lingered on, through cheap editions,
school readers and history handbooks for elementary teachers°
Probably his writings reached an extensive largely middle-
class, already-imperialist readership, and confirmed rather
than converted.41
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CHAPTER VI FICTION OF FUTURE WARS
1.	 THEMES
Another medium of input of images and concepts of war
and defence was the genre of tales of imaginary future war
which has been studied by I.F. Clarke and, relative to the
invasion issue, by Howard Moon.' In 1871 Colonel George
Chesney's The Battle of Dorking told of German invasion end-
ing British power, prosperity and empire. 2	It emphasised
themes that were to recur in later tales: the warning of
British vulnerability and unpreparedness and of foreign
threat, the denunciation of existing society, the contempt
for politics and politicians especially Radical and, above
all, the "if only" theme that disaster was preventable if
only the necessary changes were made in time. 	 Internation-
ally famous and much imitated, it began the genre of pur-
posive fiction of imaginary future wars, a favourite pro-
paganda device that flourished in Britain and on the Con-
tinent until the Great War, attempting to warn, persuade
and entertain.
The tales differed in purpose and emphasis. 	 Some
were primarily propaganda for defence change. 	 Some were
by hacks like William Le Queux, exploiting the genre's
popularity and profitability.	 Some were especially con-
cerned with the nature of war: strategy, tactics, matriel
and combat experience.	 This type was pioneered by H.O.
Arnold-Forster's In a Conning Tower (1888) which described
a duel between a British and a French ironclad culminating
in the British ramming and sinking the French. 	 Its success
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was followed in Britain by a new school of fiction of future
naval wars - expressing and reinforcing current naval anxiety
and navalism - which included G.S. Clarke's The Last Great
Naval War (1891) and Admiral Colomb's The Great War of 189-
(1892).	 Another example was William Laird Clowes' The Cap-
tam of the "Mary Rose" (1892).	 Clowes, a journalist, naval
historian and leading navalist publicist who initiated the
1893 naval scare, wrote his tale to show the probable "sea-
fighting of tomorrow" 3 and spread his navalist message: warn-
ing of naval unpreparedness, demanding Admiralty reorganizat-
ion and asserting, contrary to his later views, the necessity
of holding the Mediterranean.	 While it was Intended pri-
marily for adults, he wrote that he hoped British boys would
read It and grow up interested in naval matters so that
future public would not be navally ignorant and apathetic.4
The future-war genre overlapped and merged with others. Some
future war tales were written for boys, for example those by
Dr Gordon Stables, the best-selling boys' adventure-writer
and B.O.P. contributor: The cruise of the "Vengeful": A
Story of the Royal Navy (1902) and The Meteor Flag of England
(1905) both telling of surprise invasions and, despite
Stables' naval background, urging adequate land defences,
their message contrary to the navalists' and resembling that
of the 1859 commission and the army Invasionists. 5 The
Cruise of the "Vengeful" was probably partly derived from
Le Queux's The Great War in England in 1897 (1894): an
example of derivation within the genre. 6 Other tales had
an immediate purpose, for example Harmsworth's electioneer-
ing 'Siege of Portsmouth' (1895).	 The tales expressed
current fears and emnities. 8 During the Anglo-French
398
hostility from 1882 to 1903 France, sometimes with Russia,
was the fictional enemy.	 Later, with the Anglo-German
antagonism, from Erskine Childers' The Riddle of the Sands
(1903) the enemy was usually Germany.	 Advocates of com-
pulsory military training used fiction as propaganda.
Probably the best-known such tale was Le Queux's Harmsworth-
promoted, Roberts-advised sensational The Invasion of 1910
(1906), thick with cliché and atrocity, warning of Britain's
unpreparedness and the necessity of heeding Roberts, before
too late. 9 The tales repeatedly denounced British faults
and decadence.
The future-war tales expressed and reinforced current
attitudes to war, especially war as acceptable, exciting and
romantic. They usually minimised the horrors of battle and
were not explicit on wounds, mutilation and suffering. Some
later tales emphasised, still inexplicitly and without
detail, foreign and mob atrocities.	 Most assumed future
wars would resemble past wars, and portrayed short wars of
movement and rapid decisive battles, of cavalry charges and
close-order bayonet attacks, and of decisive fleet actions
as at Trafalgar) 0 Their assumptions were often obsolete
in terms of weaponry, and they failed to realise the impli-
cations of increased firepower, the possibility of prolonged
trench warfare and the possible scale and duration of war.
They failed to see the effects on industry and the need for
a massive munitions industry in a major war: munitions were
hardly if ever mentioned. 	 They portrayed war as disrupt-
ing the economy, causing unemployment and distress, not as
transforming the economy. 	 I.F. Clarke has claimed that
399
while the military experts failed to foresee the nature of
future war, imaginative civilan writers - Bloch, Robida,
Wells and Conan Doyle - came nearest to the truth." How-
ever most civilian writers of future-war fiction were no
more prescient than the military, whose assumptions they
shared.	 Among the recurring themes were the 'bolt from
the blue', the 'fifth column' of resident foreigners, food
shortage and starvation with government laissez-faire
inactivity, popular discontent and riots,' 2 and their
exploitation by socialists, anarchists, criminals, aliens
and enemy agents. 	 Another recurring theme was the enemy
agent and spy: cunning, ruthless and evil. 	 Le Queux, who
claimed he was a spy, counterspy and espionage expert, wrote
repeatedly of spies and their threat to Britain. 13	In his
melodramatic The Great War in England in 1897 (1894) -
written for Harmsworth and recommended by Roberts and F.N.
Maude - a French agent employed as a clerk at the Admiralty
killed the officer responsible for sending mobilisation tele-
grams to naval units, and sent telegrams ordering them away:
"England was left unprotected". 14	In England's Peril (1899),
the villainous head of the French secret service attempted
by blackmail to obtain Britain's anti-invasion plans. 	 Le
Queux claimed, "The secret intelligence departments of the
three great Powers are marvellously well organised and
possess some of the most adroit thieves and irrepressible
adventurers...utterly unscrupulous.. .It is known in the dip-
lomatic circle that England swarms with spies".' 5 Later
Le Queux wrote, again for Harmsworth, The Invasion of 1910
(1906) in which Germans resident in England, spies and sabo-
teurs, prepared for the invasion.	 In 1909 he published his
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influential Spies of the Kaiser which he claimed was "based
upon the serious facts within my own personal knowledge. . .1
have before me a file of amazing documents".16
The future-war tales varied in their messages. 	 Some
were vehicles for specific demands for reform and of strate-
gic and tactical doctrines, part of wider pressure-group
campaigns.	 Occasionally they criticised Admiralty faults,
as did W.L. Clowes' and C.N. Robinson's The Great Naval War
of 1887 (1887).	 Written by navalists, it supported Beres-
ford's campaign for Admiralty reform and especially an
effective planning department.	 In 1887 Beresford 'leaked'
his memorandum on the lack of war-planning to the Pall Mall
Gazette.	 Clowes and Robinson took this as their text,
printing part of it on their title page. 	 Their tale showed
the disastrous results of lack of naval planning and pre-
paration.	 The French, well-prepared, began the war with
surprise attacks. 	 In England, "The machinery of the
Admiralty and War Office collapsed under the
strain...and incredible confusion resulted".' 7	Neither the
fleet nor coast defences were ready and after only two weeks'
war Britain was "at the mercy of the enemy". 18 The tale
ended with the statement that this was the preventable result
of years of negligence and mismanagement. 	 Expressing widely-
held belief, tales more often criticised the War Office than
the Admiralty.	 One example was G.S. Clarke's pseudonymous
The Last Great Naval War (1891). 	 Clarke was a navalist and
advocate of War Officer reform. He expressed his Blue Water
views on the efficacy of naval defence against invasion, cri-
ticising Chesney's and other tales which had denied it:
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"ingenious and vivid fictions...in which the British navy
was spirited away in the opening pages, and successful
invasion, with the occupation of London, quickly followed
•	 •	 , 19in logical sequence'.	 He condemned the War Office as
over-centralised, inefficient, confused, overwhelmed by its
own paperwork, unprepared for war, bungling and causing
unnecessary losses: "Want of preparation for some of the
most probable contingencies of war, combined with a centra-
used administration.. .a byword of inefficiency, proved a
heavy handicap to the British army"(f,101).
Another recurring theme was imperialism: the possible
loss of the Empire, the necessity of imperial defence, and
the possible colonial and Indian contribution to defence;
shown, for example, in Clarke's Naval War and Le Queux's
invasion tales.	 In Clarke's tale colonial forces attacked
French colonies, and in Le Queux's Great War Bengal lancers
and Gurkhas fought French invaders in London. 	 Some tales,
notably those of Clarke and Colomb, were written from Blue
Water assumptions.	 Most, from Chesney's Battle of Dorking
on, were based on the invasionist assumption that naval
defence alone could not be relied upon: on the assumption
of the possible absence of the fleet, destroyed by some
secret weapon - as with Chesney's "fatal engines which sent
our ships one after the other, to the bottom" 20- or "decoyed"
•	 21
away as in Le Queux's Great War,	 or because the fleet was
distant enough for sufficient time, as in F.N. Maude's The
New Battle of Dorking (1900) when the squadrons were in the
Mediterranean and on manoeuvres off Ireland, so the French
could rush across the Channel.	 Le Queux's Invasion of 1910,
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written during the controversy between Blue Water navalists
and compulsionist invasionists, denounced, "the sleek, soft-
spoken, self-confident Blue Water School"(24).
2.	 EXAMPLES
The diversity of the input on war and defence was fur-
ther exemplified In the Earl of Mayo's The War Cruise of the
'Aries' (1894).	 Mayo was a leading Anglo-Irish landowner
with no special knowledge of naval warfare, and his tale was
about the ram as a weapon. Warships then had ram bows and
some vessels, called 'rams', were designed largely for ram-
ming, for example the Polyphemus of 1881.22 She had a more
distinguished fictional than actual career, fighting the
4)3
French in three fictional wars.' 	 However in the 'eighties
and 'nineties expert opinion was tending against ramming.
Mayo's tale was apparently inspired by the 1893 sinking of
the Victoria which he claimed showed that, "in any future
,24
war at sea the ram would play a most important part' .	 The
tale was of a near-future Anglo-French war. A private syn-
dicate, on the initiative of an Irish landowner, built the
rain Aries, "simply a battering-ram with a ship built round
It"(13), which successfully fought the French until finally
defeated by a superior force. Mayo's tale was poorly-
written and implausible: for example, the wartime avail-
ability of shipyard capacity for such a private venture.
Though by a respected public figure, it probably had little
influence.	 It is an example of a work by a person ignorant
of his subject, disseminating data that was obsolete and
inaccurate.	 The leading defence publicists operated within
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a context not only of innovation and analysis, but also of
continued dissemination to the public of the outmoded and
irrational.
A significant example of propagandist future war
fiction was H.W. Wilson's and Arnold White's When War Breaks
Out (1898).	 Wilson was an Oxford graduate and leading naval
journalist - on The Times then the Daily Mail - navalist pub-
licist and naval historian: his Ironclads in Action (1896),
with an introduction by Mahan, was a standard work.	 He was
a founder member of the Navy League and edited its Journal
from 1895 to 1908 when he joined the Imperial Maritime League.
White was a sensationalist popular journalist, 'Vanoc' of
the Referee, social-imperialist and 'Efficiency' advocate,
Navy Leaguer and friend of Fisher. 25 His books included the
social-imperialist jeremiad Efficiency and Empire (1901) and
his propaganda for children, The Navy: Its place in British
History (1912) epitomising navalist doctrine and claiming,
"Upon the strength, discipline, spirit and efficiency of the
Navy, the future of every boy and girl in the Empire
depends"(2O6).
When War Breaks Out told of a Franco-Russian attack on
England in 1900.	 In LondonEast End aliens, anarchists and
socialists rioted: "The foulest scum of Europe exists in
London...the anarchist dregs of every country...The crowd
was largely composed of foreigners whose sinister faces
showed that they believed their opportunity had come...six
policemen had been killed, two of them mutilated in true
continental style"(31,41). 	 There was sufficient food in
404
the country but "cosmopolitan speculators...wallowing in
boundless wealth and luxury"(45) caused immense price
increases !icti, with unemployment, working-class hunger and
even starvation,	 provoked riots and demands for ending
the war.	 There were insufficient battleships and "an apall-
ing deficiency of cruisers"(52) for commerce protection,
resulting in ruinous shipping losses: "How plainly England
now sees that with such a mercantile fleet as hers, supremacy
at sea is absolutely essential"(ib).	 Finally there was a
decisive British naval victory, off Beachy Head. The tale,
like others of the genre, was poorly-written,clich'd, some-
times inaccurate, and expressed its authors' views on defence
controversies.	 It was written from Blue Water assumptions
and demanded a stronger navy.	 It warned against foreign
spies.	 It assumed war would be short, with a decisive naval
battle.	 It warned that food supply would be crucial in war:
an issue then emphasised by some of the defence-minded
demanding state granaries. 26	It condemned the proposal -
advocated by Tryon, G.S. Clarke and others - for wartime
state shipping insurance - as impracticable, "a prey to
every fraudulent shipowner"ç,53), and claimed, "the only
feasible system of National Insurance is...a strong and
adequate navy"(ib).	 It asserted the difficulty of blockade
with the strain and exhaustion of personnel and problems of
coal.	 Its authors, familiar with the latest naval thinking,
differed from Mayo on ramming.	 It expressed also an assump-
tion common in its genre: that in a major war against Euro-
pean powers the government, instead of assuming special
powers and controlling the domestic situation, would be a
passive bystander in economic and social problems, continuing
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laissez-faire inaction despite popular misery and unrest.27
Moreover, as in Clarke's Naval War, it assumed that instead
of directing public opinion the government would be much
influenced by it and might even be forced to make peace. At
the end of the book the authors stated its lessons: no con-
cession to foreign encroachments - a repeated imperialist
28demand expressed, for example, by Spenser Wilkinson - a
home-grown food supply and a sufficiently strong navy:
"Eighty-five years of peace had tempted England to forget
the realities of national existence: one hundred days' war
have taught her anew the lesson of sea-power - a lesson which
will not be forgotten by this generation"ç,94). 	 The tale was
characteristic both in expressing concepts typical of its
genre, and expressing its authors' particular antipathies,
notably White's hostility to alien immigration.29
Other tales also warned of the disastrous effects of
wartime food shortage. 3°	 In Charles Gleig's When All Men
Starve (1898) there were food shortages, bread riots, attacks
on horses for meat, policemen massacred, and socialist revo-
lution.	 In Allen Clarke's Starved into Surrender (1904)
food shortage led to rioting, looting, anarchy, atrocities,
cannibalism, and finally to a socialist Utopia.
Another example of future-war fiction as propaganda
was Colonel F.N. Maude's The New Battle of Dorking (1900).
Maude was a leading and extreme Prussian-influenced conti-
nentalist publicist, without combat experience, who asserted
the mass offensive and morale and denounced Bloch's doctrines
especially on firepower, the "impassable zone of fire" and
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the supremacy of the defensive.	 In 1900 with the Boer
War reverses, almost the entire regular army overseas - the
Royal Tournament had to be performed by the Navy and Volun-
teers - and continental, especially French, hostility, there
was another invasion scare. 32 The invasion scare provoked
more future-war tales, including Maude's New Battle of Dork-
a vehicle for his views on the French invasion threat,
Bloch, firepower and tactics.	 He claimed the British fleet
could not prevent a surprise French invasion: "Our fleet,
even if double the present strength, could not get up steam
in time to prevent a landing"tjxiv). 	 The tale was set in
August 1900 and told of a French invasion, in the absence
of the British fleet. 	 The invaders almost succeeded, but
were defeated.	 Maude's tale had many recurring features of
its genre: patriotism, imperialism, undeclared war, govern-
ment laissez-faire on food and employment, 'disloyalists',
riots, denunciation of politicians, and citing with approval
the warnings of like-minded persons, here of Stead. 	 It
also stated Maude's doctrine on weapons and tactics. 	 He
condemned "the fallacies of the Bloch school"ç061) and
asserted the effectiveness of infantry close-order frontal
bayonet assault and of cavalry charges. He claimed the
British should not have abandoned dum-dum bullets, 33 and
condemned the "tactical monstrosities evolved in South
Africa"242) and especially open order.	 Close order
increased firepower, as could be proven mathematically, and
so would defeat extended order.	 An individual had no great-
er chance of death in close than extended order, and a lance
wound was more lethal than that of a modern bullet.34
Maude's tale was controversial. 	 It was significant as an
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"illuminating extreme" and as a continentalist contribution
to tactical debate and to the public's images of war and
defence.
Implicitly answering Maude was another book by an army
officer using the genre to contribute to military debate and
as propaganda for tactical doctrine, Captain W.E. Cairnes'
The Coming Waterloo (1901).	 Cairnes was a middle-aged
infantry officer without combat experience who, while his
regiment served in the Doer War, was adjutant to a Yorkshire
Volunteer battalion. 35 He was also a contributor to the
Liberal Westminster Gazette.	 He was an 'imperial', anti-
continentalist army reformer who believed it was necessary
36
to educate public opinion on the army's needs. 	 He had
written, on the Boer War, An Absent-Minded War (1900) which
Edward Spiers has called, "possibly the most famous critique
of the state of the army and the conduct of the war by the
War Office". 37	In it he denounced the army's faults as
revealed in the war and demanded reform, including of muske-
try, field training and tactics: the army should, "abandon
that blind adherence to German methods which experience
shows is quite unfitted to our needs"(p145). 	 He repeated
his demand for reform in The Army From Within (1901), again
emphasising musketry, field training and the importance of
the Doer War as the test of the army. 	 In The Coming Water-
loo he reinforced the message of his earlier writings. 	 Set
in 1903, it described an Anglo-French war in which the Bri-
tish invaded France and defeated the French. 	 He portrayed
the army as having learned the lessons of the Boer War and
reformed accordingly.	 He asserted the dominance of infantry
408
firepower, especially of rifle-fire, and the futility of
charges against it: "it's suicide to advance within five hun-
dred yards of decent infantry so long as they've got their
wits about them"4322). 	 He concluded by asserting the super-
iority of the British professional lite army over mass Euro-
pean conscripts: "The highly-trained few will annihilate the
half-trained multitude in the fighting of the future"(r364).
The debate continued.38
3.	 CONCLUSION
Defence was controversial and from The Battle of Dork-
ing, denounced by Gladstone, future-war fiction continued
controversial.	 Some condemned it as alarmist, scare-monger-
ing and increasing international hostility: such critics were
in turn criticised in the fiction. 39	Some criticised,
mocked and parodied its more extreme and implausible mani-
festations, or specific doctrines.	 In 1903 the Spectator
criticised "the wildly improbable tales"and in 1906 it
attacked "sensational fancies" conveying conscriptionist
propaganda. 4° In 1910 Charles Lowe, in the Liberal Con-
temporary Review, denounced the invasion and spy fiction,
especially Le Queux's, as, "pernicious works...a poisoning
41
of the wells of public truth.. .a public crime". 	 Criticism
was a response to the genre's importance. 	 Through the
genre, as Howard Moon had written, "the defence-minded could
42
appeal directly to the masses",	 as well as to other
defence-minded and to the national decision-makers. Future-
war tales were published in leading journals and the better
tales were favourably reviewed in the national and service
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press: for example The Times praised Arnold-Forster's In a
Conning Tower and Clowes' The Captain of the "Mary Rose".43
Contemporaries believed the genre important and influential,
though in some cases they saw its faults but apparently
believed it necessary for convincing the public. 	 Roberts
collaborated with Le Queux - though not as Le Queux claimed
44in his memoirs - and wrote recommendations for his future-
war fiction.	 Yet he wrote to Le Queux in 1894 tactfully
criticising the implausibility of his Great War: "I hardly
like to criticise a work which to be effective must to a
great extent be imaginative...under the conditions.specified
by you, I should be inclined to regard your forecast of the
result of the supposed conflict as being unduly favourable"5
Nevertheless senior officers praised such tales: Roberts
wrote prefaces and Wolseley and the Duke of Connaught com-
mended particular tales. 46 Officers, defence experts and
defence publicists wrote tales and discussed seriously those
by others: Butler, Chesney, Clowes, Arnold-Forster, Clarke,
Admiral Colomb, Eardley-Wilmot, Fred. T. Jane, Archibald
Forbes, H.W. Wilson and Maude wrote tales. 	 Duke, inter-
viewed in Black and White on their serialised Great War of
189- considered it at length, praising it and its "brilliant
staff of experts" though disagreeing with parts. 47 He
claimed that it was improbable war would begin in the Balkans
or that in a Franco-German war British troops would go to
Belgium, and that the tale could mislead the public into
believing the existing military preparation was adequate.48
In 1894 Maude gave Le Queux's Great War a full-length review
in the J.R.U.S.I. and claimed, "In our opinion based on
twenty years' close study of the problems, the sequence of
events is probable, and the data essentially correct".49
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Moreover there was a tendency for fiction and fact to
merge.	 Foreign fiction of attacks on Britain was frequently
cited as evidence of foreign Intentions. 	 One example was
H.W. Wilson's 1896 Navy League pamphlet Our Next Great War
warning that the Navy was too weak for war against France,
and citing French naval officers' writings. 	 He described
'Our Fate' if defeated, citing Plus d'Angleterre: the French
would have no mercy and Britain would lose her navy, much of
the Empire, the British Museum's Egyptian antiquites and
Elgin marbles, and pay an immense indemnity. 50 He did not
state that Plus d'Angleterre was fiction. 	 The merging of
fact and fiction was likely in a genre which sought to show
what could, from the actual present, occur in the near future.
Some tales used for verisimilitude actuai places, buildings,
warships and persons.	 For example in W.L. Clowes' and C.N.
Robinson's The Great Naval War of 1887 (1887) the royal
family travelled round, "disbursing large sums out of their
private means for the good of the country"(19). 	 In Clarke's
Naval War the British fleet under Hornby, Tryon and the Duke
of Edinburgh defeated the French fleet, and Ben Tillett led
a labour peace delegation to France. 51	In Colomb's Great
War Evelyn Wood occupied Antwerp, Labouchere and Lawson
opposed the war, Kitchener defeated a French-instigated Mah-
dist invasion of Egypt, Hornby defeated the French fleet in
the Mediterranean and Wolseley the Russian army in Bulgaria.
In Le Queux's Great War the National Gallery was burned by
anarchists singing the 'Marseillaise', Bradford town hail
was blown up by anarchists, and Buckingham Palace, Westmins-
ter Abbey and the Natural History Museum were shelled by the
invaders.	 In Gleig's When All Men Starve hungry London
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mobs massacred policemen on Wimbledon Common and looted Hamp-
stead, Kew and Richmond. 	 In Le Queux's Invasion of 1910
London was bombarded and the Houses of Parliament wrecked,
and Germans advancing through Brentford were fired on by
4-7s on Richmond Hill and riflemen in Kew Gardens. Some-
times characters were hardly-disguised actual persons: for
example in the Naval War of 1887 Thornleigh (Hornby), Gay-
mantle (Fremantle) and Lord Charles Applesford (Beresford);
in Plus Encore d'Angleterre Lords Salsborough, Hurtington
and R. Church.	 Allen Clarke's Starved into Surrender,
exceptional in its socialistic message, criticised Mr Fiskal
Orkid and "Mr Bloodyard Dripping, the music-hall minstrel of
Empire"ço128). 	 Sometimes there were references to warnings
by actual persons: for example in Maude's New Battle of Dork-
to Stead's warnings, and in Le Queux's Invasion of 1910
to Roberts'.	 Moreover in some of Le Queux's works including
his memoirs, fiction was presented as fact: notably in Spies
of the Kaiser (1909) which as David French has shown, led to
reports from the public of alleged spies presenting, "almost
an exact mirror image of his book" and leading to official
counter-espionage measures. 52 However espionage Is most
susceptible to confusion of fact and fabrication, and so an
extreme case.	 Probably few persons were deceived by future-
war fiction at the level of the man who after reading H.G.
Well's The War of the Worlds asked at the Natural History
Museum to see the Martian, 53 or of the later listeners to
Orson Welles' Martian invasion broadcast. 	 Yet In the con-
text of defence anxieties and foreign threats, probably for
many fact and fiction were inextricably mixed and fiction an
important influence on attitudes, including "unspoken
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assumptions", to war and defence.	 Though its influence can-
not be quantified it was popular, sold well and was much
reprinted and both contemporaries and later historians have
agreed it was influential. 54 Charles Lowe believed that,
"such sensational writers are readily believed by the masses
who contribute to the formation of public opinion, which in
turn tends to influence our rulers and our relations with
other countries"
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Certain conclusions may be drawn from this study.
First is the sheer variety and quantity of input of informat-
ion and images to the public on war and defence, showing wide-
spread interest, even obsession, with them. 	 From the variety,
extent and pervasiveness of input, and its vividness,excite-
ment, human interest and appeal to anxieties, fears and hopes,
came its influence.	 It used many media including newspaper
reportage, articles in the reviews, memoirs, biographies and
other non-fiction books novels, short stories, verse, lect-
ures, magazine illustrations, paintings and prints, as well
as media not considered in this thesis, such as theatre,
music hail, film, advertising, toys, tournaments, tattoos,
exhibitions, history, geography, recruiting publicity, ele-
mentary and public schools, boys' and youth organizations,
and propaganda of defence pressure groups notably the Navy
League, National Service League and Imperial Maritime League.
Moreover individual communicators often used several media.
For example, Russell and Forbes both wrote war reportage,
articles on defence, various books and fiction, and lectured.
G.S. Clarke wrote professional military articles and books,
articles in the daily press and the reviews, and fiction.
Steevens wrote popular journalism, articles in the reviews,
and books, and lectured. 	 Officers and defence publicists
used the future-war fiction genre to promote military doc-
trines and reinforce their non-fiction writings. 	 The input
varied much in quality. The communicators varied from aca-
demic experts, notably Wilkinson and Mackinder, to the
bizarre and bogus, notably Le Queux; from those with
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experience of many wars, like Forbes, to those with no war
experience, such as Lady Butler.	 Even the knowledgeable
and experienced tended to pontificate beyond their experience
and make unsubstantiated, often hyperbolic pronouncements, as
did Forbes, Dilke and Steevens.	 The communicators were
sometimes inconsistent. 	 There was also variety of emphasis
and priority and some disagreement on specific issues, not-
ably the major defence and war controversies including f ire-
power and infantry tactics, the role of cavalry, defence
against invasion, length of service, naval ramming, and the
Zulu and Nile campaigns. 	 Through the varied media the rival
schools, 'continentalist' and 'imperial', 'Blue Water' and
'invasionist', promoted their doctrines. 	 The controversies
both indicated the importance attached to the subjects, and
stimulated public interest and concern.
Beyond the variety and disagreement, however, was a
remarkable degree of consensus of national attitudes: the
fundamental unity of the dominant image of war and defence,
such that the varied media and communicators mutually rein-
forced their message. They shared a fundamental unity of
attitude: war and defence were emotional issues, perceived
as vital.	 Their image of war was positive: patriotism,
glory, romance, adventure, heroism, moral nobility, self-
sacrif ice and the noble death in battle; war as the supreme
challenge and test.	 Its negative aspects were minimised
or contained within the context of its positive aspects,
even in Forbes' later grim writings on firepower and the
wounded.	 The reality of wounds, mutilation and agony was
conveyed neither visually nor in writing. 	 The minority
who dissented from the bellicist consensus - some radicals,
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socialists, Quakers and other pacifists - criticised it and
proposed their counter-image of war as evil, futile, cruel
and destructive.	 Yet before 1914 the bellicist image domi-
nated the media and was generally accepted. 	 It was pur-
posive and inspirational, warning and urging material and
moral preparation, almost always implicitly and often expli-
citly.	 This message was implicit in the artists' portrayal
of war and explicit in what they wrote about their work. It
was in the correspondents' reports and other writing, in
Forbes' message of fitness for war and Steevens' social Dar-
winism.	 It recurred in the civilian defence publicists'
warnings and proposals, and in the fiction of future war.
The dominant image resulted from selection, derived
from the influences on and attitudes of the communicators:
traditions, climate of opinion, dominant intellectual forces,
and material and psychological pressures. 	 These included
the concepts of social Darwinism, and the insecurities and
anxieties in response to Britain's relative decline, con-
tinental threats, weapon innovation, obsolescence and arms
race, imperial anxieties and hopes, and the vested interests
of social, political and economic groups. 	 The image was
shaped by an ideological cluster of romanticism, patriotism,
imperialism, racialism, bellicism and martial values, and
all these became integral to the image, which in turn rein-
forced them.	 Moreover the basic assumptions so dominated
the communicators' perception and selection that those with
war and battle experience saw it through them. 	 The basic
assumptions, not war experience or its absence, were crucial.
There was little difference between the image presented by
those with or without battle experience: for example between
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Fripp and Lady Butler, or Duke and Wilkinson.	 War exper-
ience did not with such communicators cause revulsion and
anti-war ideology.	 Forbes experienced the horrors of war
and continued bellicist. 	 Steevens' response to battle was
pleasure and excitement, as expressed in his paean to the
battle of the Atbara. 	 Conversely leading anti-war publi-
cists such as Wilfrid Lawson themselves had no war exper-
ience. 1 The decisive factor was not what one saw but how
one saw it.
The communicators' portrayal of war and defence was
only partly influenced by external pressures such as edit-
orial or consumer demand, for they apparently had some
choice.	 Their assumptions and perceptions of war decided
their presentation, even sometimes contrary to their per-
sonal interest.	 For example, less bellicism might have
been advantageous to Forbes or Duke. 	 Forbes, writing for
the Gladstonian Daily News could have emphasised more the
negative and less the positive aspects of war.
	
Many
Liberals wanted the former and selected it from his reports,
as did Joseph Arch with the Zulu War. 	 If Forbes had been
less bellicist he might have received greater reward from
the political party with which, increasingly incongruously,
he remained associated. 	 Duke as a Radical leader might
well have gained a stronger following had he been, in the
tradition of Cobden, Bright and Lawson, anti-bellicist: he
repeatedly disagreed on defence with those with whom he
otherwise politically co-operated. 	 Nevertheless the com-
municators and the image they presented were subject to
various influences and constraints. 	 Among these were
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continental influences, including French influence on battle
painting, and German influence on the military thinking of
journalists and civilian defence reformers. 	 Also signif 1-
cant were 'journalistic imperatives' - immediacy, dramatizat-
ion, personalization, simplification - and social, literary
and artistic conventions limiting realism. 	 However, as
MacGahan's reports on the Bulgarian atrocities showed,
greater realism in describing horror could be acceptable.
Similarly photographs were published presenting a less
favourable image of war than the artists'. 	 The artists,
like the correspondents, imposed their own constraints.
Other influences on communicators included careerism and
politics.	 Most did not want to offend employers or patrons:
one possible example was Steevens on the Boer War. 	 Poli-
tical constraints limited defence reformers, for example
Duke on conscription. 	 Some communicators acquired a pro-
fessional interest in a particular image of war, for example
Forbes and his school of correspondents: in presenting war
as adventure and heroism they presented themselves as heroic
adventurers. Nevertheless the decisive limitations were
not external pressures but internal, selective perception
and self-censorship.
The defence communicators had some common characteris-
tics.	 They were almost all men, with Elizabeth Butler the
only notable exception. 	 Socio-economically they tended to
be typical of their professions, for example as artists or
journalists, and were largely middle class.
	
There were
- working-class bellicists, notably exservicemen, and working-
class publicists, but men were seldom both: Robert Blatchford
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had difficulty in reconciling the demands of socialists and
defencists. 2 On their personalities evidence is insuff 1-
dent, but their writings sometimes suggest frustration and
desire for recognition and status, and an emotional identi-
fication with the cause of defence and with their image of war.
The presentation of war and defence was fundamentally
one of military-civilian co-operation, "the entente between
the sword and the pen". 3 Despite some friction and con-
flict, and military ambivalence about war correspondents
and civilian defence reformers, the relationship between the
military and the civilian communicators was often symbiotic,
with not civilian-military opposition but groupings across
the civil-military divide, and probably the most important
division that between conservatives and reformers. Civilian
and military helped and used each other: for example the
military help to the artists, both special war artists like
Prior and studio painters like Woodville, who in turn pub-
licised the military. Other examples were the relationships
between publicity-seeking commanders, such as Wolseley, and
correspondents; and the relationships of some commanders with
civilian defence publicists, notably of Fisher and Beresford
with civilian navalists, and of Roberts with Dilke and Wil-
kinson. The civilian communicators were in close toucth with
the military, who provided facilities and data and influenced
their perceptions.	 Dilke's military writings, for example,
largely reproduced data from Charles Brackenbury, Roberts and
Ian Hamilton, often almost verbatim from their letters.
Future-war fiction was written by military and by civilians,
and they sometimes co-operated on a single work, for example
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The Great War of 189- or The Invasion of 1910.
The presentation of war and defence expressed both
responses to specific situations and a complex, sometimes
ambiguous, cluster of attitudes and values. 	 It expressed
the continuing vitality of traditional warrior values,
through an era of Liberalism and in a society long suspi-
cious of militarism.	 It might be interpreted, following
Joseph Schuinpeter, as social atavism.	 It was possibly an
aspect of the political fusion of the upper and middle
classes in the Conservative and Liberal Unionist alliance.
It was partly the ancien rgime elite's rebellicizatlon of
society, and probably more, as in Germany, an assertion of
the tough-minded largely ex-Liberal middle class 'new'
Right.	 It was partly a romantic reaction against late
Victorian urban industrial society: a reaction expressed
also in the related medievalism, chivalric imagery and
idealization of rural life and the colonial frontier. The
influence of the dominant image of war and defence, pre-
sented through so many media and at so many levels, was
pervasive, shaping the assumptions of the pre-1914 nation.
CONCLUSION: NOTES
1.	 Not all British pacifists lacked war experience.
Quakers undertook relief work in the Franco-Prussian
War and Boer War, J.O. Greenwood, Quaker Encounters
I. Friends and Relief (1975) 47-79, 149-64.





(Place of publication U.K., usually London, unless otherwise
stated. Town of publication may be found, if required, in
the standard works of reference e.g. BL Catalogue, Books in
Print)
A. MANUSCRIPT SOURCES
Arnold-Forster Papers. 	 The papers of H.O. Arnold-Forster,
British Library.
Dilke Papers.	 The papers of Sir Charles Duke, British
Library.
Roberts Papers.	 The papers of Sir Frederick Roberts, Earl
Roberts, National Army Museum.
Wilkinson Papers.	 The papers of H. Spenser Wilkinson, Army
Museums Ogilby Trust, Aldershot.
B. PERIODIALS AND NEWSPAPERS
On periodicals see The Wellesley Index to Victorian Periodi-
cals (from which attribution of anonymous and pseudonymous
articles). Articles used are listed in the footnotes and
select bibliographies. Periodical titles are here followed















Illustrated London News (ILN).
Ladysmith Lyre.
Journal of the Royal United Service Institution (JRUSI).
Magazine of Art (MA).
Nation in Arms: Journal of the National Service League.
National Review.
















Historical Record of the First or Royal
Regiment of Dragoons, 1887.
Amery, L.S.,	 My Political Life. Vol.1 England Before the
Storm 1896-1914, 1953.
Angell, Norman (Lane, Ralph Norman Angell), 	 After All, 1951.
Arnold-Forster, H.O.,	 A History of England, 1897.
The War Office, the Army and the
Empire, 1900.
Arnold-Forster, Mary, 	 The Right Honourable Hugh Oakley
Arnold-Forster, 1910.
Arthur, George (ed),	 The Letters of Lord and Lady Wolseley
1870-1911, 1922.
Atkins, John Black,	 The Life of Sir William Howard Russell,
1911, 2 vols.
Avery, Harold,	 Soldiers of the Queen, 1898.
Barrington, Mrs Russell,	 The Life, Letters and Work of
Lord Leighton, 1906.
Beresford, Charles,	 The Memoirs of Admiral Lord Charles
Beresford, 1914, 2 vols.
Blatchford, Robert,	 Tommy Atkins of the Ramchunders, 1898.
Bloch, I.S.,	 Modern Weapons and Modern War, 1900.
Bonner, Hypatia Bradlaugh, 	 Charles Bradlaugh, 1908.
Brodrick, W. St.J. (Earl of Midleton), 	 Records & Reactions
1856-1939, 1939.
Butler, Elizabeth,	 From Sketch-Book and Diary, 1909.
An Autobiography, 1922.
Butler, William F.,	 Charles George Gordon, 1889.
A British Officer (Cairnes, William Elliot), 	 Social Life in
the British Army, 1900.
An Absent-Minded War, 1900.
The author of 'An Absent-Minded War' (Cairnes, W.E.), 	 The
Army from Within, 1901.




The Work of War Artists in South Africa
(The Art Annual 1900).
Caw, James L.,	 Scottish Painting: Past and Present 1620-
1908, 1908.
Charmes, Gabriel,	 Naval Reform, 1887.
Childers, Erskine,	 War and the Arme Blanche, 1910.
Churchill, Winston S.,	 The River War, 1899.
My Early Life, 1930.
Churchill, Seton,
	 General Gordon: the Christian Hero, 1890.
Clarke, George Sydenham, 	 Fortification, 1890.
Imperial Defence, 1897.
In Defence of the Empire, 1897.
My Working Life, 1927.
Studies of an Imperialist, 1928.
Clayden, P.W.,	 England under Lord Beaconsfield, 1891.
Colomb, P.H.,	 Essays on Naval Defence, 1896.
Cramb, J.A.,
	
Reflections on the Origins and Destiny of
Imperial Britain, 1900.
Duke, C.W.,	 See 'C.W. Duke: Select Bibliography'.
Dircks, Rudolph,	 Sir Lawrence Alma-Tadema
(The Art Annual 1910).
Doyle, Arthur Conan,	 The Great Boer War, 1900.
d'Egville, Howard, 	 Imperial Defence and Closer Union, 1913.
The Invasion of England, 1915.
Escott, T.H.S.,	 Masters of English Journalism, 1911.
Fitzroy, Almeric,	 Memoirs, 1925,2 vols.
Forbes, Archibald.	 See 'Archibald Forbes:
Select Bibliography'.
Furniss, Harry,	 My Bohemian Days, 1919.
Goldman, Charles Sydney (ed),	 The Empire and the Century,1905.
Gordon, M.A.(ed),	 Letters of General C.G. Gordon to his
Sister, 1888.
Gwynn, Stephen & Tuckwell, Gertrude M,
	
The Life of the Rt.
Hon. Sir Charles W. Duke, Bart, M.P.,
1917,2 vols.
Hamilton, Ian,	 Listening for the Drums, 1944.
Hamilton, Vereker,	 Things That Happened, 1925.
Hardy, E.J.,
	
Mr Thomas Atkins, 1900.
Hatton, Joseph,	 Journalistic London, 1882.
Henderson, G.F.R.,
	
The Science of War, 1905.
Herbert, Frederick William von, 	 The Defence of Plevna,
1877, 1911.
Hirst, F.W.,	 The Six Panics and other essays, 1913.
Hobson, J.A.,	 The War in South Africa, 1900.
The Psychology of Jingoism, 1901.
Hozier, H.M.,
	
The Invasions of England, 1876, 2 vols.
428
Jackson, Mason,	 The Pictorial Press, 1885.
Jane, Fred. T.,	 Heresies of Sea Power, 1906.
Jeune, Mary (Lady St. Helier), 	 Memories of Fifty Years,1909.
Joy, G.W.,	 The Work of George W. Joy, 1904.
Keeling, A.E.,	 General Gordon: Hero and Saint, 1886.
Kipling, Rudyard,	 The Light That Failed, 1891.
Stalky & Co., 1899.
Rudyard Kipling's Verse: Inclusive
Edition 1885-1918, nd.
Something of Myself, 1937.
Lane, Ralph ('Norman Angell'),
	
	
Patriotism Under Three Flags,
1909.
Lang, Mrs A (Leonora Blanche), 	 Sir Frederick Leighton, P.R.A.,
(The Art Annual 1884).
Linesman,	 Words by an Eyewitness: The Struggle in Natal,1901.
Lloyd, J. Barclay,	 One Thousand Miles with the C.I.V., 1901.
Le Queux,
	
	 Things I Know About Kings, Celebrities and Crooks,
1923. See also 'Fiction of Future War: Select
Bibliography'.
Lord, Walter Frewen,	 The Lost Possessions of England, 1896.




The Influence of Sea Power upon
History 1660-1763, 1890.
Marston, R.B.,	 War, Famine and our Food Supply, 1897.
Maurice, F.,
	
Sir Frederick Maurice: A record of his work
and opinions, 1913.




Hostilities without Declaration of War, 1883.
The Balance of Military Power in Europe, 1888.
National Defences, 1897.
May, Edward S.,	 Imperial Defence, 1903.
Changes and Chances of a Soldier's Life,1925.
May, H.A.R.,	 Memories of the Artists Rifles, 1929.
McCarthy, Justin,	 The Story of an Irishman, 1904.
Meynell, Wilfrid, 	 The Life and Work of Lady Butler
(The Art Annual 1898).




The Reality of War: an introduction to
"Clausewitz", 1909.
Newbolt, Henry.	 Poems: New and Old, 1912.
Oliver, Frederick Scott,	 Ordeal by Battle, 1915.
Pemberton, Max,	 Lord Northcliffe: A Memoir, 1922.
Prior, Melton (ed Bensusan, S.L.),
	
	
Campaigns of a War
Correspondent, 1912.
Repington, Charles	 Court,	 Vestigia, 1919.
Richards, Frank,	 Old Soldier Sahib, 1936.
429





Ruskin, John,	 The Crown of Wild Olive, 1865.
Sala, George Augustus, 	 The Life and Adventures of George
Augustus Sala, 1895, 2 vols.
Scott, Percy,	 Fifty Years in the Royal Navy, 1919.
Shee, George,	 The Briton's First Duty: The Case for Con-
scription, 1901.
Steevens, G.W.,	 See 'G.W. Steevens: Select Bibliography'.
Steevens, Mrs. G.W. (Christina), 	 A Motley Crew, 1901.
Strachey, John St. Loe,	 The Adventure of Living, 1922.
Swinton, Ernest D.,	 Over my shoulder, 1951.
Thomas, Frederick May (ed), 	 Fifty Years of Fleet Street:
being the Life and Recollections
of Sir John R. Robinson, 1904.
Verestchagin, Vassili,	 Autobiographical Sketches, 1887,2 vols.
Vetch, R.H.,	 The Life of Lieut.-General Sir Andrew Clarke,1905.
Villiers, Frederick,	 Pictures of Many Wars, 1902.
Peaceful Personalities and Warriors
Bold, 1907.





Glances back through Seventy Years,
1892, 2 vols.
Wantage, H.S.,	 Lord Wantage, V.C., K.C.B., 1907.
White, Arnold,	 Efficiency and Empire, 1901.
The Navy: Its place in British History, 1912.
Wilkinson, Henry Spenser, 	 The Command of the Sea, 1894.
The Great Alternative, 1894.
The Brain of the Navy, 1895.
The Nation's Awakening, 1896.
War and Policy, 1900..
Lessons of the War, 1900.
Britain at Bay, 1909.
First Lessons in War, 1914.
Thirty-Five Years 1874-1909,1933.
Wilson, H.W.,,	 Ironclads in Action, 1897, 2 vols.
With the Flag to Pretoria, 1900-1, 2 vols.
After Pretoria: The Guerilla War, 1902, 2 vols.
Wolseley, Garnet J.,	 The Soldier's Pocket-Book, 1871.
Woodville, R. Caton,	 Random Recollections, 1914.
D. SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHIES
1. C.W. DILKE
Principal works by Duke consulted: the Duke Papers and works
on Duke are listed in A,C and E.
I. BOOKS
Greater Britain: A Record of Travel in English-speaking
countries, 1868,1907.
45n
The Fall of Prince Florestan of Monaco, 1874.
The Eastern Question, 1878.
The British Army, 1888.
Problems of Greater Britain, 1890, 2 vols.
(with Spenser Wilkinson) Imperial Defence, 1892.
Army Reform, 1898.
The British Empire, 1899.
II. ARTICLES
'The Present Position of European Politics', Fortnightly
Review, Jan. to June 1887.
'The Baluch and Afghan Frontiers of India', lb March,Aprll 1889.
'Our War Organization for the Future', United Service Magazine,
April 1890.
'The British Army in 1891', Fortnightly R., June 1891.
'The French Armies', ib, Nov. 1891.
'The Conservative Foreign Policy', ib, Jan.1892.
'The Uganda Problem', ib, Feb.1893.
'Guerilla and Counter-Guerilla', ib, Dec.1901.
2. ARCHIBALD FORBES
Principal works by Forbes consulted: some articles and stories
reprinted in books are not listed separately, and works by
others relating to Forbes are listed in C and E.
I. BOOKS
Drawn from Life, 1871, 3 vols.
My Experiences of the War between France and Germany, 1871.
Soldiering and Scribbling, 1872.
(Forbes et al) The War Correspondence of the "Daily News','
1877, 1878.
Glimpses through the Cannon-Smoke, 1880.
Chinese Gordon, 1884.
Souvenirs of Some Continents, 1885.
William of Germany, 1888.
Havelock, 1890.
Barracks Bivouacs and Battles, 1891.
The Afghan Wars 1839-1842 and 1878 to 1880, 1892.
Memories and Studies of War and Peace, 1895.
Cohn Campbell, Lord Clyde, 1895.
Camps, Quarters and Casual Places1896.
(Forbes et al) Battles of the Nineteenth Century, 1896,2 vols.
II. ARTICLES
'The Limited Enlistment Act', Cornhihl Magazine, Aug.1864.
431
'The Private Soldier as he is', Saint Pauls Magazine, April'68.
'Army Reform', ib, April'69.
'Soldiers' Wives', ib, April'70.
t The Victorious Prussians', ib, Dec.'70.
'Russians, Turks and Bulgarians: at the Theatre of War',
Nineteenth Century, Nov.'77.
'The Russian Military Operations in Bulgaria', Journal of the
Royal United Service Institution XXI (1877-8).
'The 'Fiasco' of Cyprus', Nineteenth C., Oct'78.
'Flogging in the Army', ib, Oct.'79.
'War Correspondence and the Authorities', ib, Jan.'80.
'Lord Chelmsford and the Zulu War', ib, Feb.'80.
'Fire-Discipline', Fortnightly Review, Dec. '83.
'An American Criticism of the Egyptian Campaign', Nineteenth
C., Aug.'84.
'In Case of Invasion', ib, April'85.
'Soldiers' Rations', ib, Dec. '88.
'Errors of the Experts', Contemporary Review, Mar.'89.
'The Battle of Balaclava', ib, Mar'91.
'The Recruiting Problem', Nineteenth C., Mar'91.
'The Failure of the Nile Campaign', Contemporary R., Jan.'92.
'The Cavalry Arm of the British Service', Blackwood's
Edinburgh Magazine, Aug.'94.
3. G.W. STEEVENS
Principal works by Steevens consulted; articles reprinted in
books are not listed separately, and works by others relating
to Steevens are listed in C and E.
I. BOOKS
Naval Policy, 1896.
The Land of the Dollar, 1897.
With the Conquering Turk: Confessions of a Bashl-Bazouk, 1897.
Egypt in 1898, 1898.
With Kitchener to Khartum, 1898.
In India, 1899.
The Tragedy of Dreyfus, 1899.
(ed) Vernon Blackburn, From Capetown to Ladysmith, 1900.
(ed) G.S. Street, Things Seen: Impressions of Men, Cities
and Books, 1900.
(ed) Vernon Blackburn, Glimpses of Three Nations, 1901.
II. ARTICLES & PAMPHLETS
'The Indiscretion of the Kaiser', New Review, Feb.'96.
'A Naval Utopia', B]ackwood's, June'96.
432
'The Apotheosis of Russia', ib, July'96,
'Arbitration in Theory and Practice', ib, Oct.'96.
'The Presidential Election as I saw it', ib, Dec.'96.
'Recent Naval Biography and Criticism', ib, March'96.
'The Navy Estimates', ib, April'97.
'German Country Life', ib, March'98.
'The Downfall of Mandism', Aldershot Military Society, 1898.
4. FICTION OF FUTURE WAR
Works of future-war and related fiction cited in Chapter V.
Works about future-war fiction are listed in E.
A.G.F.B.,	 Plus Encore d'Angleterre, 1888.
Anon,	 "Down with England!", '88.
Arnold-Forster, H.O., 	 In a Conning Tower, '88.
Anon (Butler, W.F.), 	 The Invasion of England, '82.
Cairnes, W.E.,	 The Coming Waterloo, 1901.
Anon (Chesney, George Tomkyns),	 The Battle of Dorking, '71.
Childers, Erskine,	 The Riddle of the Sands, 1903.
Clarke, Allen,	 Starved into Surrender, 1904.
Seaforth, A. Nelson (Clarke, G.S.),
	
	
The Last Great Naval
War, '91.
Anon (Clowes, William Laird & Robinson, C.N.), 	 The Great
Naval War of 1887,'87.
Clowes, W.L.,	 The Captain of the "Mary Rose", '92.
Clowes, W.L. & Burgoyne, Alan H.,	 Trafalgar Ref ought, 1905.
Colomb, Philip et al, 	 The Great War of 189-, '92.
Curties, Henry,	 When England Slept, 1909.
Doyle, Arthur Conan, 	 'Danger!' Strand Magazine, July 1914.
Dreyer, J. Tuthill,	 'The Bombardment of Saltport', Navy &
Army Illustrated, January 1900.
Gleig, Charles,	 When All Men Starve, '98.
Grip,	 The Monster Municipality, '82.
Hemyng, l3racebridge (Heming, Samuel Bracebridge), 	 The
Commune in London, '71.
Le Queux, William,	 The Great War in England in 1897, '94.
England's Peril, '99.
The Invasion of 1910, 1906.
The Mystery of a Motor Car, 1906.
Spies of the Kaiser, 1909.
The Unknown Tomorrow, 1910.
Revelations of the Secret Service, 1911.
Hushed Up! 1911.
The Death-Doctor, 1912.
The Germany Spy, 1914.
German Spies in England, 1915.
Hushed Up at German Headquarters, 1917.
Love Intrigues of the Kaiser's Sons,1918.
433
Anon (Maude, F.N.),	 The New Battle of Dorking, 1900.
Mayo, Earl of,	 The War Cruise of the 'Aries', '94.
Saki (Munro, H.H.),	 When William Came, 1913.
Stables, Gordon,	 The Cruise of the "Vengeful", 1902.
Ole Luk-Oie (Swinton, E.D.),	 The Green Curve, 1909.
Wallace, Edgar,	 Private Selby, 1912.
"1925": The Story of a fatal peace, 1915.
Wells, H.G.,	 The War of the Worlds, '98.




EHR English Historical Review JSAHR Journal of the Society
for Army HistoricalHJ Historical Journal Research
HT History Today NAMAR National Army Museum
11W History Workshop	 Annual Report
JBS Journal of British Studies RUSI Journal of the Royal
United ServicesJCH Journal of Contemporary 	 InstituteHistory
TRHS Transactions of the RoyalJICH Journal of Imperial and	 Historical SocietyCommonwealth History
UJ	 Uganda JournalJMH Journal of Modern History
VS	 Victorian Studies
Arch, N.J.,	 'Potted History: British military commemorative
ware', NAMAR 1972-3.
Anderson, Oliver,
	 'The growth of Christian militarism in
mid-Victorian Britain', EHR 1971.
Barthorp, Michael,	 'The Battle of Tofrek, 1885', JSAHR 1985.
Bond, Brian,	 'The Effect of the Cardwell reforms on army
organization, 1874-1904', RUSI 1960.
'Recruiting the Victorian Army 1870-92', VS 1962.
'Outsiders' influence on British defence policy
in the 1930s', RUSI 1982.
Brown, Lucy,	 'The Treatment of the News in mid-Victorian
Newspapers', TRHS 1977.
Clarke, I.F., 'Forecasts of Warfare in Fiction 1803-1914',
Comparative studies in Society and
History, 1967.
Cunningham, Hugh,	 'The Language of Patriotism, 1750-1914',
HW 1918.
Davin, Anna,	 'Imperialism and Motherhood', 11W 1978.
Dinwiddy, J.R.,	 'The early nineteenth century campaign
against flogging in the army', EHR 1982.
Dunae, Patrick A.,	 'Boys' Literature and the Idea of
Empire, 1870-1914', VS 1980.









'Naval Hagiography and the Victorian Hero',
HJ 1980.
'The Victorian Navy', HJ 1982.
D;10J;. Imr..raUsnl. 1866- I868 aauu..n of tmnj H7 t8O.




	 'G.A. Henty & the Vision of Empire',
Encounter, July 1970.




'The decline of nationalistic history in the
West 1900-1970', JCH 1973.
Lalumia, Matthew,	 'Realism and anti-aristocratic sentiment
in Victorian depictions of the Crimean
War', VS 1983.
Lee, Michael, 'A Centenary of Military Painting: The Life and
Work of Elizabeth, Lady Butler', Army
Quarterly & Defence Journal 1967.
Low, D.A.,	 'British Public Opinion and 'The Uganda Question':
October-December 1892', UJ 1954.
Morris, James,
	 'A View of the Royal Navy', Encounter,
March 1973.
'The Eye-Witness Fallacy', Encounter,
May 1961.
'Politics as entertainment: Victorian
music-hall songs', VS 1975.
'Scandals', NAMAR 1972-3.
'The Use of the Dum Dum Bullet in




'Army and Society in England 1870-1900:
A Reassessment of the Cardwell
Reforms', JBS 1963.
Travers, T.H.E.,	 'The Offensive and the Problems of Inno-
vation in British Military Thought,
1870-1915', JCH 1978.
'Technology, Tactics, and Morale: Jean de
Bloch, the Boer War, and British
II BOOKS	 Military Theory, 1900-1914', JMH 1979.
An1 Ieiey. M0 .e	 A }4st.ry oF thu 8..tgk Cøiv.I, iSiê to 11,q .V.im 1872 to 188 1182.
Atkins, 1!['.,	 History of the Royal Dragoons 1661-1934, nd.
Barclay, Glen St.J., The Empire is Marching: A study of the
military effort of the British Empire
1800-1945, 1976.
Barnett, Correlli,	 Britain and Her Army 1509-1970, 1970.
The Collapse of British Power, 1972.
Best, Geoffrey,	 Honour among men and nations, 1982.
Best, Geoffrey & Wheatcroft, Andrew,
	
	
War, Economy and the
Military Mind, 1976.
Bond, Brian, The Victorian Army and the Staff College, 1972.
Victorian Military Campaigns, 1967.
War and Society in Europe, 1870-1970, 1984.
Bond, Brian & Roy, Ian (ed): War and Society: A Yearbook of
Military History I, 1975.
435
Broadbent, Lucinda et al ('Glasgow University Media Group'),
War and Peace News, 1985.
Brodie, Bernard,	 War and Politics, 1973.
Brown, Lucy,	 Victorian News and Newspapers, 1985.
Rose, J. Holland et al, 	 The Cambridge History of the
British Empire.II The Growth of
the New Empire 1783-1870, 1940.
(cited as CHBE II).
Benians, E.A. et al,	 The Cambridge History of the British
Empire.III The Empire-Commonwealth
1870-1919, 1967. (cited as CHBE III).
Carrington, Charles,	 Rudyard Kipling, 1955.
Clarke, I.F,,	 Voices Prophesying War 1763-1984, 1966.
The Pattern of Expectation 1664-2001, 1979.




	 The Lower Middle Class in Britain,
1977.
Cunningham, Hugh,	 The Volunteer Force: A Social and
Political History 1859-1908, 1975.
Douglas-Smith, A.E., 	 The City of London School, 1965.




The Sharp End of War: the Fighting tlan in World War
II, 1980.
Featherstone, Donald, 	 Captain Carey's Blunder, 1973.
Field, H.J.,	 Toward a Programme of Imperial Life, 1982.




The Conduct of War 1789-1961, 1961.
Gaunt, William,	 The Aesthetic Adventure, 1945.
Victorian Olympus, 1952.
Gooch, John,	 The Plans of War: The General Staff and British
Military Strategy c1900-1916, 1974.
The Prospect of War: Studies in British Defence
Policy 1847-1942, 1981.
Greer, Germaine,	 The Obstacle Race: The fortunes of women
painters and their work, 1979.
Hamer, W.S.,	 The British Army: Civil-Military Relations
1885-1905, 1970.
Hamilton, Ian B.M.,	 The Happy Warrior: A Life of General
Sir Ian Hamilton, 1966.
Harding, James,	 Artistes Pompiers: French Academic Art in
the 19th century, 1979.
Harries-Jenkins, Gwynn,	 The Army in Victorian Society, 1977.
Hodgson, Pat,	 The War Illustrators, 1977.
Hogarth, Paul, The artist as reporter, 1967.
Holmes, Richard,	 Firing Line, 1985.
436
Howard, Michael,	 The Franco-Prussian War, 1961.
Studies in War and Peace, 1970.
War and the Liberal Conscience, 1978.
Clausewitz, 1983.
(ed), The Theory and Practice of War:
Essays Presented to Captain B.H.
Liddell Hart, 1965.
James, David,	 The Life of Lord Roberts, 1954.
Jenkins, Roy,	 Sir Charles Duke, 1958.
Johnson, Peter, Front Line Artists, 1978.
Keegan, John,	 The Face of Battle, 1976.
Keegan, John & Darracott, Joseph,	 The Nature of War, 1981.
Kennedy, Paul,	 The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery,
1976.




The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in
Britain, Volume I: The Nineteenth
Century, 1981.
To the Bitter End: A Photographic History of
the Boer War 1899-1902, 1985.
Lehmann, Joseph,	 All Sir Garnet: A Life of Field-Marshal
Lord Wolseley, 1964.
Luvaas, Jay,	 The Education of an Army: British Military
Thought 1815-1940, 1964.
MacKenzie, John M,	 Propaganda and Empire: The manipulation
of British public opinion 1880-1960,1984.
(ed), Imperialism and Popular Culture,1986.
Marder, Arthur J.,	 The Anatomy of British Sea Power, 1940.
Mason, Philip,	 A Matter of Honour, 1974.
Mathews, Joseph J., 	 Reporting the Wars, Minneapolis 1957.
McCourt, Edward,	 Remember Butler: The Story of Sir William
Butler, 1967.
Morris, A.J.A.,	 The Scaremongers: The Advocacy of War and
Rearmament 1896-1914, 1984.
Morris, Donald R.,	 The Washing of the Spears, 1966.
Morris, Jan,	 The Spectacle of Empire, 1982.
Myatt, Frederick,	 The British Infantry 1660-1945, 1983.
Opie, Robert,	 Rule Britannia: trading on the British image,
1985.
Ormond, Leone & Richard,	 Lord Leighton, 1975.
437
Playne, Caroline E., 	 The Pre-War Mind in Britain, 1928.
Pound, Reginald & Harmsworth, Geoffrey, 	 Northcliffe, 1959.
Preston, Adrian (ed), 	 In Relief of Gordon: Lord Wolseley's
Campaign Journal of the Khartoum
Relief Expedition 1884-1885, 1967.
Ranft, Bryan (ed),	 Technical Change and Naval Policy, 1977.
Royle, Trevor,
	
	 Death Before Dishonour: the true story of
Fighting Mac, Edinburgh, 1982.
Russell, Mrs. Charles E.B.,	 John Adam Cramb, 1950.
Schurman, D.M.,	 The Education of a Navy: The development of
British naval strategic thought , 1867-
1914, 1965.
Searle, G.R.,	 The Quest for National Efficiency, 1971.
Semmel, Bernard,	 Imperialism and Social Reform, 1960.
Shannon, R.T.,	 Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation, 1963.
Skelley, Alan Ramsay, 	 The Victorian Army at Home: The
Recruitment and Terms and Conditions
of the British Regular,1859-1899,1977.
Sladen, N. St.Barbe,	 The Real Le Queux, 1938.
Smith, Malvern van Wyk,
	
	
Drummer Hodge: The Poetry of the
Anglo-Boer War, 1978.
Sp.ri, EJ,ia.- 11.	 .7). Army a. Secstty I8IS-Ii	 1q80.
Stewart, A.T.Q.,	 The Pagoda War: Lord Dufferin and the fall
of the Kingdom of Ava 1885-6, 1972.
Times, The,	 The History of 'The Times': The Tradition
Established 1841-1884, 1939.
Warwick, Peter (ed),	 The South African War: The Anglo-Boer
War 1899-1902, 1980.
Wiener, Martin J.,	 English Culture and the Decline of the
Industrial Spirit 1850-1980, 1981.
Wilson, John,	 CB: A life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman,1973.
Young, B.A.,	 The Artists and the S.A.S., 1960.
III. UNPUBLISHED THESES
(Ph.D., University of London, unless otherwise stated)
Allison, Michael J.,	 'The National Service Issue, 1899-1914',
1975.
Bailes, Howard H.R.,	 'The influence of continental examples
and colonial warfare upon the reform
of the late Victorian army', 1980.
Hamilton, W. Mark,
	 'The Nation and the Navy: Methods and
organization of navalist propaganda,
1889-1914', 1977.
Moon, Howard R., 'The Invasion of the United Kingdom: public
controversy and official planning, 1888-
1918', 1968.
Ranft, Bryan MeL.,	 'The Naval Defence of British Sea-Borne
Trade 1860-1905', P.Phil, Oxon 1967.
438
F. WORKS OF RECORD AND REFERENCE
Annual Register.
Army List.
Bnzit, E. (ed),	 Dictionnaire...des Peintres, Sculpteurs,
Dessinateurs et Graveurs (Paris 1976).




Bryan's Dictionary of Painters and
Engravers (1909).
Dictionary of National Biography (cited as DNB).





The Royal Academy of Arts: A Complete
Dictionary of Contributors and their
work from its Foundation in 1769 to
1904 (1906).




The Wellesley Ini!ex to Victorian
Periodicals (1966, '72).
Men of the Time.
Navy League Annual.
Parliamentary Debates.
Rider, Frank,	 The Royal Scottish Academy 1826-1916: A
Complete List of the exhibited works
(1917).
Who Was Who.
Wood, Christopher, 	 The Dictionary of Victorian Painters
(1978).
ILLUSTRATIONS	 (following p440)
A. C.E. Fripp,	 The Battle of Isandhlwana, 1879
(see pp 96-7).
B. Alfonse de Neuville, 	 The Battle of Rorke's Drift,
1879 (see p 114).
Douglas Giles,	 The Battle of Tamaai, 1884 (see pp 98-9).





The illustrations in this thesis may be supplemented by
recent publications: -
(ed) John Ferguson,	 War and the Creative Arts (Macmillan
1972): Callot, Goya, Vereshchagin.
Robert Wilkinson-Latham,	 The Sudan Campaigns 1881-1898
(Osprey 1976): E. Butler,
Fripp, Giles, Woodville.
Pat Hodgson,	 The War Illustrators (Osprey 1977): Prior,
Villiers, Woodville and other press artists.
Peter Johnson,	 Front Line Artists (Cassell 1978): as Hodgson.
John Keegan & Joseph Darracott, The Nature of War (Cape
1981): Callot, Detaille, Fripp, Goya,
Meissonier and other battle painters.
Jan Morris,	 The Spectacle of Empire (Faber 1982):
E. Butler, Gibb, Giles, Joy, de Neuville,
Woodville.
K.Z. Cieszkowskl,	 'The Pallas of Pall Mall', History Today
(Feb. 1982): E. Butler.
R.T. Steam, 'War and the Media in the 19th Century',
RUSI (Sept. 1986): Hale, Wollen,
Woodville.
There are photographs of E. Butler, Forbes, Prior, Russell,






























-	 4 - -
(.e. p. 439)
2	
- !	 •':•
